STATE OF HARYANA Vs. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS PVT.LTD.& ORS.
Section 4 - Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon
Section 6 - Declaration that land is required for a public purpose
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Civil), 354 of 2016, Judgment Date: Jan 19, 2016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.354 OF 2016
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7553 of 2008)
State of Haryana … Appellant
Versus
Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. and others …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.355 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27588 of 2008)
J U D G M E N T
Prafulla C. Pant, J.
Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.
These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated 21.01.2008,
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No.
10611 of 2004 whereby said Court has quashed the notifications dated
08.10.2003 and 07.05.2004 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, respectively, by the State of Haryana regarding
acquisition of land measuring 129 kanals 14 marlas in village Lakarpur,
District Faridabad. The High Court has further quashed the Award dated
05.05.2006, passed by respondent No. 4 in respect of land owned by
respondent No. 1 Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd., which was acquired through
the above mentioned notifications.
Succinctly stated total area of 172 kanals 19 marlas situated in village
Lakharpur Tehsil Ballabgarh in District Faridabad was proposed to be
acquired by the State of Haryana through notification dated 08.10.2003
issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 out of which 129
kanals 14 marlas (for short subject land) belonged to respondent no.1 M/s.
Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. The details of the persons whose land is
acquired is as under:
|S. |Name of owner |Total Area |Status |
|No. | | | |
|1. |Shri Sekher |6 kanal |Compensation paid. Possession|
| |S/o Shri Roshan Lal|2 ½ marla |taken over. |
|2. |Shri Sissar S/o |6 kanal |Compensation paid. Possession|
| |Shri Roshan Lal |2 ½ marla |taken over. |
|3. |M/s. Eros City |129 kanal |Compensation deposited before|
| |Developers Pvt. |14 marla |the Land Acquisition |
| |Ltd.(Respondent | |Collector. Acquisition |
| |No.1 herein) | |quashed vide impugned |
| | | |judgment. |
|4. |Shri Vikram Bakshi |25 kanal |C.W.P. No. 1510 of 2005 |
| |S/o Shri DN Bakshi |2 marla |pending before the High |
| | | |Court. Status quo with |
| | | |regard to the possession of |
| | | |the land ordered during the |
| | | |pendency of the writ petition|
| | | |vide order dated 22.5.2006. |
| | | |Compensation deposited before|
| | | |the Land Acquisition |
| | | |Collector. |
|5. |M/s. Faridabad |2 kanal |Compensation paid. Possession|
| |Compex |18 marla |taken over. |
The subject land was stated to have been acquired for the purpose of
expansion and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex which
included development of parking area adjacent to the Surajkund Tourist
Complex near annual Surajkund Fair.
Admittedly, earlier in 1992 an attempt was made to acquire the same land
but the acquisition proceedings were dropped after this court passed order
dated 10.05.1996 in WP (C) No. 4677 of 1985 i.e., M.C. Mehta’s case
restraining the constructions in the area. Meanwhile in 1993 contesting
respondent appears to have purchased the land indicated above. It is in
1998, the order dated 10.05.1996 said to have been modified, and Municipal
Corporation Faridabad and the State Government were directed to consider
the plan of hotel project submitted by the respondent No.1.
Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that annual Surajkund
Mela, is held every year in February in Faridabad District, and has become
a regular feature of international fame. As such, there was need to
develop Surajkund Tourist Complex by acquiring land adjoining to Surajkund
Mela ground in Faridabad. It is also pointed out that significance of
Surajkund fair was noticed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985 (M.C.
Mehta vs. Union of India and ors.) wherein effective directions were issued
in the year 1996 to protect and maintain the sanctity of the area. The
acquisition of subject-land is thus not only in public interest but also to
maintain the integral development of the Surajkund Complex in a unified and
planned manner. It is contended that while quashing the notifications
mentioned above, the High Court has erred in not considering the public
interest and public purpose over private interest of the respondent/writ
petitioner, a private colonizer. The impugned order passed by the High
Court has been assailed by the appellant, also on the ground that the
equity doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation were
wrongly applied by the High Court in favour of respondent No. 1. It is
stated that before issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) objections filed on behalf of
respondent No. 1 under Section 5A of the Act were duly considered by the
authority concerned, and there was no illegality in the acquisition.
On the other hand, on behalf of respondent No. 1, Shri Shyam Divan Senior
Counsel contended that Government of Haryana which earlier attempted to
acquire the same land in the year 1992, itself dropped the acquisition
proceedings as such it cannot be said that the land in question is
genuinely required for any public purpose. The contesting respondent has
pleaded that the land in question was purchased by it in the year 1993 with
the object to construct a hotel complex of international standard. In the
counter affidavit, it is stated that the answering respondent got the
permission for change of land use and submitted the plan for sanction from
the Municipal Corporation. It also obtained permission from Public Works
Department for construction of approach road to the land. Even the
Director, Tourism, Government of Haryana, had accorded approval for the
hotel project of respondent No. 1. However, the answering respondent was
prevented from raising construction due to the restraint order dated
10.5.1996, passed by this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (in W.P. (C) No. 4677
of 1985). Said order was modified on 13.05.1998. On application filed by
the answering respondent, vide order dated 12.10.1998, this Court directed
the Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, and State Government to accept option
plan A with regard to hotel project (ground plus four floors), submitted by
it. It is submitted that there was malice on the part of the State
Government in acquiring the land in question through the notification dated
08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of the Act. It is also pleaded that
there were overwhelming circumstances in favour of the answering respondent
to invoke doctrine of promissory estoppel, and that of legitimate
expectation. In this connection, it is pointed out that permission of
change of land use was also granted in favour of the answering respondent.
