Supreme Court of India ()

Appeal (Crl.), 600 of 2007, Judgment Date: Mar 16, 2015

                                                            REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.600 OF 2007


 RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED                      ...APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT
                                                          ...RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T

           ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

           1.    This appeal by special leave has  been  preferred  against
           the Judgment and Order dated 17th February,  2006  of  the  High
           Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in  Special  Criminal  Application
           No.1821 of 2005.
           2.    The High Court declined to interfere with the Order  dated
           16th August, 2005, of  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,
           Sanand on a complaint filed by the  appellant  against  fourteen
           accused for alleged commission of offences under  Sections  409,
           420, 406, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B and 114  of  the
           Indian Penal Code directing the Police Sub-Inspector, Sanand, to
           give a report to the Court  within  thirty  days  under  Section
           202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for  short  "the
           Code") instead of directing investigation under  Section  156(3)
           of the Code, as sought by the appellant.
           3.    The case of the appellant-complainant in  complaint  filed
           by it before the Magistrate is that it is  running  business  of
           food products and had permitted M/s. New Ramdev Masala  Factory,
           wherein accused No.1 Mr. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel was  one  of
           the partners, to use the  trademark  "Ramdev"  for  seven  years
           under agreement dated 4th June, 1990.  However, M/s. New  Ramdev
           Masala Factory was closed  on  30th  May,  1994.   Accused  No.1
           executed forged partnership documents with  the  help  of  other
           accused and thereby committed the alleged offences.
           4.    The appellant sought  direction  for  investigation  under
           Section 156(3) of the Code.  However, the Magistrate instead  of
           directing investigation as prayed, thought  it  fit  to  conduct
           further inquiry under Section  202  and  sought  report  of  the
           Police Sub Inspector  within  thirty  days.   Grievance  of  the
           appellant before  the  High  Court  was  that  in  view  of  the
           allegation that documents had been forged with a view  to  usurp
           the trademark, which documents were in possession of the accused
           and were required to be seized, investigation ought to have been
           ordered under  Section  156(3)  instead  of  conducting  further
           inquiry under Section 202.  Thus, there was non  application  of
           mind  by  the  Magistrate.   It  is  also   submitted   in   the
           alternative, that even in the course of investigation for giving
           report under Section 202,  police  is  entitled  to  arrest  the
           accused as arrest is part  of  'investigation'  but  the  police
           failed to effect the arrest.
           5.    The High Court did not accept the stand of the  appellant.
           It was observed that the appellant had approached the High Court
           against the Order of the Magistrate after delay of  four  months
           from the date of the Order which  itself  disentitled  it  to  a
           direction under Section 156(3).  It was  further  observed  that
           the  Magistrate  had  given  reasons  for  declining  to  direct
           investigation under Section 156(3) and the said  Order  did  not
           call for any interference.  The reasons given by the Magistrate,
           inter alia, are that the Police had refused to register a  case.
           There was civil litigation which had  gone  up  to  the  Supreme
           Court and thus the case was of civil nature.  The  fact  whether
           the  documents  in  question  were  forged  or  not   could   be
           ascertained in civil proceedings by getting the opinion  of  the
           hand writing expert.  Scope of inquiry  under  Section  202  was
           limited to find out whether a case was made  out  for  issue  of
           process.    Suppression of material fact of  pendency  of  civil
           dispute by the complainant  also  justified  the  order  of  the
           Magistrate to proceed  under  Section  202  instead  of  Section
           156(3).  It was  further  observed  that  a  Magistrate  is  not
           justified in ordering police investigation in mechanical  manner
           as laid down by the Gujarat High Court in  Arvindbhai  Ravjibhai
           Patel vs. Dhirubhai Shambhubhai Kakadiya[1] .
           6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.   When  the
           matter came up for hearing  on  11th  April,  2007,  this  Court
           framed the question as follows:
                       "The question involved in the instant Special  Leave
                      Petition is as to the extent of  power  that  may  be
                      exercised by a police officer while making an inquiry
                      under  Section  202(1)  of  the  Code   of   Criminal
                      Procedure  particularly,  whether  he  has  power  to
                      arrest in course of the inquiry entrusted to  him  by
                      the Magistrate.  Reliance is placed on Sub-Section  3
                      of Section 202 to contend that the  power  to  arrest
                      without warrant cannot be exercised by a  person  not
                      being a police officer.  Impliedly  it  is  contended
                      that so far as the police officer is  concerned  that
                      constraint is not there."

                 However, in the  light  of  submissions  made  during  the
           hearing, we frame following questions for consideration:
                      "(i)  Whether discretion of the  Magistrate  to  call
                      for a report under Section 202 instead  of  directing
                      investigation 156(3) is  controlled  by  any  defined
                      parameters?

                      (ii)  Whether  in  the  course  of  investigation  in
                      pursuance of  a  direction  under  Section  202,  the
                      Police Officer is entitled to arrest an accused?

            (iii)   Whether in the present case, the  Magistrate  erred  in
                      seeking report under Section 202 instead of directing
                      investigation under Section 156(3)?"


           7.     Contention  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  is  that  the
           Magistrate and the  High  Court  erred  in  declining  to  order
           investigation under Section 156(3) which was necessary  in  view
           of the allegation of forgery of documents and  stamp  papers  by
           the accused to create back dated partnership  deeds  by  forging
           signatures of a dead person.  Such documents being in custody of
           the accused could not be otherwise produced except on arrest  in
           the course of investigation and in accordance with Section 27 of
           the Evidence Act.  Option of proceeding under  Section  202,  as
           against Section 156(3), has to be exercised only  when  evidence
           has already been collected and what remained to be  decided  was
           whether there was sufficient ground to proceed.  Mere fact  that
           the appellant first approached the Police and the police did not
           register First Information Report could not be taken against  it
           nor the dispute being of civil nature  was  a  bar  to  criminal
           proceedings, if a case was made out.
           8.    Learned counsel for  the  appellant  also  submitted  that
           direction under Section 156(3) for  investigation  was  all  the
           more necessary in view of interpretation given  by  the  Gujarat
           High Court in  Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel vs. J.P.  Chavda  and
           Ors.[2] that under Section 202, the Police Officer had no  power
           of arrest.  In such a situation calling for report under Section
           202 will not serve the purpose of finding out the truth.  It was
           also submitted that the said view  was  erroneous  and  contrary
           view in other judgments was sound and needs to  be  approved  by
           this Court.  Referring to Section 202 (3), it  was  pointed  out
           that a person other than police officer could not exercise power
           of arrest but police officer was  not  so  debarred.   Moreover,
           arrest was integral part of investigation.
           9.    Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel, the alleged accused has  filed
           an application for impleadment stating that dispute between  the
           parties  is  of  civil  nature.   His  contention  is  that  the
           appellant is attempting to abuse the process of law to arm-twist
           the accused by having  him  arrested  by  the  police.   In  the
           circumstances, no interference was called  for  by  this  Court.
           This application has been opposed by the appellant on the ground
           that during the stage of inquiry under Section 202 of the  Code,
           the accused has no right to be heard as laid down by this  Court
           in Adalat Prasad vs. Rupal Jindal & Others[3].  Having regard to
           the legal issue involved, we have heard learned counsel for  the
           accused on the questions involved.

