Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 2308-2309 of 2016, Judgment Date: Mar 01, 2016

                                                               REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2308-2309 OF 2016
                (Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.8536-8537 of 2008)



VIJAY PRAKASH JARATH                                        .......APPELLANT


                                   VERSUS



TEJ PRAKASH JARATH                                         .......RESPONDENT

                                  WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No.2310 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP(C)No.32118 of 2009)



                               J U D G M E N T


JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.


Civil Appeal Nos.2308-2309 of 2016 (Arising out  of  SLP(C)Nos.8536-8537  of
2008)



1.          The respondent before this Court  –  Tej  Prakash  Jarath  filed
Suit No.608 of 1992 on 09.11.1992.  In the aforesaid suit, defendants  Nos.3
and 4 – Om Prakash Jarath (the father of the  plaintiff  in  the  suit)  and
Vijay Prakash Jarath (the elder  brother  of  the  plaintiff)  respectively,
filed written statements on 11.11.1992. Thereupon, issues came to be  framed
on 18.10.1993. After the framing of the issues, the petitioners before  this
Court (i.e. defendant Nos.3 and 4 in the original suit),  filed  a  counter-
claim on 17.06.1996 i.e. almost two and a half years after  the  framing  of
the issues.
2.          The trial court, vide its order dated 28.10.1996,  accepted  the
aforesaid counter-claim.  The above  order  dated  28.10.1996,  came  to  be
assailed  by  the  respondent-plaintiff-Tej  Prakash  Jarath  through  Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.1266  of  2001,  before  the  High  Court  of
Uttarakhand at Nainital (hereinafter referred to as `the High  Court’).  The
High Court relying upon the judgment of this Court in  Rohit  Singh  &  ors.
vs. State of Bihar (Now State of Jharkhand)  &  Ors.,  (2006)  12  SCC  734,
concluded, that the counter-claim filed by  the  petitioner-defendant  Nos.3
and 4 before the trial court, was not legally acceptable.  The order  passed
by the High Court dated 02.01.2008,  recording  the  above  conclusion,  has
been assailed through the instant special leave petitions.
3.          Leave granted.
4.          Before adverting to the merits  of  the  controversy,  we  would
first endeavour to deal with  the  issues  as  to  whether  the  High  Court
correctly applied the judgment rendered by this Court in Rohit  Singh’  case
(supra),  to  the  controversy  in  hand.   In  order  to   appreciate   the
conclusions  drawn  by  this  Court  in  Rohit  Singh’s  case  (supra),  the
following observations (relating to  the  facts  and  conclusions)  recorded
therein need to be taken into consideration:
“17.  We shall first consider whether there was a counterclaim in  the  suit
in terms of Order 8 Rule 6A of the Code in this case.  The  suit  was  filed
against the Divisional Forest Officer and the State of Bihar  as  Defendants
1 and  2  on  26.2.1996  by  Respondent  No.6  herein.   After  the  written
statement was filed by the defendants, issues were framed and the suit  went
to trial.  On 3.6.1996  and  6.6.1996  the  evidence  on  the  side  of  the
plaintiff was concluded.  On 14.6.1996 the
evidence on  the  side  of  the  defendants  was  completed.   On  24.6.1996
arguments  were  concluded.  Judgment was
reserved. 25.6.1996 was fixed as the date for pronouncing the judgment.  The
judgment was not pronounced and it appears that the Judge  was  subsequently
transferred.  Therefore, on 20.8.1996 arguments  were  again  heard  by  the
successor Judge and judgment was reserved.  27.8.1996 was fixed as the  date
for judgment.  Apparently, it was not pronounced.   It  is  thereafter  that
Defendants 3 to 17 filed an application on  11.9.1996  for  intervention  in
the suit.  We have already referred to the allegations in  that  application
for impleading filed. We only notice  again  that  they  claimed  to  be  in
possession of the property and that their  presence  before  the  court  was
necessary in order  to  enable  the  court  to  effectually  and  completely
adjudicate upon and settle all  the  questions  involved  in  the  suit.  On
19.9.1996 the application for  intervention  was  allowed.  On  30.9.1996  a
written statement  was  filed  by  Defendants  3  to  12.  We  have  already
summarised the pleas raised therein.

