Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 844 of 2015, Judgment Date: Jul 02, 2015

7.          Upon consideration of the rival  contentions  and  materials  on
record, the points falling for determination are:  (i) in the facts  of  the
case, when did  the Magistrate take cognizance  of  the  complaint  for  the
first time i.e.  on   18.05.2007  or  on  21.06.2007,  when  the  Magistrate
satisfied  of  a  prima   facie   case   to   take   cognizance    of    the
complaint;  (ii) whether amendment to a complaint filed  under  Section  200
Cr.P.C. is  impermissible  in  law  and  whether  the  order  allowing   the
amendment  suffers from serious infirmity.
8.          Section 200 Cr.P.C. provides for the  procedure  for  Magistrate
taking cognizance of an offence on complaint.  The Magistrate is  not  bound
to take cognizance of an offence merely because a complaint has  been  filed
before him when in fact the complaint does not disclose a cause  of  action.
The language in Section 200 Cr.P.C. “a Magistrate taking  cognizance  of  an
offence on complaint  shall  examine  upon  oath  the  complainant  and  the
witnesses present, if any…” clearly suggests that for taking  cognizance  of
an offence on complaint, the Court shall examine the complainant upon  oath.
 The object of examination of the complainant is to  find  out  whether  the
complaint is justifiable or is vexatious.  Merely  because  the  complainant
was examined that does not mean that the Magistrate has taken cognizance  of
the offence. Taking cognizance of an offence means the Magistrate must  have
judicially applied the mind to the contents of the complaint  and  indicates
that Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence.
9.          Mere presentation of the complaint and receipt of  the  same  in
the court does not mean that the Magistrate  has  taken  cognizance  of  the
offence.  
19.         In the instant case, the  amendment  application  was  filed  on
24.05.2007 to carry out the amendment by adding  paras  11(a)  and  11  (b).
Though,  the  proposed  amendment  was  not  a  formal  amendment,   but   a
substantial one, the Magistrate allowed the amendment application mainly  on
the ground that  no  cognizance  was  taken  of  the  complaint  before  the
disposal of amendment application.  Firstly, Magistrate  was  yet  to  apply
the judicial mind to the  contents  of  the  complaint  and  had  not  taken
cognizance of the matter.  Secondly, since summons was yet to be ordered  to
be issued to the accused, no prejudice  would  be  caused  to  the  accused.
Thirdly, the amendment did not change the original nature of  the  complaint
being one for defamation. Fourthly, the publication of  poem  ‘Khalnayakaru’
being in the nature of subsequent event created a new  cause  of  action  in
favour of the respondent which could have been prosecuted by the  respondent
by filing a separate  complaint  and  therefore  to  avoid  multiplicity  of
proceedings, the trial court allowed the amendment application.  Considering
these factors which weighed  in the mind of the courts below, in  our  view,
the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the order  passed  by  the
Magistrate allowing the amendment application and the  impugned  order  does
not suffer from any serious infirmity warranting  interference  in  exercise
of jurisdiction under Article  136 of the Constitution of India.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 844  OF 2015
                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.4813/2012)

