Tags NDPS Sentence

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 1233 of 2006, Judgment Date: Jun 29, 2016

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1233 OF 2006

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                          ... APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

JAG RAJ SINGH @ HANSA                                      ... RESPONDNET

                               J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

      This appeal has been filed by  the  State  of  Rajasthan  against  the
judgment of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur  in  S.B.
Criminal Appeal No.98 of 2001 dated 24.11.2003 acquitting the  accused  from
the charges under Section  8/15  of  the  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'NDPS Act') after   setting
aside the judgment and conviction order  of  Special  Judge,  (NDPS  Cases),
Hanumangarh, Rajasthan  dated  31.5.2000  by  which  judgment  accused  were
sentenced to undergo  12  years  rigorous  imprisonment  with  fine  of  Rs.
1,20,000/- each. Accused were to go further  rigorous  imprisonment  of  one
year each in case of not depositing the fine. Accused Kishan Lal  had  filed
Single Bench Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 2000 and accused Jagraj Singh  alias
Hansa had filed Single Bench Criminal  Appeal  No.  98  of  2001.  Both  the
appeals having been allowed by the High  Court  of  Rajasthan,  this  appeal
being Criminal Appeal No. 1233 of 2006  has  been  filed  by  the  State  of
Rajasthan against the acquittal of Jagraj Singh alias  Hansa.  The  Criminal
Appeal No. 1232 of 2006 has already been dismissed by this court.
2.    The prosecution case in the  nutshell  is:  Shishupal  Singh,  Station
House Officer, Bhadra received a secret information on 9th  August, 1998  at
8 P.M. that a blue jeep car  No. HR 24-4057  would  come  and  pass  through
Haryana via Sirsa. A memo  was  prepared  regarding  the  above  information
which was also entered into Roznamacha and information was also conveyed  to
the Circle Officer, Nohar at 8:05 p.m. on the same day through a  constable.
Station House Officer along with certain other  police  personnel  proceeded
after taking two independent witnesses namely Hawa Singh  and  Karam  Singh.
At 10:15 p.m. Jeep HR 24-4057 was seen coming from  Sahaba.  It  was  stated
that one driver and two other persons were sitting who told their  names  as
Jagraj Singh and Kishan Lal. Bags were lying in  the  jeep.   Station  House
Officer gave notice to Jagraj and Krishan  Lal  and  thereafter  search  was
conducted. Nine bags containing opium powder were recovered  from  the  jeep
for which the accused were having no licence. Opium powder was  weighed  and
two samples of 200 grams each were taken from each  bag.  Seizure  memo  was
prepared on the spot. Both the persons were arrested.  Material  was  sealed
and after reaching the police station first  information  report  being  FIR
No.  291/98  was  registered.  Samples  were  sent   to   Forensic   Science
Laboratory, Jaipur and on  receiving  a  positive  report,  chargesheet  was
filed  against  both  the  accused  under  section  8/15  of  the  Act.  The
prosecution  produced  12  witnesses  including   Station   House   Officer,
Shishupal Singh as PD-11. Two independent witnesses PD-2 Hawa singh and  PD-
3 Karam Singh were declared hostile.  Prosecution  also  produced  documents
Exh. P1 to P40. Statements of accused were recorded  under  Section  313  of
Cr. P.C.  Sri Ram Meena  the then Circle  Officer,  Nohar  was  examined  as
defence witness-1.
3.     Before  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  accused  contended  that  the
mandatory provisions of Section 42(1) and 42 (2) as well as  Section  50  of
the NDPS Act have not been complied with;  both  the  independent  witnesses
have not supported the status of recovery and that entire action  had  taken
place at police station; the chain of event is not present so as to  convict
the  accused.   The  test  report  is  not  admissible  and  readable.   The
contentions  of  accused  were  refuted  by  the  learned   Special   Public
Prosecutor.  Learned  Sessions  Judge  held  that  information  received  by
Station House Officer was recorded as Exh. P-14 and the  same  was  sent  to
Circle Officer, Nohar by Exhibit P-15. Hence, the Station House Officer  has
fully complied with the provisions of Sections 42(1)  and  42(2).   Sessions
Judge further held that the vehicle was being used to  transport  passengers
as has been clearly stated by PW-4 Veera Ram, hence, as per  explanation  to
Section  43 of the NDPS Act,  vehicle  was  covered  within  the   ambit  of
public place. Therefore, there was no need of any warrant  or  authority  to
search.  Learned Sessions Judge also found  that  Section  50  was  complied
since notices were issued to both the accused before search. Sessions  Judge
noted that although both the independent witnesses have turned  hostile  but
the police officers and officials  have  been  examined  on  behalf  of  the
prosecution with whom the fact of enmity has  not  been  proved.   Chain  of
event was complete.  After  coming  to  the  aforesaid  conclusion,  learned
Sessions Judge convicted both the accused.
4.    Both the Criminal Appeals filed by Kishan Lal and  Jagraj  Singh  were
decided by a common judgment of the High Court dated  24.11.2003.  The  High
Court while allowing the appeal gave following reasons and findings:
(i) The secret information which was recorded as Exh. P-14 and in Exh.  P-21
Roznamacha it was not mentioned that “two persons will  come  from  Jhunjhnu
who are carrying powder of opium”, whereas Exh.P-15,  the  information  sent
to  the Circle Officer, Nohar which was also  received  by  Circle  Officer,
Nohar  the above fact was mentioned which was missing in the Exh.  P-14  and
P-21.  In view of the above,  Section 42(2) was not complied with.
(ii) The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section  42  provides  that  if  such
officer has reasons to believe, he may carry the search after recording  the
grounds of belief whereas  no  ground  of  belief  as  contemplated  by  the
proviso was recorded in the present case and search  took  place  after  sun
set which violates the provisions of Section 42(2) proviso.

