Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Special Leave Petition (Civil), 1878-1879 of 2009, Judgment Date: Feb 05, 2016

                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NOS.1878-1879 OF 2009


Suresh Narayan Kadam & Ors.                                   .…Petitioners

                                   versus

Central Bank of India & Ors.                                   …Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1.     The proceedings in these petitions as indeed the proceedings  in  the
Bombay High Court (out of which the present petitions have arisen)  indicate
a clear need for encouraging  an  amicable  settlement  process,  preferably
through mediation, in which the services of a mediator  well-versed  in  the
art, science and technique of mediation may  be  taken  advantage  of.   The
alternative, of course, is protracted litigation which may not be  the  best
alternative for the contesting  parties  or  for  a  society  that  requires
expeditious justice delivery.

2.     In his Foreword written on 12th April, 2011 to the first  edition  of
“Mediation Practice & Law –  The  path  to  successful  dispute  resolution”
written by Mr. Sriram Panchu, Senior Advocate  and  Mediator,  Mr.  Fali  S.
Nariman, a Senior Advocate of this Court and a respected jurist, writes:

“[T]he same subject matter of disputation between two parties can  be  dealt
with in two different ways, not necessarily exclusive: first, by  attempting
to resolve a dispute in such a way that the parties involved win as much  as
possible and lose as little as possible through the intervention of a  third
party steeped in the techniques of mediation;  and  second,  (failing  this)
the dispute would be left to be resolved by each party presenting  its  case
before a  disinterested  third  party  with  an  expectation  of  a  binding
decision  on  the  merits  of  the   case:   a   win-all   lose-all,   final
determination”.

The  second  alternative  may  not  be  the  best  alternative,  as  already
mentioned by us.
3.     The decision rendered by the High  Court  which  is  under  challenge
before us states that efforts were made to have  the  disputes  between  the
contesting parties settled but it is clear that no  institutional  mechanism
was invited to assist in the settlement process.  The proceedings before  us
also indicate that several efforts were made  to  encourage  the  contesting
parties to arrive at a settlement, and at one point of time the parties  did
reach an interim arrangement but  that  could  not  fructify  into  a  final
settlement only because  of  the  absence  of  an  intervention  through  an
institutional mechanism.  Appreciating this,  this  Court  has  consistently
encouraged  the  settlement  of  disputes   through   an   institutionalized
alternative dispute resolution  mechanism  and  there  are  at  least  three
significant decisions rendered by this Court on the subject. They  are:  (i)
Salem  Advocate  Bar  Assn.  (II)  v.  Union   of   India[1]   (ii)   Afcons
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd.[2] (iii)  K.
Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa.[3]
4.     That apart this Court has, on several  occasions,  referred  disputes
for amicable settlement through the  Mediation  Centre  functioning  in  the
Supreme Court premises itself and Mediation Centres across the country in  a
large variety of disputes including (primarily)  matrimonial  disputes.   In
spite of the encouragement given by this Court, for one reason  or  another,
institutionalized mediation has  yet  to  be  recognized  as  an  acceptable
method of dispute resolution provoking Mr. Fali S.  Nariman  to  comment  in
the same Foreword in the context of the  Afcon’s  decision  that  “Mediation
must stand on its own; its success judged on its own record, un-assisted  by
Judges.”
5.     With this prologue, it  is  necessary  to  state  the  facts  of  the
dispute before us. The Maharashtra Housing and  Area  Development  Authority
(MHADA) had constructed some buildings  for  the  lower  and  middle  income
groups in a complex known as Samata Nagar, Kandivli, Mumbai.  Each  building
had twenty flats. The Central Bank of India  (for  short  ‘the  Bank’)  took
possession of the land and ten such buildings on 16th August, 1982 with  the
intention of housing the families of a total  of  200  employees.   Pursuant
thereto, the Bank issued Circulars on 15th September,  1982  and  25th  May,
1983 relating to the policy of allotment of the flats to its Class  III  and
Class IV employees.
6.     The Circular dated 15th  September,  1982  provided  that  the  flats
would be allotted  to  employees  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Central
Office, Bombay Main Office and the Bombay Metropolitan Regional  Office.  It
also provided that the allotment would be as per the absolute discretion  of
the management and that the  facility  of  allotment  was  not  given  as  a
condition of service nor did any right vest in any staff member.

