Tags Income Tax

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 2667 of 2007, Judgment Date: Apr 28, 2016

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2667 OF 2007


VLS FINANCE LTD. & ANR.                          .....APPELLANT(S)          

                                  VERSUS       
                                                           
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR.              .....RESPONDENT(S)         


                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
                 In this appeal, challenge is  laid  to  that  part  of  the
judgment of High Court of Delhi  dated  15th  December,  2006  whereby  High
Court has held that  the  block  assessment  proceedings  initiated  by  the
respondent-Department against the appellants herein  have  not  become  time
barred, by giving  the  respondents  benefit  of  the  period  during  which
proceedings were pending in the High Court, in view of some  interim  orders
passed in those proceedings which remained operative till the writ  petition
filed by the appellants were decided finally.   Factual  background  leading
to the present appeal is as under:

Search and seizure took place in the  business  premises  of  the  appellant
companies on 22nd June, 1998 on the  strength  of  warrant  of  autorization
dated 19th June, 1998 which went upto in the morning  hours  of  23rd  June,
1998.  It was followed by further searches from time to time which  went  on
till 5th August.

Notice under Section 158BC(c) of  the  Income  Tax  Act,  1961  (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act') was  issued  on  28th  June,  1999  requiring  the
appellants to furnish return for the block period  from  April  1,  1988  to
22nd June, 1998.  This notice was withdrawn and another  notice  was  issued
on 26.07.1999.  In response thereto, the appellants  filed  return  for  the
aforesaid block period on 10th September, 1999.   As per  Section  158BE  of
the Act, assessment is to be completed within two years from the end of  the
month in which the last of the authorisation for search  under  Section  132
or for requisition under Section 132A, as the case  may  be.   However,  the
assessing officer could not do so  because  of  certain  developments  which
took place and are narrated hereinafter.

A direction under Section  142(2A)  was  issued  on  29.06.2000,  which  was
served to the appellants on 19th July, 2000  for  conducting  special  audit
for the aforesaid block period.
A Writ Petition (Civil) No.  4685 of  2000  was  filed  by  the  appellants,
wherein a challenge was laid to the aforesaid order dated  29th  June,  2000
issued by  respondent  no.  2  directing  a  special  audit  in  respect  of
appellants under Section 142(2A) of the Act.  In  the  said  writ  petition,
the appellants also challenged the clarificatory order  dated  10th  August,
2000 issued by respondent no. 2 with regard to special audit in  respect  of
appellant no.  1  for  the  period  from  the  Assessment  Year  1994-95  to
Assessment Year 1998-99 and  insofar  as  appellant  no.  2-the  period  for
Assessment Year 1994-95 to Assessment Year 1996-97.

During the pendency of the  writ  petition,  as  amendment  application  was
filed being CM No. 9305/2006, seeking to  add  additional  ground  that  the
Block Assessment Proceedings under Section 158BC(c) of  the  Act  were  time
barred.  The appellants submitted that the  time  limit  for  completion  of
Block Assessment expired on 30th June, 2000 in terms  of  Section  158BE  of
the Act, since 2  years  period  expired  on  that  date.   It  was  further
submitted that the authorization executed on 22nd June, 1998 could not  have
been utilized for conducting further search till August, 1998.  it was  also
contended that the order under Section 142(2A) of  the  Act  was  issued  in
violation of principles of natural justice as there  was  no  complexity  in
the accounts of the appellants and, therefore, there  was  no  justification
in law to order special audit under Section 142(2A) of the Act.

The respondents filed their affidavit in reply to the show cause  explaining
that the order for special audit  under  Section  142(2A)  of  the  Act  was
issued with proper authorization made by Commissioner of  Income  Tax  after
due deliberation and on the basis of the report  of  the  Assessing  Officer
viz. Assistant Commissioner of  Income  Tax,  New  Delhi.   It  was  further
submitted that the period of completion of block assessment  was  to  expire
on 31st August,  2000  and  not  on  30th  June,  2000  as  claimed  by  the
appellants.  As per the respondents, since seizure operation were  conducted
from 22nd June, 1998 and these operations  concluded  only  on  5th  August,
1998, the time limit of two years for completion of “Block  Assessment”  was
to expire only on 31st August, 2000.