(iii) The jeep which was the personal jeep of Viraram could not  be  treated
as public transport vehicle. No evidence was  brought  on  the  record  that
there was any permit for public transport vehicle. The  brother  in  law  of
Viraram i.e. Kartararam do not support the  case  that  the  vehicle  was  a
public transport vehicle. Section 43 of the Act was not  applicable;  hence,
the view  of  the  court  below  that  compliance  of  Section  42  was  not
necessary,  is incorrect.
(iv)  Further,  the  secret  information  from  informer  was  received  and
recorded and search was conducted thereafter. The present was not a case  of
conducting the search at public place suddenly.
(v)  The sealing of the material sample was not proper  nor  the  sample  of
seal was deposited in the stock house. The  seal  vide  which  material  has
been sealed has not been kept safe any where, it remained in the  possession
of the officer who conducted the search.
(vi) The independent witnesses have not supported the  case  of  prosecution
at all.

5.    The State of Rajasthan feeling aggrieved against the judgment  of  the
High Court has come up in this appeal. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant
has contended that there was compliance of provisions of Section  42(1)  and
(2) of Section 42 and moreover, the vehicle being used to  carry  passengers
as has come in the statement of the owner of the vehicle Vira Ram  PW-4  and
the search being at public place,  by virtue of  Section  43  there  was  no
necessity of compliance of Section 42. It is further  contended  that  minor
discrepancy in Exh. P-14 and that of Exh. P-15 was inadvertent  mistake  due
to which it cannot  be  said  that  provisions  of  Section  42(1)  was  not
complied with. It is contended that Station House Officer and  other  police
personnel accompanying the team have been examined and they have proved  the
recovery and chain  of  events.  The  High  Court  has  committed  error  in
acquitting the accused whereas there was sufficient ground and  material  to
support the conviction order recorded by the Special Judge.
6.    The learned counsel appearing  for  the  accused  have  supported  the
judgment of the High Court and submits  that  compliance  of  provisions  of
Section 42(1) and 42(2) have been held to be mandatory  by  this  Court  and
due to non compliance  of the said provisions, the  conviction  has  rightly
been set aside by the High Court. It is submitted that  Section  43  of  the
Act is  not  attracted  since  the  search  was  conducted  after  recording
information  from  informer  and  Station  House  Officer  himself  in   his
statement had stated the facts for proving compliance of Section 42,  hence,
it cannot be said that compliance of Section 42 was  not  required  more  so
the jeep was personal jeep of Vira Ram and High Court has rightly held  that
there was no material to prove that jeep was a public transport vehicle.  No
permit from transport authority to ply the vehicle  as  a  public  transport
vehicle had been filed or even pleaded.
7.    We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the  parties
and have perused the record.
8.    Whether the High Court committed error in acquitting  the  accused  is
the issue which needs to be considered in this appeal.  Whether  there  were
sufficient material to support the findings of the High Court regarding non-
compliance of Section 42(1) and Section 42 (2) and whether  Section  43  was
applicable in the present case  are  the  other  issues  which  need  to  be
answered. Whether recovery as claimed by the prosecution is  supported  from
the evidence on record and material and samples  were  properly  sealed  are
other related issues.
9.    The NDPS Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating  to
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and  regulation
of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic  substances.  This
Court had occasion to consider the provisions of NDPS Act  in  large  number
of cases. This Court has noted that the  object  of  NDPS  Act  is  to  make
stringent provisions for control and regulation of  operations  relating  to
those drugs and substances. At the same time, to avoid harm to the  innocent
persons and to avoid abuse  of  the  provisions  by  the  officers,  certain
safeguards are provided which in the context have to be  observed  strictly.
This Court in State Of  Punjab  vs  Balbir  Singh,  1994  (3)  SCC  299,  in
paragraph 15 has made the following observations:
“15.The object of NDPS Act is to make stringent provisions for  control  and
regulation of operations relating to those  drugs  and  substances.  At  the
same time, to avoid harm to the innocent persons and to avoid abuse  of  the
provisions by the officers, certain safeguards are  provided  which  in  the
context have to be observed strictly. Therefore  these  provisions  make  it
obligatory that such of those officers mentioned therein,  on  receiving  an
information, should reduce the same to writing and also record  reasons  for
the belief while carrying  out  arrest  or  search  as  provided  under  the
proviso to Section 42(1). To that extent they  are  mandatory.  Consequently
the failure to comply with these requirements thus affects  the  prosecution
case and therefore vitiates the trial.”