           10.   As already observed, the contention of  the  appellant  is
           that when there  is  allegation  of  forgery  and  discovery  of
           documents is necessary, a Magistrate  must  order  investigation
           under Section 156(3) instead of proceeding  under  Section  202.
           Alternatively, direction to the Police to investigate and give a
           report under Section 202  implies  arrest  and  discovery  which
           under  Section  157  of  the  Code   are   integral   parts   of
           investigation.   Contrary  view  of  Gujarat   High   Court   in
           Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel (supra) and other  High  Courts  was
           erroneous while the view taken by other  High  Courts  to  which
           reference will be  made  in  later  part  of  this  Judgment  is
           correct.  Section 202 (3) expressly provides that if  a  person,
           other than police officer is required to  conduct  investigation
           under Section 202 (1), he is not authorized  to  arrest  without
           warrant which implied that there is no such restriction on power
           of arrest available with a police officer.
           11.   On the other hand, contention on  behalf  of  the  alleged
           accused is  that  both  the  powers  of  the  Magistrate  -  (i)
           directing investigation under Section 156(3); and (ii) direction
           under  Section  202  to  seek  a  report   from   police   after
           investigation to enable the  Magistrate  to  decide  whether  to
           proceed further and issue process  are  qualitatively  different
           and are in different chapters of the Code.  Thus, as per  scheme
           of the Code, power of police in pursuance  of  directions  under
           the said two provisions is not the same.
                  The  Magistrate   has   discretion   either   to   direct
           registration of a  case  under  Section  156(3)  or  to  conduct
           inquiry himself as the situation may warrant.   This  discretion
           is to be exercised by the Magistrate in his  wisdom  and  having
           regard to the nature of  material  available.   Direction  under
           Section 156(3) to register a criminal case and to investigate is
           to be exercised where the Magistrate  is  satisfied  that  prima
           facie a cognizable offence has been committed.  On the contrary,
           where he thinks it necessary to conduct further  inquiry  before
           deciding whether he should proceed further in the matter, matter
           has to be dealt with under  Section  202.   Mere  allegation  of
           forgery is not enough to require  the  Magistrate  to  pass  the
           order under Section 156(3).
           12.   It is further submitted that  in  the  present  case,  the
           civil proceedings are pending  between  the  parties  where  the
           question of genuineness or otherwise of the partnership deed  is
           an issue.  The process of criminal law cannot  be  used  when  a
           dispute is primarily of civil nature.  Simultaneously initiation
           of criminal proceedings may be permitted  where  an  offence  is
           shown to have been committed.  Thus, the Magistrate was entitled
           to satisfy himself as to whether any cognizable offence had been
           committed before proceeding further.   The  Magistrate  was  not
           satisfied  from  the  material  available  that  any  cognizable
           offence had been committed and he  rightly  decided  to  conduct
           further enquiry under Section 202.  Having regard to the limited
           nature of inquiry  under  Section  202  which  option  had  been
           rightly chosen by the Magistrate, direction  to  the  police  to
           investigate and give a report was limited by  the  very  purpose
           for which the  limited  inquiry  was  to  be  held,  as  against
           procedure for investigation in cases not covered  under  Section
           202 of the Code.  The purpose was to enable  the  Magistrate  to
           decide  whether  there  was  ground  to  proceed  further.   The
           Magistrate having taken cognizance of the offence and the police
           having not registered a criminal case nor the Magistrate  having
           directed registration of criminal case, procedure and  power  of
           the Police in the matter are different and in such  a  situation
           police did not have the power to arrest, without  permission  of
           the Magistrate as was the view of the  Gujarat  and  other  High
           Courts.
           13.   We may first deal with the  question  as  to  whether  the
           Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3)  or  was
           justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and  what  are  the
           parameters for exercise of power under the two provisions.
           14.   The two provisions are in two different  chapters  of  the
           Code, though common expression 'investigation' is used  in  both
           the  provisions.   Normal  rule  is  to  understand   the   same
           expression in two provisions  of  an  enactment  in  same  sense
           unless the context otherwise requires.  Heading of  Chapter  XII
           is "Information to the Police and their Powers  to  Investigate"
           and that of Chapter XV is "Complaints to  Magistrate".   Heading
           of Chapter  XIV  is  "Conditions  Requisite  for  Initiation  of
           Proceedings".  The two provisions i.e. Sections 156 and  202  in
           Chapters XII and XV respectively are as follows :
                      "156.   Police   officer's   power   to   investigate
                      cognizable case.

                      (1) Any officer in charge of a  police  station  may,
                      without the order of a  Magistrate,  investigate  any
                      cognizable case which  a  Court  having  jurisdiction
                      over the local area within the limits of such station
                      would have power to inquire into  or  try  under  the
                      provisions of Chapter XIII.

                      (2)   No proceeding of a police officer in  any  such
                      case shall at any stage be called in question on  the
                      ground that the case was one which such  officer  was
                      not empowered under this section to investigate.

                      (3)  Any Magistrate empowered under section  190  may
                      order such an investigation as above- mentioned.

