Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1133 of 2016, Judgment Date: Jun 30, 2016

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1133 OF 2016
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) 21027 OF 2013)


Union of India & Ors.                                  ...  Appellants

                                Versus

Diler Singh                                          ...   Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.

      The respondent, a constable in Central Reserve  Police  Force  (CRPF),
was enrolled as such on 1.4.1990.   He was posted in the 23 Battalion  where
he served continuously approximately for fourteen years.   Subsequently,  he
was transferred to 61 Battalion where he served for two years.   During  the
second posting a charge-sheet was served on him alleging that on  22.06.2001
about 11.30 hrs. he left the campus  without  permission  of  the  competent
authority and went to the bazaar and consumed  liquor  and  quarrelled  with
some civilians.  On being informed, S.I. Sheoji Ram, HC  Mahabir  Singh  and
Captain Fiyaz Ahmed brought him from bazaar to the campus.   On  the  advice
of the competent authority, a  medical  examination  was  conducted  on  the
respondent and as per the medical report given  by  the  assistant  surgeon,
District Hospital, Medak at Sangareddy, it was  found  that  the  respondent
had consumed liquor.
2.    On the basis of the  aforesaid  report,  a  departmental  enquiry  was
ordered by  Commandant  61-Bn.  vide  Memo  No.  P-VIII-8/01-61-EC-II  dated
6.7.2001 and the respondent was also placed  under  suspension  with  effect
from 6.7.2001.  The enquiry officer conducted an enquiry and on the base  of
the material and testimony of the witnesses came to hold  that  the  charges
had been proved.
3.    The disciplinary authority concurred with  the  findings  recorded  by
the enquiry officer and came to hold that the charges levelled  against  the
respondent had been proved beyond doubt.   Recording  concurrence  with  the
findings returned by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority  opined
that the respondent was not fit to  continue  any  more  in  the  Force  and
accordingly in exercise of  power  conferred  under  Section  11(1)  of  the
Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (for brevity, ‘the  Act’)  read  with
Rule 27-A(1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (in short  ‘the
Rules’) ordered the respondent to be  removed  from  the  service.   It  was
further stipulated in the order that except the pay and allowances given  to
the respondent during suspension  period  from  7.7.2001  to  12.9.2001,  he
would not be entitled to any pay or allowances and the period of  suspension
shall be treated as such.  That apart,  it  was  directed  that  medals  and
awards, if any, that had been received by  the  delinquent  employee  during
service period shall be forfeited under the provision of  Section  12(1)  of
the Act.
4.     The  respondent  initiated  a  civil  action  by  filing  Civil  Suit
No.253/2002/05 in the  Court  of  Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division),  Narnaul
seeking a declaration that the orders passed against him by the  authorities
were illegal.  The appellants contested the suit by putting  forth  a  stand
that due enquiry was held  by  the  authorities  and  the  charges  levelled
against the respondent were duly proved and there was  no  procedural  error
in the enquiry.
5.  Learned Civil Judge framed the following issues:
“1. Whether  the  impugned  order  No.  P-III-8/2001-61  Stha  II  dated  12
September, 2001 are  wrong,  illegal,  against  facts,  arbitrary  malafide,
against principles  of  natural  justice,  null  and  void  and  ineffective
against the rights of plaintiff?

2. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit?

3. Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction  to  try  and  entertain  the
present suit?

4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?”

