Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1684 of 2016, Judgment Date: Feb 23, 2016


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1684 OF 2016
                 (Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 22141 of 2013)


RAM RATI                                                      … APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

MANGE RAM (D) THROUGH LRS.
AND OTHERS                                                  … RESPONDENT (S)


                               J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:



Leave granted.


Whether a witness can be recalled under Order 18 Rule  17  of  The  Code  of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the  Code’)  for  further
elaboration of aspects left out in evidence already  closed,  is  the  issue
for consideration in this case.

There are two suits filed by the respective parties and pending  before  the
Tis Hazari Courts at Delhi. Civil Suit No. 43  of  2009  was  filed  by  the
respondents herein for declaration and injunction in respect of  the  plaint
schedule property. In respect of very same property,  the  appellant  herein
also filed a suit seeking  permanent  injunction  and  that  suit  has  been
numbered as Civil Suit No. 44 of  2009.  The  suits  were  consolidated  for
common trial, on joint request, by order dated 08.12.2007. Suit  No.  43  of
2009, with the consent of the parties, was ordered to be tried in the  court
where Suit No. 44 of 2009 was pending  by  order  dated  26.09.2005  of  the
District Judge, Delhi.  Much before that, evidence in Civil Suit No.  44  of
2009 had commenced and the appellant herein had been examined  as  PW-1  and
the respondents herein had cross-examined PW-1 as well.  That  evidence  was
closed on  16.04.2005.  After  the  consolidation  of  the  two  suits,  the
respondents herein filed an application on 13.04.2010. We shall extract  the
averments made in the said application as under:

“APPLICATION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT FOR DISCHARGING THE  STATEMENT  OF  PW-1
AND EXAMINATION OF WITNESS I.E. PW-1 AFRESH UNDER ORDER 18  RULE  17  C.P.C.
READ WITH SECTION 151 C.P.C.

Sir,

      The applicant most respectfully submits as under:-

1.     That  the  plaintiff  examined  PW-1,  Sh.  Chottu  Ram  as  PW1-  on
6.12.2004. His cross examination was concluded on 16.4.2005.

2.    That this Hon’ble Court consolidated the  present  suit  with  another
suit titled as Mange Ram  Vs.  Chander  Kanta  etc.  vide  its  order  dated
8.12.2007.

3.    That while passing the order of consolidation  dated  8.12.2007,  this
Hon’ble Court ordered as under:-

“It has been so urged on behalf of both contesting sides that trial  in  two
cases be conducted commonly and evidence led in either case be read in  both
these cases.”

4.    The directions or observations of this  Hon’ble  Court  as  reproduced
above operates prospectively and not retrospectively.

5.    That when the Hon’ble Court ordered that evidence in one case  may  be
read in evidence in another case, then plaintiff in Mange  Ram  Vs.  Chander
Kanta & Ors. would be deprived of the opportunity of  cross  examination  of
PW-1 which was concluded on 16.4.2005, much prior to the date  of  order  of
consolidation.

6.    That as per settled position of law on this point and as per terms  of
order of this Hon’ble Court dated 08.12.2007, either the  PW-1  be  examined
afresh or opportunity to cross examine  the  PW-1  may  be  granted  to  the
applicant/plaintiff in Mange Ram Vs. Chander Kanta & Ors.

It is, therefore,  prayed  that  PW-1  may  kindly  be  examined  afresh  or
opportunity to cross examine the PW-1 in Ram Rati Vs.  Mange  Ram  etc.  may
kindly be granted to the applicant.”



By order dated 15.04.2008 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi  in  Civil
Suit No. 43 of 2009 filed by the respondents, the suit as against  Defendant
Nos. 5 and 6 was rejected and it was held that the plaint did  not  disclose
any cause of action against them. Defendant No. 5 was the plaintiff in  Suit
No. 44 of 2009 and Defendant No. 6 is her husband. That Defendant No.  5  is
the applicant before this Court.