                      202. Postponement of issue of process.-

                      (1) Any Magistrate , on receipt of a complaint of  an
                      offence of which he is authorized to take  cognizance
                      or which has been made over to him under section 192,
                      may, if he thinks fit, [and shall in a case where the
                      accused is residing at a place  beyond  the  area  in
                      which he exercises  his  jurisdiction]  postpone  the
                      issue of process  against  the  accused,  and  either
                      inquire  into  the  case   himself   or   direct   an
                      investigation to be made by a police  officer  or  by
                      such other person as he thinks fit, for  the  purpose
                      of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground
                      for proceeding:

                      Provided that no  such  direction  for  investigation
                      shall be made, -

                           (a) where it appears to the Magistrate  that  the
                           offence complained of is triable  exclusively  by
                           the Court of Sessions; or
                           (b) where the complaint has not been  made  by  a
                           Court, unless the complainant and  the  witnesses
                           present (if any) have been examined on oath under
                           section 200.

                       (2)   In  an  inquiry  under  sub-section  (1),   the
                      Magistrate may, if he thinks fit,  take  evidence  of
                      witnesses on oath:

                      Provided that if it appears to  the  Magistrate  that
                      the offence complained of is triable  exclusively  by
                      the  Court  of  Session,  he  shall  call  upon   the
                      complainant to produce all his witnesses and  examine
                      them on oath.

                      (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made
                      by a person not being a police officer, he shall have
                      for that investigation all the  powers  conferred  by
                      this Code on an officer in charge of a police station
                      except the power to arrest without warrant."

           15.   Cognizance is taken by a Magistrate under Section 190  (in
           Chapter XIV) either on "receiving a  complaint",  on  "a  police
           report" or "information received" from any person other  than  a
           police officer or upon his own knowledge.
                 Chapter   XV   deals   exclusively   with   complaints   to
           Magistrates.  Reference to Sections, 202, in the  said  Chapter,
           shows that it provides for "postponement of  issue  of  process"
           which is mandatory if accused resides  beyond  the  Magistrate's
           jurisdiction (with which situation this case does  not  concern)
           and discretionary in other cases in which event an  enquiry  can
           be conducted by the Magistrate or investigation can be  directed
           to be made by a police officer or such other person  as  may  be
           thought fit "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is
           sufficient ground for proceeding".  We are skipping the  proviso
           as it does not concern the question  under  discussion.   Clause
           (3) provides that if investigation is by a person other  than  a
           police officer, he shall have  all  the  powers  of  an  officer
           incharge of a police station except the power to arrest.
           16.   Chapter XII, dealing with the information  to  the  police
           and  their  powers  to  investigate,   provides   for   entering
           information relating to a 'cognizable offence' in a book  to  be
           kept by the officer incharge of a police station  (Section  154)
           and such entry is called "FIR".  If from  the  information,  the
           officer incharge of the police station  has  reason  to  suspect
           commission of an offence which he is  empowered  to  investigate
           subject to compliance of other requirements, he  shall  proceed,
           to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances and,  if
           necessary, to take measure, for the discovery and arrest of  the
           offender (Section 157(1).
            17.  In Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P.[4],  this  Court  dealt
           with the questions :

                      "30.1. (i) Whether the immediate non-registration  of
                      FIR leads to scope for  manipulation  by  the  police
                      which affects the right of the victim/complainant  to
                      have  a  complaint  immediately   investigated   upon
                      allegations being made; and

                      30.2.   (ii)   Whether    in    cases    where    the
                      complaint/information does not clearly  disclose  the
                      commission of a cognizable offence  but  the  FIR  is
                      compulsorily registered then  does  it  infringe  the
                      rights of an accused."

            18.  These questions were answered as follows :
                      "49. Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non
                      for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is
                      that there must be information and  that  information
                      must  disclose   a   cognizable   offence.   If   any
                      information disclosing a cognizable  offence  is  led
                      before an officer in charge  of  the  police  station
                      satisfying the requirement  of  Section  154(1),  the
                      said police officer has no  other  option  except  to
                      enter the substance thereof in the  prescribed  form,
                      that is to say, to register a case on  the  basis  of
                      such information. The provision of Section 154 of the
                      Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is  duty-
                      bound  to  register  the  case  on   the   basis   of
                      information  disclosing  a  cognizable  [pic]offence.
                      Thus, the plain words of Section 154(1) of  the  Code
                      have to be given their literal meaning.
                      "Shall"

                      72. It is thus unequivocally clear that  registration
                      of FIR is  mandatory  and  also  that  it  is  to  be
                      recorded in the FIR book by giving  a  unique  annual
                      number to each FIR to enable strict tracking of  each
                      and every  registered  FIR  by  the  superior  police
                      officers as well as by the competent court  to  which
                      copies of each FIR are required to be sent.
                      "Information"

                      73.  The  legislature  has   consciously   used   the
                      expression "information" in  Section  154(1)  of  the
                      Code as  against  the  expression  used  in  Sections
                      41(1)(a)* and  (g)  where  the  expression  used  for
                      arresting a person  without  warrant  is  "reasonable
                      complaint" or "credible information". The  expression
                      under Section 154(1) of the Code is not qualified  by
                      the  prefix  "reasonable"  or  "credible".  The  non-
                      qualification of the word  "information"  in  Section
                      154(1) unlike in Sections 41(1)(a)* and  (g)  of  the
                      Code is for the reason that the police officer should
                      not refuse to record any information relating to  the
                      commission of a cognizable offence on the ground that
                      he  is  not  satisfied  with  the  reasonableness  or
                      credibility  of  the  information.  In  other  words,
                      reasonableness or credibility of the said information
                      is not a condition precedent for the registration  of
                      a case.

                      94. Principles of  democracy  and  liberty  demand  a
                      regular and efficient check on police powers. One way
                      of keeping check on authorities with such  powers  is
                      by documenting every action of  theirs.  Accordingly,
                      under the Code,  actions  of  the  police,  etc.  are
                      provided to be written and documented.  For  example,
                      in case of arrest under Section 41(1)(b) of the Code,
                      the arrest memo along with the grounds has to  be  in
                      writing mandatorily; under  [pic]Section  55  of  the
                      Code, if an officer is deputed  to  make  an  arrest,
                      then the superior  officer  has  to  write  down  and
                      record the offence, etc. for which the person  is  to
                      be arrested; under Section 91 of the Code, a  written
                      order has to be passed by the  officer  concerned  to
                      seek documents; under Section  160  of  the  Code,  a
                      written notice has to be issued  to  the  witness  so
                      that he  can  be  called  for  recording  of  his/her
                      statement, seizure memo/panchnama has to be drawn for
                      every article seized, etc.