6.    While dealing with the issue number 1, the trial Court  took  note  of
the fact that the charges were issued against the delinquent  officer  under
Section 11(1) of the Act, relied on the decision rendered in Ram  Singh  Rai
v. Union of India[1] and Rattan Singh v. Union  of  India  &  Others[2]  and
came to hold that the disciplinary authority was  not  entitled  in  law  to
convert the charge under Section 11(1), a minor penalty to a  major  penalty
and accordingly opined that the impugned order  of  dismissal  was  illegal,
null and void.  The trial Court further held that  it  had  jurisdiction  to
try the suit and eventually decreed the suit with costs.   It  directed  for
reinstatement of the  respondent  plaintiff  in  service  with  effect  from
12.09.2001 along with arrears of pay and allowances and other  consequential
benefits.
7.    Being aggrieved, the aforesaid  judgment  and  decree  was  called  in
question by the  department  in  Civil  Appeal  No.11  of  2009  before  the
Additional  District  Judge,  Narnaul  who  by  judgment  dated   27.03.2010
reversed the judgment of the trial Court and held that the trial  Court  had
no jurisdiction to try the suit, and further the judgment and decree  passed
by it were not sustainable in view of the  decision  in  Union  of  India  &
others v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat[3].
8.    The respondent assailed the  defensibility  of  the  judgment  of  the
first appellate  Court  in  Regular  Second  Appeal  No.4578/2010.   Learned
single Judge noted the grounds of challenge, referred  to  the  decision  in
Ram Singh Rai (supra) and reproduced a passage from the decision  in  Deputy
Inspector General of Police, CRPF and another v. Akhilesh Kumar[4] and  came
to hold that the controversy is covered by  the  judgment  of  the  Calcutta
High Court rendered in Akhilesh Kumar  (supra) and accordingly  opined  that
the allegations levelled  against  the  respondent  plaintiff  were  not  of
serious nature which would have attracted  penalty  of  dismissal  from  the
services.  The  aforesaid perception led to acceptance  of  the  appeal  and
dislodgment of the judgment and decree of  the  first  appellate  Court  and
restoration that of the trial Court.
9.    We  have  heard  Mr.  Maninder  Singh,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General for Union of India and  Mr.  J.S.  Naik,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent.
10.   To appreciate  the  controversy,  it  is  relevant  to  refer  to  the
relevant provisions of the Act.  Section 2(c) defines “the  Force”  to  mean
the Central Reserve Police Force.   Section  2(d)  defines  “member  of  the
Force” to mean a person who has been appointed to Force by  the  Commandant,
whether before  or  after  the  commencement  of  the  Act  and  in  Section
1,3,6,7,16,17,18 and 19, includes also a person appointed to  the  Force  by
the Central Government, whether before or after such  commencement.  Section
7 specifies in general duties of members of the Force.  Section  8  provides
for superintendence, control and administration  of  the  Force.  Section  9
stipulates about more heinous offences.   It  provides  that  a  member  who
commits heinous offences shall be punishable with  transportation  for  life
for a term of not less than seven years or  with  imprisonment  for  a  term
which may extend to fourteen years or with fine which  may  be  extended  to
three months’ pay or with fine to that extent in addition to  such  sentence
of transportation or imprisonment.  Section 10  provides  for  less  heinous
offences.  It states that a member of the Force  who  commits  such  offence
shall be punishable within imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  one
year, or with fine which may extend to three  months’  pay,  or  with  both.
Thus, the aforesaid provision defines the offences and  provides  punishment
for the same.
11.   In the case at hand, we  are  concerned  with  the  concept  of  minor
punishments as postulated under Section 11 of the Act.  Section  11  of  the
Act reads as follows:-
“11. Minor punishments. – (1) The  Commandant  or  any  other  authority  or
officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to  any  rules  made  under  this
Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or  dismissal  any  one
or more of the following punishments to any member  of  the  Force  whom  he
considers to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty,  or  remissness  in
the discharge of any duty or of  other  misconduct  in  his  capacity  as  a
member of the Force, that is to say, -

reduction in rank;

fine of any amount not exceeding one month’s pay and allowances;

(c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for  a  term  not  exceeding  one
month;

(d) confinement in the quarter-guard for not more  than  twenty-eight  days;
with or without punishment drill or extra guard, fatigue or other duty, and

(e) removal from any office of  distinction  or  special  emolument  in  the
Force.

(2) Any punishment specified in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section  (1)
may be awarded by any gazetted officer when in command of any detachment  of
the Force away from headquarters, provided he  is  specially  authorised  in
this behalf by the Commandant.