7.     The Circular dated 25th May, 1983 made some  minor  modifications  in
the eligibility for allotment but the sum  and  substance,  as  far  as  the
present proceedings are concerned, remained more or less the same.
8.     Based on the above broad principles, the allotment of flats was  made
to its employees by  the  Bank.   We  are  told  that  presently,  about  50
families are living in these flats, the rest being vacant.
9.     As earlier agreed upon by MHADA and the  Bank,  on  29th  July,  1994
MHADA leased out the land underneath the buildings to the Bank for a  period
of 90 years.  Some of the salient conditions mentioned  in  the  Lease  Deed
read as follows:-
“(h) Not to assign, sublet, underlet or  otherwise  transfer  in  any  other
manner whatsoever including parting with the possession of the whole or  any
part of the said land or its interest thereunder or benefit  of  this  lease
to any person or persons or change the user of the said  land  or  any  part
thereof without the previous written permission of the Authority.

(i)  To  use  the  said  land  and  the  tenements  in  the  said  buildings
constructed thereon for  the  purpose  of  residence  of  its  employees  as
service quarter only and for no other purpose.

(l) Not to make any excavation upon any part of the said  land  without  the
previous consent of the Authority in writing first obtained, except for  the
purpose  of  repairing  renovation  or  rebuilding  the  existing  structure
standing on the said land or utilization of permissible  F.S.I.  if  any  as
per Development control rules/regulations on the plot leased to  the  lessee
which is a part of a layout of village Poisar at Borivali Bombay."

10.    Apparently with a view to  redevelop  the  plot  by  demolishing  the
buildings purchased by the Bank, it appears that the Bank stopped  allotting
the flats from sometime in 1997 onwards and on or about 15th June,  2007  it
floated a  proposal  for  redevelopment  of  the  plot  by  demolishing  the
buildings.  The proposal for redevelopment necessitated the eviction of  the
employees from the flats occupied by  them.   Therefore,  sometime  in  July
2007 eviction notices were  issued  to  the  employees-allottees  under  the
provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Act,
1971 (for short “the Act”).
11.    Some of the employees contested the  proceedings  and  eventually  an
order was passed by the Estate Officer  appointed  under  the  Act  in  2008
rejecting all their submissions and they were directed to vacate the  public
premises within 15 days of the date of  publication  of  the  order  failing
which they were liable to be evicted, if need be, by the use of  such  force
as may be necessary.  The employees were also ordered to  pay  damages  with
effect from 15th June, 2007 till  the  date  of  handing  over  of  peaceful
possession of the public premises to  the  Bank  failing  which  the  amount
would be recovered as arrears of land revenue.
12.    Feeling aggrieved, the employees preferred appeals  under  Section  9
of the Act which came to be dismissed by the City Civil Court in  Bombay  in
June 2008.  The Appellate Authority dismissed all  the  appeals  with  costs
but stayed the order of eviction for a period of seven days  to  enable  the
employees to approach the Bombay High Court.
13.    The employees then approached the High Court by filing Writ  Petition
Nos.4417 of 2008 and 5589 of 2008 which  were  heard  by  a  learned  Single
Judge and dismissed by a  judgment  and  order  dated  19th  December,  2008
(impugned before us).
14.    The employees made the following four  submissions  before  the  High
Court:
MHADA had leased the land to the Bank for building residential quarters  for
Class IV employees;
the premises were part of  the  conditions  of  services  of  the  Class  IV
employees which could not be taken away by issuing a quit notice;
The  purpose  for  which  the  Bank  required  vacant  buildings   was   for
demolishing  them  in  order  to  build  new  buildings  for  housing  their
managerial staff; and
The notice for eviction did not spell  out  the  reasons  for  evicting  the
petitioners.
15.    Each of these contentions was rejected by the High Court  but  before
us, learned counsel for the petitioners effectively  pressed  only  the  1st
and 3rd contentions, being interlinked.
16.    At this stage, we must point out that the  High  Court  has  observed
that several adjournments  were  granted  to  the  parties  to  negotiate  a
settlement.  However, the parties failed to arrive at any settlement and  it
is for this reason that the High Court was compelled  to  deliver  judgment.
Before this Court also several efforts were made to arrive at some  kind  of
an amicable settlement including providing alternative accommodation to  the
employees or making  monthly  payment  to  them  in  lieu  of  the  allotted
premises.  However, for one reason or another despite best efforts  made  by
learned counsel for the parties, no settlement could be arrived at.
17.    At one stage, the following interim arrangement was broadly  accepted
by both the sides as noted in the order dated 29th November, 2010  but  even
that interim arrangement did not fructify  into  a  settlement  between  the
parties and it is for this reason that we too have been compelled to  decide
on the correctness or otherwise of the judgment  and  order  passed  by  the
High Court.
“(i)   49 employees (sub staff) are  occupying  units  spread  over  several
buildings.  Though most of the units are vacant, as some of  the  units  are
occupied, the Bank is not in a position to demolish the buildings  and  take
up development work which it proposes. In the circumstances, out of  the  49
employees, those who are allottees of quarters, will be shifted by the  Bank
to one or two buildings so that the Bank will be able to demolish the  other
buildings and take up the development.