10.   To the similar effect are the observations of  this  Court  in  Saiyad
Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyed & others vs. The State Of  Gujarat,  (1995)  3  SCC
610. Following was stated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment:
“6. It is to be noted that under the NDPS Act punishment  for  contravention
of its provisions can extend to  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a  term  which
shall not be less than IO years but which May extend to 20  years  and  also
to fine which shall not be less than Rupees one lakh but  which  may  extend
to Rupees two lakhs, and the court is empowered to impose a  fine  exceeding
Rupees two lakhs for reasons to be recorded in its judgment. Section  54  of
the NDPS Act shifts the onus of proving his innocence upon the  accused;  it
states that in trials under the NDPS Act it  may  be  presumed,  unless  and
until the contrary is Proved, that  an  accused  has  committed  an  offence
under it in respect of the articles covered by it  "for  the  possession  of
which he fails to  account  satisfactorily".  Having  regard  to  the  grave
consequences that may entail the possession of illicit ar- ticles under  the
NDPS Act, namely, the shifting of the onus to the  accused  and  the  severe
punishment to which he becomes  liable,  the  legislature  has  enacted  the
safeguard  contained  in  Section  50.  To  obviate  any  doubt  as  to  the
possession by the accused of  illicit  articles  under  the  NDPS  Act,  the
accused is authorised to require  the  search  for  such  possession  to  be
conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate.”

11.   In the present case, Section 42 is  relevant  which  is  extracted  as
below:
“ 42. Power  of  entry,  search,  seizure  and  arrest  without  warrant  or
authorisation.-(l) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to  a
peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central  excise,  narcotics,
customs, revenue  intelligence  or  any  other  department  of  the  Central
Government including para-military forces or armed forces  as  is  empowered
in this behalf by general or special order by  the  Central  Government,  or
any such officer (being an officer superior in rank  to  a  peon,  sepoy  or
constable) of the revenue, drugs   control,  excise,  police  or  any  other
department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf  by  general
or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to  believe  from
persons knowledge or information given by  any  person  and  taken  down  in
writing that any narcotic drug, or  psychotropic  substance,  or  controlled
substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has  been
committed or any document or other article which  may  furnish  evidence  of
the commission of such offence or any illegally  acquired  property  or  any
document or  other  article  which  may  furnish  evidence  of  holding  any
illegally acquired property which is  liable  for  seizure  or  freezing  or
forfeiture under Chapter V A of  this  Act  is  kept  or  concealed  in  any
building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between sunrise and sunset,
(a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place;

(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove  any  obstacle  to
such entry;

(c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in  the  manufacture
thereof and any other article and any animal  or  conveyance  which  he  has
reason to believe to be liable  to  confiscation  under  this  Act  and  any
document or other article  which  he  has  reason  to  believe  may  furnish
evidence of the commission of any  offence  punishable  under  this  Act  or
furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is  liable
for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter V A of this Act; and

(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person  whom  he
has reason to believe to have committed any offence  punishable  under  this
Act:

Provided that if such officer has reason to believe that  a  search  warrant
or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording  opportunity  for  the
concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an  offender,  he  may
enter and search such building,conveyance or  enclosed  place  at  any  time
between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief.

(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under  subsection
(1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso  thereto,  he  shall
within seventy-two hours send a  copy  thereof  to  his  immediate  official
superior.”