(3) The assistant commandant, a company officer or  a  subordinate  officer,
not being below the rank of subedar  or  inspector,  commanding  a  separate
detachment or an output or in temporary command at the headquarters  of  the
Force, may, without, a moral trial, award to any member of the Force who  is
for the time being  subject  to  his  authority  any  one  or  more  of  the
following punishments for  the  commission  of  any  petty  offence  against
discipline which is not otherwise provided for in this Act, or which is  not
a sufficiently serious nature  to  require  prosecution  before  a  Criminal
Court, that is to say, -

(a) confinement for not more than seven days in the  quarter-guard  or  such
other place as may be considered suitable, with forfeiture of  all  pay  and
allowances during its continuance;

(b) punishment drill, or extra-guard, fatigue or other duty,  for  not  more
than thirty days, with or without confinement to quarters, lines or camp;

(c) censure or severe censure: provided that this punishment may be  awarded
to a subordinate officer only by the Commandant.

(4)  A  jamadar  or  sub-inspector  who  is  temporarily  in  command  of  a
detachment or an outpost may, in like manner and for the commission  of  any
like offence, award to any member of the Force for the  time  being  subject
to his authority any of the punishments specified  in  clause  (b)  or  sub-
section (3) for not more than fifteen days.”

12.   At a subsequent stage, we shall advert to  the  interpretation  placed
by this Court on  the  aforementioned  provision.   Prior  to  that,  it  is
necessary to state in detail the misconduct or misbehaviour  in  support  of
charges framed against the respondent. The same is as under:
                                “Article – 1

That, on transfer of Force  No.901342841  Constable  Diler  Singh,  from  23
Battalion C.R.P.F. to 61 Battalion C.R.P.F., he reported on  28.09.2000  and
was posted in C/61.  Presently, Force No. 901342841  Constable  Diler  Singh
is posted at Platoon  No.7,  Police  Station  Jinnaram,  C.R.P.F.  Narsapur,
Medhak, Andhra Pradesh, which is a Naxalwadi  Area.  Therefore,  keeping  in
view the sensitivity of the area, it was necessary  for  each  personnel  to
take   permission   for   leaving   the   camp.     Despite    applicability
(implementation) of these orders, Force No.901342841 Constable Diler  Singh,
on 22.06.2001 at about 1330 hours, went outside the Camp without  permission
of any competent officer, which is against the discipline of force and  good
orders.

                                 Article – 2

That, Force No. 901342841 Constable Diler  Singh,  on  22.06.2001  at  about
1330 hours left out from platoon  No.7,  Police  Station  Jinna  Ram,  C/61,
C.R.P.F. Narsapur, Medhak, Andhra Pradesh, which is Naxalwadi Area,  without
permission of any competent officer  and  after  going  to  the  market,  he
consumed very much liquor (wine) and quarrelled there with  many  civilians.
On  receiving  information  about  this  at  Platoon,  witness  No.2,5   and
Constable Nawaj Ahmad brought him from the market under influence of  liquor
at about 1500 hours.  At about 1800 hours, witness  No.4  with  one  Section
handed over it to C.H.M. in Company Headquarters.  Thereafter at about  2030
hours, he was taken to .... Singa Reddy’s Civil Hospital, where his  medical
examination was got conducted.  According to  the  medical  certificate,  he
had consumed liquor(wine).  Therefore, the act on his part  is  against  the
worthy orders and discipline of the Force.”

13.   The enquiry officer, as is vivid from the enquiry report,  found  that
all the witnesses had supported the fact that on 22.06.2001  the  respondent
had gone out of the camp and in  the  market  he  had  consumed  liquor  and
quarrelled with the local persons, and accordingly has proceeded to hold  as
under:-
“Thus, it is also proved that on 22.06.2001, constable Diler Singh came  out
of his platoon post without obtaining permission from any one  and  consumed
liquor, thereafter, he quarrelled with the local persons in the  market  and
besides above, he by using indecent language hurled abuses to the  personnel
present in the  camp  and  on  reaching  at  company  headquarters  Narsapur
against CRPF personnel and officers, which is totally  against  the  conduct
and behaviour of a civilized and good constable.”