18.    After  this,  the  witnesses  of  the  plaintiff  were  recalled  and
permitted to be cross-examined by these Defendants. That was  on  5.10.1996.
Again the witnesses for defendants 1 and 2,  were  recalled  and  they  were
permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of these defendants.  The  evidence
on the side of Defendants 3 to 17 was let in.   It  commenced  on  24.2.1997
and was closed on 30.1.1997.  Thereafter, arguments  were  heard  again  and
the arguments on the side of the defendants including that of  Defendants  3
to 17 were concluded on 4.3.1997.  The suit was adjourned for  arguments  on
the side of the plaintiff. On 5.3.1997, the suit was dismissed  for  default
of the plaintiff. It was then restored on 29.5.1998. It  was  thereafter  on
5.6.1998, that Defendants 3 to 17 filed  an  application  for  amending  the
written statement.  The amendment was allowed on  20.7.1998.  There  was  no
order  treating  the  amended  written  statement  as  a  counter-claim   or
directing either the plaintiff or Defendants 1  and  2  to  file  a  written
statement or an answer thereto.  Defendants  3  to  17  had  questioned  the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court in their written statement.   That
plea was permitted to be withdrawn on 4.2.1999. It is clear that  after  the
evidence was closed, there was no occasion for impleading  the  interveners.
Even assuming that they were properly impleaded, after they had filed  their
written statement, the suit had gone for further trial and further  evidence
including that of the interveners had been taken, the evidence again  closed
and even arguments on the side of the interveners had been  concluded.   The
suit itself was  dismissed  for  default  only  because  on  behalf  of  the
plaintiff there was a failure  to  address  arguments.   But  the  suit  was
subsequently restored.  At that stage no counter-claim could be  entertained
at the instance of the interveners. A  counter-claim,  no  doubt,  could  be
filed
even after the written statement is filed, but that does  not  mean  that  a
counter-claim can be raised after issues are  framed  and  the  evidence  is
closed.   Therefore, the entertaining  of  the  so-called  counter-claim  of
Defendants 3 to 17 by the trial court, after  the  framing  of  issues   for
trial, was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.  On that  short  ground
the so called counter-claim, filed by Defendants 3 to 17 has to be  held  to
be not maintainable.

19.   As can be seen, what Defendants 3 to  17  did,  was  to  merely  amend
their written statement by adding a sentence  to  para  16  of  the  written
statement they originally filed. In para 16 it was only pleaded  that  those
defendants were claiming to be in peaceful  possession  of  the  suit  lands
ever since the time of their predecessors.  They wanted  to  add  that  they
had claimed acquisition of title based on long and uninterrupted  possession
and they crave leave to get their title declared in the  suit  for  which  a
declaratory court fee is paid. It may be noted that not even  a  prayer  was
sought to be added seeking a declaration of their title  as  is  the  normal
practice.   It is, therefore, clear  that  on  going  through  the  original
written statement and the amendment introduced, that there was  no  counter-
claim in terms of Order 8 Rule 6A of the Code in the  case  on  hand,  which
justifies  a  trial  of that counter-claim even
assuming that such a counter-claim was maintainable even if  no  relief  was
claimed against the plaintiff in the suit but it was directed  only  against
the co-defendants in the suit.  The counter-claim so called is liable to  be
rejected on that ground as well.”

                                         (emphasis is ours)


