Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1812-1815 of 2010, Judgment Date: Oct 09, 2014



                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL  NOS. 1812-1815 OF 2010



STATE OF ORISSA & ANR.                               ...     APPELLANT (S)


                                   VERSUS


FAKIR CHARAN SETHI                                     ...  RESPONDENT (S)

(DEAD THROUGH LRS) & ORS.



                               J U D G M E N T


RANJAN GOGOI, J.


1.      Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 2010 arising from the common  judgment  and

order dated 30.7.2009 passed by the High Court of  Orissa  in  F.A.No.10  of

2001 affirming the decree dated 29.7.2000 passed by the learned Trial  Court

may be conveniently treated as the main appeal for consideration.   In  that

event the fate of the  connected  appeals  would  stand  determined  by  the

outcome of the aforesaid Civil Appeal i.e. C.A. No.1812 of 2010.


2.    The respondents 1 and 2, as plaintiffs, instituted Title  Suit  No.620

of 1998 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, (Senior  Division)  Bhubaneswar

seeking a declaration of occupancy rights in their favour  as  well  as  for

affirmation of their possession as tenants in respect of the suit  land.   A

further direction to the defendants 1 and  2  (appellants)  to  accept  rent

from the plaintiffs and a permanent restraint against  interference  in  the

possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land was also sought in the  suit

filed.


3.    The short case  of  the  plaintiffs(respondents)  before  the  learned

Trial Court was to the effect that  their  father  Nidhi  Sethi  who  served

under the Ex-ruler of Kanika Raja as a washer man was granted lease  of  the

suit land measuring 4.16 acres covered under Sabik Plot No.292  appertaining

to holding No.303 situated  in  Mouza  Chandrasekharpur.  According  to  the

plaintiffs, the aforesaid land was leased  to  their  father  on  14.2.1942;

possession of the land was delivered  and  rent  paid  by  their  father  as

tenant was accepted by the Ex-ruler. The plaintiffs further claimed that  an

unregistered Hatapatta (lease agreement) (Ext.1) was also granted by the Ex-

proprietor in favour of the plaintiffs’ father.  It  was  the  case  of  the

plaintiffs that since the date of the lease their father and thereafter  the

plaintiffs had been in possession of  the  suit  land  using  the  same  for

residential as well as agricultural purposes.


4.    It was the further case of the plaintiffs, as stated  in  the  plaint,

that the intermediary interest in the estate including the suit  land  stood

abolished and vested in the State  Government  sometime  in  the  year  1954

under the provisions of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act,  1951  (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Abolition  Act’).  According  to  the  plaintiffs,  even

thereafter, their father had paid rent to the State Government  through  the

Tehsildar and had continued to be in possession of the  suit  land.  It  was

also the case of the plaintiff that their father had died in the year  1967,

whereafter, the plaintiffs continued to remain in  possession.  Furthermore,

according to the plaintiffs, in the Record of Rights published in  the  year

1974  upon  completion  of  settlement  operation  the  land  was  shown  as

Government land; the said entry was on account of fact that  the  plaintiffs

were living outside Orissa.  In  the  Record  of  Rights  pursuant  to  1988

settlement the State Government was shown as the  owner  of  the  suit  land

with a note of forcible possession of the same  by  the  plaintiffs  against

the remarks column. While the matter was situated, the defendants  3  and  4

in the suit i.e. Director of NCC and Defence  Estate  Officer  attempted  to

trespass into the suit land.  The  suit  in  question  was  therefore  filed

seeking the reliefs earlier noticed.


5.    The defendants 1 and 2  filed  a  joint  written  statement  pleading,

inter alia, that the claim of the lease in  favour  of  the  father  of  the

appellant with effect from 14.2.1942 and  the  execution  of  the  Hatapatta

(Ext.1) was untouched.  The  Hatapatta  and  the  supporting  rent  receipts

issued by the Ex-ruler (Ext.2 series), according  to  the  defendants,  were

forged and fabricated documents. The claim of possession of  the  father  of

the plaintiffs and thereafter of the  plaintiffs  over  the  suit  land  was

vehemently contested by the State in the written statement filed. The  State

also contended that the entries in the Record of Rights after conclusion  of

the settlement operation in  the  year  1974  which  did  not  disclose  any

interest of the plaintiffs over the suit land were  not  challenged  by  the

plaintiffs in any forum. According to  the  State,  the  entry  of  forcible

possession of the plaintiffs in the remarks column of the Record  of  Rights

pursuant to the 1988 settlement operation is a forged and fabricated  entry.

