STATE OF U.P Vs. CHARAN SINGH
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Civil), 2381 of 2007, Judgment Date: Mar 26, 2015
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2381 OF 2007
STATE OF U.P .........APPELLANT
Vs.
CHARAN SINGH .........RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and final order
dated 18.07.2006, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2588 of 1998, whereby the High Court has
upheld and modified the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal dated
24.02.1997 in Adjudication Case No.139 of 1992.
The factual matrix and the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the
parties are briefly stated hereunder with a view to find out whether the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court warrants interference by this
Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
The respondent was appointed as a temporary Tube-well Operator w.e.f.
06.03.1974 by the Assistant Director of Fisheries Department, Meerut (U.P).
His services were terminated vide letter dated 22.08.1975 stating thereby
that he was a temporary employee and that his services were no longer
required by the Department. He was given one month's wages in lieu of the
notice. On 01.05.1976, the respondent filed a petition before the
Conciliation Officer, Meerut, stating therein that the respondent's
employment has been wrongfully terminated by the appellant as he is a
permanent employee of the Fisheries Department and the provisions under
Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act"), which are mandatory in nature, have not been
complied with and as such, the termination of the services of the
respondent by the appellant is illegal. The matter was transferred from the
Conciliation Officer to the Labour Commissioner, Kanpur for adjudication.
The respondent made several representations before various high offices and
courts including this Court wherein, the same was forwarded to the
Secretary, U.P. State Legal Aid and Advisory Board on 09.09.1986 to take
necessary action in this regard, which instead directed the respondent to
contact the Sabhapati, District Judge, District Law Assistance and
Consultant, Civil Court premises, Meerut for consultation.
Thereafter, the respondent moved an application before the State Government
for the reference of the industrial dispute under the provisions of Section
4-K of the Act and the State Government vide notification no.14499-502 MRIR
OP 395/91, dated 24.10.1992 referred the dispute to the Industrial
Tribunal, Meerut, thereby framing the following questions for its
determination:
Whether the services of the workman has been illegally terminated, and
Whether there is any violation of Section 6-N of the Act?
The Industrial Tribunal after considering the evidence on record and the
rival legal contentions of both the parties has answered the questions
referred to it, in favour of the respondent, stating thereby that the
termination of the services of the workman was illegal and was liable to be
set aside. The Industrial Tribunal directed the appellant to reinstate the
respondent on any post equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator. The
Industrial Tribunal passed an Award for the reinstatement of the workman
w.e.f. 24.02.1997. However, the workman was not granted any back wages.
In Pursuance of the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant
offered a letter of appointment to the respondent workman vide its order
dated 03.05.1999 to the post of fisherman in the pay-scale of 2610-60-3150-
65-3400/-. However, the respondent workman did not join his duties to the
said post even after repeated reminders from the appellant. The appellant
thereafter, filed a Misc. Writ Petition before the High Court contending
that the respondent workman has been reinstated on the post of "Machhuwa",
which they claimed was equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator. Since
the respondent workman did not respond to several letters of the appellant
which was calling him back for work, he is not entitled to any wages for
the period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 on the principle "no work no pay". The
High Court however, rejected the contention of the appellant and held that
the State Government had kept the workman out of job for many years and
therefore, the State Government is liable to pay the entire amount due to
the workman for the above mentioned period.
Aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and order, the present appeal is
filed by the appellant with a prayer to set aside the same and requested
this Court to pass such order as this Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case by urging various facts and legal
contentions.
It has been contended by Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, the learned Additional Advocate
General (AAG) on behalf of the appellant that the High Court has
erroneously disposed of the writ petition in view of the fact that as per
the order dated 03.05.1999 passed by the office of the Deputy Director of
Fisheries, Meerut, the respondent was given appointment to the post of
fisherman (Machhua) in the pay-scale of 2610-60-3150-65-3400/-, which is
equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator. He has further contended that
the post held by the respondent as a Tube-well Operator was temporary and
was not a sanctioned post as he was assigned the same as per the
availability of work in the Department. Even after his appointment for the
post of fisherman, as per the above said order, the respondent did not take
charge of the aforesaid post stating that it is not equivalent to the post
of a Tube-well Operator, in spite of several letters and reminders sent by
the appellant to him in pursuance of the Award passed by the Industrial
Tribunal.
