Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1427 of 2016, Judgment Date: Feb 16, 2016

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1427 OF 2016
                 [Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.15921 of 2013]

Rajender Singh                                                  …..Appellant

                                   Versus

Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi & Ors.                               …..Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T



SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

Heard the parties at some length.  Leave granted.
By the impugned order dated January 15, 2013 the High  Court  of  Delhi  has
dismissed  L.P.A.  No.39  of  2013  preferred  by  the  appellant.    As   a
consequence the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge  dated
13.12.2012 passed in W.P.(C)No.7124/2009 as well as order passed  in  review
from that order, dated 18.12.2012 stand affirmed.
The relevant facts leading to the aforesaid orders of the  High  Court  need
to be noticed only in  brief.   Consolidation  proceedings  under  The  East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of  Fragmentation)  Act,  1948
[hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1948 Act’]  commenced  in  Village  Karala,
Delhi around 1975 and concluded in 1976.  After about 23  years  of  closure
of consolidation proceedings, on 16.4.1999 the contesting  respondents  no.4
to 7 filed an application  under  Section  43A  of  the  1948  Act,  seeking
allotment  of  land  of  Khasra  No.168  on  the  ground  that  during   the
consolidation proceedings their father late Rajender Singh was found  to  be
in possession over the area of  11  biswas  of  Scheme  Khasra  No.168  (old
Khasra No.703).  Such possession was allegedly reflected in  the  Scheme  of
Consolidation of the village and  described  as  –  “Scheme  Kabizan”.   The
consequent Case No.2/CO/1999 was initially dismissed  by  the  Consolidation
Officer  by  order  dated  11.05.1999  on  the  ground  that   consolidation
proceedings had  been  completed  long  back  and  hence  the  Consolidation
Officer had become functus officio.  That order was however reversed by  the
Financial  Commissioner  before   whom   the   parties   agreed   that   the
Consolidation Officer still had jurisdiction in respect  of  an  application
invoking powers under Section 43A  of  the  1948  Act.   After  remand,  the
Consolidation Officer commenced hearing of the case but it was disrupted  on
account of a necessity to  implead  legal  representatives  of  late  Baljit
Singh on whom notices were ordered to be issued on  04.10.2004.   The  order
passed on 04.10.2004 did not indicate any further  date  for  hearing.   The
next order dated 18.10.2004 noted service of notices on the concerned  legal
representatives  of  Baljit  Singh.   It  also  recorded  presence  of   the
applicant Tej Ram along with his counsel.  Evidently the  appellant  or  his
counsel were not present on that date or on the next date  which  was  fixed
as  16.11.2004.   On  the  next  further   date,   i.e.,   24.12.2004,   the
Consolidation Officer allowed the claim after noticing presence of only  Tej
Ram.   Inspite  of  the  presence  of  the  appellant  or  his  counsel  not
mentioned, at one place the order records that the  counsel  for  respondent
had argued the case at length and had pressed for dismissal of the  petition
because father of the claimants  did  not  claim  during  his  lifetime  and
allegedly the claim was inappropriate at such late stage.   The  order  also
records that as per revenue records the aforesaid land had been allotted  in
the name of respondents no.3 to  7  as  joint  holding  of  the  respondents
separated during consolidation proceedings.  It was also  noticed  that  the
encumbrances on the said land  were  only  against  the  appellant  Rajender
Singh son of Hoshiar Singh.  As per order the revenue records  were  perused
along with the consolidation scheme leading to fresh allotment  to  Tej  Ram
and others of new Khasra No.168 having area of 11 biswas  on  the  basis  of
“Scheme Kabizan”.   In  light  of  such  allotment  the  Halka  Patwari  was
directed to make corresponding entries in the revenue records.
Against  the  order  of  Consolidation  Officer  allowing   the   claim   of
respondents Tej Ram and others the appellant and  the  proforma  respondents
filed a Revision Petition in the  court  of  Financial  Commissioner,  Delhi
bearing  Case  No.47/2005-CA.   The  case  of  the  appellant  was  that  no
opportunity of hearing was given by the Consolidation Officer and the  order
was passed by manipulating the records when in fact  no  notice  of  hearing
was ever issued after the decision to issue notice to legal  representatives
of late Baljit Singh.  The plea of possession being with the  appellant  and
the proforma respondents as also of inordinate delay of 23  years  was  also
raised.  However, the revision case was dismissed on 03.02.2009 only on  the
basis of a record showing Scheme Kabiz which was allegedly never  challenged
by any body.