S.R. SUKUMAR                                                     ..Appellant

                                   Versus


S. SUNAAD RAGHURAM                                              ..Respondent



                           J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T


R. BANUMATHI, J.

            Leave granted.
2.          This appeal arises out of an order dated  20.01.2012  passed  by
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal  Petition  No.5077/2007
wherein the High Court declined to quash the order dated  21.06.2007  passed
in PCR No.8409/2007 thereby confirming the order passed  by  the  VII  Addl.
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore permitting the respondent to  carry
out the amendment in a criminal complaint on the premise that the  amendment
was made prior to taking cognizance of the offence.
3.          On 9.05.2007, respondent filed the complaint under  Section  200
Cr.P.C.  against the first appellant and his mother Smt. H.R. Leelavathi (A-
2)  alleging  that   they  have  committed  the  offences  punishable  under
Sections 120-B, 499 and 500 IPC.   In  the  complaint,  the  respondent  has
alleged that he was born of  the  wedlock  of  his  father  late  Shri  S.G.
Raghuram and mother Late Smt. B.S. Girija.  However, his  father  after  the
death of his mother Girija, married another divorcee lady namely  Smt.  H.R.
Leelavathi (A-2) who at the time of the second marriage, already had  a  son
aged six years S.H. Sukumar (appellant), born  from  her  previous  wedlock.
The respondent alleged in the complaint that his  father’s  name  i.e.  Late
Shri S.G. Raghuram has been purportedly used by the appellant portraying  as
if he is his natural  father.   Respondent  alleged  that  the  act  of  the
appellant using name of respondent’s father as his own father often  created
doubts among the near and dear ones about the legitimacy of the  respondent-
complainant and integrity and character of his  father  which  had  affected
the respondent’s reputation.
4.          Respondent filed the complaint on 9.05.2007  and  his  statement
was recorded in part on 18.05.2007 and further recorded on 23.05.2007.  Next
day i.e. on 24.05.2007, respondent moved an  application  seeking  amendment
to the complaint by praying for insertion of paras 11(a) and  11(b)  in  the
complaint stating the fact of  poem  named  ‘Khalnayakaru’  written  by  the
appellant in connivance with his mother (A-2) depicting  the  respondent  as
Villain-‘Khalnayak’, with an intention to malign the  character,  image  and
status  of  the  respondent.  The  trial  court  allowed  the  amendment  on
24.05.2007 and took the cognizance of the offence and directed  issuance  of
the process to the appellant vide Order dated 21.06.2007.  Aggrieved by  the
Order dated 21.06.2007, the appellant approached the High Court praying  for
quashing  the  proceedings  in   PCR   No.8409/2007   registered   as   C.C.
No.15851/2007 on the ground that there  is  no  provision  under  the  Code,
providing for amendment of the  complaint.  The  High  Court  vide  impugned
Order dated  20.01.2012  dismissed  the  petition  filed  by  the  appellant
observing that before  the  date  of  allowing  amendment  application  i.e.
24.05.2007, cognizance of case was not taken and therefore no  prejudice  is
caused to the appellant.  Further, the High Court was of the  view  that  if
amendment is not allowed, then the multiple proceedings  would  have  ensued
between the parties.
5.          Mrs. Kiran Suri, learned  Senior  Counsel   appearing   for  the
appellant contended that under the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  there  is  no
provision for amendment of complaint and in  the  absence  of  any  specific
provision in the Code, courts below  erred  in  allowing  the  amendment  in
criminal complaint.  It was submitted that  on  18.05.2007,  the  Magistrate
took cognizance of the complaint for  the  first  time  and  the  Magistrate
allowed the amendment application on 24.05.2007  and  the  Magistrate  again
took cognizance of case for the second  time  on  21.06.2007  and  thus  the
cognizance taken twice by the Magistrate is  impermissible  under  the  law.
It was further submitted that once  cognizance  was  taken,  the  Magistrate
ought not to have allowed the amendment and the impugned order is liable  to
be set aside.
6.          Per contra, learned counsel for the  respondent  contended  that
the respondent-complainant  was  examined  in  Court  on  oath  in  part  on
18.05.2007 and his  examination  was  deferred  to  23.05.2007  for  further
inquiry and during the course of  inquiry,  the  amendment  application  was
filed  and  the  same  was  allowed  in  order  to  avoid  multiplicity   of
proceedings.  It was further contended that  on  18.05.2007,  no  cognizance
was taken and therefore it would be wrong to  suggest  that  cognizance  was
taken twice by the Magistrate.  It was submitted that  though  there  is  no
enabling provision in the Criminal Procedure Code  to  amend  the  complaint
and there is no specific bar in  carrying  out  the  amendment  and  in  the
interest of justice, Court has power to do so.
7.          Upon consideration of the rival  contentions  and  materials  on
record, the points falling for determination are:  (i) in the facts  of  the
case, when did  the Magistrate take cognizance  of  the  complaint  for  the
first time i.e.  on   18.05.2007  or  on  21.06.2007,  when  the  Magistrate
satisfied  of  a  prima   facie   case   to   take   cognizance    of    the
complaint;  (ii) whether amendment to a complaint filed  under  Section  200