14.   In this backdrop, the judgments of the Courts below and  that  of  the
High Court are to be scrutinised.  The trial Court by  placing  reliance  on
the decisions in Ram Singh Rai (supra) and Rattan Singh (supra)  has  opined
that the punishment  of  dismissal  could  not  have  been  imposed  on  the
delinquent employee under Section 11(1) of the  Act.   The  first  appellate
Court while holding that the trial Court  has  no  territorial  jurisdiction
also reversed the finding which was  rendered  in  the  context  of  Section
11(1) of the Act.  In this context, learned appellate Judge  relied  on  the
decision in Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra). The High Court, as  is  evident,  has
not referred to the decision in Ghulam Mohd. Bhat  (supra) but has  adverted
to a different aspect which is in the relam of proportionality.
15.   It is submitted by Mr. Maninder Singh,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General  for  the  appellants  that  the  High  Court  has  not  framed  any
substantial question  of  law  under  Section  100  of  the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure which is absolutely mandatory.   It  has  further  been  submitted
that the High Court should have applied the ratio laid down  by  this  Court
in Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra)  which  defines  the  operational  spectrum  of
Section 11(1) of the Act and also not  followed  the  decision  in  Akhilesh
Kumar (supra) to dislodge the judgment of the appellate Court.
16.   Learned counsel for the respondent,  per  contra,  would  support  the
judgment passed by the High Court on the foundation  that  this  High  Court
has ascribed adequate reasons to come to the conclusion and,  in  any  case,
the punishment of dismissal in the facts and circumstances is too harsh  and
shocks the conscience.
17.   First, we shall deal with the submission with  regard  to  framing  of
substantial question(s) of law.  On a perusal of the judgment  of  the  High
Court, it is evident that it has not  framed  any  substantial  question  of
law. The Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam  Tiwari[5],  has  held  that
the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second  appeal  without  formulating
the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so  it
acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty  cast  on  Court.
The existence of substantial question of law is the sine  qua  non  for  the
exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended  Section  100  of  the  Code.
The said principle has been reiterated in many a decision including the  one
in the Govindaraju v. Mariamman[6] which has been placed  reliance  upon  by
Mr.  Maninder  Singh.   In  the  said  case  it  has  been  laid  down,  the
substantial question of law has to be framed for such a formulation  is  the
sine qua non for exercise of power under Section 100 of the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure
18.   It is necessary to state here that the High Court while admitting  the
second appeal should have framed the substantial question(s)  of  law  which
would have been adverted to at the time  of  final  hearing.   That  is  the
command of the provision and has  been  clearly  stated  by  this  Court  in
number of occasions.  We may unhesitatingly state that we  do  not  remotely
get a sprinkle of bliss by ingeminating or repeating the same.  It has  been
done following the rigoristic concept of  ‘duty  for  duty  sake’  with  the
great expectation that this would be the last one.
19.   The core  issue  that  emerges  for  consideration  is  whether  under
Section 11(1) of the Act, punishment  of  dismissal  can  be  imposed.   The
controversy is no more res integra.  In  Ghulam  Mohd.  Bhat  (supra)  while
interpreting Section 11 of the Act, it has been held thus:-
“5.   A  bare  perusal  of  Section  11  shows  that  it  deals  with  minor
punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in the  preceding
section.  It lays down  that  the  Commandant  or  any  other  authority  or
officer, as may be prescribed, may subject to any rules made under the  Act,
award any one or more of the punishments to any member of the  Fore  who  is
found  guilty  of  disobedience,  neglect  of  duty  or  remissness  in  the
discharge of his duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member  of
the Force. According to the High Court the only  punishments  which  can  be
awarded under this Section are  reduction  in  rank,  fine,  confinement  to
quarters and removal from any office of distinction or special emolument  in
the Force. In our opinion, the interpretation is not  correct,  because  the
section says that these punishments  may  be  awarded  in  lieu  of,  or  in
addition to, suspension or dismissal.