That order of  the  Financial  Commissioner  was  impugned  through  a  writ
petition first before the Single Judge and then  also  before  the  Division
Bench through L.P.A. as already noticed earlier.  Since  the  appellant  was
unsuccessful throughout, he has preferred the present appeal to raise three-
fold grievances.  The first grievance is that  in  fact  no  opportunity  of
hearing was afforded by the Consolidation Officer and as a  consequence  the
appellant could not place his case  properly  to  show  that  there  was  no
occasion to know of the entry of “Scheme Kabiz” or  to  challenge  the  same
when it was never made known to affected persons by making allotment on  its
basis.  According to appellant the  land  remained  under  their  possession
which was also reflected in the revised revenue  records  prepared  pursuant
to the finalization of consolidation proceedings.  The second  grievance  is
that no inquiry was made as to what was the nature of  possession  reflected
as Scheme Kabiz.  According to learned counsel for  the  appellant,  if  the
possession was not through any method of encumbrance known to law  but  only
that of a rank trespasser, such possession could  not  have  been  made  the
basis of allotment under Section 43A of the 1948 Act as  has  been  done  by
the  order  of  the  Consolidation  Officer  dated  24.12.2004.   The   last
grievance is that the Consolidation Officer as well as other authorities  of
the High Court failed to appreciate that claim under Section  43A  was  made
after 23 years and such belated claim should not have  been  entertained  or
allowed.  In support of  the  second  and  third  contentions  noted  above,
learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon judgment of  this
Court in the case of Mange Ram v. Financial Commissioner  &  Ors.  (2003)  2
SCC 1.
Learned counsel for the contesting respondents has on the other  hand  taken
us through the Scheme of Consolidation as provided in the 1948 Act  and  has
highlighted that the grievance of the applicants  before  the  Consolidation
Officer under Section 43A was within  the  scope  of  that  Section  and  no
objection can be raised on account of delay of 23 years because once  Scheme
Kabiz was recorded in favour of applicants,  Section  26  of  the  1948  Act
required such encumbrance  by  way  of  possession  to  be  transferred  and
attached to the holding or tenancy allotted under the  scheme  to  the  land
owner or the tenant who had suffered the encumbrance.  Learned  counsel  for
the respondents made a further submission that  on  account  of  encumbrance
noted in the scheme, the respondents/applicants had continued in  possession
and  their  grievance  was  only  in  respect  of  mistake  or  omission  in
preparation of new record of rights prepared under Section 22  of  the  1948
Act and such mistake or omission in the  preparation  of  record  of  rights
cannot have material effect on the substantive rights of parties which  they
continued to enjoy and once the mistake was  realised  by  the  authorities,
the exercise of power under  Section  43A  for  correction  of  clerical  or
arithmetical mistakes was appropriate and the High  Court  rightly  did  not
interfere with such correction of clerical errors.  He reiterated that  from
the wordings appearing in the  order  of  the  Consolidation  Officer  dated
24.12.2004 it is beyond any  doubt  that  order  was  passed  after  hearing
learned counsel for the appellant.  In  support  of  his  submissions  based
upon Section 26, learned counsel placed reliance upon judgment in  the  case
of Amar Singh, Jagram (Dead) by LRs. v. Chandgi (Dead) by LRs (1989)  1  SCC
308.
After hearing the parties and perusal of the relevant  orders  and  material
on record, we are satisfied with the submission that the final order  passed
by the Consolidation  Officer  on  24.12.2004  was  without  opportunity  or
notice of hearing to the appellant and proforma  respondents  subsequent  to
adjournment of the matter without further dates on  04.10.2004.   The  order
itself mentions only the presence of Tej Ram and not the  appellant  or  any
one from his side.  The order does not name any advocate from either of  the
sides and the observation that ‘the counsel for the  respondent  has  argued
the case at length’ may be a mistake or  a  casual  observation  based  upon
inconclusive and ineffective hearing  on  earlier  dates.   On  this  ground
alone which has not  been  properly  considered  either  by  the  revisional
authority or the High Court, the matter deserves to be remitted back to  the
Consolidation Officer for fresh hearing and re-determination  in  accordance
with law.
However, it is deemed proper to clarify some relevant aspects  of  the  case
as well as legal issues that must be  kept  in  mind  by  the  Consolidation
Officer for proper adjudication  after  remand.   A  perusal  of  the  order
passed by the Financial Commissioner discloses that he was of the view  that
the recording of “Scheme Kabiz”  had  attained  finality  as  it  was  never
challenged.   Such conclusion should not have been drawn  without  examining