It has been further contended by the learned AAG for the appellant that the
Department of Fisheries does not come under the definition of "Industry" as
defined under Section 2(k) of the Act, as has been decided by this Court in
the cases of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Arun kumar Singh[1] and Bombay
Telephone Canteen Employees Association, Prabhadevi Tel. Exchange v. U.O.I
& Anr.[2].
It has been further contended by the learned AAG that the respondent has
not contributed in his services to the post of fisherman and therefore, as
per the "no work no pay" principle, as held by this Court in a catena of
cases, the respondent is not entitled to any monetary benefits under
Section 6-H of the Act for the period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 as awarded
by the High Court. Thus, the findings of both the courts below are
erroneous and suffer from error in law and therefore, the same cannot be
allowed to be sustained by this Court.
On the other hand, it has been contended by Mr. G.V.Rao, the learned
counsel on behalf of the respondent that the termination of the services of
the respondent is bad in law as his services have been illegally terminated
on the ground that he is a temporary employee. He has further contended
that the services provided by the appellant is fully covered within the
ambit of the Act and the termination of the services of the respondent-
workman from his services amounts to retrenchment and since he has worked
for more than 240 days in one calendar year, he is entitled to the benefits
as provided under the provision of Section 6-N of the Act. Since, the
appellant has not complied with the provisions of the Act, as such, the
termination order of the respondent dated 22.8.1975 is liable to be quashed
and he is entitled for reinstatement with back wages, as the post of a
fisherman is not equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator.
We have heard both the parties. On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties and the evidence on record, we
have come to the conclusion that the High Court has rightly held that the
State is liable to pay the entire amount due to the workman for the period
24.2.1997 to 31.1.2005, as the State has kept the workman out of job for
many years arbitrarily and unreasonably despite the Award of reinstatement
of the respondent on an equivalent post which was passed by the Industrial
Tribunal. Thus, not reporting for the duty of fisherman offered to him by
the appellant cannot be said to be unjustified on the part of the
respondent. In support of the above said conclusions arrived at by us, we
record our reasons hereunder:-
It has already been rightly held by the Industrial Tribunal that the
Department of Fisheries is covered under the definition of "Industry" as
defined under Section 2(k) of the Act and also in accordance with the
statement of R.W.1 and E.W.1, Shri. R.B.Mathur, on behalf of the appellant
before the Industrial Tribunal, because the object of the establishment of
the appellant-department is fulfilled by engaging employees and that the
department is run on a regular basis. Thus, the matter of termination of
the services of the workman of the said department can be legally
adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal as the matter is covered under the
provisions of the Act read with the Second Schedule in Entry No.10. Thus,
it has been rightly held by the courts below that the dispute raised by the
workman in relation to the termination of his services by the appellant is
an industrial dispute.
Further, it is a well established fact that the respondent-workman has
continuously worked for 240 days in a calendar year and the Industrial
Tribunal has rightly recorded the finding of fact on the basis of pleadings
and evidence on record holding that the work which was being done by the
respondent-workman still continues to exist in the establishment of the
appellant, which fact has been admitted by the respondent as well as the
witnesses of the employer before the Industrial Tribunal. Further, Shri.
