Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 3646 of 2011, Judgment Date: Dec 29, 2015

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3646 OF 2011


Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd.                          …..Appellant

                                     Versus

M/s. Haryana Concast Limited & Anr.                          ...Respondents

                                     With


Civil Appeal No. 14736 of 2015
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 7074 of 2010)

Civil Appeal Nos.14737-14738 of 2015
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 117-118 of 2011) and

Civil Appeal Nos. 9293-94 of 2014


                               J U D G M E N T

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

A common issue of law: Whether a  Company  Court,  directly  or  through  an
Official Liquidator, can wield any control in respect of sale of  a  secured
asset by a  secured  creditor  in  exercise  of  powers  available  to  such
creditor under the Securitization and  Reconstruction  of  Financial  Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for  brevity  ‘the  SARFAESI
Act’), arises in all these matters which have been heard together and  shall
be governed by this common judgment.
In order to understand the central issue involved in each  of  the  matters,
it may be useful to notice that Civil Appeal No. 3646 of 2011  preferred  by
Pegasus Assets Reconstruction  Private  Limited  (for  brevity,  ‘Pegasus’),
which has been heard as the lead matter, arises  out  of  a  Division  Bench
judgment of Punjab and Haryana  High  Court  dated  15.12.2009  whereby  the
Division Bench upheld the judgment of Company Court and approved of  certain
fetters placed upon M/s. Pegasus Assets  Reconstruction  Pvt.  Ltd.,   while
allowing it to exercise its powers as a secured creditor under the  SARFAESI
Act and proceed with the sale of the secured assets.  Since the judgment  of
Division Bench disallowed the appeal of  Haryana  State  Infrastructure  and
Industrial Development Corporation (for brevity ‘HSIIDC’) against the  order
of Company Judge allowing Pegasus to stay outside the winding up  proceeding
of the respondent Haryana Concast Limited, HSIIDC is also before this  Court
through SLP (C) No. 7074 of 2010.
The secured asset in the form of approximately 36 acres of land  of  Haryana
Concast Ltd.  was  subjected  to  auction  by  Pegasus  in  association  and
collaboration with the Official Liquidator  as  per  order  of  the  company
judge and was ultimately sold for Rs.32  crores  in  favour  of  M/s.  Venus
Realcon Pvt. Ltd. One Vinod Rajaliwala challenged the orders of the  company
judge confirming  sale  in  favour  of  M/s.  Venus  Realcon  Pvt.  Ltd.  by
preferring a company appeal and also through a  public  interest  litigation
(a writ petition). Both were dismissed by the Division Bench.  Those  orders
have been challenged by Mr. Vinod Rajaliwala through Special Leave  Petition
(C) Nos.117-118 of 2011.  The three matters indicated above thus  relate  to
secured assets of the same company under Liquidation, M/s.  Haryana  Concast
Limited.
The  fourth  matter,  C.A.  No.  9293-94  of  2014  preferred  by  Megnostar
Telecommunications Private Limited (for brevity, ‘Megnostar’) arises out  of
a Division Bench Judgment of Delhi  High  Court  dated  17.9.2012.  By  this
order the Delhi High Court has differed with the views taken by  the  Punjab
and Haryana High Court in the judgment assailed by Pegasus in  Civil  Appeal
No.3646 of 2011.  According to Delhi High Court, the company  judge  or  the
official liquidator cannot have any say in the sale  of  secured  assets  by
the secured creditors under the SARFAESI Act.   The Companies Act cannot  be
used to put any fetters on the sale by secured creditors because  a  secured
creditor under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act has been granted  a  right  to
enforce the security interest “without the  intervention  of  the  court  or
tribunal” in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI  Act.   It  goes
without saying that if the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana  High  Court
in the matter of Pegasus is approved and the Civil Appeal No. 3646  of  2011
is dismissed, then the Delhi High Court’s view will  stand  disapproved  and
Civil Appeal No. 9293-94 of 2014 will have to be allowed.
In order to decide the issue indicated above, it  is  not  necessary  to  go
into factual details relating to either the case of Pegasus or  to  that  of
Megnostar.  Only the broad features  necessary  for  appreciation  of  rival
submissions in respect of these matters have been taken note of.
C.A.No.3646 of 2011
M/s. Haryana Concast Ltd., respondent no.1 suffered a winding  up  order  of
the Company Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court in 1999.  The only  secured
creditor,  the  Bank  of  India  obtained  a  recovery  certificate  against
respondent no.1 from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh in  2002  for  a
sum of Rs.5.84 crores approx. with pendente lite and future interest  @  18%
p.a. from the date of filing of the suit  till  realization.   Although  the
High Court allowed the  Official  Liquidator  to  sell  the  assets  of  the
company in May 2004 and  the  bank  also  submitted  its  claim  before  the
Official Liquidator in July 2004 for Rs.10.58 crores approx.  as  dues  upto
30th June 2004, the sale could not be effected for one reason or the  other.
 Being a guarantor, the HSIIDC settled the liabilities  of  three  banks  by
paying Rs.10.39 crores approx. and as a result acquired a charge  only  over
the moveable assets, that is, raw materials of the company.  Accordingly  it
was substituted/ subrogated in place of the three banks.   As  a  registered
securitization company, Pegasus entered into an  assignment  agreement  with
the sole secured creditor, Bank of India on 27.8.2008 and soon informed  the
Official Liquidator that  it  intends  to  remain  outside  the  winding  up
process, to enforce its security as per  the  provisions  of  SARFAESI  Act,
subject to the rights of the erstwhile workmen of  the  company,  respondent
no.1 as per  Section  529A  of  the  Companies  Act.   Pegasus  pursued  its
aforesaid stand by filing  an  application  before  the  Company  Judge  for
recalling an order  dated  March  20,  2008  wherein  it  had  directed  the
Official Liquidator to undertake a fresh sale of the assets of the  company.
 In this petition dated 22.09.2008, Pegasus also sought  directions  to  the
Official Liquidator to hand over the secured assets of the  company  in  its
favour.  The Company Judge allowed Pegasus to  proceed  under  the  SARFAESI
Act for enforcing its security by an order passed on March 20, 2009  but  in
view of orders passed earlier in the  winding  up  proceedings  the  Company
Judge laid down certain terms and conditions for permitting Pegasus to  stay
outside the winding up proceedings and bring about sale  of  secured  assets
under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act read with Rules 8  and  9  of  Security
Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as  ‘the  Rules’).
These conditions forming part  of  paragraph  19  of  the  judgment  of  the
learned Company Judge are extracted  hereinbelow  because  these  have  been
objected to by Pegasus as fetters which the Company  Judge  could  not  have
obtained and therefore Pegasus preferred Company Appeal No.28 of 2009  which
has been dismissed by the order under appeal dated 15.12.2009.  Para  19  is
as follows :