 The certified copy of the tenancy roll (Ex.4) prepared by the  intermediary

and submitted by the Government, after the vesting, showing the name of  the

plaintiffs therein as well as the tenancy ledger (Ex.5) were also  contended

to be forged.


6.    The learned trial court framed as many as five issues for  trial,  out

of which issues D and E were considered to be  of  primary  importance.  The

aforesaid two issues framed were as follows :

“D –Did the  plaintiff’s father acquire occupancy right over the  suit  land

being a tenant under the ex-proprietor ?

  E –Are the plaintiffs and their father in  continuous  possession  of  the

suit land since 1942?”


7.    The learned Trial Court accepted the credibility and  authenticity  of

the Hatapatta (Ext.1); rent receipts issued by the Ex-ruler (Ext.2  series);

rent receipts granted by the Tehsildar after the vesting of the land in  the

State Government (Ext.3); certified copy of the Rent  Roll  (Ex.4)  prepared

by the Ex-proprietor  and  submitted  to  the  Government  at  the  time  of

vesting; the certified copy of the tenancy ledger (Ext. 5) prepared  by  the

Tehsildar, Cuttack on 31.3.1981.  That apart,  a  host  of  other  documents

exhibited by the plaintiffs, particularly,  the  reports  of  the  different

authorities (Exts.9, 11 and 12) to show the possession of the plaintiffs  as

well as the  certificates  of  such  possession  issued  by  the  Tehsildar,

Bhubaneswar  (Ext.14);  receipts  granted  by  the   Bhubaneswar   Municipal

Corporation (Ext.15 series); Driving  Licence  (Ext.  17),  Bank  Pass  Book

(Ext.18); Ration Card (Ext.19); Telephone Bills (Ext.20 series)  were  taken

into account by the learned Trial Court to record its finding of  possession

in favour of the plaintiffs.


8.    The continuous possession of the plaintiffs since  the  year  1942  as

found by the learned trial  court  was  understood  to  have  satisfied  the

requirement under Section 8 of the Abolition Act  entitling  the  plaintiffs

to be recognized as tenants under the State Government, and,  therefore,  to

the reliefs sought in the suit. The claim of the State with  regard  to  the

doubtful authenticity of the documents relied upon by  the  plaintiffs  were

understood by the learned trial court to be unsubstantiated  and  unverified

claims and, therefore, unworthy of any credence.  It  is  on  the  aforesaid

broad basis that the plaintiff suit was decreed by the learned trial  court.



9.    Against the decree dated 29.7.2000 passed by the learned trial  court,

the State of Orissa filed an appeal i.e. F.A.No.10 of 2001 before  the  High

Court. During the pendency of the appeal before the  High  Court,  the  land

was allotted to one Bombay Cardio Vascular Surgical  Pvt.  Ltd.  (respondent

No.2 in C.A.No.1814 of 2010). The aforesaid allotment was  made  subject  to

the result of  F.A.No.10  of  2001.  The  said  allotment  and  the  alleged

assertion of right  on  the  basis  thereof  by  the  allottee  came  to  be

challenged by the first respondent/plaintiff in  W.P.Nos.7962  and  8874  of

2008. A Public Interest Litigation registered as  W.P.No.7434  of  2008  was

also filed before the High Court challenging the  ‘grant’  of  the  land  in

favour of the plaintiffs and the entries with  regard  to  their  possession

made in the Record of Rights of the year 1988. The aforesaid writ  petitions

along with F.A.No.10 of 2001 were heard analogously and were disposed of  by

the common order of the High Court dated 30.7.2009.