R.B.Mathur has clearly deposed before the Industrial Tribunal that the work
of Tube-well Operator has now been taken over by other workmen, such as
"Machhuwa" and that some Tube-well Operators were appointed on other posts
as well. Thus, in view of the statements made above by him, it is amply
clear that the required conditions under the provisions of Sections 6-N and
6-W of the Act were not complied with by the appellant and the only
contention of the appellant-department is that one month's salary was paid
to the workman concerned treating him to be a temporary employee. This
contention of the learned AAG on behalf of the appellant, however, is not
sustainable in law and the same has rendered the order of termination of
the services of the respondent-workman illegal and therefore, both the
courts below have rightly set aside the same and passed an Award of
reinstatement and back wages, respectively. However, not awarding back
wages to the respondent by the Industrial Tribunal and awarding of the same
by the High Court for the period between 24.2.1997 to 31.1.2005 only, has
been done without assigning any cogent reason even though he is gainfully
employed and lawfully entitled for the same from the date of termination
from his services, i.e. 22.08.1975, which cannot be said to be valid in
law. Therefore, the judgment and Award passed by the courts below with
regard to his reinstatement on a post equivalent to the post of Tube-well
Operator and denial of payment of back wages from the date of his
termination, i.e. 22.08.1975 is wholly untenable in law as the same is
contrary to the well established principles of law and the same is required
to be modified by awarding back wages.
The learned AAG has further contended that the termination of the services
of the workman was made in view of the Government order dated 30.07.1975,
by which the post of the Tube-well Operator was abolished and the
termination letter was served on the respondent-workman as he was a
temporary employee. However, these reasons were not stated in his
termination letter dated 22.08.1975 by the appellant and instead, it was
mentioned that his services were no longer required which tantamount to
retrenchment of the respondent as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act.
Thus, the contention of the appellant cannot be accepted by us in this
regard, in view of the untenable reason stated in the letter of termination
of the services of the respondent-workman. Further, the Government order
dated 30.07.1975, clearly stated that in place of Tube-well Operator, the
post of Nalkoop Mechanic, class IV employee, was being created that would
carry out the work of the Tube-well Operator. Hence, the post of the Tube-
well Operator was not abolished but only the name of the post was changed,
as rightly held by the Industrial Tribunal.
Therefore, in view of the above stated facts and also on a perusal of the
reasons given by the Industrial Tribunal in its Award on the contentious
point, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the termination
of the services of the workman was done in accordance with above mentioned
Government order cannot be accepted by us as the same is erroneous in law.
The fact that the persons junior to him as well as his contemporaries are
still working for the appellant-department, shows that the termination of
the services of the respondent has been done in an unreasonable and unfair
manner.
Now, coming to the question of the entitlement of back wages to the
respondent workman, the same is answered in the positive, in view of the
fact that the workman had refused to accept the new job as fisherman which
was offered to him pursuant to the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal
on the ground that the said post is not equivalent to the post of the Tube-
well Operator. Even though the appellant had agreed to comply with the
terms of the Award dated 24.02.1997 passed by the Industrial Tribunal and
had offered reinstatement to him, it is well within the right of the
workman to refuse the new job offered to him and the same cannot be said to
be unjustified or erroneous on the part of the respondent-workman.
In the present case, there has been an absence of cogent evidence adduced
on record by the appellant to justify the termination of the services of
the respondent-workman, who has been aggrieved by the non-awarding of back
wages from the date of termination till the date of passing the Award by
the Industrial Tribunal. There is no justification for the Industrial
Tribunal to deny the back wages for the said period without assigning any
cogent and valid reasons. Therefore, the denial of back wages to the
respondent even though the Industrial Tribunal has recorded its finding on
the contentious question no.1 in the affirmative in his favour and in the
absence of evidence of gainful employment of the respondent during the
relevant period, amounts to arbitrary exercise of power by the Industrial
Tribunal for no fault of the respondent and the same is contrary to law as
laid down by this Court in a catena of cases. Hence, it is a fit case for
this Court to exercise its power under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, to award back wages to the respondent, even though
the respondent has not filed a separate writ petition questioning that
portion of the Award wherein no back wages were awarded to him by the
Courts below for the relevant period. The respondent has got a right to
place reliance upon the said provision of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908
and show to this Court that the findings recorded by both the Courts below
in denying back wages for the relevant period of time in the impugned
judgment and Award is bad in law as the same is not only erroneous but also
error in law. Therefore, in accordance with the power exercised by this
Court under Order XLI Rule 33 of this Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and in the
light of the judgment of this Court in Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v.
