Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 326 of 2012, Judgment Date: Feb 15, 2016

                                                                ‘REPORTABLE’

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 326 OF 2012

State of Karnataka                                               … Appellant

                                   versus
Dattaraj & others                                              … Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T


Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1.    Dattaraj  –  the  respondent-accused  no.  1,  married  Savita  (since
deceased), on 7.6.2002.  About three months  before  the  marriage,  at  the
asking of Dattaraj, it was agreed to give Rs.21,000/- in cash  and  3  tolas
of gold.  Accordingly, the family of  Savita  complied  with  the  aforesaid
commitment, at the time of marriage.  After their marriage,  Savita  started
to live in her matrimonial house  along  with  Dattaraj  (respondent-accused
no. 1).  Soon after his marriage, Dattaraj went to Dubai, leaving Savita  at
the matrimonial house.  During his absence, she went to her parents’  house.
 Dattaraj contacted Savita, and had  a  telephonic  conversation  with  her,
while she was at her parents’ house.   He  enquired  from  her,  with  whose
permission she had gone to her maternal house.   He  also  rebuked  her  for
having left the matrimonial house, without his permission.
2.    While Savita was in her maternal house, Dattaraj required her  to  get
Rs.20,000/- in cash from her parents, as his brother  needed  the  money  to
purchase some agricultural land.  On the asking of Dattaraj, Savita got  the
money from her parents.  After Dattaraj returned from Dubai, he was  invited
by Savita’s parents for a “pooja” (prayer) ceremony. The  “pooja”  had  been
arranged to celebrate the installation of a bore-well, on  the  agricultural
lands owned by Savita’s father.  It was alleged, that Dattaraj  (respondent-
accused no. 1) had agreed to attend the “pooja”, only if he was given  three
tolas of gold,  as  also,  wearing  apparel.   As  against  the  above,  the
assertion of Dattaraj was, that such gifts were customary,  and  were  given
by the parents of Savita, on their own free will.  In any case, it is not  a
matter of dispute, that gold and clothing were  indeed  given  to  Dattaraj,
during the “pooja” arranged by the  parents  of  Savita,  to  celebrate  the
installation of a bore-well.
3.    After Dattaraj returned from Dubai, Savita became pregnant.  She  left
for her maternal house, prior to her delivery.  She delivered a girl  child,
at her parents’ house.  Thereafter, she returned to her matrimonial house.
4.    On yet another occasion, while Savita along with Dattaraj (respondent-
accused no. 1) had gone to stay with  her  parents,  it  was  alleged,  that
Dattaraj had made similar monetary  demands.   On  this  occasion,  Savita’s
parents had expressed their helplessness, and had  informed  Dattaraj,  that
they did not have adequate resources to  meet  his  demands.   It  was  also
alleged, that on this occasion, Dattaraj had picked up a  quarrel  with  the
parents of Savita.  It  was  alleged,  that  when  Savita  returned  to  her
matrimonial  house  with  Dattaraj,  she  was  taunted  by  the  brother  of
Dattaraj, namely, by Siddappa @  Siddaraj  (respondent-accused  no.  3),  as
also by Ningesh (respondent-accused no. 2) and  Revamma  (respondent-accused
no. 4), the father and mother of respondent-accused no. 1 respectively,  for
bringing inadequate gifts from her parents’ house.
5.    Savita went to her parents’ house for “Rakhi  Poornima”  (festival  to
celebrate sanctity of the brother-sister, relationship), to  tie  a  “rakhi”
(sacred thread) on  her  brother’s  arm.   It  was  alleged,  that  Dattaraj
demanded a sewing machine.  This demand made by Dattaraj was  allegedly  met
by the parents of Savita.  This is  yet  another  incident  of  the  alleged
demand of dowry, made by Dattaraj and his family members.
6.    The case of the  prosecution  is,  that  despite  the  fact  that  the
parents of Savita met all the demands made by  Dattaraj,  as  well  as,  his
family members,  they  remained  unsatisfied  and  continued  to  pressurise
Savita’s family for more dowry.  It is also the  case  of  the  prosecution,
that Dattaraj used to harass and ill-treat Savita, and  would  even  assault
her.
7.    On 1.9.2006, Savita died of burn  injuries.   The  mother  of  Savita,
Tukkubai – PW-1, was informed about the burn injuries  suffered  by  Savita,
on 1.9.2006 itself.  She was also informed, that Savita, had  been  admitted
to hospital.  When Tukkubai – PW-1 reached the hospital along with  her  son
Dattatry – PW-4, the dead body of Savita was lying in the  mortuary  of  the
Government hospital, Gulbarga.  None of the respondents-accused was  present
at the hospital.  Immediately, Tukkubai – PW-1, filed a complaint.   In  the