Thus, the only ground taken up in the application filed under Order 18  Rule
17 of the CPC is that after consolidation of the  suits,  the  plaintiff  in
Civil Suit No. 43 of 2009 should get an opportunity to cross-examine the PW-
1 (Defendant No. 5 in Civil suit No. 43 of 2009).

It is interesting to note that in the order dated 24.02.2010 passed  by  the
Additional District Judge in  Civil  Suit  No.  44  of  2009,  it  has  been
observed by the Court that the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 44 of 2009 is  no
more a party to Civil  Suit  No.  43  of  2009  and  the  earlier  order  of
consolidation of suits dated 08.12.2007 was maintained,  further  clarifying
that the past evidence of plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 44 of 2009, which  has
already been recorded, to be treated as the main suit.

We shall extract the order dated 24.02.2010, which reads as follows:

“Since the facts in this suit  and  suit  No.  43/09  are  intertwined  even
though Plaintiff is no more a  party  to  suit  No.  43/09,  her  claim  for
declaration to suit property therein may have reflection on the  entitlement
of Plaintiff, therefore, with the consent of both sides,  the  consolidation
order dated 8.12.2007 is being maintained and  suit  No.  44/09  where  past
evidence of Plaintiff Ram Rati has been recorded is treated as main suit.”



But it has to be noted that the Suit No. 43 of 2009 stands rejected  against
that PW-1 (Defendant No.5). Not only that, being a defendant in Suit No.  44
of 2009, PW-1 had been cross-examined also by the  respondent  herein.  What
is lost, if at all it can be termed so, is the opportunity to  cross-examine
in the capacity as plaintiff in O.S. No. 43  of  2009.  But  that  suit,  as
noted above, had already been rejected as against PW-1  (Defendant  No.  5),
appellant herein. Unfortunately, both the courts have taken  the  view  that
the examination of PW-1 in Suit No. 44 of 2009 having taken place  prior  to
consolidation, the plaintiff  in  Suit  No.  43  of  2009  did  not  get  an
opportunity to cross-examine him.

The trial court, by order dated 18.12.2010, allowed  the  application  filed
by the respondent … “for further elaboration on the left out points  by  the
parties…”. The High Court, in the impugned order, endorsed  the  view  taken
by the trial court, holding that                    … “reading the  impugned
order shows that the witness has been recalled,  if  available  for  further
elaboration on the left out points to both the  parties”.  Since,  the  High
Court and trial court have taken a wholly wrong approach in the  matter  and
against the settled principles of law, it has become  necessary  for  us  to
restate the law as well.

Order 18  of  CPC  deals  with  hearing  of  the  suit  and  examination  of
witnesses.  By  an  amendment  introduced  thereunder   with   effect   from
01.02.1977, Rule 17A was introduced permitting production  of  evidence  not
previously known or which could not be produced despite  due  diligence.  It
appears,  the  amendment  only  caused  unnecessary   protraction   of   the
litigation, and hence, the said provision was omitted by The Code  of  Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002.  However,  Rule
17 was retained which reads as follows:

“17. Court may recall and examine witness.- The court may at any stage of  a
suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject  to  the  law
of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to  him  as  the
court thinks fit.”





The respondent filed the application under Rule 17 read with Section 151  of
the CPC invoking the inherent powers of the court to  make  orders  for  the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.  The  basic
purpose of Rule 17 is to enable the court to clarify any position or  doubt,
and the court may, either suo motu or on the request of  any  party,  recall
any witness at any stage in that regard. This power can be exercised at  any
stage of the suit. No doubt, once the court  recalls  the  witness  for  the
purpose of any such clarification, the  court  may  permit  the  parties  to
assist the court by examining the witness for the purpose  of  clarification
required or permitted by the court.  The  power  under  Rule  17  cannot  be
stretched any further. The said power cannot be invoked to fill up  omission
in the evidence already led by a witness. It cannot also  be  used  for  the
purpose of filling up a lacuna in the evidence. ‘No prejudice is  caused  to
either party’ is also not a permissible ground to invoke Rule 17. No  doubt,
it is a discretionary power of the court but to be used only sparingly,  and
in case, the court decides to invoke the provision, it should also see  that
the trial is not unnecessarily protracted on that ground.

In Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) Through LRs. v. Sharadchandra  Prabhakar
Gogate[1], this principle has been summarized at paragraphs- 25, 28 and  29:

“25. In our view, though the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17  CPC  have  been
interpreted to include applications to be filed by the  parties  for  recall
of witnesses, the main purpose of the said Rule  is  to  enable  the  court,
while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard  to
the evidence led by the parties. The said provisions are not intended to  be
used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who has already  been
examined.
xxx                      xxx                             xxx
28. The power under the provisions  of  Order  18  Rule  17  CPC  is  to  be
sparingly exercised and in appropriate cases  and  not  as  a  general  rule
merely on the ground that his recall and re-examination would not cause  any
prejudice to the parties. That is not the scheme or intention  of  Order  18
Rule 17 CPC.
29. It is now well settled that the power to recall any witness under  Order
18 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the court either on its own motion or  on
an application filed by any of the parties to the  suit,  but  as  indicated
hereinabove, such power is to be invoked not to fill up the lacunae  in  the
evidence of the witness which has already been recorded  but  to  clear  any
ambiguity that may have arisen during the course of his examination.”


In K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy[2], the principles enunciated  in  Vadiraj
(supra) have been followed, holding at paragraphs- 9 and 10:

“9. Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code enables the court, at any stage of a  suit,
to recall any witness who has been examined (subject to the law of  evidence
for the time being in force) and put such questions  to  him  as  it  thinks
fit. The power to  recall  any  witness  under  Order  18  Rule  17  can  be
exercised by the court either on its own motion or on an  application  filed
by any of the parties to the suit requesting the court to exercise the  said
power.  The  power  is  discretionary  and  should  be  used  sparingly   in
appropriate cases to enable the court to clarify any doubts it may  have  in
regard to the evidence led by the parties. The said power  is  not  intended
to be used to fill up omissions  in  the  evidence  of  a  witness  who  has
already been examined. (Vide  Vadiraj  Naggappa  Vernekar  v.  Sharadchandra
Prabhakar Gogate.)
10. Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not a provision intended to  enable  the
parties to recall any witnesses for their  further  examination-in-chief  or
cross-examination or to place additional material or  evidence  which  could
not be produced when the evidence was being recorded. Order 18  Rule  17  is
primarily a provision enabling the court to clarify any issue or  doubt,  by
recalling any witness either suo motu, or at the request of  any  party,  so
that the court itself can put questions and elicit answers. Once  a  witness
is recalled for purposes of such clarification, it may,  of  course,  permit
the parties to assist it by putting some questions.”



The rigour under Rule 17, however, does not affect the  inherent  powers  of
the court to pass the required orders for ends  of  justice  to  reopen  the
evidence for the purpose of  further  examination  or  cross-examination  or
even for production of fresh evidence. This power can also be  exercised  at
any stage of the suit, even after closure of evidence.  Thus,  the  inherent
power is the only recourse, as held by this Court in K.K.  Velusamy  (supra)
at paragraph-11, which reads as follows:

“11. There is no specific provision in the  Code  enabling  the  parties  to
reopen the evidence for  the  purpose  of  further  examination-in-chief  or
cross-examination. Section 151 of the Code  provides  that  nothing  in  the
Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect  the  inherent  powers  of
the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the  ends  of  justice
or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. In the absence  of  any
provision providing for reopening of evidence or recall of any  witness  for
further examination or cross-examination, for purposes other  than  securing
clarification required by the court, the inherent power  under  Section  151
of the Code, subject to its  limitations,  can  be  invoked  in  appropriate
cases  to  reopen  the  evidence  and/or  recall   witnesses   for   further
examination. This inherent power  of  the  court  is  not  affected  by  the
express power conferred upon the court under Order 18 Rule 17  of  the  Code
to recall any witness to enable the court to put  such  question  to  elicit
any clarifications.”