6. The use of the words “in lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to,  suspension  or
dismissal”, appearing in sub-section(1) of Section 11 before clauses (a)  to
(e) shows that the authorities mentioned  therein  are  empowered  to  award
punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member  of  the  Force  who  is
found guilty and  in  addition  to,  or  in  lieu  thereof,  the  punishment
mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) may also be awarded.”


And again:-
“7. … It is, therefore, clear that section 11 deals with  only  those  minor
punishments which may be awarded in  a  departmental  inquiry  and  a  plain
reading thereof makes it quite clear that  a  punishment  of  dismissal  can
certainly be awarded thereunder even if the  delinquent  is  not  prosecuted
for an offence under Section 9 or Section 10.”

20.   We respectfully agree with the said view  and  opine  that  under  the
scheme of the Act, in exercise of power  under  Section  11(1)  of  the  Act
punishment of dismissal can be  imposed.   As  is  seen  from  the  impugned
order, the High Court, to reverse the  conclusion  of  the  first  appellate
Court, has extensively quoted from the decision of the Calcutta  High  Court
rendered in Akhilesh Kumar (supra).  Be it stated that the charges  levelled
against the delinquent officer therein was the same.  The Division Bench  of
the Calcutta High Court, analysing the Act,  especially  Section  10(m)  and
various clauses of the CRPF Manual, came to hold thus:-
“It is an admitted position from the  factual  matrix  of  the  departmental
proceedings that the writ petitioner/delinquent was posted in  a  camp.   As
per rule of such positing in a camp/lines the  concerned  personnel  is  not
free to move as per his choice even during the period  when  he  is  not  on
actual  duty.   The  discipline  of  a  camp  is  completely  different   in
comparison with the posting of an individual in an office and  or  in  other
places outside of the camp.  It is true, by rotation  of  8  hours  duty  is
allotted to the respective personnel  who  are  attached  to  the  camp  and
staying in the camp but that does not mean that  when  he  will  not  be  in
active duty, he would be allowed to go outside of  the  camp  without  prior
permission.  From the relevant provision of Clauses 7.2 and 6.23 as  already
quoted it appears  that absence without leave or permission  from  the  camp
would invite initiation of judicial trial of the delinquent if  there  is  a
serious and grave situation or otherwise  a  departmental  enquiry.   Hence,
finding of the learned trial judge that as  the  delinquent/writ  petitioner
was not on active  duty,  the  aforesaid  clauses  got  no  effect,  is  not
appealing us  for  its  applicability  to  quash  the  order  of  dismissal.
However, from the aforesaid provision  of  maintaining  discipline  while  a
personnel is posted in a camp which requires a  prior  permission  to  leave
the camp even for a short period from the Company Commander, we are  of  the
view that the charge under Article no.1 was proved.  Now,  on  the  question
of quantum of punishment, namely, dismissal from service as imposed on  such
charge, we are of the view that as under clause 6.23 there  is  a  provision
for initiation of the departmental enquiry and as per decision only a  minor
punishment could be imposed and as Section 10(m) of CRPF  Act  provides  the
minor punishment issue in that field, we are  of  the  view  that  dismissal
being a major punishment should not have been  passed  by  the  Disciplinary
Authority.

8.    Considering all the issues, we are quashing the order of dismissal  as
well as the order of confirmation of such by  the  Appellate  Authority  and
remanding the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority  under  the  service
regulation of the delinquent to decide the quantum of  punishment  as  would
be commensurating with the charge of misconduct as admitted,  which  invites
only minor punishment.”