“19.  If any attempt to harmonize the provisions of  the  SARFAESI  Act  and
the Companies Act could be made, in the context of orders  for  sale  having
already been made  by  the  Company  Court  and  the  participation  of  the
assignor of the applicant at several steps for the conduct of  sale  through
the Company Court, it will be inexpedient unyoke the  proceeding  that  were
put through the O.L.  While upholding the  claim  that  the  procedure  laid
down under the SARFAESI Act would enable  the  provisions  of  the  Security
Enforcement Rules to be applied for conduct and confirmation  of  the  sale,
the dispensation in this case would be

       (a)  to  permit  the  applicant  to  stay  outside  the  winding   up
proceedings and take action to  bring  to  sale  the  secured  assets  under
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act read with Rules 8 and 9 of Security  Interest
Enforcement Rules, 2002.

      (b) The applicant-Reconstruction Company  shall  keep  all  the  steps
taken under the SARFAESI Act and the relevant rules transparent  and  submit
all the proposals for  sale  to  the  O.L.  and  the  details  of  valuation
obtained for the conduct of the sale for  the  purpose  of  determining  the
used price.

      (c)   Sale shall  be  advertised  with  a  specific  clause  that  the
winding up proceedings are pending before the Company  Court,  with  details
of case number and the Court of adjudication.

      (d)   The expenses already incurred for the conduct  of  the  sale  by
O.L.  shall  be  deducted  from  out  of  the  sale  proceeds   before   any
appropriation or disbursement and deposited with O.L.

      (e)   The Reconstruction Company shall place before the Company  Court
the details of its claim and all expenses incurred before the Company  Court
before making any appropriation to himself and disbursed.

      (f)   The surplus proceeds over what is lawfully due to  it  shall  be
deposited to the credit of the Company (in liquidation) before the O.L.”