After surveying the various principles stated by this Court on  Section  151
from 1961, in K.K. Velusamy (supra), they have  been  succinctly  summarized
as follows under paragraph-12:


“xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or  confers  any
power or jurisdiction on courts.  It  merely  recognises  the  discretionary
power inherent in  every  court  as  a  necessary  corollary  for  rendering
justice in accordance with law, to do what  is  “right”  and  undo  what  is
“wrong”, that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends  of  justice
and prevent abuse of its process.
(b)  As  the  provisions  of  the  Code  are  not  exhaustive,  Section  151
recognises and confirms that if the Code does  not  expressly  or  impliedly
cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can  be  used  to
deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant  it.  The
breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to  exercise  such  power
on the facts and circumstances.
(c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the  Code,
by  purported  exercise  of  its  inherent  powers.  If  the  Code  contains
provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect,  and  such  provisions
either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the  power
of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation  to  that
matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in  order  to  cut  across  the
powers conferred  by  the  Code  or  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  such
provisions. In other  words  the  court  cannot  make  use  of  the  special
provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where  the  remedy  or  procedure  is
provided in the Code.
(d) The inherent powers of the  court  being  complementary  to  the  powers
specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them  for  the  purposes
mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered  by  any
specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those  powers  would  not
in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the  Code
or be against the intention of the legislature.
(e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly  cautious,
as there is no legislative guidance to deal with  the  procedural  situation
and the exercise of power depends upon the  discretion  and  wisdom  of  the
court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case.  The  absence  of  an
express provision in  the  Code  and  the  recognition  and  saving  of  the
inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte  blanche
to grant any relief.
(f) The power under Section 151 will have to  be  used  with  circumspection
and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no  provision
in the Code governing the matter, when  the  bona  fides  of  the  applicant
cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and  to
prevent abuse of process of court.”



Some good guidance on invocation of Section 151 of  the  CPC  to  reopen  an
evidence or production of fresh evidence is also available in K.K.  Velusamy
(supra). To quote paragraph-14:

“14. The amended provisions of the  Code  contemplate  and  expect  a  trial
court to hear the arguments immediately after  the  completion  of  evidence
and then proceed to judgment. Therefore,  it  was  unnecessary  to  have  an
express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh  witness  or
for recalling any witness for further examination. But if there  is  a  time
gap between the completion of evidence and hearing  of  the  arguments,  for
whatsoever reason, and if in that interregnum, a  party  comes  across  some
evidence which he could not lay his hands on earlier, or  some  evidence  in
regard to the conduct or action of the other  party  comes  into  existence,
the court may in exercise of its inherent power under  Section  151  of  the
Code, permit  the  production  of  such  evidence  if  it  is  relevant  and
necessary in the interest of justice, subject to such  terms  as  the  court
may deem fit to impose.”



Vadiraj (supra) and K.K. Velusamy (supra) have  also  found  affirmation  by
this Court in Bagai Construction  Through  its  Proprietor  Lalit  Bagai  v.
Gupta Building Material Store[3].

The settled legal position under Order 18 Rule 17 read with Section  151  of
the CPC, being thus very clear, the impugned  orders  passed  by  the  trial
court as affirmed by the High Court to recall a witness at the  instance  of
the respondent “for further elaboration on the left out points”,  is  wholly
impermissible in law.

In the above circumstances, the impugned order is set aside and  the  appeal
is allowed.

We are informed that during the pendency of the  appeal,  the  evidence  has
been closed and what remains is only the final arguments.  In  view  of  the
above, we direct the trial court to dispose of the suits  expeditiously  and
preferably within one moth from the date  of  receipt  of  a  copy  of  this
order.

There shall be no order as to costs.


                                                           ……………..……………………J.
                                                            (KURIAN JOSEPH)


                                                           ……………..……………………J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
New Delhi;
February 23, 2016.
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[1]    (2009) 4 SCC 410
[2]    (2011) 11 SCC 275
[3]    (2013) 14 SCC 1

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                                                                  REPORTABLE