                      107. While registration of FIR is  mandatory,  arrest
                      of the accused immediately on registration of FIR  is
                      not at all mandatory. In fact,  registration  of  FIR
                      and arrest of an  accused  person  are  two  entirely
                      different concepts  under  the  law,  and  there  are
                      several   safeguards   available   against    arrest.
                      Moreover, it is also pertinent  to  mention  that  an
                      accused  person  also  has  a  right  to  apply   for
                      "anticipatory bail" under the provisions  of  Section
                      438 of the Code if the conditions  mentioned  therein
                      are satisfied. Thus, in  appropriate  cases,  he  can
                      avoid the arrest under that provision by obtaining an
                      order from the court.

                      108. It is also relevant to  note  that  in  Joginder
                      Kumar v. State of U.P.(1994) 4 SCC 260],  this  Court
                      has held that arrest cannot be made by the police  in
                      a routine manner.  Some  important  observations  are
                      reproduced as under: (SCC pp. 267-68, para 20)

                      "20. ... No arrest can be made in a routine manner on
                      a mere allegation of commission of  an  offence  made
                      against a person. It would be prudent  for  a  police
                      officer  in  the  interest  of  protection   of   the
                      constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his
                      own interest that no arrest should be made without  a
                      reasonable   satisfaction    reached    after    some
                      investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of
                      a complaint and a reasonable belief both  as  to  the
                      person's complicity and even so as  to  the  need  to
                      effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty  is  a
                      serious matter. The  recommendations  of  the  Police
                      Commission   merely   reflect   the    constitutional
                      concomitants of the  fundamental  right  to  personal
                      liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest
                      merely on the suspicion of complicity in an  offence.
                      There must be some reasonable  justification  in  the
                      opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such
                      arrest is necessary and justified. Except in  heinous
                      offences, an arrest  must  be  avoided  if  a  police
                      officer issues notice to person to attend the Station
                      House and not to leave the Station without permission
                      would do."

                      111. Besides, the Code gives power to the  police  to
                      close a matter both before and after investigation. A
                      police  officer  can  foreclose  an  FIR  before   an
                      investigation under Section 157 of the  Code,  if  it
                      appears to him that there is no sufficient ground  to
                      investigate the same. The section itself states  that
                      a police officer can start investigation when he  has
                      "reason to suspect the  commission  of  an  offence".
                      Therefore,   the   requirements   of   launching   an
                      investigation under  Section  157  of  the  Code  are
                      higher than the requirement under Section 154 of  the
                      Code. The police officer can also, in a  given  case,
                      investigate the matter and then file a  final  report
                      under Section 173 of the Code seeking closure of  the
                      matter. Therefore, the police is not liable to launch
                      an investigation in every FIR  which  is  mandatorily
                      registered  on  receiving  information  relating   to
                      commission of a cognizable offence.

                      114. It is true that a delicate  balance  has  to  be
                      maintained between the interest of  the  society  and
                      protecting the liberty of an individual.  As  already
                      discussed  above,  there   are   already   sufficient
                      safeguards provided in the Code  which  duly  protect
                      the liberty of an individual in case of  registration
                      of false FIR. At  the  same  time,  Section  154  was
                      drafted keeping in mind the interest  of  the  victim
                      and the society. Therefore, we are of the cogent view
                      that mandatory registration of FIRs under Section 154
                      of the Code will not be in contravention  of  Article
                      21  of  the  Constitution  as  purported  by  various
                      counsel.

                      115. Although, we, in unequivocal  terms,  hold  that
                      Section 154 of  the  Code  postulates  the  mandatory
                      registration of FIRs on  receipt  of  all  cognizable
                      offences,  yet,  there   may   be   instances   where
                      preliminary inquiry may  be  required  owing  to  the
                      change in genesis and  novelty  of  crimes  with  the
                      passage of time. One such instance is in the case  of
                      allegations relating to  medical  negligence  on  the
                      part of doctors. It will be unfair and inequitable to
                      prosecute a medical professional only on the basis of
                      the allegations in the complaint.

                      120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary
                      inquiry is to be conducted will depend on  the  facts
                      and circumstances of each case. The category of cases
                      in which preliminary  inquiry  may  be  made  are  as
                      under:
                      (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
                      (b) Commercial offences
                      (c) Medical negligence cases
                      (d) Corruption cases
                      (e) Cases where there  is  abnormal  delay/laches  in
                      initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over  3
                      months'  delay  in  reporting  the   matter   without
                      satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay."

             19.   Thus,  this  Court  has  laid  down  that  while  prompt
           registration of FIR is mandatory, checks and balances  on  power
           of  police  are  equally  important.   Power  of  arrest  or  of
           investigation is not mechanical.   It  requires  application  of
           mind in  the  manner  provided.   Existence  of  power  and  its
           exercise are different.  Delicate balance had to  be  maintained
           between the interest of society and liberty  of  an  individual.
           Commercial offences have been put in the category of cases where
           FIR may not be warranted without enquiry.
           20.   It has been held, for the same reasons, that direction  by
           the Magistrate for investigation under Section 156(3) cannot  be
           given mechanically.  In Anil Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa[5],  it  was
           observed :

                      "11. The scope of Section 156(3)  CrPC  came  up  for
                      consideration before this  Court  in  several  cases.
                      This Court in Maksud Saiyed case [(2008) 5  SCC  668]
                      examined the requirement of the application  of  mind
                      by  the  Magistrate  before  exercising  jurisdiction
                      under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction
                      is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section
                      156(3)  or  Section  200  CrPC,  the  Magistrate   is
                      required to apply his  mind,  in  such  a  case,  the
                      Special  Judge/Magistrate  cannot  refer  the  matter
                      under Section 156(3) against a public servant without
                      a valid sanction order. The application  of  mind  by
                      the Magistrate should be reflected in the order.  The
                      mere  statement  that  he  has   gone   through   the
                      complaint, documents and heard  the  complainant,  as
                      such,  as  reflected  in  the  order,  will  not   be
                      sufficient.  After  going  through   the   complaint,
                      documents and hearing the complainant,  what  weighed
                      with the  Magistrate  to  order  investigation  under
                      Section 156(3)  CrPC,  should  be  reflected  in  the
                      order, though a detailed expression of his  views  is
                      neither  required  nor  warranted.  We  have  already
                      extracted the order passed  by  the  learned  Special
                      Judge which, in our view, has stated no  reasons  for
                      ordering investigation."