The stand of the appellant, Pegasus is that the Division Bench erred in  law
in not appreciating that rights and  liabilities  of  the  appellant  as  an
asset reconstruction company had to be  governed  by  and  within  the  four
corners of the SARFAESI Act and not by or under the  Companies  Act.   On  a
pointed query that it  had  accepted  the  order  including  the  terms  and
conditions and finalized the sale of  the  secured  asset  in  collaboration
with the Official Liquidator, learned counsel for  Pegasus  fairly  accepted
that Pegasus was not against the sale of  secured  asset  already  concluded
but the appeal is being pursued for getting the legal  issue  settled  as  a
precedent for future, otherwise as  an  assets  reconstruction  company  the
appellant shall be facing similar fetters in case the secured assets  happen
to be of a company under winding up.
Learned  counsels  representing  the  company  respondent  no.1   which   is
represented by the Official Liquidator and learned  counsel  for  respondent
no.2 HSIIDC have advanced submissions to the contrary.  According to them  a
winding up proceeding has to be supervised by  the  Official  Liquidator  as
per orders of the Company Judge and the provisions  of  the  Companies  Act.
The counsel for the company, respondent no.1 asserted that once  the  assets
have come into the hands of  the  Official  Liquidator,  these  have  to  be
protected and governed by provisions of the Companies Act  which  are  meant
not only to serve the interest of secured creditor like Pegasus but also  to
take care of interest of the workmen and by ascertaining  their  dues  which
have highest priority and require protection as  per  Section  529A  of  the
Companies Act as well as interest of the unsecured creditors.  The stand  of
respondent no.2 is that once the  bank  had  opted  to  participate  in  the
winding up proceedings before the Company Judge,  Pegasus  should  not  have
been permitted to take a contrary stand as it could have only  stepped  into
the shoes of the bank.  HSIIDC had also preferred  a  cross  appeal  bearing
No. 23 of 2009 before the Division Bench against order of the Company  Judge
dated March 20, 2009.  Before the Division Bench, it claimed a right  to  be
associated with Pegasus in the process of sale of the secured assets of  the
company, from beginning to end.  However, it is  clear  as  a  crystal  that
HSIIDC is neither a secured creditor of the company under winding up nor  it
has stepped into shoes of any secured creditor.
C.A.Nos.9293-9294 of 2014
Megnostar is  the  company,  now  under  liquidation,  which  mortgaged  its
property bearing Plot No.1297 admeasuring 502.33 Sq. Yds. situated  at  MIE,
Bahadurgarh,  Haryana  along  with  structures,  present  and  future,  with
respondent-bank through Memo of Deposit of Title Deeds dated 29.04.2008  for
securing loans obtained from the bank.   In  December  2008  respondent-bank
issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act  upon  Megnostar  on
account of persistent defaults in making timely payment of  amounts  due  to
the bank.  On 05.02.2009 Megnostar requested  for  release  of  the  secured
assets to enable it to sell the same for making part payment of dues of  the
bank.  A Company Petition No.359 of 2009 was filed by an unsecured  creditor
M/s. Magicon Impex Pvt. Ltd. for winding up of Megnostar but  the  bank  was
not made aware of this proceeding till visit  of  some  officials  from  the
office  of  the  Official  Liquidator  on  28.08.2011.   The  bank  obtained
directions from the District Magistrate concerned  under  Section  14(1)  of
the SARFAESI Act, took over possession of the secured  asset  on  16.06.2010
and a  notice  to  that  effect  was  published  in  various  newspapers  on
18.06.2010.  O.A. No.38 of 2009 filed by  the  bank  against  Megnostar  was
allowed by DRT-II, Delhi on 13.07.2010 holding the company liable to pay  to
the bank Rs.12.95 crores approx. with pendente lite and  future  interest  @
15.5.% p.a. with quarterly interests from date of filing of O.A.  till  date
of realization.  To realize its dues, the respondent-bank published auction-
cum-sale notice of the secured assets  on  23.07.2011  in  exercise  of  its
rights under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.  In the public auction  held
on 24.08.2011 respondent, M/s. Mohan Tractors (P) Ltd. offered  the  highest