12.   The High Court has come to the conclusion  that  there  is  breach  of
mandatory provisions of Section 42(1) and Section 42(2) and further  Section
43 which was relied by the Special Judge  for  holding  that  there  was  no
necessity to comply Section 42 is not applicable. We thus proceed  to  first
examine the question as to whether there is breach of provisions of  Section
42(1) and Section 42(2). The breach of Section 42  has  been  found  in  two
parts. The first part  is  that  there  is  difference  between  the  secret
information recorded in Exh. P-14 and Exh. P-21 and the information sent  to
Circle Officer, Nohar by Exh. P-15. It is useful to refer  to  the  findings
of the  High Court in the above context, which is quoted below:

 “ From  the  above  examination,  it  is  not  found  that  Exh.  P-14  the
information which is stated to be received from the informer  under  Section
42(2) of Act or Exh. P-21, the information given by the  informer  which  is
stated to be recorded in the Rozanamacha, copy  whereof  has  been  sent  to
C.O. Nohar, who was the then Senior Officer, Rather, Exh. P-15,  the  letter
which was sent, it is not the copy of Exh. P-14,  but  it  is  the  separate
memo prepared of their own. From the above examination, it is not  found  in
the present case that section 42 (2) of Act, 1985 is complied with.”

13.   What Section 42(2) requires is that where an  officer  takes  down  an
information in writing under sub-Section (1) he shall sent  a  copy  thereof
to his immediate officer senior . The  communication  Exh.  P-15  which  was
sent to Circle Officer, Nohar was not as per  the  information  recorded  in
Exh. P 14 and Exh. P 24. Thus, no error was committed by the High  Court  in
coming to the conclusion that there was breach of Section 42(2).

14.   Another aspect of non-compliance of Section 42(1) proviso,  which  has
been found by the  High  Court   needs  to  be  adverted.   Section  42  (1)
indicates that any authorised officer can carry out search between sun  rise
and sun set without warrant or authorisation. The scheme indicates  that  in
event the search has to be made between sun set and sun  rise,  the  warrant
would be necessary unless officer has  reasons  to  believe  that  a  search
warrant  or  authorisation  cannot  be  obtained   without   affording   the
opportunity for escape of offender which grounds of his  belief  has  to  be
recorded. In the present case, there is no case that any ground  for  belief
as contemplated by proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 42  or  Sub-section
(2) of Section 42 was ever recorded by Station House Officer  who  proceeded
to carry on search. Station House Officer has appeared as PD-11 and  in  his
statement also he has not come  with  any  case  that  as  required  by  the
proviso to Sub-section (1), he recorded his grounds of belief anywhere.  The
High  Court  after  considering  the  entire  evidence  has  made  following
observations :

“Shishupal Singh PD-11 by whom search has been  conducted,  on  reaching  at
the place of occurrence by him no reasons  to  believe  have  been  recorded
before conducting the search of  jeep  bearing  HR  24  4057  under  Section
42(1), nor any reasons in regard to not obtaining  the search  warrant  have
been recorded. He has also not stated any such facts in his statements  that
he has conducted any proceedings in  regard  to  compliance  of  proviso  of
Section 42(1). Since reasons to believe have not been  recorded,  therefore,
under Section 42(2) it is not found on record that  copy  thereof  has  been
sent to the senior officials. Shishupal Singh could be the best  witness  in
this regard, who  has  not  stated  any  fact  in  his  statement  regarding
compliance of proviso to Section  42(1) and Section 42(2), sending  of  copy
of reasons to believe recorded by him to his senior officials.”


15.   In this context, it is relevant to note that before the Special  Judge
also the breach of Section 42(1) and 42(2) was contended on  behalf  of  the
defence. In paragraph 12 of the  judgment  Special  Judge  noted  the  above
arguments of defence. However, the  arguments  based  on  non-compliance  of
Section 42 (2) were brushed aside by observing that discrepancy in  Exh.  P-
14 and  Exh.  P-15  is  totally  due  to  clerical  mistake  and  there  was
compliance of Section 42(2). Special Judge coming to compliance  of  proviso
to Section 42(1) held that vehicle searched  was  being  used  to  transport
passengers as has been clearly sated by its owner Veera Ram, hence,  as  per
the explanation to Section  43  of  the  Act,  the  vehicle  was   a  public
transport vehicle and there was no need  of  any  warrant  or  authority  to
search such a vehicle.  The High Court has reversed the  above  findings  of
the Special Judge. We thus, proceed to examine as to whether Section 43  was
attracted in the present case which  obviated  the  requirement  of  Section
42(1) proviso. Section 43 of the Act is as follows:

 “43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place.-Any  officer  of  any  of
the departments mentioned in section 42 may