complaint it was alleged, that the  respondents-accused  had  committed  the
murder of Savita, on account of their dowry demands having not been met,  by
the maternal family of Savita.  The above  report  was  lodged  on  2.9.2006
i.e., the day following the death of Savita.   The  fact,  that  Savita  was
left all by herself at the hospital, and that no one out of the respondents-
accused attended upon her even during her pitiable  condition,  was  alleged
as sufficient to establish, that the relationship  between  Savita  and  the
family of her in-laws, was not cordial.  The defence repudiated the  version
of the prosecution by  asserting,  that  Savita  had  committed  suicide  on
account of her over-sensitive nature.
8.    Consequent upon the culmination of the  investigation,  a  chargesheet
was filed by the prosecution, leading to  the  framing  of  charges  against
Dattaraj  (respondent-accused  no.  1),  his  brother  Siddappa  @  Siddaraj
(respondent-accused no. 3), his father Ningesh (respondent-accused  no.  2),
and his mother Revamma (respondent-accused no. 4).  The  respondents-accused
were charged with the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B  read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to  as,
the IPC), as well as, under Sections 3, 4 and 6  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition
Act, 1961  (hereinafter  referred  to  as,  the  Dowry  Act).   The  factual
position recorded above, constituted the basis of  the  alleged  actions  of
cruelty, by the  respondents-accused  towards  Savita,  and  therefore,  the
offence under  Section  498A.   The  fact  that  Savita  had  died  of  burn
injuries, within seven years of  her  marriage,  and  that,  she  was  being
subjected to dowry demands, cruelty and harassment by the accused,  was  the
basis for substantiating the offence under Section 304B of the IPC.
9.    The Sessions Judge  (Fast  Track  Court-III),  Bidar,  who  tried  the
respondents-accused arrived at the conclusion, that the cash, the  gold  and
other gifts given by the parents of Savita  to  the  accused,  were  in  the
nature of dowry articles presented  by  Savita’s  family,  to  Dattaraj  and
other members of his family.  This conclusion was  arrived  at  because  the
term “dowry” means and includes, property or valuable security given  either
directly or indirectly, not only at the time of marriage, but  also  at  any
time after marriage.
10.   Despite the fact that Tukkubai – PW-1, admitted  that  the  family  of
Dattaraj had gifted the maternal family of Savita,  4  tonnes  of  sugarcane
seeds and a bag of jowar, when a girl child was  delivered  by  Savita,  the
trial Court concluded, that the taunts and physical torture at the hands  of
the accused, stood established from eye-witnesses account.   The  same  were
considered sufficient to establish,  mental  and  physical  cruelty  towards
Savita.  The evidence indicating that Savita had been  asking  Dattaraj  not
to  go  to  Dubai,  which  according  to  the  defence,  was  sufficient  to
establish, that there was love and harmony between them, was rejected.   The
threat of Savita to Dattaraj, that if he went abroad, he may  not  find  her
alive, was also found to be of no substance.  The trial Court also  rejected
the contention of the accused, that Savita had a meal at  the  residence  of
the sister of Dattaraj -Sulebai,  just  two  hours  before  the  occurrence,
again to indicate that Savita was  not  being  harassed  by  the  family  of
Dattaraj.  The ground for such rejection by the trial Court was,  that  even
though it was established that Savita had eaten her meal  two  hours  before
the occurrence, yet there was no evidence to establish that  she  had  eaten
her meal, at the house of Sulebai –  the  sister  of  Dattaraj.   The  trial
Court also rejected the contention advanced on behalf  of  the  respondents-
accused, that the doctor  who  conducted  the  post-mortem  examination  had
deposed, that the deceased had no physical injuries  on  her  person.   This
was used by the defence to establish, that the burn injuries were an act  of
suicide, at the free will of Savita herself.   And  that,  the  respondents-
accused had not committed any act linked to the incident of burning.
11.   Accordingly, the trial Court convicted all the  four  accused  persons
for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B read  with  Section
34 of the IPC, and under Sections  3,  4  and  6  of  the  Dowry  Act.   The
following sentences were awarded by the trial Court to the accused:-
“All the accused persons are sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life  for
the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC.

Further, they are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 years,  and
to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand)  each,  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 498A  of  IPC.   In  default,  to  undergo  further
simple imprisonment for 3 months.