bid of Rs.80 lacs.  As a successful auction purchaser, it  was  handed  over
the possession and title deed of  the  mortgaged  property.   On  28.08.2011
this property at Bahadurgarh was visited by 4-5 persons claiming to be  from
the office of the Official Liquidator.  They had come to take possession  of
the property on the basis of an order dated 03.08.2011 in  Company  Petition
No.359 of  2009  whereby  the  Company  Judge  had  appointed  the  Official
Liquidator as a provisional liquidator with direction to take charge of  all
assets of the company Megnostar.  The  personnel  from  the  office  of  the
Official Liquidator  were  apprised  of  developments  and  sale  under  the
SARFAESI Act but with  the  aid  of  police  personnel  they  took  forcible
possession of the mortgaged property on August 30, 2011.  In September  2011
the bank filed C.A.No.1948 of 2011 in C.P. No.359 of 2009  for  a  direction
upon the Official Liquidator to  unseal  the  property  and  hand  over  its
possession to M/s. Mohan Tractors.  To similar  effect  was  C.A.No.1947  of
2011 filed by M/s. Mohan Tractors.  The Company  Judge  appointed  a  valuer
who submitted a Valuation Report on 14.01.2012.  As per the report the  land
was valued at Rs.77.44 lacs approx. and the  construction  existing  on  the
land was valued at Rs.40.65 lacs, the total value thus amounted  to  Rs.1.18
crores approx.  The learned Company Judge dismissed C.A. Nos.1947  and  1948
of 2011 by order dated 26.4.2012.  Against that, the  bank  respondent  no.2
preferred Company Appeal No.58 of 2012 before the  Division  Bench  of  High
Court of Delhi.  A separate appeal bearing no.62 of 2012 was filed  by  M/s.
Mohan Tractors.  Those appeals were allowed by the  Division  Bench  as  per
order under appeal dated 17.09.2012.
The case of Mr. Vinod Rajaliwala requires separate  consideration  but  only
after an  adjudication  on  the  main  issue  indicated  earlier  and  after
deciding which of the two views is in accordance with  law,  of  Delhi  High
Court in the case of Megnostar or of Punjab &  Haryana  High  Court  in  the
case of Pegasus.  As the case of Pegasus has been argued as a  lead  matter,
we propose to first consider the views  of  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court.
After noticing the Statement of Objects  &  Reasons  for  enactment  of  the
SARFAESI Act as discussed by the Company  Judge,  the  Division  Bench  took
note of detailed arguments advanced on behalf of Pegasus  which  is  to  the
following effect.  Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act  provides  for  acquisition
of rights  or  interest  in  financial  assets  of  any  bank  or  financial
institution by any securitization company or reconstruction  company,  inter
alia, by entering into an agreement and  this  Section  begins  with  a  non
obstante clause.   Section  9  enumerates  various  measures  which  can  be
adopted by a securitization company  or  reconstruction  company,  including
the sale or lease of a part or whole of the business  of  the  borrower  and
this Section also begins with a non obstante clause.  Chapter  III  consists
of 7 sections providing for enforcement  of  security  interest  created  in
favour of any secured creditor.  Section 13, which also begins  with  a  non
obstante clause of a limited nature for overcoming the  hurdles  of  Section
69 or Section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, creates a right  in
the secured creditor to enforce any security interest in its favour  without
the intervention of a court or tribunal, in accordance with  the  provisions
of this Act.  The detailed scheme for  enforcement  of  the  secured  assets
under various sub-sections and provisos  in  Section  13  were  pointed  out
along with Section 35 and 37 in support of a submission that the  provisions
are not only a complete code for enforcement of secured asset by  a  secured
creditor but in case of conflict with any other statute, the  provisions  of
the SARFAESI Act would prevail.  Some other statutes enumerated  in  Section
37 can play a supplemental role along with any other law for the time  being
in force including the Companies  Act  but  obviously  only  till  they  are
consistent with provisions of the SARFAESI  Act.   The  relevant  case  laws
were also cited and considered.  The rival contention  and  case  laws  were
noted for framing the main question of law in the following words : -