(a) seize  in  any  public  place  or  in  transit,  any  narcotic  drug  or
psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of  which  he  has
reason to believe an offence punishable under this Act has  been  committed,
and, along with such drug or substance, any animal or conveyance or  article
liable to confiscation under this Act, any document or other  article  which
he has reason to believe may  furnish  evidence  of  the  commission  of  an
offence punishable under this Act or any document  or  other  article  which
may furnish evidence of holding any illegally  acquired  property  which  is
liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter V A of this Act;

(b) detain and search any person whom he  has  reason  to  believe  to  have
committed an offence punishable under this Act, and if such person  has  any
narcotic drug or psychotropic  substance  or  controlled  substance  in  his
possession and such possession appears to him to  be  unlawful,  arrest  him
and any other person in his company.

Explanation.- For the purposes  of  this  section,  the  expression  "public
place" includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place  intended
for use by, or accessible to, the public”


16.   Explanation to Section 43  defines  expression  “public  place”  which
includes any public conveyance. The word “public conveyance” as used in  the
Act has to be understood as a conveyance which can  be  used  by  public  in
general. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939  and  thereafter  the  Motor  Vehicles
Act, 1988 were enacted to regulate the law relating to motor  vehicles.  The
vehicles which can be used for public are public Motor  Vehicles  for  which
necessary permits have  to  be  obtained.  Without  obtaining  a  permit  in
accordance with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no vehicle  can  be  used  for
transporting passengers. In the present case, it is  not  the  case  of  the
prosecution that the jeep HR-24 4057 had any  permit  for  transporting  the
passengers. The High Court has looked into the  evidence  and  come  to  the
conclusion that there was no material to indicate that there was any  permit
for running the jeep as  public  transport  vehicle.  The  High  Court   has
further held that even Kartara Ram who as per owner  of  the  vehicle  Veera
Ram was using the vehicle, do not support that the jeep was used  as  public
transport vehicle. The High Court held  that  personal  jeep  could  not  be
treated as public transport vehicle. Following  observations  were  made  by
the High Court:


“Kartara Ram is produced as PD-5,who has deposed  the  statement  that  Vira
Ram is his brother-in-law (Saala), on whose name jeep bearing No.HR 24  4057
is lying registered. He had employed  Inderjit  singh  as  driver  for  that
jeep. Person namely Krishan has never been employed as driver. This  witness
has been declared hostile and  he  has  been  examined  too,  who  does  not
support the prosecution case. In this manner, Viraram is the  owner  of  the
jeep. According to him he had given the jeep to  Kartara  Ram,  but  Kartara
Ram has not stated anywhere in is statement that this jeep was given to  him
and he used the same as Public Transport Vehicle. Since powder of opium  was
caught in this jeep and even Notice Exh. P-6 was also  served  upon  him  by
the police, he with a view to save himself, can also depose  such  statement
that Kartara used to use the jeep as  Public  Transport  Vehicle  ,  whereas
Kartara Ram PD-5 does not affirm this fact. Jeep was personal, it  is  clear
on the record. In this manner, just on this ground that  he  has  given  the
jeep to his brother-in-law and he used  it  to  carry  the  passengers,  the
personal jeep could not be treated as  public  transport  vehicle.  However,
the fact that jeep is used to carry the passengers  has  not  been  affirmed
from the statements of Kartara Ram. There is no evidence on  record  on  the
basis of which it could be stated that jeep  was  public  transport  vehicle
and they have the permit for it, rather it was the private  vehicle  and  it
is stated that Vira Ram himself is the owner of that vehicle”


17.   There is nothing to impeach the  aforesaid  findings.   We  have  also
perused the statement of Vira Ram in  which  statement  he  has  never  even
stated that he has any permit for running the vehicle as transport  vehicle.
He has stated that “..... I had given this jeep to Kartara Ram  resident  of
…... who is my relative to run it for  transporting  passengers”  Admittedly
the jeep was intercepted and was seized  by  the  police.  In  view  of  the
above, the jeep cannot be said to be a public conveyance within the  meaning
of Explanation to Section 43. Hence, Section 43 was  clearly  not  attracted
and provisions of Section 42(1) proviso were required to  be  complied  with
and the aforesaid statutory mandatory provisions having  not  been  complied
with, the High  Court  did  not  commit  any  error  in  setting  aside  the
conviction.