Further, they are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 3  years  and
to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offence punishable  under  Section
4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  In default, to undergo simple  imprisonment
for six months.

Further, they are ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for  3  years,  and
to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- each, for the offence punishable under  Section
3 of the Dowry Prohibition  Act.   In  default  to  undergo  further  simple
imprisonment for one year; and lastly

They are ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 years, and  to  pay  a
fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) each, for the  offence  punishable
under Section 6 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act.   In  default,  to  undergo
further simple imprisonment for six months.

All the  said  substantive  sentences  shall  run  concurrently.   They  are
entitled for set off.

Out of the fine amount, it is ordered to pay Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one  lakh
fifty thousand) to the mother of the deceased.”

12.   All the four respondents-accused preferred Criminal  Appeal  no.  3514
of 2008 before the High  Court  of  Karnataka,  Circuit  Bench  at  Gulbarga
(hereinafter referred to as, the High Court).  A Division Bench of the  High
Court convicted Dattaraj and acquitted the other three accused, namely,  the
brother, the father and the mother  of  Dattaraj.   While  arriving  at  the
conclusion, that the other three accused  besides  the  husband  of  Savita,
namely, Dattaraj (respondent-accused no. 1) had played no role in the  death
of Savita, the High Court was of the view, that the evidence of  Tukkubai  –
PW-1 and Dattatry – PW-4,  the  mother  and  the  brother  of  the  deceased
respectively, did not attribute  any  kind  of  overt  acts  of  cruelty  or
harassment to respondent-accused nos. 2 to 4, and as such, their  conviction
under Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the  IPC,  was  bad  in
law.  For the same  reason,  respondent-accused  nos.  2  to  4  were  found
innocent, insofar as, the allegations under Sections  3,  4  and  6  of  the
Dowry Act are concerned, and were accordingly  acquitted  for  the  offences
punishable thereunder.
13.   Dissatisfied with the impugned order dated  30.6.2009  passed  by  the
High Court, the State of Karnataka has approached  this  Court  through  the
present appeal.
14.   During the course of hearing, learned counsel representing  the  State
of Karnataka vehemently contended, that the acquittal of the accused by  the
High Court,  was  in  clear  violation  of  the  declaration  of  law,  with
reference to the provisions under which the accused were  charged.   Insofar
as the instant aspect of the matter is  concerned,  reliance  in  the  first
instance was placed on the decision rendered by this Court in  Kans  Raj  v.
State of Punjab & Ors., (2000) 5  SCC  207.   Learned  counsel  invited  our
pointed attention to the following observations recorded therein:-
“15.  It is  further  contended  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  that  the
statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed  to
be cruelty or harassment  by  the  husband  soon  before  her  death.  “Soon
before” is a  relative  term  which  is  required  to  be  considered  under
specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be  laid
down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea  of
proximity test. The term “soon before”  is  not  synonymous  with  the  term
“immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as  used
and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence  Act.  These
words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the  time
of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the  reasonable  time
which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood  and  determined  under  the
peculiar circumstances of each  case.  In  relation  to  dowry  deaths,  the
circumstances  showing  the  existence  of  cruelty  or  harassment  to  the
deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally  refer  to
a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period  of  time.  If
the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown  to  have  persisted,
it shall be deemed to be  “soon  before  death”  if  any  other  intervening
circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not  brought  on
record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death.  It  does  not,
however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.  Proximate  and
live link between the effect of  cruelty  based  on  dowry  demand  and  the
consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The  demand
of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon  such  demand  and  the  date  of
death should not be too remote in time which, under  the  circumstances,  be
treated as having become stale enough.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

Learned counsel submitted, that the view expressed  in  the  Kans  Raj  case
(supra) had been reiterated in another decision rendered by  this  Court  in
Tummala Venkateswar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 240.
15.   Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the appellant,  on
a recent judgment rendered by a three-judge Bench of this Court in  Rajinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477, wherein Section  304B  has  been
explained to the effect, that the term “dowry” expressed therein, would  not
be limited to the traditional meaning attached to the aforesaid  expression,
but would include a demand for money for other purposes as  well.   In  this
behalf it would be relevant to mention, that the three-judge Bench  did  not
accept the position expressed in Appasaheb v. State of  Maharashtra,  (2007)
9 SCC 721, in  connection  whereof,  this  Court  had  first  explained  the
position in the Appasaheb case (supra), as under:-
“11.  This Court has spoken sometimes with divergent  voices  both  on  what
would fall within "dowry" as defined and what is  meant  by  the  expression
"soon before her death". In Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9  SCC
721, this Court construed the definition of  dowry  strictly,  as  it  forms
part of Section 304-B which is part of a penal statute. The Court held  that
a demand for money for defraying the expenses of  manure  made  to  a  young
wife who in turn made the same demand to her father  would  be  outside  the
definition of dowry. This Court said: (SCC p. 727, para 11)

“11. …A demand for money on account of  some  financial  stringency  or  for
meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for  purchasing  manure  cannot  be
termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is  normally  understood.  The
evidence adduced by the prosecution  does  not,  therefore,  show  that  any
demand for ‘dowry’ as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act  was
made by the Appellants as what was allegedly asked for was  some  money  for
meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure.”