In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4685 of 2000, interim order dated 24th  August,
2000 was passed, which reads as under:
“C.W. No. 4685/2000
            Notice to the respondents to show cause as to  why  petition  by
not admitted, returnable on 14th September, 2000.

             Mr.  R.D.   Jolly,  Advocate  accepts  notice  on   behalf   of
respondents.

C.M. No. 7227/2000
            Notice for 14th September, 2000.  Mr. Jolly accepts notice.

            Counter be filed by 13th September, 2000.

            Interim stay of the orders dated 29th June, 2000.

            Annexure-A read with Annexure-B dated 10th August, 2000.”


This stay remained in operation during the pendency of the writ petition.

The matter was finally heard and  decided  by  the  Delhi  High  Court  vide
judgment dated 15th December,  2006.   It  has  quashed  the  direction  for
special audit in view of the fact  that  no  hearing  was  afforded  to  the
appellant before issuing such direction, which was necessary as per the  law
laid down in the case of Rajesh Kumar and others  Vs.  Dy.  Commissioner  of
Income Tax and others[1].

However, the High Court decided the question of limitation in favour of  the
Department holding that the period between 24th August, 2000, i.e,  date  on
which interim  order  was  passed  staying  special  audit  direction  under
Section 142(2A) dated 29th June, 2000 and 15th December,  2016,  i.e.,  when
the High Court has passed the order setting aside the direction for  special
audit, be excluded in counting limitation for concluding block assessment.

The appellants contended before the High Court that since there was no  stay
on block assessment  proceedings  in  terms  of  interim  order  dated  24th
August, 2000, the direction to exclude the period between 24th August,  2000
to 15th December, 2006 was beyond its jurisdiction.   It  was  alternatively
contended before the High Court that the limitation for  passing  the  block
assessment having expired on 30th June, 2000 in terms  of  Section  158BE(1)
of the Act, the direction to exclude  the  limitation  period  between  24th
August,  2000  to  15th  December,  2006  would  not,  in  any  case,   save
limitation.   While  rejecting  the  aforesaid  contentions  raised  by  the
appellants, the High Court held that since special audit  was  an  important
and integral step in the assessment  proceedings,  once  the  direction  for
special audit was stayed by the  High  Court,  assessment  proceedings  ipso
facto could not go  on.  The  High  Court  rejected  the  assessee's  second
alternative argument holding that limitation period of two years was  to  be
calculated from 5th August, 1998, on which date last panchnama was drawn.

In the instant appeal, impugning the decision of the High  Court,  following
substantial questions of law are raised for consideration by this Court:
(a)   Whether on the facts and circumstances of the  case,  the  High  Court
having quashed the direction under Section 142(2A) of the Act was  justified
in law in directing to exclude the period between 24th August, 2000 to  15th
December, 2006 in counting the period of limitation for  passing  the  block
assessment order?
(b)   Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the interim  order
dated 24th August, 2000 staying the direction for  special  audit  contained
in order dated 29th June, 2000, could be construed as amounting to  stay  of
assessment proceedings?
(c)   Whether on the facts and circumstances of the  case,  the  High  Court
erred in law in holding that  the  period  of  limitation  expired  on  31st
August, 2000, instead of 30th June, 2000, in terms of Section 158BE(1)  read
with Explanation 2 thereto?
(d)   Whether on the facts and in the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  is
permissible  under  Section  132  of  the  Act  that  the  same  warrant  of
authorization be executed 16  times  and  be  revalidated  again  and  again
instead of issuing fresh authorization  for  each  visit  and  whether  such
revalidation can be  done  without  recording  any  reasons  justifying  the
revalidation as in the present case.

In effect the central issue is one of limitation, which  has  the  following
two facets, viz.;
(a)   Whether the period of limitation expired on 31st August, 2000  or  the
last date for completing block assessment was 30th June, 2000?
(b)   Whether the period between 24th August, 2000 to 15th  December,  2006,
when interim stay  was  in  operation,  required  to  be  excluded  for  the
purposes of counting limitation period?