18.   There is one more aspect which needs to be noted.  The  present  is  a
case where prosecution himself has come with case  that  secret  information
was received from informer which information was recorded in Exh.  P-14  and
Exh. P-21 Roznamacha and thereafter  the Station House Officer  with  police
party proceeded towards the scene. The present  is  not  a  case  where  the
Station House Officer suddenly carried out search at  a  public  place.  The
Station House Officer in his statement has also come up with the  facts  and
case to prove compliance of Section  42.  When  search  is  conducted  after
recording information under Section 42(1), the   provisions  of  Section  42
has to be complied with.  This Court in Directorate Of Revenue & Another  vs
Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370,  had occasion to  consider  Sections
41,42 and 43 explanation. Following was stated in paragraph 14:

“14. Section 43, on plain reading of the Act, may not  attract  the  rigours
of Section 42 thereof. That means that even subjective satisfaction  on  the
part of the authority, as is required under sub-section (1) of  Section  42,
need not be complied with, only because the place whereat search  is  to  be
made is a public place. If Section 43 is to be treated as  an  exception  to
Section 42, it is required to be strictly complied with.  An  interpretation
which strikes a balance between the enforcement of  law  and  protection  of
the valuable human right of an accused must be resorted  to.  A  declaration
to the effect that the minimum requirement, namely,  compliance  of  Section
165 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  would  serve  the  purpose  may  not
suffice as non-compliance of the said provision would not render the  search
a nullity. A distinction therefor must  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  search
conducted on the  basis  of  a  prior  information  and  a  case  where  the
authority comes across a case of commission of  an  offence  under  the  Act
accidentally or per chance………….”


19.   Thus the present is not a case where Section 43 can be  said  to  have
been attracted, hence, non-compliance of Section 42(1) proviso  and  Section
42(2) had seriously prejudiced the  accused.  This  Court  had  occasion  in
large number of cases to consider the  consequence  of  non-  compliance  of
provisions of Section 42(1)  and  42(2),  whether  the  entire  trial  stand
vitiated due to above non compliance or conviction  can  be  set  aside.  In
this context reference is made to the judgment of this  Court  in  State  of
Punjab Vs. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC 299. In the above batch of  cases,  the
High Court has acquitted accused on the ground  that  search  was  conducted
without conforming to the provisions of the NDPS Act. Sections 41,42 43  and
other  relevant  provisions  came  for  consideration  before  this   Court,
referring to the provisions of Chapter IV following was stated in  paragraph
8:

“8. But if on a prior information leading to a  reasonable  belief  that  an
offence under Chapter IV of the Act has  been  committed,  then  in  such  a
case, the Magistrate or the officer empowered have to proceed and act  under
the provisions of Sections 41  and  42.  Under  Section  42,  the  empowered
officer even without a warrant issued as  provided  under  Section  41  will
have the power to enter,  search,  seize  and  arrest  between  sunrise  and
sunset if he has reason to believe from personal  knowledge  or  information
given by any other person and taken down in writing that  an  offence  under
Chapter IV has been committed or any document or  other  article  which  may
furnish the evidence of the commission of such offence is kept or  concealed
in any building or in any place. Under  the  proviso  if  such  officer  has
reason to believe that search warrant or authorisation  cannot  be  obtained
without affording  opportunity  for  the  concealment  of  the  evidence  or
facility for the escape of the offender, he can  carry  out  the  arrest  or
search between sunset and sunrise also after recording the  grounds  of  his
belief. Sub-section (2) of 8 1990 Cri LJ 414 (Del) Section 42  further  lays
down that when such  officer  takes  down  any  information  in  writing  or
records grounds for this belief under the proviso, he shall  forthwith  send
a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.”


20.   After referring large number of cases, this Court recorded  conclusion
in paragraph 25 which is to the following effect:

“25. The  question  considered  above  arise  frequently  before  the  trial
courts. Therefore we find it necessary to set out our conclusions which  are
as follows :

(1) If a police officer without any prior information as contemplated  under
the provisions of the NDPS Act makes a search or arrests  a  person  in  the
normal course of investigation into an  offence  or  suspected  offences  as
provided under the provisions of CrPC and when such search is  completed  at
that stage Section 50 of the  NDPS  Act  would  not  be  attracted  and  the
question of complying with the requirements thereunder would not  arise.  If
during such search or arrest there is a  chance  recovery  of  any  narcotic
drug  or  psychotropic  substance  then  the  police  officer,  who  is  not
empowered,  should  inform  the  empowered  officer  who  should  thereafter
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the NDPS Act. If he happens  to
be an empowered officer also, then from that stage onwards, he should  carry
out the investigation in accordance with the other provisions  of  the  NDPS
Act.