                  The  above  observations  apply  to  category  of   cases
           mentioned in Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra).
           21.   On the other hand, power under Section 202 is of different
           nature.  Report sought under  the  said  provision  has  limited
           purpose of deciding "whether or not there is  sufficient  ground
           for proceeding".  If this be the  object,  the  procedure  under
           Section 157 or Section 173  is  not  intended  to  be  followed.
           Section 157 requires sending of report by the  police  that  the
           police officer suspected commission of offence from  information
           received by the police and thereafter the police is required  to
           proceed to the spot, investigate the facts and take measures for
           discovery and arrest.  Thereafter,  the  police  has  to  record
           statements and report on which the Magistrate may proceed  under
           Section 190.  This  procedure  is  applicable  when  the  police
           receives information of a cognizable offence, registers  a  case
           and forms the requisite opinion and not every case registered by
           the police.
            22.  Thus, we answer the first question  by  holding  that  the
           direction under Section 156(3)  is  to  be  issued,  only  after
           application of mind by the Magistrate.  When the Magistrate does
           not take cognizance and does not find it necessary  to  postpone
           instance of process  and  finds  a  case  made  out  to  proceed
           forthwith, direction under the said provision  is  issued.    In
           other words, where on  account  of  credibility  of  information
           available, or weighing the interest of justice it is  considered
           appropriate  to  straightaway  direct  investigation,   such   a
           direction is issued.  Cases where  Magistrate  takes  cognizance
           and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate
           has  yet  to  determine  "existence  of  sufficient  ground   to
           proceed".  Category of cases falling under Para 120.6 in  Lalita
           Kumari (supra) may fall under Section  202.   Subject  to  these
           broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise
           of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice
           from case to case.
           23.   We now proceed to deal with the second question  of  power
           of police to arrest in the course of investigation under Section
           202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate  to  enable
           him to  decide  whether  a  case  to  proceed  further  existed.
           Careful examination of scheme of the Code reveals that  in  such
           situation power of arrest is  not  available  with  the  police.
           Contention  based  on  language  of  Section  202(3)  cannot  be
           accepted.
           24.    The  maxim  'expressio  unius  est  exclusion  alterious'
           (express mention of one thing excludes others) has been called a
           valuable servant but a dangerous  master.   In  Mary  Angel  and
           others vs. State of T.N.[6], this Court observed as  follows  on
           the scope of the maxim:
                      "19. Further, for the rule of interpretation  on  the
                      basis of the  maxim  "expressio  unius  est  exclusio
                      alterius", it has been  considered  in  the  decision
                      rendered by the Queen's Bench in the case of Dean  v.
                      Wiesengrund [(1955) 2 QB 120 : (1955) 2 All ER  432].
                      The Court considered the said  maxim  and  held  that
                      after all it is no more than an aid  to  construction
                      and has little, if any, weight where it  is  possible
                      to account for the "inclusio unius" on grounds  other
                      than   intention   to   effect   the   [pic]"exclusio
                      alterius". Thereafter,  the  Court  referred  to  the
                      following passage  from  the  case  of  Colquhoun  v.
                      Brooks [(1887) 19 QBD 400 : 57 LT  448]  QBD  at  406
                      wherein the Court called for its approval-

                         "...  'The  maxim  "expressio  unius  est  exclusio
                      alterius" has been pressed upon us. I agree with what
                      is said in the court below by Wills,  J.  about  this
                      maxim.  It  is  often  a  valuable  servant,  but   a
                      dangerous master to follow  in  the  construction  of
                      statutes or documents.  The  exclusio  is  often  the
                      result of inadvertence or  accident,  and  the  maxim
                      ought not to be applied, when its application, having
                      regard to the subject-matter to which  it  is  to  be
                      applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.' In  my
                      opinion, the application of the maxim here would lead
                      to  inconsistency  and  injustice,  and  would   make
                      Section 14(1)  of  the  Act  of  1920  uncertain  and
                      capricious in its operation."

                      20. The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court
                      in the case of CCE v. National Tobacco Co.  of  India
                      Ltd. [(1972) 2 SCC 560].   The  Court  in  that  case
                      considered the question whether there was or was  not
                      an  implied  power  to  hold  an   enquiry   in   the
                      circumstances of the case in view of  the  provisions
                      of Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rule
                      10-A of the Central Excise Rules and referred to  the
                      aforesaid passage "the  maxim  is  often  a  valuable
                      servant, but a dangerous master ..."  and  held  that
                      the rule is subservient to the basic  principle  that
                      courts must endeavour to  ascertain  the  legislative
                      intent  and  purpose,  and  then  adopt  a  rule   of
                      construction which effectuates rather than  one  that
                      may defeat these. Moreover, the rule  of  prohibition
                      by necessary implication could be applied only  where
                      a  specified  procedure  is   laid   down   for   the
                      performance of  a  duty.  In  the  case  of  Parbhani
                      Transport Coop. Society Ltd.  v.  Regional  Transport
                      Authority  [AIR 1960 SC 801 : (1960) 3 SCR 177]  this
                      Court observed that the maxim  "expressio  unius  est
                      exclusio alterius" is a maxim  for  ascertaining  the
                      intention of the legislature and where the  statutory
                      language is plain and the meaning clear, there is  no
                      scope for applying. Further, in Harish Chandra Bajpai
                      v. Triloki Singh [AIR 1957 SC 444  :  1957  SCR  370,
                      389]  SCR  at  p.  389  the  Court  referred  to  the
                      following passage from Maxwell on  Interpretation  of
                      Statutes, 10th Edn., pp. 316-317:

                         "Provisions sometimes found in  statutes,  enacting
                      imperfectly or for particular cases only  that  which
                      was  already  and   more   widely   the   law,   have
                      occasionally furnished ground for the contention that
                      an intention to alter  the  general  law  was  to  be
                      inferred  from  the  partial  or  limited  enactment,
                      resting  on  the  maxim  expressio  unius,   exclusio
                      alterius. But that  maxim  is  inapplicable  in  such
                      cases. The only inference which a court can draw from
                      such superfluous provisions (which generally  find  a
                      place in Acts to meet unfounded objections  and  idle
                      doubts), is that the legislature was either  ignorant
                      or unmindful of the real state of the law, or that it
                      acted under the influence of excessive caution."