Cr.P.C. is  impermissible  in  law  and  whether  the  order  allowing   the
amendment  suffers from serious infirmity.
8.          Section 200 Cr.P.C. provides for the  procedure  for  Magistrate
taking cognizance of an offence on complaint.  The Magistrate is  not  bound
to take cognizance of an offence merely because a complaint has  been  filed
before him when in fact the complaint does not disclose a cause  of  action.
The language in Section 200 Cr.P.C. “a Magistrate taking  cognizance  of  an
offence on complaint  shall  examine  upon  oath  the  complainant  and  the
witnesses present, if any…” clearly suggests that for taking  cognizance  of
an offence on complaint, the Court shall examine the complainant upon  oath.
 The object of examination of the complainant is to  find  out  whether  the
complaint is justifiable or is vexatious.  Merely  because  the  complainant
was examined that does not mean that the Magistrate has taken cognizance  of
the offence. Taking cognizance of an offence means the Magistrate must  have
judicially applied the mind to the contents of the complaint  and  indicates
that Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence.
9.          Mere presentation of the complaint and receipt of  the  same  in
the court does not mean that the Magistrate  has  taken  cognizance  of  the
offence.   In Narsingh  Das Tapadia vs. Goverdhan Das  Partani  &  Another.,
AIR 2000 SC 2946,  it was held that the mere presentation  of   a  complaint
cannot be held to mean that the Magistrate has  taken  the  cognizance.   In
Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh & Another, (2012) 3 SCC 64, this  Court
explained the meaning of the  word  ‘cognizance’  holding  that  “…In  legal
parlance  cognizance  is  taking  judicial  notice  by  the  court  of  law,
possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so  as  to
decide  whether  there  is  any  basis  for   initiating   proceedings   and
determination of the cause or matter judicially”.
10.         Section 200 Cr.P.C. contemplates a Magistrate taking  cognizance
of an offence on complaint to examine the complaint and  examine  upon  oath
the complainant and the witnesses  present,  if  any.  Then  normally  three
courses are available to the Magistrate.  The Magistrate  can  either  issue
summons to the accused or order an inquiry  under  Section  202  Cr.P.C.  or
dismiss the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C.  Upon consideration  of  the
statement of complainant and the material  adduced  at  that  stage  if  the
Magistrate is satisfied  that  there are sufficient grounds to  proceed,  he
can proceed to issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C.  Section 202  Cr.P.C.
contemplates ‘postponement of issue of  process’.    It  provides  that  the
Magistrate on receipt  of  a  complaint  of  an  offence   of  which  he  is
authorised to take cognizance may, if he thinks fit, postpones the issue  of
process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against,  and
either  inquire  into the case himself, or  have  an  inquiry  made  by  any
Magistrate subordinate  to  him,  or  an  investigation  made  by  a  police
officer, or by some other person for the purpose  of   deciding  whether  or
not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.  If the Magistrate  finds  no
sufficient ground for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint by  recording
briefly the reasons for doing so as contemplated under Section  203  Cr.P.C.
A Magistrate takes cognizance of an  offence  when  he  decides  to  proceed
against the person accused of having committed that offence and not  at  the
time when the Magistrate is just informed either by  complainant  by  filing
the complaint or by the police report about the commission of an offence.
11.         “Cognizance” therefore has a reference  to  the  application  of
judicial mind by the Magistrate in connection  with  the  commission  of  an
offence and not merely to a Magistrate learning that some offence  had  been
committed.  Only upon examination of the complainant,  the  Magistrate  will
proceed to apply the  judicial  mind  whether  to  take  cognizance  of  the
offence  or  not.  Under  Section  200  Cr.P.C.,  when  the  complainant  is
examined, the Magistrate cannot  be  said  to  have  ipso  facto  taken  the
cognizance, when the Magistrate was merely gathering  the  material  on  the
basis of  which  he will decide whether a prima facie case is made  out  for
taking cognizance of the offence  or  not.  “Cognizance  of  offence”  means
taking notice of the accusations and  applying  the  judicial  mind  to  the
contents of the complaint and the material filed therewith.  It  is  neither
practicable  nor  desirable  to  define  as  to  what  is  meant  by  taking
cognizance.  Whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the  offence  or
not will depend upon facts and circumstances of the particular case.
12.          In  S.K.  Sinha,  Chief  Enforcement   Officer   vs.   Videocon
International Ltd. And Ors., (2008) 2 SCC  492,  considering  the  scope  of
expression “cognizance” it was held as under:-
“The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in the Code. But the  word
(cognizance)  is  of  indefinite  import.  It  has  no  esoteric  or  mystic
significance in criminal law. It merely means “become  aware  of”  and  when
used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to  take  notice  of
judicially”. It indicates the point when  a  court  or  a  Magistrate  takes
judicial notice of an offence with  a  view  to  initiating  proceedings  in
respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.”