(2-A) Under Section 41(1) only an empowered  Magistrate  can  issue  warrant
for the arrest or for the search in respect  of  offences  punishable  under
Chapter IV of the Act etc. when he has reason to believe that such  offences
have been committed  or  such  substances  are  kept  or  concealed  in  any
building, conveyance or place. When such warrant for arrest  or  for  search
is issued by a Magistrate who is not empowered, then such search  or  arrest
if carried out would be illegal. Likewise only empowered  officers  or  duly
authorized officers as enumerated in Sections 41(2) and 42(1) can act  under
the provisions of the NDPS Act. If such arrest or search is made  under  the
provisions of the NDPS Act by anyone other  than  such  officers,  the  same
would be illegal.

(2-B)  Under  Section  41(2)  only  the  empowered  officer  can  give   the
authorisation to his subordinate officer  to  carry  out  the  arrest  of  a
person or search as mentioned therein. If there  is  a  contravention,  that
would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the conviction.

(2-C) Under Section 42(1) the empowered officer if has a  prior  information
given by any person, that should necessarily be taken down in  writing.  But
if he has reason to believe from  personal  knowledge  that  offences  under
Chapter IV have been committed or materials which may  furnish  evidence  of
commission of such offences are concealed in any building etc. he may  carry
out the arrest or search without a warrant between sunrise  and  sunset  and
this provision does not  mandate  that  he  should  record  his  reasons  of
belief. But under the proviso to Section 42(1) if such officer has to  carry
out such search between sunset and sunrise, he must record  the  grounds  of
his belief.

To this extent these provisions are mandatory and contravention of the  same
would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. (3)  Under  Section
42(2) such empowered officer who takes down any information  in  writing  or
records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith  send  a
copy thereof to his immediate official superior.  If  there  is  total  non-
compliance of this provision the same affects the prosecution case. To  that
extent it is mandatory. But if there  is  delay  whether  it  was  undue  or
whether the same has been explained or not, will be a question  of  fact  in
each case.

(4-A) If a police officer, even if he happens to be an  "empowered"  officer
while effecting  an  arrest  or  search  during  normal  investigation  into
offences purely under the provisions of CrPC fails to strictly  comply  with
the provisions 'of Sections 100 and 165 CrPC including  the  requirement  to
record reasons, such failure would only amount to an irregularity.

(4-B) If an empowered officer or an authorised officer under  Section  41(2)
of the Act carries out a search, he would be doing so under  the  provisions
of CrPC namely Sections  100  and  165  CrPC  and  if  there  is  no  strict
compliance with the provisions of CrPC then such search would not per se  be
illegal and would not vitiate the trial.

The effect of such failure has to be borne  in  mind  by  the  courts  while
appreciating the evidence in the facts and circumstances of each case.

(5) On prior information the empowered officer or authorised  officer  while
acting under Sections 41(2) or 42  should  comply  with  the  provisions  of
Section 50 before the search of the person is made and  such  person  should
be informed that if he so requires, he shall be produced before  a  Gazetted
Officer or a Magistrate as provided thereunder.  It  is  obligatory  on  the
part of such officer to inform the person to be searched. Failure to  inform
the person to be searched and if such person so requires,  failure  to  take
him to the  Gazetted  Officer  or  the  Magistrate,  would  amount  to  non-
compliance of Section 50 which is mandatory and thus  it  would  affect  the
prosecution case and vitiate the trial.  After  being  so  informed  whether
such person opted for such a course or not would be a question of fact.

(6) The provisions of Sections 52 and 57 which deal with  the  steps  to  be
taken by the officers after making arrest or seizure under  Sections  41  to
44 are by themselves not mandatory. If there is non-compliance or  if  there
are lapses like delay etc. then the same has to be examined to  see  whether
any prejudice has been caused to the accused and such failure  will  have  a
bearing on the appreciation of evidence regarding arrest or seizure as  well
as on merits of the case.”


21.   A three Judges Bench in  Saiyad Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyed & others  vs.
The State Of Gujarat (supra) after elaborate consideration of provisions  of
the NDPS  Act including section 50 had endorsed the judgment of  this  court
in Balbir Singh's case (supra).

22.   A Constitution Bench of this Court  in  State  of  Punjab  Vs.  Baldev
Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172,  had occasion to consider  the  provisions  of  the
NDPS Act and several earlier  judgments  of  this  Court.  The  Constitution
Bench noticed that the earlier judgments in Balbir Singh's  case  has  found
approval by three Judges Bench in Saiyad Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyed  &  others
vs. The State Of Gujarat (supra) and a discordant note  was  struck  by  two
Judges Bench in State of Himachal Pradesh  Vs.  Pirthi  Chand  and  another,
(1996) 2 SCC 37.  The Constitution Bench approved the view of this Court  in
Balbir Singh's case that there is an obligation on authorised officer  under
section 50 to inform the suspect that he has right to  be  informed  in  the
presence of the Gazetted Officer. It was held by Constitution Bench that  if
search is conducted in violation of Section 50 it may not vitiate the  trial
but that would render the recovery of illicit articles suspect and  vitiates
the conviction and  sentence  of  the  accused.  What  is  said  about  non-
compliance of Section 50 is also  true  with  regard  to  non-compliance  of
Section 42 of the Act.