10.   The High Court on hearing the appeal against the decree (F.A.No.10  of

2001) upheld the findings of the learned  trial  court  by  reiterating  the

same on reconsideration of  the  evidence  and  materials  on  record.  What

however would require specific notice is that before  the  High  Court,  the

appellant-State had filed two affidavits of the  Tehsildar  Bhubaneswar  and

Cuttack Tehsil respectively to show that Exts.4  and  5,  (issued  in  1981-

1982) relied upon by the learned trial court, could not have been issued  by

the Tehsildar, Cuttack inasmuch as Village Chandrasekharpur (where the  suit

land is situated) was  under  the  jurisdiction  of  Cuttack  District  till

bifurcation in the year 1970 and thereafter the said village became  a  part

of  Bhubaneswar  Tehsil.  As  per  Government’s  Notification  all   records

pertaining to village Chandrasekharpur are  not  available  in  the  Cuttack

Tehsil. The authority of the Tehsildar, Cuttack to issue Ext.  4  and  5  in

the  years  1981-82  when  village  Chandrasekharpur  became   a   part   of

Bhubaneswar  Tehsil  was  specifically  questioned  in  the  aforesaid   two

affidavits. In so far as  Ext.  3  series  (rent  receipts)  issued  by  the

Tehsildar is concerned, lack of authenticity of the same was  reiterated  by

the  Tehsildar,  Cuttack  in  his  affidavit  filed  in   the   High   Court

specifically contending that the same was “not genuine” and could  not  have

been granted in accordance with law i.e. under the law.


11.   Before us, Shri Tushar Mehta,  learned  ASG  has  contended  that  the

Hatapatta being an unregistered instrument cannot be construed as a  legally

valid instrument of lease. Even if the said document i.e.  Ext.1  is  to  be

accepted, the rent receipts (Ext.2 series) are  entry passes for  collection

of different forest produce inasmuch as in the Record  of  Rights  published

since the year 1931, indisputably, the land is described as  “Jhati  Jungle”

or forest land. What is of significance is  the  further  argument  of  Shri

Mehta that the said land being “Jhati Jungle” or forest land and the  status

of the  land  being  Anabadi  (unfit  for  cultivation)  possession  of  the

plaintiffs’ father of the suit land on the date of vesting  i.e.  1954  even

if is accepted (though the  same  has  been  vehemently  denied),  the  said

possession will not enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs inasmuch  as  the

possession contemplated by Section 8  of  the  Abolition  Act  must  be  for

purposes of cultivation and the holding of the land must be  in  the  status

of a raiyat. In this regard, reliance has been placed  on  the  decision  of

this Court in State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Harapriya Bisoi[1].   According  to

Shri Mehta, there is no legal much less acceptable evidence and  no  finding

whatsoever of such possession in favour of the plaintiffs has been  recalled

by the learned trial court. Pointing out the relevant paragraphs  (paras  34

to 36) of the report in State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Harapriya  Bisoi  (supra)

Shri Mehta has contended that the pendency of a  criminal  investigation  in

respect of the Hatapatta issued in the said case, has been noticed  by  this

Court.  The Hatapatta (Ext. 1) issued to the father of  the  plaintiffs,  as

claimed, are in circumstances similar to the present case. By  pointing  out

the averments in the  written  statement  filed  by  the  State  before  the

learned trial court  and  the  affidavits  of  the  Tehsildar,  Cuttack  and

Bhubaneswar Tehsil before the High Court,  Shri  Mehta  has  submitted  that

there is grave doubt with  regard  to  the  authenticity  of  the  documents

relied on by the learned trial court  as  well  as  by  the  High  Court  in

support of the impugned findings. Shri Mehta has also pointed out  that  the

other documents (Exts.9 to 20) would at best go to show  the  possession  of

the plaintiffs after the date of vesting which is not at  all  relevant  for

deciding the entitlement of the plaintiffs as claimed in the suit.