13.         A three Judge Bench of this Court in the  case  of   R.R.  Chari
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 SCR 312, while considering what the  phrase
‘taking cognizance’ mean, approved the decision of Calcutta  High  Court  in
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal  Affairs,  West  Bengal  vs.  Abani
Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437, wherein it was observed that:
“…What  is  “taking  cognizance”  has  not  been  defined  in  the  Criminal
Procedure Code and I have no desire now to attempt to define it.   It  seems
to me clear, however, that before it can be said  that  any  Magistrate  has
taken cognizance of any offence under S.190(1)(a), Criminal  P.C.,  he  must
not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he  must
have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as  indicated
in the subsequent  provisions of this Chapter,–  proceeding  under  S.  200,
and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under  S.  202.   When  the
Magistrate applies his mind  not  for the purpose of  proceeding  under  the
subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking  action  of  some  other
kind, e.g., ordering investigation  under  Section  156(3),  or  issuing   a
search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot  be  said  to
have taken cognizance of the offence...” (Underlining added)


The same view was reiterated by this  Court  in  Jamuna  Singh  &  Ors.  vs.
Bhadai Sah, (1964) 5 SCR 37 and Nirmaljit  Singh  Hoon  vs.  State  of  West
Bengal & Anr., (1973) 3 SCC 753.
14.         Elaborating upon the words expression “taking cognizance” of  an
offence by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 Cr.P.C.,  in
Devarapally Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. vs. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors.,   AIR
1976 SC 1672,  this Court held as under:-
“…But from the scheme of the Code,  the  content  and  marginal  heading  of
Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190  to  199
occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court  only
when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways  in
which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b)  and  (c)
of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has  not  taken  cognizance
of the offence will depend on  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case
including the mode in which the case is sought to  be  instituted,  and  the
nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the  Magistrate.  Broadly
speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the  Magistrate  applies  his  mind
for the  purposes  of  proceeding  under  Section  200  and  the  succeeding
sections in Chapter XV to the Code  of  1973,  he  is  said  to  have  taken
cognizance of the offence within  the  meaning  to  Section  190(1)(a).  It,
instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise  of
his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as  issuing  a  search
warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation  by  the
police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken  cognizance  of
any offence.”