23.   In Beckodan Abdul Rahiman vs State Of Kerala, 2002 (4) SCC 229,   this
Court had occasion to consider both Section 42 and Section 50. In the  above
case there was non compliance of Section 42 (2) as well as  Section  50.  It
was also noticed that a Constitution Bench in State  of  Punjab  Vs.  Baldev
Singh (supra) has already laid down that provisions of  Section  42  and  50
are mandatory  and  their  non-compliance  would  render  the  investigation
illegal. Following was held in paragraphs 5 and 6:

“5.In this case the violation of the mandatory provisions is writ  large  as
is evident from the statement of K.R. Premchandran  (PW1).  After  recording
the information, the witnesses is  not  shown  to  have  complied  with  the
mandate of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  42  of  the  Act.  Similarly  the
provisions of Section 50 have not been complied with as the accused has  not
been given any option as to whether he wanted to be searched in presence  of
a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate.


6.We are of the firm opinion that  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of
Section 42 and the mandate of Section 50  were  not  complied  with  by  the
prosecution which rendered the case as  not  established.  In  view  of  the
violation of  the  mandatory  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  appellant  was
entitled to be acquitted….”


24.   It is also relevant to note another  Constitution  Bench  judgment  of
this Court in Karnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 2009 (8)  SCC  539,  where
this Court had again occasion to consider the provisions of Sections 42  and
50. The Constitution Bench noted the divergence of opinion  in  two  earlier
cases which has resulted in placing the matter before the larger Bench.  The
question was noticed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgment which are to  the
following effect:

“1) In the case of Abdul  Rashid  Ibrahim  Mansuri  vs.  State  of  Gujarat,
(2000) 2 SCC 513, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that compliance  of
Section 42 of the Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic  Substances  Act,  1985
(hereinafter referred to as "NDPS Act") is mandatory  and  failure  to  take
down the  information  in  writing  and  forthwith  send  a  report  to  his
immediate official superior would cause prejudice to  the  accused.  In  the
case of Sajan Abraham vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 692, which was  also
decided by a three-Judge  Bench,  it  was  held  that  Section  42  was  not
mandatory and substantial compliance was sufficient.

2)  In  view  of  the  conflicting  opinions   regarding   the   scope   and
applicability of Section 42 of the Act in the matter of  conducting  search,
seizure and arrest without warrant  or  authorization,  these  appeals  were
placed before the Constitution Bench to resolve the issue.


3) The statement of objects and reasons of the NDPS Act makes it clear  that
to  make  the  scheme  of  penalties  sufficiently  deterrent  to  meet  the
challenge of well organized gangs of smugglers, and to provide the  officers
of a number  of  important  Central  enforcement  agencies  like  Narcotics,
Customs, Central Excise, etc. with the power of  investigation  of  offences
with regard to new drugs of  addiction  which  have  come  to  be  known  as
psychotropic substances posing serious  problems  to  national  governments,
this comprehensive law  was  enacted  by  Parliament  enabling  exercise  of
control over”

25.   After referring to the earlier judgments, the Constitution Bench  came
to the conclusion that non-compliance of requirement of Sections 42  and  50
is impermissible whereas delayed compliance  with  satisfactory  explanation
will be acceptable compliance of Section 42.  The Constitution  Bench  noted
the effect of the aforesaid two decisions in paragraph  5.  The  present  is
not a case where insofar as compliance of  Section  42(1)  proviso  even  an
arguments based on substantial compliance is raised   there  is  total  non-
compliance of Section  42(1) proviso. As observed above,  Section  43  being
not attracted search was to be conducted after complying the  provisions  of
Section 42. We thus, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that  non
compliance of Section 42(1) and Section 42(2) were proved on the record  and
the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside  the  conviction
order.
26.   In view of what has been stated above, it is not necessary for  us  to
enter into the other reasons given by the High Court for setting  aside  the
conviction order. The High  Court  has  given  the  sufficient  reasons  and
grounds for setting aside the conviction order in which we do not  find  any
infirmity so as to interfere in this appeal.

27.   In the result the appeal is dismissed.


                                                            ………………………………….J.
                                                  ( ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE )


                                                            ………………………………….J.
                                                        ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
JUNE 29, 2016.