                 We are of the view that  the  maxim  does  not  apply  for
           interpretation of Section 202 (3) for the reasons  that  follow.
           In our view, the correct interpretation of the provision is that
           merely negating the power of  arrest  to  a  person  other  than
           police officer does not mean that  police  could  exercise  such
           power.  The emphasis in the provision is to empower such  person
           to exercise other powers of incharge of a  police  station  than
           the power of arrest. As regards the power of police  to  arrest,
           there are express provisions dealing with the same and power  of
           police to arrest is not derived from or  controlled  by  Section
           202 (3).  The said power is available under Section 41 or  under
           a warrant.  The power remains available  subject  to  conditions
           for exercise thereof.   For  example  it  can  be  exercised  if
           cognizable offence is committed in  the  presence  of  a  police
           officer  (Section  41(1)(a).   Under  Section  202,  since   the
           Magistrate is in seisin of the matter  and  has  yet  to  decide
           "whether or not there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding",
           there is no occasion for formation  of  opinion  by  the  police
           about credibility of available information necessary to exercise
           power of arrest as the only authority of the police is  to  give
           report to Magistrate to enable him to decide  whether  there  is
           sufficient ground to proceed.  Power of  arrest  is  not  to  be
           exercised  mechanically.   In  M.C.   Abraham   vs.   State   of
           Maharashtra[7], it was observed :
                      "14.  ......In the first place, arrest of an  accused
                      is a part of the  investigation  and  is  within  the
                      discretion of the investigating officer.  Section  41
                      of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for arrest
                      by  a  police  officer  without  an  order   from   a
                      Magistrate and without a warrant. The  section  gives
                      discretion to the police officer who may, without  an
                      order from a Magistrate and even without  a  warrant,
                      arrest any person in  the  situations  enumerated  in
                      that section. It is open to him,  in  the  course  of
                      investigation, to arrest  any  person  who  has  been
                      concerned with any cognizable offence or against whom
                      reasonable  complaint  has  been  made  or   credible
                      information  has  been  received,  or  a   reasonable
                      suspicion exists of his  having  been  so  concerned.
                      Obviously, he is not expected to act in a  mechanical
                      manner and in all cases to arrest the [pic]accused as
                      soon as the report is lodged. In  appropriate  cases,
                      after some investigation, the  investigating  officer
                      may make up his mind as to whether it is necessary to
                      arrest the accused person. At that  stage  the  court
                      has  no  role   to   play.   Since   the   power   is
                      discretionary, a police officer is not  always  bound
                      to arrest an accused even if the  allegation  against
                      him is of  having  committed  a  cognizable  offence.
                      Since an arrest is in the nature of  an  encroachment
                      on the liberty of the subject  and  does  affect  the
                      reputation and status of the citizen, the  power  has
                      to be cautiously exercised.  It  depends  inter  alia
                      upon the nature of the offence alleged and  the  type
                      of persons who are accused of  having  committed  the
                      cognizable offence. Obviously, the power  has  to  be
                      exercised with caution and circumspection."

           25.   Nature of cases dealt with under  Section  202  are  cases
           where material available is not clear to proceed  further.   The
           Magistrate  is  in  seisin  of  the  matter  having  taken   the
           cognizance.  He has to decide whether there is ground to proceed
           further.   If  at  such  premature  stage  power  of  arrest  is
           exercised by police, it will  be  contradiction  in  terms.   As
           regards denial of opportunity to record confession under Section
           27 of the  Evidence  Act,  it  has  to  be  kept  in  mind  that
           admissibility of such confession cannot guide exercise of  power
           of arrest.  Source of power  of  arrest  is  governed  by  other
           provisions and not by Section 27.   It  is  only  if  arrest  is
           otherwise permissible  that  provision  of  Section  27  may  be
           invoked.  If exercise  of  power  of  arrest  is  not  otherwise
           warranted, admissibility of confession under Section  27  cannot
           facilitate such exercise.  We, thus, hold that the police of its
           own cannot exercise its power of arrest in the course of  making
           its report in pursuance of direction under Section 202.
           26.   We may now proceed to deal with the conflict in  decisions
           which has been pointed out to us.   Bombay,  Gujarat  and  Delhi
           High Courts in Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel (supra), Emperor  vs.
           Nurmahomed Rajmahomed[8],  Mahendrasinh  Shanabhai  Chauhan  and
           Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and  Anr.[9]  and  Harsh  Khurana  vs.
           Union of India[10] have held that in the course of investigation
           directed under Section 202 (1) the police  cannot  exercise  the
           power of arrest.  Reasoning is  by  and  large  similar.   Cases
           covered by Section 202 are  such  where  Magistrate  is  yet  to
           decide whether the material was  sufficient  to  proceed.   Till
           formation of such opinion, arrest will be incongruous.   We  may
           only refer to the observations of M.P. Thakker, J. (as  he  then
           was) in Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel (supra) :
                      "2. The question that has surfaced in the  back  drop
                      of the aforesaid facts  and  circumstances  is:  when
                      upon  receipt  of  a  complaint  of  an   offence   a
                      Magistrate instead of issuing process  postpones  the
                      issue of process against the accused  and  direct?  a
                      police officer  to  make  an  investigation  for  the
                      purpose  of  deciding  whether  or   not   there   is
                      sufficient ground  for  proceeding,  can  the  police
                      officer in charge of the investigation  on  his  own,
                      place the accused under arrest? Section 202  (1)   in
                      so far as material reads as under:

                           202.  (1)  Any  Magistrate,  on  receipt   of   a
                           complaint of an offence of which he is authorised
                           to take cognizance or which has been made over to
                           him under Section 192, may,  if  he  thinks  fit,
                           postpone  the  issue  of  process   against   the
                           accused, and either inquire into the case himself
                           or direct an investigation to be made by a police
                           officer or by such other person as he thinks fit,
                           for the purpose of deciding whether or not  there
                           is sufficient ground for proceeding."