5.    The factual position in the relied upon judgment, is  not  similar  to
the factual position of the case in hand. In the  present  case,  after  the
issues had been  framed,  the  plaintiff’s  evidence  had  commenced  to  be
recorded. Though the same had not yet been concluded.  In Rohit Singh’  case
(supra), on the other hand, not only were issues framed,  and  the  evidence
of the rival parties, including  the  defendant  recorded.  Furthermore,  on
several occasions, arguments were heard for the  ultimate  disposal  of  the
suit. And more than once, the judgment  was  also  reserved,  but  then,  on
account of transfer of the Judge, and for other reasons,  evident  from  the
extract recorded hereinabove, judgment could not be pronounced.   It  is  in
the aforesaid situation, that the counter claim filed by the defendants,  at
such a belated stage, was considered to be, not sustainable in law. We  are,
therefore, satisfied  in  holding,  that  the  judgment  rendered  in  Rohit
Singh’s case is clearly not applicable to the  facts  and  circumstances  of
this case.
6.          Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellants  had  contended,
on the basis of observations recorded in para 18 (extracted above) in  Rohit
Singh’s case (supra), that counter claim  would  not  be  permissible  after
framing of the issues, and after the evidence  is  concluded.  Even  if  the
above parameter is  applied  to  the  facts  of  the  present  case,  it  is
apparent, that the judgment rendered in Rohit  Singh’s  case  (supra)  would
not lead to the findings recorded by the High Court in the  impugned  order,
for the simple reason, that in Rohit Singh's case, evidence from both  sides
was concluded, and even arguments had been heard, whereas,  in  the  present
case, even  though  evidence  on  behalf  of  the  respondent-plaintiff  has
commenced, it has not  yet  concluded.   The   evidence  on  behalf  of  the
defendants is yet to commence.
7.          Despite the  conclusions  recorded  by  us  hereinabove,  it  is
relevant to record, that it was also the contention of the  learned  counsel
for the respondent-plaintiff, that the decision rendered by  this  Court  in
Rohit Singh’s case, has been reiterated in Bollepanda P. Poonacha & Anr  vs.
K.M.Madapa, (2008) 13 SCC 179,      and a perusal  of  the  above  judgment,
would lead to the conclusion, that in the factual analysis, the  conclusions
drawn by the High Court were justified.  Our pointed attention was drawn  to
the conclusions recorded in paragraph 15 of the  above  judgment,  which  is
extracted hereunder:
“15.  A belated counter claim must be discouraged by this Court. See  Ramesh
Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani [(2003) 7 SCC 350]. We are, however,  not
unmindful of the decisions of this Court where a defendant has been  allowed
to amend his written statement so as to enable him to elaborate his  defence
or to take additional pleas in support  of  his  case.  The  Court  in  such
matters has a wide discretion.  It  must,  however,  subserve  the  ultimate
cause of justice.   It  may  be  true  that  further  litigation  should  be
endeavoured to be avoided.  It may also be  true  that  joinder  of  several
causes of action in  a  suit  is  permissible.  The  Court,  must,  however,
exercise  the  discretionary  jurisdiction  in  a  judicious  manner.  While
considering that subservance of justice is the ultimate goal, the  statutory
limitation shall not be overstepped.  Grant of relief will depend  upon  the
factual background involved in  each  case.  The  Court,  while  undoubtedly
would  take  into  consideration  the  questions  of  serious  injustice  or
irreparable loss, but nevertheless should bear in mind that a provision  for
amendment of pleadings are not available as a  matter  of  right  under  all
circumstances.  One cause of action cannot be allowed to be  substituted  by
another. Ordinarily, effect of an admission made in earlier pleadings  shall
not be permitted to be taken away.   See  State  of  A.P  Vs.  M/s.  Pioneer
Builders, A.P. [(2006) 9 SCALE 520] and Steel Authority of  India  Ltd.  Vs.
Union of India [2006 (9) SCALE 597] and Himmat Singh Vs. I.C.I.  India  Ltd.
[2008 (2) SCALE 152].”

                                            (emphasis is ours)


Having perused the conclusions drawn in paragraph 15,  extracted  above,  we
are satisfied, that the same  are  wholly  inapplicable  to  the  facts  and
circumstances of this case, and that, the decision of the High  Court  could
not have been legitimately based on the conclusions  recorded  in  paragraph
15, extracted above.
8.          It is in these circumstances, that we advert to Order VIII  Rule
6A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is being reproduced below:

“6A.  Counter-claim by defendant  - (1)   A   defendant
in a suit may, in addition to  his  right of pleading a set-off under rule
6, set up,  by  way of counter-claim
against the claim of the plaintiff, any right  or  claim  in  respect  of  a
cause of action accruing to  the  defendant  against  the  plaintiff  either
before or after the  filing  of  the  suit  but  before  the  defendant  has
delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his  defence
has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the  nature  of  a  claim  for
damages or not:

    Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the  pecuniary  limits
of the jurisdiction of the Court.

(2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so  as  to
enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the  same  suit,  both  on
the original claim and on the counter-claim.

(3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in  answer
to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed  by
the Court.