15.          Contention  of  the  appellant  is  that  the  act  of   taking
cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate precedes the examination  of  the
complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C.  and the learned  Senior  Counsel  for
the appellant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in CREF  Finance
Ltd. vs. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd. And Anr., (2005)  7  SCC  467  wherein
this Court has held as under:-
“10.  In the instant case, the appellant  had  filed  a  detailed  complaint
before the Magistrate. The record shows that the Magistrate took  cognizance
and fixed the matter for recording of the statement of the complainant on 1-
6-2000. Even if we assume, though that is  not  the  case,  that  the  words
“cognizance taken” were not to be found in the  order  recorded  by  him  on
that date, in our view that would make no difference.  Cognizance  is  taken
of the offence and not of the offender and, therefore,  once  the  court  on
perusal of the complaint is  satisfied  that  the  complaint  discloses  the
commission of an offence and there is no reason to reject the  complaint  at
that stage, and proceeds further in the matter, it  must  be  held  to  have
taken  cognizance  of  the  offence.  One  should  not  confuse  taking   of
cognizance with issuance of process. Cognizance  is  taken  at  the  initial
stage when the Magistrate peruses the complaint with  a  view  to  ascertain
whether the commission of any offence is disclosed. The issuance of  process
is at a later stage when after considering the material  placed  before  it,
the court decides to proceed against the  offenders  against  whom  a  prima
facie case is made out. It  is  possible  that  a  complaint  may  be  filed
against several persons, but the Magistrate  may  choose  to  issue  process
only against some  of  the  accused.  It  may  also  be  that  after  taking
cognizance and examining the complainant on oath, the court may come to  the
conclusion that no case is made out for  issuance  of  process  and  it  may
reject the complaint…..” (Underlining added)

In our considered view, the above  decision  is  of  no  assistance  to  the
appellant.  A perusal of the above decision would show that this  Court  has
emphasized upon the satisfaction of the Court to the commission  of  offence
as a condition precedent for taking cognizance of offence.  However, in  the
facts of the said case, Court was of the view that the cognizance was  taken
by the Magistrate once the Magistrate applied his mind on  the  contents  of
the  complaint  and  on  the  satisfaction  that          prima  facie  case
existed.
16.         In the present case, the complaint was filed  on  9.05.2007  and
the matter was adjourned to 15.05.2007 and  on  that  date  on  request  for
inquiry, the matter was adjourned to 18.05.2007.  On  18.05.2007,  statement
of complainant was recorded in part  and  the  order  sheet  for  18.05.2007
reads as under:-
“Complainant is present with Shri N.V. Adv.  Cognizance  taken  u/s  200  of
Cr.P.C. r/w statement Complainant is recorded in part.  Now 5.35 p.m.  hence
on request call on 23.5.2007.”