21.   The aforesaid analysis reveals that the  Division  Bench  has  clearly
held that the delinquent employee, being a member of the  Force,  could  not
have left the camp without prior permission.  It  has  also  opined  when  a
personnel is posted in a camp, he is not free to  move  as  per  his  choice
even during the period when he is not on duty.   However,  as  is  manifest,
the Division Bench  has  opined  that  the  imposition  of  dismissal  as  a
punishment, which is a major  one,  could  not  have  been  imposed  by  the
disciplinary  authority.   The  said  opinion  has  been  expressed  without
referring to the position of law that has been  clearly  laid  down  in  the
case of Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra).  Thus, the basic  premise  is  erroneous.
In the impugned order, the writ court has,  after  reproducing  the  passage
from Akhilesh Kumar (supra), opined that the controversy is covered  by  the
judgment  rendered  by  the  High  Court  of  Calcutta.   It  is   extremely
significant to note that the learned Single  Judge  has  not  even  made  an
effort to appreciate the decision in Ghulam Mohd. Bhat  (supra)  though  the
same was relied upon by  the  learned  first  appellate  Judge.   Thrust  of
reasoning of the first appellate  court  was  that  a  major  punishment  of
dismissal could be imposed in law.  It is quite unfortunate  that  the  High
Court has dislodged the finding  without  any  analysis  but  reproducing  a
passage from the Calcutta High Court which had not  referred  to  the  ratio
laid down by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ghulam  Mohd.  Bhat’s  case.
Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is  wholly  unsustainable.

22.   The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that even if  the
charges have been proven, the  punishment  of  dismissal  in  the  obtaining
factual matrix is absolutely harsh and shocking to the conscience.    It  is
his submission that the punishment  is  disproportionate.    The  respondent
was a part of the disciplined force.  He has left the campus  without  prior
permission, proceeded to the market, consumed  liquor  and  quarrelled  with
the civilians.  It has been established that he had consumed liquor  at  the
market place, and it has been also proven that  he  has  picked  up  quarrel
with the civilians.  It is not expected  of  a  member  of  the  disciplined
force to behave in this manner.  The submission, as has been noted  earlier,
is  that  the  punishment  is  absolutely  disproportionate.   The  test  of
proportionality has been explained by this Court in Om Kumar and  others  v.
Union of India[7],  Union of India  and  another  v.  G.  Ganayutham[8]  and
Union of  India  v.  Dwarka  Prasad  Tiwari[9].   In  Dwarka  Prasad  Tiwari
(supra), it has  been  held  that  unless  the  punishment  imposed  by  the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the  conscience  of
the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference.  When  a  member  of
the disciplined force deviates to such an extent  from  the  discipline  and
behaves in an untoward manner which is not conceived of, it is difficult  to
hold  that  the  punishment  of   dismissal   as   has   been   imposed   is
disproportionate and shocking to the judicial conscience.
23.   We are inclined to think so as a member of the disciplined force,  the
respondent was expected to follow the rules, have control over his mind  and
passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to  fly
in fancy.  It is not a mild deviation which human nature  would  grant  some
kind of lenience.  It is  a  conduct  in  public  which  has  compelled  the
authority  to  think  and,  rightly  so,  that  the  behaviour  is   totally
indisciplined.  The respondent, if we allow ourselves to say so,  has  given
indecent burial to self-control, diligence and strength  of  will-power.   A
disciplined man is expected, to quote a few lines from Mathew Arnold:-
“We cannot kindle when we will
The fire which in the heart resides,
The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides:
But tasks in hours of insight will’d
Can be through hours of gloom fulfill’d.

Though the context is slightly different, yet we  have  felt,  it  is  worth
reproducing.
24.   Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgment  and  decree  passed
by the High Court is set aside and that of  the  first  appellate  court  is
restored  and  the  suit  instituted  by  the  respondent/plaintiff   stands
dismissed.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, there  shall  be  no
order as to costs.
                                             .............................J.
                                                        [Dipak Misra]

                                             ..........................., J.
                                                        [N.V. Ramana]
New Delhi;
June 30, 2016


-----------------------
[1]    2003 (1) SCT 523
[2]    2003 (1) SCT 59
[3]    (2005) 13 SCC 228
[4]    2007 (6) SLR 438
[5]     (2001) 3 SCC 179
[6]    (2005) 2 SCC 500
[7]     (2001) 2 SCC 386
[8]     (1997) 7 SCC 463
[9]     (2006) 10 SCC 388

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