12.  In reply, Shri Jaideep  Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on

behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has taken us through the pleadings in  the

plaint and the relevant part of the evidence of PWs.1 and  2  to  show  that

what was pleaded and proved by the evidence brought  by  the  plaintiffs  is

the continuous possession  of  the  plaintiffs  or  their  predecessors  and

cultivation of a part of suit land by them since the year 1942. On the  said

basis it is urged that the statutory protection available to the  plaintiffs

under Section 8(1) of the Abolition Act was rightly accorded by the  learned

trial court and affirmed by the High Court in appeal. It is  contended  that

the objections taken with  regard  to  the  authenticity  of   some  of  the

documents brought on record by  the  plaintiffs  are  belated  as  the  said

documents were allowed to be exhibited in the trial  without  any  objection

from  the  State.  The  criminal  investigation  does  not  pertain  to  the

Hatapatta issued  to  the  plaintiffs  father  (Ext.1).  It  is,  therefore,

contended that there is no basis for interference.


13.   It will not be necessary to go into  the  various  contentious  issues

arising from the weighty arguments advanced by the learned counsels for  the

parties as, according to us, the controversies arising are capable of  being

resolved within a narrow compass.  In State of Orissa & Ors.  Vs.  Harapriya

Bisoi (supra), it has been held by this Court that possession  of  a  tenant

under an intermediary  on  the  date  of  vesting  of  the  land  under  the

Abolition Act so as to give the tenant the benefit of continuity  of  tenure

under Section 8(1) of the said Act would have to  be  in  the  status  of  a

raiyat actually cultivating the land. The definition of Raiyat contained  in

Section 2(n) and the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Orissa  Tenancy  Act,

1913 were at length considered by  this  Court  to  come  to  the  aforesaid

conclusion which may be noticed by a  specific  reference  to  the  relevant

paragraphs of the report in State of  Orissa  &  Ors.  Vs.  Harapriya  Bisoi

(supra):-


“26. By virtue of Section 8, any person who immediately before  the  vesting

of an estate in the State Government was in possession of any holding  as  a

tenant under an intermediary, would on and from the date of the vesting,  be

deemed to be a tenant of the State  Government.  The  words  “holding  as  a

tenant” mean the “raiyat” and not any other class of  tenant:  reference  in

this regard may be drawn to  the  definition  of  “holding”  in  the  Orissa

Tenancy Act, 1913:

“3. (8) ‘holding’ means a parcel or parcels of land held  by  a  raiyat  and

forming the subject of a separate tenancy;”

Section 8 thus confers protection only  on  the  “raiyat”  i.e.  the  actual

tiller of the soil.

27. Significantly, a “lease” and  “lessee”  on  the  one  hand  are  defined

separately from the “raiyat” under the Act. Thus, the mere  execution  of  a

lease by the intermediary in favour of a person would not confer the  status

of a “raiyat” on the lessee nor would protect the possession of such  lessee

under Section 8. In fact, a  “lease”  would  amount  to  a  transfer  of  an

interest of  the  intermediary  in  the  land  to  the  lessee.  In  such  a

situation, far from being a tenant protected under  Section  8,  the  lessee

would in fact step into the shoes of  the  intermediary  with  his  interest

being liable for confiscation and his entitlement  limited  to  compensation

from the State.

28. On the other hand, for protection under Section  8,  one  has  to  be  a

raiyat cultivating the land directly and  having  the  rights  of  occupancy

under the tenancy laws of the State. Thus, a “lessee” who  is  not  actually

cultivating the land i.e. who is not a “raiyat”, would  not  be  within  the

protection of Section 8  of  the  Act.  Section  2(h)  of  the  Act  in  its

residuary part states that “intermediary” would cover all owners or  holders

of interest in land between the raiyat and the State.”


In Para 30  of  the  aforesaid  report,  on  similar  facts,  the  claim  of

cultivation of the land recorded as Anabadi and  jhati  jungle  i.e.  forest

land in the said case was negatived by this Court on the  plain  logic  that

such a claim of cultivation can have no basis when the land is described  in

the  Revenue  records  as  ‘Jhati  Jungle’  and   also   as   Anabadi   i.e.

uncultivable.