           27.   On the other hand in Emperor vs. Bikha Moti[11]  and  Asha
           Das and others vs. The State[12], Sind  and  Assam  High  Courts
           respectively have taken a contrary view  by  holding  that  when
           direction for investigation issued  under  Section  202  (1)  is
           issued, the police is  to  investigate  precisely  in  the  same
           manner and arrest the accused in precisely the  same  manner  as
           they would have done if  they  had  recorded  First  Information
           Report.
           28.   We may only refer to the  observations  of  Devis,  CJ  in
           Bikha Moti (supra) as follows:
                      "Now S. 202(1) refers not only to an enquiry but also
                      to an investigation : and Section 202(2) confers upon
                      a person other than a Magistrate or a police  officer
                      all powers conferred upon a police officer in  charge
                      of a  police  station  except  the  power  of  arrest
                      without warrant. Surely this implies  that  a  police
                      officer to whom a complaint has  been  referred   for
                      investigation has the power to arrest without warrant
                      under S.54, Criminal P.C. and all other powers  which
                      may be exercised by a police officer in the course of
                      an investigation.  To us, the scheme of  the  section
                      appears to be that when a complaint is  sent  to  the
                      police for investigation  and  report,  they  are  to
                      investigate in  precisely  the  same  manner  and  to
                      arrest in precisely the same way as they  would  have
                      done if their powers had  been  first  invoked  by  a
                      first report under S.  154,  their  being  only  this
                      difference, that in the one case  the  police  embody
                      the result of their investigation to  the  Magistrate
                      in a report which the Magistrate proceeds to consider
                      under S.203, while  in  the  other  case  the  police
                      embody the result of their investigation in  what  is
                      called a challan or charge-sheet, but which is really
                      a police report under S.190(b), the term  challan  or
                      charge  sheet  not  occurring  in  the  section,  the
                      accused person, in  any  case,  if  arrested  by  the
                      police, being produced before the Magistrate  in  the
                      ordinary way.  To hold otherwise would  be  to  leave
                      the  proceedings  started  by  the  Magistrate  under
                      S.202, Criminal P.C. unfinished, and in the air; for,
                      he would not have, as the law contemplates, a  report
                      of the investigation but he would have a  refusal  by
                      the police to report as in this case, and  other  and
                      independent proceedings in the same matter  initiated
                      by them.  But the law contemplates that  proceedings,
                      begun  by  the  acceptance  by  a  Magistrate  of   a
                      complaint under S.200, Criminal P.C. and sent to  the
                      police for investigation under Section 202, should be
                      terminated by the Magistrate as set  out  in  Section
                      203 and the following sections.  The proceedings  are
                      not terminated when  the  Magistrate's  authority  is
                      defied, his jurisdiction in  effect  denied  and  the
                      order to investigate and report disobeyed.   The  law
                      does not contemplate this, and  we  cannot  see  that
                      this aspect of the case has been considered in any of
                      the judgments which have been cited to us in  support
                      of the case of this Court in
                      27 SLR 67."

           29.   For the reasons already discussed above,  we  approve  the
           view taken in Sankalchand Valjibhai  Patel  (supra),  Nurmahomed
           Rajmahomed (supra), Mahendrasinh Shanabhai Chauhan  (supra)  and
           Harsh Khurana (supra) and overrule the rule taken in Bikha  Moti
           (supra) and Asha Das (supra).
           30.   We now come to the last question whether  in  the  present
           case the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3)
           instead of Section 202.  Our answer is  in  the  negative.   The
           Magistrate has given reasons, which have been upheld by the High
           Court.  The case has been held to be primarily of civil  nature.
           The accused is alleged to have forged partnership.  Whether such
           forgery actually took place, whether it caused any loss  to  the
           complainant and whether there is the requisite mens rea are  the
           questions which are yet to be determined.   The  Magistrate  has
           not found clear material to proceed against the accused.  Even a
           case for summoning has not yet been found.  While a  transaction
           giving rise to cause of action  for  a  civil  action  may  also
           involve a crime in which case resort to criminal proceedings may
           be justified, there is judicially acknowledged tendency  in  the
           commercial world to give colour of a criminal case to  a  purely
           commercial transaction.  This Court has cautioned  against  such
           abuse.
            31.  In Indian Oil  Corpn.  vs.  NEPC  India  Ltd.[13],  it  was
observed :

                  "13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take  notice
                  of a growing tendency  in  business  circles  to  convert
                  purely  civil  disputes  into  criminal  cases.  This  is
                  obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil
                  law remedies are time consuming  and  do  not  adequately
                  protect  the  interests  of  lenders/creditors.  Such   a
                  tendency  is  seen  in  several  family  disputes   also,
                  [pic]leading    to     irretrievable     breakdown     of
                  marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a
                  person  could  somehow  be  entangled   in   a   criminal
                  prosecution,  there   is   a   likelihood   of   imminent
                  settlement. Any  effort  to  settle  civil  disputes  and
                  claims, which do not involve  any  criminal  offence,  by
                  applying pressure through criminal prosecution should  be
                  deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State  of
                  U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636] this Court observed: (SCC p. 643,
                  para 8)


                       "It is to be seen if a matter, which  is  essentially
                       of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal
                       offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut  of
                       other  remedies  available  in  law.  Before  issuing
                       process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal
                       of caution. For the accused it is a  serious  matter.
                       This Court has laid certain principles on  the  basis
                       of  which  the  High  Court  is   to   exercise   its
                       jurisdiction  under  Section   482   of   the   Code.
                       Jurisdiction under this section has to  be  exercised
                       to prevent abuse of  the  process  of  any  court  or
                       otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

           32.   In Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special  Judicial  Magistrate[14],
           it was observed :

                  "28. Summoning of an accused in  a  criminal  case  is  a
                  serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as
                  a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to
                  bring only two witnesses to support  his  allegations  in
                  the complaint to have the criminal law set  into  motion.
                  The order of the Magistrate summoning  the  accused  must
                  reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of  the
                  case and the law applicable thereto. He  has  to  examine
                  the nature of allegations made in the complaint  and  the
                  evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and
                  would that be sufficient for the complainant  to  succeed
                  in bringing charge home to the accused. It  is  not  that
                  the Magistrate is a  silent  spectator  at  the  time  of
                  recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the
                  accused. The Magistrate has to carefully  scrutinise  the
                  evidence brought on  record  and  may  even  himself  put
                  questions to the complainant and his witnesses to  elicit
                  answers to find out the truthfulness of  the  allegations
                  or otherwise and then examine if  any  offence  is  prima
                  facie committed by all or any of the accused."