(ii)   It is made clear that if any family  members  of  deceased  allottees
(who have been given  compassionate  appointment)  are  continuing  in  such
units,  they  will  not  be  entitled  to  alternative  accommodation.  Such
occupants will have to vacate.

(iii)  The Bank will, in the meanwhile, continue  its  efforts  to  identify
alternative premises for those who are being shifted to the two buildings.”

18.    There is no doubt that none  of  the  employees  have  any  right  to
retain the allotted premises, more particularly since the allotment was  not
a part of their  condition  of  service.   This  is  quite  clear  from  the
Circulars dated 15th September, 1982 and 25th May,  1983.   That  apart,  no
right based submission was made before us.  That being the position,  it  is
really difficult  to  appreciate  the  basis  on  which  the  employees  are
claiming an entitlement to continue in the allotted premises.
19.    It was submitted before us that the land was leased out by the  MHADA
to the Bank for the purposes of housing middle  income  group  employees  or
lower income group employees.  As a result of the  redevelopment  plan,  the
Bank was intending  to  demolish  the  buildings  and  to  construct  luxury
apartments for their  managerial  level  officers,  contrary  to  the  lease
agreement with MHADA.   Assuming this to be so, if there is a  violation  of
the provisions of the lease deed between the  MHADA  and  the  Bank,  it  is
really for them to settle their differences, if any.  The employees  do  not
come into the picture at all.
20.    The various clauses in the lease agreement that  have  been  referred
to do not in any manner involve the employees  and  for  them  to  raise  an
issue about any alleged violation of the provisions of  the  lease  deed  is
totally inconsequential.  This is not a  public  interest  litigation  where
the rule relating  to  standing  can  be  relaxed.   We  are  therefore  not
inclined to accept this submission of the employees  that  since  the  MHADA
had leased out the land to the Bank  for  housing  middle  income  group  or
lower income group employees, the Bank is disentitled from  demolishing  the
buildings and constructing luxury  apartments  for  their  managerial  level
officers.
21.    The second argument advanced by the employees is really  a  different
facet of the first argument and since we do not find any basis  at  all  for
the grievance of the employees against  either  the  MHADA  or  against  the
Bank, we reject this submission as well.
22.    Under these circumstances, we find no merit in  these  petitions  and
therefore decline to  grant  special  leave  to  appeal  and  dismiss  these
petitions but with no order as to costs.
23.     Since  the  employees  have  been  residing  in  the  flats  for   a
considerable period of time, we grant  them  time  to  vacate  the  premises
allotted to them on or before 31st March, 2016.  We expect the employees  to
peacefully vacate the allotted premises and if there is some  difficulty  in
this regard, the Bank is at liberty to  approach  the  High  Court  for  the
implementation of its order of eviction.
24.    We may also  note  that  the  Bank  has  demanded  damages  from  the
employees both who are still working  with  the  Bank  and  those  who  have
retired.  In our opinion, since the employees were pursuing  their  remedies
before the High Court as well as before this  Court,  we  do  not  think  it
appropriate to direct them to pay any damages to the Bank for  the  use  and
occupation of the premises allotted  nor  do  we  think  it  appropriate  to
permit the Bank to recover the damages awarded against the employees.

                                                               ..……………………..J
                                                            (Madan B. Lokur)



                                                                  ………………………J
New Delhi;                                                    (R.K. Agrawal)
February 5, 2016
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[1]  (2005) 6 SCC 344
[2]  (2010) 8 SCC 24
[3]  (2013) 5 SCC 226