First, we shall take up the second issue  for  discussion.   It  is  not  in
dispute that the period during which interim stay of  the  order  passed  by
the court is in operation has to be excluded while computing the  period  of
two  years  as  limitation  period  prescribed  for  completing  the   block
assessment.  The parties have, however, joined issue on the nature  of  stay
order which qualify for such exclusion.  For this, it would be necessary  to
scan through the language of Explanation 1 to Section 158BE(2) of  the  Act.
This provision makes the following reading:
“Explanation 1. - In computing the period of limitation for the purposes  of
this section, -

(i)  the period during which the  assessment  proceeding  is  stayed  by  an
order or injunction of any court; or

(ii)  the period commencing from the day  on  which  the  Assessing  Officer
directs the assessee to get his accounts audited under sub-section  (2A)  of
section 142 and ending on the day on  which  the  assessee  is  required  to
furnish a report of such audit under that sub-section; or

(iii) & (iv) xxx xxx xxx

shall be excluded:

Provided xxx xxx xxx”


The plea of the appellants is that only  that  period  can  be  excluded  in
computing the period of  limitation,  during  which  assessment  proceedings
were stayed.  A certain distinction was tried to be  drawn  in  the  instant
case by referring to the interim order which was passed by  the  High  Court
on 24th August, 2000 which has stayed the order of the Department  directing
compulsory audit.  It was, thus,  argued  that  stay  was  limited  only  to
conducting compulsory  audit  and  there  was  no  stay  of  the  assessment
proceedings.

M/s. Ganesh and Vohra, learned senior counsel appearing for  the  appellants
made a fervent plea to the effect that in the absence of  any  stay  of  the
assessment proceedings, there was no embargo on the part  of  the  assessing
authority to proceed with the  assessment  even  when  the  order  directing
special  audit  was  stayed,  and  therefore,  benefit  of   the   aforesaid
explanation would not be available to the respondents.  It was  argued  that
the High Court  had  committed  an  error  in  giving  the  benefit  of  the
exclusion of the said period on a wrong premise that special  audit  was  an
integral part of the  assessment  proceedings.   It  was  also  argued  that
Explanation 1, as it  existed  at  the  relevant  time,  did  not  make  any
provision for excluding the period from  the  date  when  assessing  officer
directs the assessee to get his accounts audited  till  the  date  when  the
assessee is  required  to  furnish  the  report  of  such  audit.   Such  an
amendment, it was pointed out, is made in  Clause  (ii)  of  Explanation  to
Section 153B of the Finance Act, 2013, w.e.f. 1st June,  2013  to  fill  the
lacunae that existed in the statutory framework and this would also  fortify
the submissions of the appellants that at the relevant  time  there  was  no
such provision for exclusion of the time period during  which  there  was  a
stay of special audit but no  stay  assessment  proceedings.   It  was  also
argued that insofar as the provision relating to limitation is concerned  it
needs strict interpretation, and certain judgments were referred to, by  the
learned counsel, in this behalf.

Ms. Pinky Anand, learned ASG, on the other hand, supported the order of  the
High Court by arguing that with the passing of High Court order staying  the
orders dated 29th June, 2000 and 10th  August,  2000  passed  under  Section
142(2A) of the Act which  meant  that  the  Department  was  prevented  from
carrying out special  audit,  it  was  not  possible  to  proceed  with  the
assessment as well as inasmuch as the  assessing  officer  at  the  time  of
passing  the  order  under  Section  142(2A)  of  the   Act   recorded   his
satisfaction that in order to  carry  out  the  proper  assessment,  special
audit was essential.  She, thus, submitted that the High Court rightly  held
that special audit was integral part of the assessment.

We have already reproduced the language of Explanation  1.   it  is  not  in
doubt that this explanation grants  benefit  of  exclusion  only  for  those
cases where 'the assessment proceeding is stayed by an order or  injunction'
of the court. On literal construction, therefore,   it  becomes  clear  from
the reading of this provision that the period that is to be  excluded  while
computing the period of limitation for completion of  Block  Assessments  is
the period during which assessment proceedings are stayed by an order  of  a
court and this provision shall not apply if the stay  of  some  other  kind,
i.e, other than staying the assessment proceedings, is passed.  The  counsel
for the appellants are justified in  their  contention  that  the  provision
relating to limitation need to be strictly construed.  In the case  of  K.M.
Sharma Vs. ITO[2], this principle is laid down in the following words:
“13.  Fiscal statute, more particularly a provision such as the present  one
regulating period of limitation must receive strict construction.   The  law
of  limitation  is  intended  to  give  certainty  and  finality  to   legal
proceedings and to avoid exposure to risk  of  litigation  to  litigant  for
indefinite period on future  unforeseen  events.   Proceedings,  which  have
attained finality under existing law due to  bar  of  limitation  cannot  be
held to be open for revival unless the amended provision  is  clearly  given
retrospective operation so as to allow upsetting of proceedings,  which  had
already been concluded and attained finality.”