whether this entry was duly published inviting  any  objections  or  in  the
alternative whether such  recording  in  a  chart  was  further  acted  upon
leading to allocation or  allotment  of  the  land  with  the  corresponding
encumbrances.  So far as the case of Amar Singh  (supra)  is  concerned,  it
was not a case of exercise of power under Section 43A and the issue  whether
the defendants of that  case  were  tenants  in  respect  of  the  lands  in
question was found to be  beyond  any  cavil  and  concluded  by  concurrent
finding of facts.  In  that  case,  since  the  power  and  jurisdiction  of
Consolidation Officer under Section 26 was questioned, this Court held  that
the officer had jurisdiction  to  define  the  portion  of  the  land  newly
allotted under  the  scheme  and  put  the  holder  of  the  encumbrance  in
possession of the corresponding part of the substituted holding allotted  to
the land owner in lieu of his original holding.
In the case of Mange Ram (supra) this Court found  that  the  appellant  had
advanced claim of possession over a piece of land measuring 5 biswas on  the
basis that his predecessor had trespassed over that  land  and  had  carried
out cultivation.  The appellant had relied on a list  of  1982  showing  his
possession.  The consolidation operation had been concluded  and  closed  in
the year 1982 whereas application for being put in possession was  filed  by
the appellant after 11 years in 1993.   In  such  circumstances  this  Court
held that a mere trespasser could not  be  treated  as  an  encumbrancer  as
envisaged under the 1948 Act.  The Court further  held  that  the  appellant
must fail on account of long delay and laches of  11  years  in  approaching
the authorities for relief.
From the materials on record we could not find anything  throwing  light  on
the nature of possession claimed by  the  contesting  respondents  which  is
relevant for one of the propositions emerging from the judgment in the  case
of Mange Ram (supra).   In  several  of  the  pleadings  the  appellant  has
claimed  that  they  continued  to  enjoy  allotment  in  their  favour  and
possession has remained with  them  over  the  11  biswas  of  land  in  the
concerned  Khasra.   However,  during  arguments  learned  counsel  for  the
contesting  respondents  has  made  a  counter  claim  that  possession  has
remained with the contesting respondents and therefore  delay  of  23  years
cannot be material.  We expect  the  Consolidation  Officer  to  keep  these
aspects in mind while deciding the matter afresh.  From the prayer  made  on
behalf of the contesting respondents before the Consolidation Officer it  is
evident that they had not prayed for mere correction in the  new  record  of
rights prepared at the instance of the Consolidation Officer  under  Section
22 of the 1948 Act, rather they  had  prayed  for  allotment  or  allocation
which was the relief granted by the Consolidation Officer  who  ordered  for
revising the record of rights as a sequel to such  allotment.   However,  if
even without the allotment or allocation made by the  Consolidation  Officer
through his order dated 24.12.2004,  the  applicants/contesting  respondents
could continue with possession over the land  in  question  and  whether  in
fact they continued to enjoy such possession,  needs  to  be  enquired  into
because it will have an important bearing at least over the effect of  delay
of 23 years.  Lastly, the Consolidation Officer should  keep  in  mind  that
although it has jurisdiction to look into the claim  under  Section  43A  of
the 1948 Act, such jurisdiction can be  exercised  only  to  correct  errors
which are clerical or arithmetical  in  nature.   The  mere  fact  that  the
appellant conceded to jurisdiction under Section 43A leading to an order  of
remand will not have the effect of enlarging such jurisdiction  beyond  what
is prescribed by the law.
The aforesaid clarifications are relevant  in  the  facts  of  the  case  to
ensure that no further unnecessary time  is  wasted  in  deciding  the  real
controversy.  Hence while setting aside the  impugned  orders  of  the  High
Court and also the orders passed by  the  Consolidation  authorities  on  or
after 24.12.2004, we remand the matter to the Consolidation Officer for  re-
hearing  the  parties  and  fresh  determination  within  six   months,   in
accordance with law keeping in mind the legal principles and other  relevant
observations recorded earlier in this order as guidelines.  It is also  made
clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of  the  case  of
either parties.
The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent but without any  order  as  to
costs.

                                                            …………………………………….J.
                                                         [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]


                                                           ……………………………………..J.
                                                              [R.K. AGRAWAL]
New Delhi.
February 16, 2016.
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