           33.   In view of above, we find that the Magistrate and the High
           Court rightly held that in the present case report under Section
           202 was the right course  instead  of  direction  under  Section
           156(3).  The question is answered accordingly.
           34.   We may now also refer to other decisions cited at the  bar
           and their relevance to the questions arising in the case.
                 In Smt.  Nagawwa  vs.  Veeranna  Shivalingappa  Konjalgi  &
           Ors.[15], referring to earlier Judgments on the scope of Section
           202, it was observed :
                      "3. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose [AIR
                      (1963) SC 1430 this Court had after fully considering
                      the matter observed as follows:

                           "The courts have also pointed out in these  cases
                           that what the Magistrate has to  see  is  whether
                           there is evidence in support of  the  allegations
                           of the complainant and not whether  the  evidence
                           is  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction.   The
                           learned Judges in some of these cases  have  been
                           at pains to observe that an enquiry under Section
                           202 is not to be likened to  a  trial  which  can
                           only take place after process is issued, and that
                           there can be only one trial. No doubt, as  stated
                           in sub-section (1) of  Section  202  itself,  the
                           object of the enquiry is to ascertain  the  truth
                           or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate
                           making the enquiry  has  to  do  this  only  with
                           reference  to  the  intrinsic  quality   of   the
                           statements made before him at the  enquiry  which
                           would naturally mean the  complaint  itself,  the
                           statement on oath made by the complainant and the
                           statements made before him by persons examined at
                           the instance of the complainant."

                      Indicating the scope, ambit of  Section  202  of  the
                      Code of Criminal  Procedure  this  Court  in  Vadilal
                      Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker [AIR (1960)
                      SC 1113] observed as follows:

                           "Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if  he
                           thinks  fit,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded   in
                           writing,  postpone  the  issue  of  process   for
                           compelling   the   attendance   of   the   person
                           complained against and direct an inquiry for  the
                           purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of
                           the complaint; in other words, the  scope  of  an
                           inquiry under the section is limited  to  finding
                           out the truth or falsehood of  the  complaint  in
                           order to determine the question of the  issue  of
                           process.  The  inquiry  is  for  the  purpose  of
                           ascertaining  the  truth  or  falsehood  of   the
                           complaint;  that  is,  for  ascertaining  whether
                           there is evidence in support of the complaint  so
                           as  to  justify  the   issue   of   process   and
                           commencement of proceedings  against  the  person
                           concerned.  The  section  does  not  say  that  a
                           regular  trial  for  adjudging   the   guilt   or
                           otherwise of the person complained against should
                           take  place  at  that  stage;  for   the   person
                           complained against can be legally called upon  to
                           answer the accusation made against him only  when
                           a process has issued and he is put on trial."

                 Same view has been taken  in  Mohinder  Singh  vs.  Gulwant
           Singh[16], Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia & Anr. vs. Shaileshbhai
           Mohanbhai Patel & Ors.[17], Raghuraj  Singh  Rousha  vs.  Shivam
           Sunadaram Promoters Pvt. Ltd.[18], Chandra Deo Singh vs.  Prokas
           Chandra Bose[19].
                 In Devrapalli Lakshminaryanan Reddy & Ors. vs. V.  Narayana
           Reddy & Ors.[20], National Bank of Oman vs. Barakara Abdul  Aziz
           & Anr.[21],  Madhao & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra &  Anr.[22],
           Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau vs. State of Gujarat[23],  the  scheme
           of Section 156(3) and 202 has been discussed.  It  was  observed
           that power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate
           before taking cognizance and was in the  nature  of  pre-emptory
           reminder or intimation to the police  to  exercise  its  plenary
           power of investigation  beginning Section 156  and  ending  with
           report or chargesheet under Section 173.   On  the  other  hand,
           Section 202 applies at post cognizance stage and  the  direction
           for investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether  there
           was sufficient ground to proceed.

           35.   These aspects have already been discussed  above  and  are
           indeed undisputed.
           36.    In  H.N.  Rishbud  and  Inder  Singh  vs.  The  State  of
           Delhi[24], this Court explained the scope  of  investigation  by
           the police and held that investigation included power to arrest.
            There is no dispute with this legal position.
           37.   In the light of above discussion, we are  unable  to  find
           any error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High Court
           that direction under Section 156(3) was  not  warranted  in  the
           present case and the police may not be justified  in  exercising
           power of arrest in the course of submitting report under Section
           202.
           38.   The questions  framed  for  consideration  stand  answered
           accordingly.
           39.   The appeal is dismissed.

                                  ..........................................J.
                                                            [  T.S. THAKUR ]

                                 ...........................................J.
                                                              [ ADARSH KUMAR
                                                                      GOEL ]

                                  ..........................................J.
                                                           [  R. BANUMATHI ]

           NEW DELHI
           MARCH 16, 2015
-----------------------
[1] 1997 (2) GLR 1572
[2] (1979) 1 GLR 17
[3] (2004) 7  SCC 338
[4] (2014) 2 SCC 1
[5] (2013) 10 SCC 705
[6] (1999) 5 SCC 209
[7] (2003) 2 SCC 649
[8] (1929) 31 BOMLR 84
[9] (2009) 2 GLR 1647
[10] 121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB)
[11] AIR (1938) Sind 113
[12] AIR (1953) Assam 1
[13] (2006) 6 SCC 736
[14] (1998) 5 SCC 749
[15] (1976) 3 SCC 736
[16] (1992) 2 SCC 213
[17] (2012)  10 SCC 517
[18] (2009) 2 SCC 363
[19] (1964) 1 SCR 639
[20] (1976) 3 SCC 252
[21] (2013) 2 SCC 488
[22] (2013) 5 SCC 615
[23] (2010) 4 SCC 185
[24] (1955) 1 SCR 1150