(4) The counter-claim shall be treated as  a  plaint  and  governed  by  the
rules applicable to plaints.”


A perusal of Sub-clause (1) of Section 6A of Order VIII, leaves no room  for
any doubt, that the cause of action in respect of which a counter claim  can
be filed, should accrue before the  defendant  has  delivered  his  defence,
namely, before the defendant has filed  a  written  statement.  The  instant
determination of ours is supported by the conclusions  drawn  in  Bollepanda
P. Poonacha & Anr vs. K.M.Madapa (supra), wherein  this  Court  observed  as
under:
“11. The provision of Order 8 Rule 6-A must be considered having  regard  to
the  aforementioned  provisions.  A  right  to  file  counterclaim   is   an
additional right.  It may be filed in respect of any  right  or  claim,  the
cause of action therefor, however, must accrue either before  or  after  the
filing of the suit but before the defendant has  raised  his  defence.   The
respondent  in  his  application  for   amendment   of   written   statement
categorically raised the plea that the appellants  had  tresspassed  on  the
lands in question in the summer of 1998.  Cause of  action  for  filing  the
counterclaim inter alia was said to have arisen at  that  time.  It  was  so
explicitly stated in the said application.  The  said  application,  in  our
opinion, was, thus, clearly not maintainable. The  decision  of  Ryaz  Ahmed
(supra) is based on the decision of this Court in Baldev Singh  Vs.  Manohar
Singh [(2006) 6 SCC 498].”
                                          (emphasis is ours)

It is not a matter of dispute in the present case, that cause of action  for
which the counter-claim was filed in the  present  case,  arose  before  the
respondent-plaintiff filed the suit (out of  which  these  petitions/appeals
have arisen). It is therefore  apparent  that  the  appellants  before  this
Court were well within their right to file the counter-claim.

9.    It is quite apparent from the factual  position  noticed  hereinabove,
that after the issues were framed  on  18.10.1993,  the  counter  claim  was
filed by the appellants before this Court (i.e. by  defendant  Nos.3  and  4
before the trial court) almost two and a half years  after  the  framing  of
the issues. Having given our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  provisions
relating to the filing of counter claim, we are satisfied,  that  there  was
no justification whatsoever  for  the  High  Court  to  have  declined,  the
appellant before this Court from filing his  counter  claim  on  17.06.1996,
specially because, it is not a matter of dispute, that the cause of  action,
on the basis of which the counter claim was filed by defendant Nos.3 and  4,
accrued before their written statement  was  filed  on  11.11.1992.  In  the
present case, the respondent-plaintiff's evidence was still  being  recorded
by the trial court, when the counter-claim was filed.  It has also not  been
shown to us, that any prejudice would be caused to the  respondent-plaintiff
before the trial court, if the counter-claim was  to  be  adjudicated  upon,
along with the main suit. We are of the view, that no serious  injustice  or
irreparable loss (as expressed in paragraph  15  of  Bollepanda  P.Pooncha's
case), would be suffered by the respondent-plaintiff in this case.
10.    For the reasons recorded  hereinabove,  we  set  aside  the  impugned
order passed by the High Court  dated  02.01.2008,  and  restore  the  order
passed by the trial court dated 28.10.1996.
11.      The appeals are allowed in the above terms.
12.   Needless to  mention,  that  it  shall  be  open  to  the  respondent-
plaintiff to raise all pleas open  to  him  through  the  written  statement
which is filed by the respondent-plaintiff, to the counter claim.
Civil Appeal No.2310 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.32118 of 2009)

13.    Leave granted.
14.  Learned counsel for  the  parties  are  agreed,  that  the  controversy
raised in the instant appeal, is akin to the one adjudicated  upon  by  this
Court in Vijay Prakash Jarath vs. Tej Prakash Jarath (Civil Appeal Nos.2308-
2309 of 2016, arising out of SLP(C)Nos.8536-8537 of 2008, decided by  us  on
01.03.2016. The instant appeal  is  accordingly  allowed  in  terms  of  the
decision rendered by this Court in Vijay  Prakash  Jarath  vs.  Tej  Prakash
Jarath decided on 01.03.2016.


                                                ..........................J.
                                                      (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)




                                                ..........................J.
                                                                (C.NAGAPPAN)

NEW DELHI;
MARCH 1, 2016.