As a general rule, therefore, when  there  is  no  stay  of  the  assessment
proceedings passed by the Court, Explanation 1 to Section 158BE of  the  Act
may not be attracted.  However, this general statement  of  legal  principle
has to be read subject to an exception in order to interpret  it  rationally
and practically.  In those cases where stay of some other nature is  granted
than the stay of the assessment proceedings but the effect of such  stay  is
to prevent the assessing officer from effectively passing assessment  order,
even that kind of stay order may  be  treated  as  stay  of  the  assessment
proceedings because of the reason that such stay order becomes  an  obstacle
for the assessing officer to pass an  assessment  order  thereby  preventing
the assessing officer to proceed with the assessment proceedings  and  carry
out appropriate assessment.  For an example, if the court  passes  an  order
injuncting the assessing officer from summoning certain records either  from
the assessee or even from a third party and without those records it is  not
possible to proceed with the assessment proceedings and pass the  assessment
order, even such  type  of  order  may  amount  to  staying  the  assessment
proceedings.  In that context, we  would  like  to  comment  that  the  High
Court, in the impugned judgment has  propounded  the  correct  and  relevant
test, viz., whether the special audit is an integral part of the  assessment
proceedings, i.e.,  without  special  audit  it  is  not  possible  for  the
assessing officer to carry out the assessment?  If it is so,  then  stay  of
the special audit  may  qualify  as  stay  of  assessment  proceedings  and,
therefore, would be covered by the said explanation.

The question, therefore, is as to whether,  in  the  given  case,  the  High
Court was right in holding that the special audit was not  only  a  step  in
the assessment proceedings, but an  important  and  integral  step,  in  the
absence of which an assessment order could not be made.  In support  of  the
aforesaid conclusion, the High Court referred to the judgment  in  Auto  and
Metal Engineers and other Vs. Union of  India  and  Others[3]  wherein  this
Court examined in detail as  to  what  constitutes  assessment  proceedings.
The Court in that case was interpreting Explanation 1 to Section 153 of  the
Act, which is pari materia to Explanation 1 of 158BE of the Act.   The  said
provision was interpreted in the following manner:
“Sub-section (1) of section 153 prescribed the period of  limitation  within
which an order of assessment could be passed.  For the assessment  years  in
question the last date for making the order of  assessment  under  the  said
provision was March 31, 1972.  By Explanation 1 to section  153  the  period
of limitation prescribed under sub-section  (1)  for  making  the  order  of
assessment  was  extended  by  the  period  during  which   the   assessment
proceeding was stayed by an order or injunction of any  court.   The  object
of the Explanation seems to be that if the Assessing Officer was  unable  to
complete the assessment on account of an order  or  injunction  staying  the
assessment proceeding passed by a court the period during which  such  order
or injunction was in  operation  should  be  excluded  for  the  purpose  of
computing the period of limitation for making  the  assessment  order.   The
process of assessment thus commences with the filing of the return or  where
the return is not filed, by the issuance by the Assessing Officer of  notice
to file the return  under  section  142  (1)  and  it  culminates  with  the
issuance of the notice of demand under  section  156.   The  making  of  the
order of assessment is, therefore,  an  integral  part  of  the  process  of
assessment.  Having regard to  the  fact  that  the  object  underlying  the
Explanation is to extend the period  prescribed  for  making  the  order  of
assessment, the expression “assessment proceeding” in the  Explanation  must
be construed to comprehend the entire process of  assessment  starting  from
the stage of filing of the return under section 139 or  issuance  of  notice
under section 142(1) till the  making  of  the  order  of  assessment  under
section 143(3) or section 144.  Since the making of the order of  assessment
under section 143 (3) or section 144 of the Act is an integral part  of  the
assessment  proceeding,  it  is  not  possible  to  split   the   assessment
proceeding and confine it up to the stage of inquiry under sections 142  and
143 and exclude the making of the order of assessment from  its  ambit.   An
order staying the passing of the final order of assessment  is  nothing  but
an order staying the assessment proceeding.  Since the passing of the  final
order of assessment had been stayed by the Delhi High  Court  by  its  order
dated November 23, 1971, in the writ petitions, it must be held  that  there
was a stay of assessment proceedings for the purpose  of  Explanation  1  to
section 153.”