“Whether  the  Company  Court  enjoys  jurisdiction  to  issue   supervisory
direction to a securitization company/ secured creditor in  connection  with
a company in liquidation or under winding up in the face of  Section  13  of
the SARFAESI Act or securitization  company  opting  to  stand  outside  the
winding up is absolutely free to utilise the sale proceeds of assets of  the
company in liquidation?”

The Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court  considered  the  case  of
Mardia Chemicals v. Union  of  India  (2004)  4  SCC  311;  Rajasthan  State
Financial Corporation v. Official Liquidator AIR 2006 SC 755 = (2005) 8  SCC
190; Bakemans Industries v. New Cawnpore (2008) 144 Company Cases  71  (SC);
Ram Kripal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2007) 11  SCC  22;  and  Central
Bank of India v. State of Kerala (2009) 4 SCC 94 for coming to a  conclusion
in paragraph 34 that the Company Court  enjoys  the  jurisdiction  to  issue
directions to a securitization company or a secured creditor who  has  opted
to stay outside the winding up and invoke its power under Section 13 of  the
SARFAESI Act.
We are unable to subscribe to the  aforesaid  views.   On  the  other  hand,
after going through the  judgment  of  Delhi  High  Court  in  the  case  of
Megnostar we are persuaded to approve its views because of  various  reasons
some of which we shall enumerate and explain hereinafter.
The relevant case laws  discussed  in  the  two  conflicting  judgments  are
virtually the same but the error committed by  the  Division  Bench  in  the
case of Pegasus lies mainly in coming to  a  conclusion  that  there  is  no
inconsistency between the Companies Act and the SARFAESI Act if the  Company
Judge issues supervisory directions to achieve the object  of  Section  529A
which finds a clear mention in one of the provisos of Section 13(9)  of  the
SARFAESI Act.  This view is unacceptable for the reasons detailed  by  Delhi
High Court in the case of Megnostar.  Those reasons  commend  themselves  to
us also.  We are particularly in agreement with the view in paragraph 26  of
the judgment which is as follows :

“26.  If it were to be held that the Official  Liquidator  (who  acts  under
the dictates of the Company Court) is to be also associated with  the  sale,
it  will  naturally  open  up  the  fora  of  the  Company  Court  also  for
entertaining matters relating to such sale and which  as  aforesaid  is  not
only likely to lead to conflicts but is also contrary to the spirit  of  the
SARFAESI Act of sale being without the intervention of the Court.”