Basanti Devi and Anr[3]., we hold that the State Government is liable to
pay 50% of the back wages to the respondent from the date of his
termination order dated 22.08.1975 till the date of the Award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal, i.e. 24.02.1997. The relevant paragraphs of the above
referred judgment reads thus:
"17. In our approach we can also draw strength from the provisions of Rule
33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as under:
"33. Power of Court of Appeal.-The appellate court shall have power to pass
any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and
to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may
require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that
the appeal is a part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of
all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or
parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there
have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in
one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an
appeal may not have been filed against such decrees:
Provided that the appellate court shall not make any order under Section 35-
A, in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree the
appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order."
18. This provision was explained by this Court in Mahant Dhangir v. Madan
Mohan in the following words:
"The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any
question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between
respondent and co-respondents. The appellate court could pass any decree or
order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The
appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may
require. The words 'as the case may require' used in Rule 33 of Order 41
have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass any order
or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint?
We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule
itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be
these: That the parties [pic]before the lower court should be there before
the appellate court. The question raised must properly arise out of the
judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the
appellate court could consider any objection against any part of the
judgment or decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party to the
appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate court under Rule 33 is
discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to
determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between
the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on
mere technicalities."
Further, the learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his legal
submissions with regard to back wages has rightly placed reliance on the
decision of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya[4], wherein this Court has held thus:
"22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held
before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the
employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but
for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a
person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service
cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order
which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the
latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned,
but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the
source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all
opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family
has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid
starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum
decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The
reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the
competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by
the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the
principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back
wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest
his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to
specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the
employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The
denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act
of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned
and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back
wages including the emoluments."
(emphasis laid down by this Court)
He has further placed reliance on the decision of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v.
Hindalco Industries Ltd.[5], wherein this Court has held thus:
"36. On the issue of back wages to be awarded in favour of the appellant,
it has been held by this Court in Shiv Nandan Mahto v. State of Bihar that
if [pic]a workman is kept out of service due to the fault or mistake of the
establishment/company he was working in, then the workman is entitled to
full back wages for the period he was illegally kept out of service. The
relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:
"8. ... In fact, a perusal of the aforesaid short order passed by the
Division Bench would clearly show that the High Court had not even
acquainted itself with the fact that the appellant was kept out of service
due to a mistake. He was not kept out of service on account of suspension,
as wrongly recorded by the High Court. The conclusion is, therefore,
obvious that the appellant could not have been denied the benefit of back
wages on the ground that he had not worked for the period when he was
illegally kept out of service. In our opinion, the appellant was entitled
to be paid full back wages for the period he was kept out of service."
37. Further, in Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, the three-Judge Bench of
this Court considered the question whether back wages should be awarded to
the workman in each and every case of illegal retrenchment. The relevant
paragraph reads as under:
"8. There is no rule of thumb that in every case where the Industrial
Tribunal gives a finding that the termination of service was in violation
of Section 25-F of the Act, entire back wages should be awarded. A host of
factors like the manner and method of selection and appointment i.e.
whether after proper advertisement of the vacancy or inviting applications
from the employment exchange, nature of appointment, namely, whether ad
hoc, short term, daily wage, temporary or permanent in character, any
special qualification required for the job and the like should be weighed
and balanced in taking a decision regarding award of back wages. One of the
important factors, which has to be taken into consideration, is the length
of service, which the workman had rendered with the employer. If the
workman has rendered a considerable period of service and his services are
wrongfully terminated, he may be awarded full or partial back wages keeping
in view the fact that at his age and the qualification possessed by him he
may not be in a position to get another employment. However, where the
total length of service rendered by a workman is very small, the award of
back wages for the complete period i.e. from the date of termination till
the date of the award, which our experience shows is often quite large,
would be wholly inappropriate. Another important factor, which requires to
be taken into consideration is the nature of employment. A regular service
of permanent character cannot be compared to short or intermittent daily-
wage employment though it may be for 240 days in a calendar year.""