And thereupon, having examined the object and  intent  of  the  legislation,
this Court held in the Rajinder Singh case (supra), as under:-
“26.  The facts of this appeal are glaring.  Demands  for  money  were  made
shortly after one year of the marriage.  A  she-buffalo  was  given  by  the
father to the daughter as a  peace  offering.  The  peace  offering  had  no
effect. The daughter was ill-treated.  She  went  back  to  her  father  and
demanded money again. The father, then, went along with his brother and  the
Sarpanch of the village to the matrimonial home  with  a  request  that  the
daughter be not ill-treated on account of the demand for money.  The  father
also assured the said persons that their money  demand  would  be  fulfilled
and that they would have to wait till the crops of his field are  harvested.
Fifteen days before her death, Salwinder Kaur  again  visited  her  parents'
house on being maltreated by her new family. Then came death  by  poisoning.
The cross-examination of the father of Salwinder Kaur  has,  in  no  manner,
shaken his evidence.  On  the  facts,  therefore,  the  concurrent  findings
recorded by both the courts below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed.”

Based on the above decision it was the vehement contention  of  the  learned
counsel for the  appellant,  that  the  demands  made  by  the  accused  for
purchase of agricultural land, as also, with reference to a sewing  machine,
were liable to be treated as demands constituting “dowry”.

16.    We  have  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  submissions
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the rival parties.   It  is
not necessary for us to deal  with  the  statements  of  various  witnesses,
relied upon by the trial  Court,  as  well  as,  the  High  Court.   In  our
considered view, it would be sufficient for the disposal of the  controversy
in hand, to refer to a few relevant portions  of  the  cross-examination  of
Tukkubai – PW-1, the mother of Savita.  Tukkubai – PW-1, during  the  course
of her cross-examination, acknowledged the following factual position:-
“It is true two years A-1 remained in India  after  coming  from  Dubai  and
after one year my daughter delivered female child my  daughter  was  in  our
house at the time of delivery for about 4 to 5 months.  By  giving  all  the
necessary ornaments to my grand  daughter,  my  daughter  was  sent  to  her
house.  It is true there is custom  to  present  gold  and  clothes  to  the
person if they come from foreign country.  At the time of putting  my  grand
daughter in cradle, we went to their house  by  engaging  “Tam  Tam”.   They
gave four tonnes sugarcane seeds and a bag of jowar to  us  and  we  carried
them to our village in the said “Tum Tum”.
            xxx                   xxx                    xxx
It is true there is  custom  to  give  gold  and  clothes  at  the  time  of
performing Pooja to the bore-well.  At the time of Rakhi  pourna  when  they
came to our house, there was Chikungunya to my husband.  As my son  was  not
there in village, A-1 took my husband  to  hospital.   It  is  not  true  to
suggest to avoid coolie work for my daughter, we ourselves voluntarily  gave
tailoring machine to  my  daughter.   My  daughter  was  knowing  tailoring.
Tailoring machine was given to our daughter for tailoring  clothes  by  her.
A-1 once again went to Dubai for about two months to bring Visa service.
xxx                    xxx                   xxx
It is not true to suggest my daughter was  not  having  a  liking  of  A-1’s
going to foreign country second time.
xxx                    xxx                   xxx
I have studied up to  IVth  Standard.   My  son  drafted  the  complaint  by
sitting in the Govt. hospital.”