The aforesaid judgment applies on all force, as rightly  held  by  the  High
Court.  We may also refer to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court
in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Dhariwal Sales Enterprises[4].   That  was
a case where special audit report under  Section  142(2A)  of  the  Act  was
called for but could not be  submitted.   The  High  Court  held  that  time
period spent for  obtaining  a  copy  of  the  report  upto  the  time  when
intimation of non-submission was given by the assessee would be excluded.

We, therefore, agree with the High Court  that  the  special  audit  was  an
integral  step  towards  assessment  proceedings.   The  argument   of   the
appellants that the writ petition of the appellant  was  ultimately  allowed
and the Court had quashed the order directing special audit would mean  that
no special audit  was  needed  and,  therefore,  it  was  not  open  to  the
respondent to wait for special audit, may not be a  valid  argument  to  the
issue that is being dealt with.  The  assessing  officer  had,  after  going
through the matter, formed an opinion that  there was  a  need  for  special
audit and the report of special audit was necessary  for  carrying  out  the
assessment.  Once such an  opinion  was  formed,  naturally,  the  assessing
officer would not proceed with the assessment  till  the  time  the  special
audit report is received, inasmuch as in his opinion, report of the  special
audit was necessary.  Take a situation where the order of special  audit  is
not challenged.  The assessing officer would naturally wait for this  report
before proceeding further.  Order of special audit  followed  by  conducting
special  audit  and  report  thereof,  thus,  become  part   of   assessment
proceedings.  If the order directing special  audit  is  challenged  and  an
interim order is granted  staying  the  making  of  a  special  report,  the
assessing officer would not proceed with the assessment in  the  absence  of
the audit as he thought,  in  his  wisdom,  that  special  audit  report  is
needed.  That  would be the normal and natural  approach  of  the  assessing
officer at that time.  It is stated at the cost of repetition  that  in  the
estimation of the assessing officer special audit was essential for  passing
proper assessment order.  If the court, while  undertaking  judicial  review
of  such  an  order  of  the  assessing  officer  directing  special   audit
ultimately holds that such an order is  wrong  (for  whatever  reason)  that
event happens at a later date  and  would  not  mean  that  the  benefit  of
exclusion of the period during which there was a stay order  is  not  to  be
given to the Revenue.  Explanation 1 which permits exclusion of such a  time
is not dependent upon the final outcome of the proceedings in which  interim
stay was granted.

We, therefore, answer this question in favour of Revenue.

With this, we revert to the other question, viz. from which date the  period
of limitation is  to  be  counted,  i.e.  from  22nd  June,  1998  when  the
respondent authorities visited the premises of the appellants on  the  basis
of Warrant of Authorisation dated 19th June, 1998 or 5th  August,  1998,  on
which date  the  Revenue  authorities  last  visited  the  premises  of  the
appellants on the basis of the same  Warrant  of  Authorisation  dated  19th
June, 1998 and conducted the search of  the  appellants  premises.   If  the
period is to be counted from 19th June, 1998, the last  date  by  which  the
assessment was to be carried would be 30th June,  2000.   If  it  is  to  be
counted from 5th August, 1998, then the limitation period was to  expire  on
31st August, 2000.  In the event the last  date  for  completing  the  block
assessment is held to be 30th June, 2000, then the  assessment  became  time
barred even before the interim stay was granted by the High Court as it  was
granted on 24th August, 2000, i.e. after the supposed limitation period  was
over and, therefore, the conclusion which we have recorded in answering  the
other question, as above, would not come to the rescue  of  the  Department.
On the other hand, if the  period  of  limitation  was  to  expire  on  31st
August, 2000, then by virtue of our answer to the first  issue,  the  period
of limitation for block assessment has not expired inasmuch  as  this  Court
has passed an order dated 5th February, 2007 that audit may  go  on  but  no
final assessment order be  passed.   Because  of  this  reason,  it  becomes
necessary to decide this aspect of the matter as well.