Thus, in view of the cases referred to supra, there was absolutely no
justification on the part of the Industrial Tribunal to deny back wages to
the respondent even when it is found that the order of termination is void
ab initio in law for non-compliance of the mandatory provisions under
Section 6-N of the Act. Keeping in view the fact that the period of
termination was in the year 1975 and the matter has been unnecessarily
litigated by the employer by contesting the matter before the Industrial
Tribunal as well as the High Court and this Court for more than 40 years,
and further, even after the Award/order of reinstatement was passed by the
Industrial Tribunal directing the employer to give him the post equivalent
to the post of Tube-well Operator, the same has been denied to him by
offering the said post which is not equivalent to the post of Tube-well
Operator and thereby, attributing the fault on the respondent for non
reporting to the post offered to him, which is once again unjustified on
the part of the employer.
Thus, the principle "no work no pay" as observed by this Court in the
catena of cases does not have any significance to the fact situation of the
present case as the termination of the services of the workman from the
post of Tube-well Operator is erroneous in law in the first place, as held
by us in view of the above stated reasons.
The respondent and his family members have been suffering for more than
four decades as the source of their livelihood has been arbitrarily
deprived by the appellant. Thereby, the Right to Liberty and Livelihood
guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been
denied to the respondent by the appellant as held in the case of Olga
Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors[6]., wherein this
Court has held thus:
"32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main
plank of their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by
Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be
deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and
pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their
life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will
assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are
evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood.
Upon that assumption, the question which [pic]we have to consider is
whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one
answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to
life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean
merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by
the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to
procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life.
An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood
because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means
of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the
constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his
right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the
point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its
effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to
live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the
procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as
a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live,
leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral
component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood
and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the
massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate
because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force
which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is
the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable
is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They
have to eat to live: only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat.
That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood.
That is the context in which it was said by Douglas, J. in Baksey that the
right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the
most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and
the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J.
in Munn v. Illinois means something more than mere animal existence and the
inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and
faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with
approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P."
(emphasis laid down by this Court)
Therefore, with respect to the judicial decisions of this Court referred to
supra, we hold that the appellant is liable to pay 50% back wages in favour
of the respondent from the date of the termination order dated 22.08.1975
till the date of the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, i.e.
24.02.1997.
In so far as the awarding of full back wages to the respondent by the High
Court in its judgment and order dated 18.07.2006 for the period 24.02.1997
to 31.01.2005 is concerned, we retain the same. The appellant is further
directed to pay full back wages to the respondent after computing the same
on the basis of the revised pay-scale and pay him all other monetary
benefits as well. The aforesaid direction shall be complied with by the
appellant within four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this
order.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with modification regarding back wages
as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The order dated 11.12.2006
granting stay shall stand vacated. No costs.
.....................................................................J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
.....................................................................J.
[R.BANUMATHI]
New Delhi,
March 26, 2015
ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.9 SECTION XV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 2381/2007
STATE OF U.P Appellant(s)
VERSUS
CHARAN SINGH Respondent(s)
Date : 26/03/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT
today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, AAG
Mr. Gaurav Srivastava, Adv.
Mr. Utkarsh Jaiswal, Adv.
Ms. Pragati Neekhra,Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Devendra Singh,Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of
the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed Reportable
Judgment.
(VINOD KR.JHA) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1]
[2] (1995) Supp (4) SCC 241
[3]
[4] (1997) 6 SCC 723
[5]
[6] (1999) 8 SCC 229
[7]
[8] (2013) 10 SCC 324
[9]
[10] (2014) 11 SCC 85
[11]
[12](1985)3 SCC 545