17.   On a perusal of the statement  of  Tukkubai  –  PW-1,  the  mother  of
Savita, it is apparent that the monetary gifts given  to  Dattaraj  and  his
family members, were in the  nature  of  customary  gifts  exchanged  during
different ceremonies.  But what is of  extreme  significance  is  the  fact,
that even the family of Dattaraj, the husband  of  Savita,  had  given  four
tonnes of sugarcane seeds and a bag of jowar to her family, when the  family
of Savita visited her matrimonial house, on the occasion of the birth  of  a
female child.  It is acknowledged by Tukkubai –  PW-1,  that  the  aforesaid
gifts were taken by the family members of Savita to their  own  village,  by
hiring a “tum-tum” (a horse-drawn cart).  This return gift by the family  of
Dattaraj was also in  conformity  with  the  customary  tradition  for  such
occasions.  It seems that the two families  celebrated  all  festivities  in
the spirit  of  their  customary  obligations.   Both  families  engaged  in
offering gifts to each other, in accord with  the  prevailing  practice  and
tradition.  For this reason, the judgment rendered  by  this  Court  in  the
Rajinder Singh case (supra), which was strongly relied upon by  the  learned
counsel for the appellant, in our considered view, would be of no  avail  in
the determination of the projection canvassed.

18.   Insofar as the demand of Rs.20,000/- for the purchase of  agricultural
land is concerned, it is apparent that the  same  was  allegedly  made  when
Dattaraj was in Dubai.  The  said  demand  was  allegedly  made  by  Ningesh
(respondent – accused no.2), the father of Dattaraj, when  he  had  gone  to
leave Savita at her maternal home.  Dattaraj is stated to have  returned  to
India from Dubai eight to ten months, after  the  above  demand.   A  female
child was born to Savita about a  year  after  the  return  of  Dattaraj  to
India.  After the birth of the female child,  Savita  had  remained  in  her
maternal house, for about four to  five  months.   Therefore,  even  if  the
above oral allegation is accepted as correct, it was  a  demand  made  about
two  years  before  the  occurrence.   The  same  was  too  remote  to   the
occurrence, and therefore,  would  not  satisfy  the  requirement  of  “soon
before her death” contemplated under Section 304B(1)  of  the  Indian  Penal
Code.

19.   The only remaining alleged dowry demand,  besides  those  referred  to
above was, that of a sewing-machine.  Yet again the position  was  clarified
by Tukkubai – PW-1.  During her cross-examination she  stated,  that  Savita
knew  tailoring.   And  that,  the  sewing-machine  was  given  to  her  for
tailoring clothes.  This was really a gift to Savita, and therefore,  cannot
be considered as a part of the demand made by Dattaraj, for himself  or  for
his  family  members.   This  allegation,  in  our   considered   view,   is
inconsequential, with respect to the  provisions  under  which  the  accused
were charged.

20.   There was no further attribution, as against the respondent –  accused
nos. 2 to 4. It is therefore  not  possible  for  us  to  accept,  that  the
prosecution was successful in establishing  either  harassment  or  violence
towards Savita, as  against  the  aforestated  accused,  nor  of  any  dowry
demand.  In such view of the matter, it is difficult for us to conclude  the
culpability of respondent-accused nos. 2 to 4,  in  the  entire  occurrence.
We are satisfied, that the High Court was fully justified in recording  that
even the statements of  Tukkubai  –  PW-1  and  Dattatry  –  PW-4,  did  not
attribute any kind of overt act to respondent-accused  nos.  2  to  4.   The
High Court was, therefore, fully justified in acquitting  respondent-accused
nos. 2 to 4, for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and  304B  read
with Section 34 of the IPC, as also, for the charges  under  Sections  3,  4
and 6 of the Dowry Act.

21.   For the reasons  recorded  hereinabove  we  are  satisfied,  that  the
impugned order passed by the High Court, does not justify  any  interference
at our hands.  The instant appeal being devoid of any merit, is  accordingly
dismissed.

                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                     (Jagdish Singh Khehar)



                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                                (S.A. Bobde)
New Delhi;
February 15, 2016.

ITEM NO.1A            COURT NO.3            SECTION IIB

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal  No(s).  326/2012

STATE OF KARNATAKA                          Appellant(s)

                          VERSUS

DATTARAJ &  ORS.                            Respondent(s)

[HEARD BY HON'BLE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND HON'BLE S.A.BOBDE, JJ.]


Date:15/02/2016      This      appeal      was      called      on       for
                         pronouncement of judgment today.


For Appellant(s) Ms. Anitha Shenoy,AOR


For Respondent(s)      Mr.Anirudh Sanganeria, Adv.
                       Mr. Chinmay Deshpande, Adv.


             Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Jagdish  Singh  Khehar  pronounced   the
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.  Justice  S.A.
Bobde.
            For the reasons recorded in the Reportable  judgment,  which  is
placed on the file, the instant appeal is dismissed,  being  devoid  of  any
merit.


(Renuka Sadana)                   (Parveen Kr. Chawla)
 Court Master                                AR-cum-PS
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