Lastly, it is submitted that the High Court has rightly quashed the
notifications issued by the State Government for acquisition of the land
owned by the answering respondent.
In reply to this, on behalf of the State of Haryana, it is submitted that
since the construction did not start within six months as required under
the terms of order by which permission for change of land use was granted
as such merely for the reason that permission to change of land use
granted, the acquisition cannot be questioned. It is further submitted
that the acquisition proceedings have been upheld by the High Court in
Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi, who was owner
of another piece of land acquired by same notification dated 08.10.2003
issued under Section 4 of the Act read with consequential notification
issued under Section 6 of the Act.
We have also gone through the copy of order dated 07.07.2010 passed by the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005
filed by Vikram Bakshi, said writ petition was filed challenging the
notification dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, and the consequential notification issued under Section 6 of the
Act. The land for which acquisition sought to be quashed by Vikram Bakshi
relates to 32 kanal of land comprising of rectangle no. 40 khasra Nos. 14,
17/1, 17/2, 18/1, 23/1, and 24/1 of Village Lakharpur Tehsil Ballabhgarh
District Faridabad. In said petition also, public purpose i.e. expansion
and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex was questioned, and
issue relating to consideration of objections filed under Section 5-A was
raised. The High Court after considering the rival submissions and going
through the record opined that there was no illegality in the acquisition
and dismissed the Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 on 07.07.2010.
In Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy
District and others (2008) 9 SCC 552, this Court has held that the project
for which land is acquired should be taken as a whole and must be judged
whether it is in the larger public interest. It cannot be split into
different components and to consider whether each and every component will
serve public good. A holistic approach has to be adopted in such matters.
This Court further observed in said case that development of infrastructure
is legal and legitimate public purpose for exercising power of eminent
domain. In deciding whether acquisition is for “public purpose” or not,
prima facie, the Government is the best judge. Although the decision of
the Government is not beyond judicial scrutiny, normally, in such matters a
writ court should not interfere by substituting its judgment for the
judgment of the Government. In Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra), this Court
has further explained that the meaning of expression “public purpose” is
wider than that of “public necessity”.
Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas
Restriction of Unregulated Development Rules, 1965 (for short “1965 Rules”)
requires the applicant seeking change of land use for construction to
undertake to start construction on the land within a period of six months
and complete the construction within a period of two years from the date of
order permitting the change of land use. It appears that no construction
was done in terms of Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of 1965 Rules on the land in
question, for which acquisition is quashed by the impugned order.
In State of Haryana and Others vs. Vinod Oil and General Mills and Another
(2014) 15 SCC 410, this Court has held that permission for change of land
use has no relevance while considering the validity of acquisition. It is
further observed in said case that there is no bar to the subsequent
acquisition of a land, after the land was released from earlier
acquisition.
In A.P. Pollution Control Board II vs. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) and Others
(2001) 2 SCC 62, this Court has observed in para 69 as under:
“69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because of the
approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land use by the
Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central Government, a case
for applying principle of “promissory estoppel” applied to the facts of
this case. There could be no estoppel against the statute…...”
As far as the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent relating to
the promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation is concerned, in Monnet
Ispat and Energy Limited vs. Union of India and Others (2012) 11 SCC 1,
this Court while enumerating the principles relating to doctrine of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation has clearly held that the
protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfillment of
the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In
other words, personal benefit must give way to public interest and the
doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked which would block
public interest for private benefit.
In Hira Tikkoo vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others (2004) 6 SCC
765, this Court explaining the scope of principle of legitimate expectation
has held that the doctrine cannot be pressed into service where the public
interest is likely to suffer as against the personal interest of a party.
In paragraph 22 this Court has observed as under:
“22. In public law in certain situations, relief to the parties aggrieved
by action or promises of public authorities can be granted on the doctrine
of “legitimate expectation” but when grant of such relief is likely to harm
larger public interest, the doctrine cannot be allowed to be pressed into
service. We may usefully call in aid the legal maxim: “Salus Populi est
suprema lex: regard for the public welfare is the higher law.” This
principle is based on the implied agreement of every member of society that
his own individual welfare shall in cases of necessity yield to that of
community. His property, liberty and life shall under certain circumstances
be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good.”
In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court as above, in our
opinion the High Court has erred in quashing the acquisition of land in
question, by applying doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation, in the facts of the present case. We have no hesitation in
holding that the purpose i.e. for expansion and systematic development of
Surajkund Tourist Complex, is a public purpose. It included development of
parking area adjacent to Surajkund Tourist Complex near annual Surajkund
Fair. We are of the view that the High Court is incorrect in holding that
the State has not acted bonafide, after 1992 acquisition proceedings were
dropped. It is apparent from the record that earlier proceedings were
dropped in the light of orders passed in M.C. Mehta’s Case in the year
1996, restraining construction in the area, and after modification in the
said order in the year 1998, the State took fresh decision to acquire the
land for public purpose and there is no illegality in the same.
Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and impugned judgment and order
dated 21.01.2008 passed by the High Court in CWP No.10611 of 2004, is set
aside. No order as to costs.
………………………….J
(Ranjan Gogoi)
………………………..J
(Prafulla C. Pant)
New Delhi
Dated: January 19, 2016