14.   In the present case  even  though  the  evidence  of  PW1  and  2  may

indicate that the suit land was cultivated by the plaintiffs, in  the  light

of views expressed by this Court in para 30 of the report in  the  State  of

Orissa & Ors. Vs. Harapriya Biso (supra), the  aforesaid  evidence,  without

further details, has  to  be  construed  as  wholly  unacceptable  proof  of

cultivation of the suit land by the plaintiffs’ predecessors on the date  of

vesting of the land under the provisions of the Abolition Act.   It must  be

made clear that what is relevant under Section 8(1) of the Abolition Act  to

confer the benefit of continuity of tenure to the tenant  is  possession  as

well as cultivation of the land as on the date of vesting.   Therefore  what

was required to be established by the plaintiffs  in  the  present  case  is

cultivation by the predecessors of the plaintiffs in the year 1954 when  the

land had vested in the State notwithstanding  the  status  of  the  land  as

shown in the Record of Rights.  No specific  evidence  in  this  regard  has

been laid by the plaintiff (PW1) except a bald and ominous  claim  that  the

land was cultivated by his father.  If the plaintiffs had  failed  to  prove

possession and cultivation as on the date of vesting, as we are inclined  to

hold, the same, irrespective of any  other  question,  will  disentitle  the

plaintiffs to the reliefs sought in the suit.


15.   The appellant- State in  its  written  statement  before  the  learned

trial court as well as in the appeal before the  High  Court  had  raised  a

specific plea of forgery and fabrication of the  documents  relied  upon  by

the plaintiffs.  The affidavits of the Tehsildar,  Cuttack  and  Bhubaneswar

Circle filed before the High Court specifically deal with  aforesaid  issue.

The appellant State had filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27  of  the

Code of Civil Procedure for leave to bring the same  on  record.   The  said

application was rejected and all objections brushed aside  by  holding  that

the burden  to  prove  the  forgery  alleged  has  not  been  satisfactorily

discharged by the  State.   It  is  our  considered  view  that  the  matter

required a deeper probe and investigation and did not  call  for  a  summary

rejection.  That apart in  State  of  Orissa  &  Ors.  Vs.  Harapriya  Bisoi

(supra) the issue  with  regard  to  validity  of  a  Hatapatta  similar  to

Ext.  1  was  found  to  be  the  subject  matter  of  an  ongoing  criminal

investigation. All these required  the  elimination  of  even  slightest  of

doubt with regard to the authenticity of the  relied  upon  documents.   The

effect of fraud on judicial orders has also   been  exhaustively  considered

in State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Harapriya Bisoi (supra) and  it  will  not  be

necessary to reiterate the views expressed therein except  to  say  that  on

the slightest of doubt or even prima facie proof of fraud, the  matter  must

be thoroughly investigated by the court to arrive at  the  truth.   Judicial

order must be based on strong foundational facts  free  from  any  doubt  as

regards the correctness and authenticity  thereof.   In  the  light  of  the

facts noticed by us the High Court, in our considered view,  ought  to  have

investigated the matter a little further instead of  summarily  holding  the

objections of the State to be mere claims or  assertions  of  fraud  without

legal proof.


16.   However, in view of our conclusions on the issue of possession of  the

plaintiffs’ predecessors on the date  of  vesting  of  the  land  under  the

Abolition Act and the continuity of the tenure  claimed  by  the  plaintiffs

after such vesting under Section 8(1) of the Abolition Act  the  plaintiffs’

suit is liable to be  dismissed  and  the  decree  granting  relief  to  the

plaintiffs is required  to  be  reversed.   We,  therefore,  set  aside  the

judgment and order dated 29.7.2000 passed by the High Court in F.A.No.10  of

2001 and allow Civil Appeal No. 1812/2010 challenging the said  order.   The

remaining civil appeals shall stand decided accordingly.  Specifically,  the

orders passed by the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 7434 and 7962 of  2008

are set aside whereas Writ Petition No. 8874/2008 shall  stand  disposed  on

in terms of the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 1812/2008.


17.   All the appeals shall stand decided in the above terms.


                                                                …………………………J.

                                                         [RANJAN   GOGOI]






                                                            ......……………………J.

                                                            [R.K.AGRAWAL


NEW DELHI,

OCTOBER 09, 2014.


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[1]    2009 (12) SCC 378


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