On 23.05.2007, the complainant was present and his  statement  was  recorded
and the same was marked as Ex.P-1 and annexures A to G  were  referred.   On
request,  the  matter  was  adjourned  to  24.05.2007  on  which  date   the
complainant filed application under Section 200  Cr.P.C.  seeking  amendment
to the complaint by adding paras 11(a) and 11(b)  and the  said  application
was allowed.  Amended complaint was filed and one witness was  examined  for
the complainant on 2.06.2007.  On  21.06.2007,  the  Magistrate  passed  the
detailed  order  recording  his  satisfaction   to   proceed   against   the
appellant(A-1) and also observing that there are no  sufficient  grounds  to
proceed against Smt. H.R. Leelavathi and  ordered  issuance  of  summons  to
accused No.1–appellant herein. Before examination of  the  complainant,  the
Court was yet to make up the mind whether to take cognizance of the  offence
or not.  It is wrong to contend that the Magistrate has taken cognizance  of
the case even on 18.5.2007 when the Magistrate has  recorded  the  statement
of complainant–respondent in part and  even  when  the  Magistrate  has  not
applied his judicial mind. Even though  the  order  dated  18.05.2007  reads
“cognizance taken under Section 200 Cr.P.C.”; the same is  not  grounded  in
reality and actual cognizance was taken only later.
17.         Insofar as  merits  of  the  contention  regarding  allowing  of
amendment application, it is true that there is  no  specific  provision  in
the Code to  amend  either  a  complaint  or  a  petition  filed  under  the
provisions of the Code, but the Courts have held that the petitions  seeking
such amendment to  correct  curable  infirmities  can  be  allowed  even  in
respect of complaints. In U.P. Pollution Control Board vs.  Modi  Distillery
And Ors., (1987) 3 SCC 684, wherein the name  of  the  company  was  wrongly
mentioned in the complaint that is, instead  of  Modi  Industries  Ltd.  the
name of the company was mentioned  as  Modi  Distillery  and  the  name  was
sought to be amended.  In such factual background, this Court  has  held  as
follows:-
“…The  learned  Single  Judge  has  focussed  his  attention  only  on   the
[pic]technical flaw in the complaint and has failed to comprehend  that  the
flaw had occurred due to the recalcitrant attitude of  Modi  Distillery  and
furthermore the infirmity is one which could be  easily  removed  by  having
the matter remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate  with  a  direction  to
call upon the appellant to make  the  formal  amendments  to  the  averments
contained in para 2 of the complaint so as to make the  controlling  company
of the industrial unit figure as the concerned  accused  in  the  complaint.
All that has to be done is the making of a formal application for  amendment
by the appellant for leave  to  amend  by  substituting  the  name  of  Modi
Industries Limited, the company owning the  industrial  unit,  in  place  of
Modi Distillery…. Furthermore, the legal  infirmity  is  of  such  a  nature
which could be easily cured...”


18.         What is discernible from  the  U.P.  Pollution  Control  Board’s
case is that easily curable legal infirmity could be cured  by  means  of  a
formal application for amendment.   If  the  amendment  sought  to  be  made
relates to a simple  infirmity  which  is  curable  by  means  of  a  formal
amendment and by allowing such amendment, no prejudice could  be  caused  to
the  other  side,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  is  no  enabling
provision in the Code for entertaining such amendment, the Court may  permit
such an amendment to be made.  On the contrary, if the amendment  sought  to
be made  in the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity   or
the same  cannot  be  corrected  by  a  formal  amendment  or  if  there  is
likelihood of  prejudice to the other  side, then   the   Court   shall  not
allow such amendment in the complaint.
19.         In the instant case, the  amendment  application  was  filed  on
24.05.2007 to carry out the amendment by adding  paras  11(a)  and  11  (b).
Though,  the  proposed  amendment  was  not  a  formal  amendment,   but   a
substantial one, the Magistrate allowed the amendment application mainly  on
the ground that  no  cognizance  was  taken  of  the  complaint  before  the
disposal of amendment application.  Firstly, Magistrate  was  yet  to  apply
the judicial mind to the  contents  of  the  complaint  and  had  not  taken
cognizance of the matter.  Secondly, since summons was yet to be ordered  to
be issued to the accused, no prejudice  would  be  caused  to  the  accused.
Thirdly, the amendment did not change the original nature of  the  complaint
being one for defamation. Fourthly, the publication of  poem  ‘Khalnayakaru’
being in the nature of subsequent event created a new  cause  of  action  in
favour of the respondent which could have been prosecuted by the  respondent
by filing a separate  complaint  and  therefore  to  avoid  multiplicity  of
proceedings, the trial court allowed the amendment application.  Considering
these factors which weighed  in the mind of the courts below, in  our  view,
the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the order  passed  by  the
Magistrate allowing the amendment application and the  impugned  order  does
not suffer from any serious infirmity warranting  interference  in  exercise
of jurisdiction under Article  136 of the Constitution of India.
20.         The appeal is dismissed.  The trial court is  directed  to  take
up the matter and dispose the same  in  accordance  with  law  as  early  as
possible.  It is made clear that we have not expressed any  opinion  on  the
merits of the matter.

                                                                 ….……………………J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)


                                                                ….……………………J.
                                                              (R. BANUMATHI)

New Delhi;
July 2, 2015