The argument of learned counsel for the appellants on  this  issue  is  that
there was only one warrant of  authorisation  which  empowered  the  Revenue
authorities to carry out search and visit of the revenue officials  on  22nd
June, 1998 on the basis of said Warrant of Authorisation  dated  19th  June,
1998, would end in exhausting the said warrant  of  authorisation.   It  was
argued that for subsequent visits, fresh authorisation was required  and  no
such  authorisation  was  taken  and,  therefore,  subsequent  searches  are
illegal and no benefit thereof should enure to be respondent.

We may point out that the appellants never challenged subsequent visits  and
searches of their premises by the respondents on  the  ground  that  in  the
absence of a fresh authorisation  those  searches  were  illegal,  null  and
void.  Notwithstanding the same,  it  was  argued  that  at  least  for  the
purpose of limitation the  subsequent  searches  could  not  be  taken  into
consideration, as according to the learned counsel, the legal  position  was
that the authorisation dated 19th June, 1998, was  executed  on  22nd  June,
1998 and the search came to an end with that when the search party left  the
premises on 23rd June, 1998 after making seizure of  certain  documents  etc
and issuing restraint order under Section 132(3) of the Act  in  respect  of
certain items which they allegedly could not seize due  to  impracticability
on that day.  Some judgments of various  High  Courts  are  relied  upon  to
support this proposition.  It was also argued that there was no  concept  of
'revalidation of authorisation' provided  under  the  Act,  which  has  been
applied by the High Court in the impugned judgment, which according  to  the
learned counsel for the appellants, amounts to  legislating  a  new  concept
which is contrary to law.

The  learned  Additional   Solicitor   General,   refuting   the   aforesaid
contention, submitted that as per explanation (2) to Section 158BE, when  it
is a case of  search,  period  of  limitation  is  to  be  counted  'on  the
conclusion of search as recorded in the last panchnama drawn.....'   It  was
argued that last panchnama was admittedly drawn on  5th  August,  1998  and,
therefore, period of limitation is to be counted from that date.

After considering the respective submissions, we are of the opinion that  on
the facts of this case, the issue also has to be answered in favour  of  the
Revenue without going into the legal niceties.

As noticed above, the revenue authorities visited and searched the  premises
of the appellants for the first time on 22nd June, 1998.  In  the  panchnama
drawn on  that  date,  it  was  remarked  'temporarily  concluded',  meaning
thereby,  according  to  the  revenue  authorities,  search  had  not   been
concluded.  For this reason, the respondent authorities visited  many  times
on subsequent occasions and every time panchnama was  drawn  with  the  same
remarks, i.e. 'temporarily concluded'.  It is only on 5th August, 1998  when
the premises were searched last, the panchnama drawn on that  date  recorded
the remarks that the search was 'finally  concluded'.   Thus,  according  to
the respondents, the search had finally been completed only on  5th  August,
1998  and  panchnama  was  duly  drawn  on  the  said  date  as  well.   The
appellants, in  the  writ  petition  filed,  had  no  where  challenged  the
validity of searches on the subsequent dates raising a plea  that  the  same
was illegal in the absence of any fresh and  valid  authorisation.   On  the
contrary, the appellants proceeded on the basis  that  search  was  conduced
from 22nd June, 1998 and finally concluded on 5th August, 1998.

On the aforesaid facts and in the absence  of  any  challenge  laid  by  the
appellants to the subsequent searches, we cannot countenance  the  arguments
of the appellants that limitation period is not to be counted from the  last
date of search when the search operation completed, i.e. 5th  August,  1998.
Therefore, this issue is also decided in favour of the respondents.

In view of the foregoing, this appeal is liable  to  be  dismissed  and  is,
accordingly, dismissed with costs.

                             .............................................J.
                                                             (A.K. SIKRI)


                             .............................................J.
                                                  (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 28, 2016.



-----------------------
[1]   (2007) 2 SCC 181
[2]   (2002) 254 ITR 772 (SC)
[3]   (1998) 229 ITR 399
[4]   (1996) 221 ITR 240