However, there are certain areas covered by the Delhi High Court which  need
further elucidation and clarification.  For that it  will  be  relevant  and
necessary to  first  go  through  the  ambit,  scope  and  peculiarities  of
Statutes like the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951  (for  brevity  the
‘SFC  Act’)  and  The  Recovery  of  Debts  due  to  Banks   and   Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (for brevity the ‘RDB  Act’)  in  contrast  with  the
SARFAESI Act and  some  case  laws  which,  in  our  view,  are  of  special
significance for better understanding of the issues.
All the  aforesaid  Acts  are  Central  legislations  enacted  for  specific
purposes.  The  SFC  Act  enables  the  State  Governments  to  establish  a
Financial Corporation for  a  State  on  the  lines  of  Central  Industrial
Finance Corporation set up under Act XV of 1948 to provide medium  and  long
term credit to industrial undertakings, somewhat outside the normal  lending
activities  of  Commercial  Banks.   This  Act,  inter-alia,  vests  special
privileges in the State Financial Corporations in the matter of  enforcement
of its claims against borrowers, through sections such as  29,  30,  31  and
32.  Coercive steps including sale of secured property is, vide  Section  31
required to be taken by moving appropriate application before the  concerned
District Judge as per procedure prescribed under Section  32.   Section  46B
does bestow overriding status on this Act over the  then  existing  law  but
not over the Companies Act of 1956 which is a later law.  Hence, in  several
judgments it has rightly been held that if the defaulter is a company  under
winding up, a State Financial Corporation can at best be a secured  creditor
who may opt to remain out of winding up but nonetheless it will  be  subject
to orders passed in accordance with law under the Companies Act.
The RDB Act is of 1993, i.e. later to the Companies Act.  Its avowed  object
is  to  provide  for  the  establishment  of   Tribunals   for   expeditious
adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and  financial  institutions
and for  matters  connected  therewith  or  incidental  thereto.   This  Act
creates a special machinery  for  speedy  recovery  of  dues  of  banks  and
financial institutions  which,  by  an  amendment  of  2004  now  include  a
registered securitization company or reconstruction company envisaged  under
the SARFAESI Act.  Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of  ordinary  courts  or
authority in respect of matters falling within the jurisdiction of  Tribunal
as specified in  Section  17.   An  Appellate  Tribunal  is  provided  under
Section 20.  The power of the tribunal extends to determining the  debt  due
as well as its realization.  Section  34  confers  over-riding  effect  upon
this Act over any other law in force.
In  contrast,  the  SARFAESI  Act  was   enacted   in   2002   to   regulate
securitization and reconstruction of financial  assets  and  enforcement  of
security  interest  and  for  matters  connected  therewith  or   incidental
thereto.  Inter-alia, one of the main objects of this Act is to  clothe  the
banks and financial institutions in India with power to take  possession  of
securities and sell them. All its significant provisions have been noted  in
detail in Mardia Chemicals in which vires  of  this  Act  was  examined  and
upheld.  A reading of Sections 9 and  13  of  the  SARFAESI  Act  leaves  no
manner of doubt that for enforcement of its  security  interest,  a  secured
creditor has been  not  only  vested  with  powers  to  do  so  without  the
intervention of the court or tribunal but detailed procedure has  also  been
prescribed to take care of various eventualities such as when  the  borrower
company is under  liquidation  for  which  proviso  to  sub-section  (9)  of
Section 13 contains clear mandate keeping in view the provisions of  Section
529 and 529A of the Companies Act, 1956.  Since significant amendments  were
introduced in Section 529 while inserting  Section  529A  through  Amendment
Act 35 of 1985, effective from 24.5.1985 and with the aid of a non  obstante
clause in  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  529A  workmen’s  dues  were  given
preference over other dues and made to stand pari passu  with  dues  of  the
secured creditors, in case of apparent conflict, this Court through  various
judgments has upheld the proceedings under the RDB Act as it happens  to  be
a later Act with overriding effect over other  laws.  The  interest  of  the
workmen in respect of dues payable to them as per Section 529  and  529A  of
the Companies Act has been  protected  by  permitting,  wherever  necessary,
association of the Official  Liquidator  with  the  proceedings  before  the
Debts Recovery Tribunal under the RDB Act.  In our considered judgment,  the
same view is required to be taken in context of SARFAESI Act also,  for  the
additional reason that  Section  13  requires  notice  to  the  borrower  at
various stages which in the case of a  company  under  winding  up  being  a
borrower would mean requirement of notice to the Official  Liquidator.   The
Security Interest (Enforcement)  Rules,  2002  (for  brevity,  ‘the  Rules’)
framed under the provisions of SARFAESI Act also  require  notice  upon  the
borrower or his agent at different stages.  For sale  of  immovable  secured
assets, as per Rule  8,  the  authorized  officer  can  take  possession  by
delivering a Possession Notice to the borrower and  by  affixing  Possession
Notice on the outer door or at  some  conspicuous  place  of  the  property.
Before the sale also, the authorized officer is required  to  serve  to  the
borrower a notice of 30 days.  Thus the Rules also ensure that the  Official
Liquidator is in knowledge of the proceedings  under  the  SARFAESI  Act  in
case the borrower happens to be a company under winding up.  As a  borrower,
the Official Liquidator has ample opportunity to  get  the  details  of  the
workers dues as ascertained under  the  Companies  Act,  placed  before  the
authorized officer and seek proper distribution of the amount realised  from
the sale of secured assets in accordance with various  provisos  under  sub-
section (9) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act.
The above discussion supports the view taken by Delhi  High  Court  that  no
order is required by the Company  Judge  for  association  of  the  Official
Liquidator in order to protect the interest of workers and to realize  their
dues.  Sufficient provisions have been  made  for  this  purpose  under  the
SARFAESI Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
In the event, in the capacity of a borrower the Official Liquidator  is  not
satisfied with the decisions or steps taken by the secured creditor  or  the
authorized officer, at appropriate stage it has  sufficient  opportunity  to
avail right of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the  Debts
Recovery Tribunal.  There is a right of  further  appeal  under  Section  18
before the Appellate Tribunal.  On the other hand,  if  the  view  taken  by
Punjab & Haryana High Court  in  Pegasus  is  accepted,  there  shall  be  a
conflict of rights and interest of the secured creditor who have  the  right
and liberty to  realize  their  secured  interest  in  accordance  with  the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act on one hand, and  the  statutory  rights  and
liability of the Official Liquidator acting under the orders of the  Company
Judge as per provisions of the Companies Act, on the other.   The  appellate
fora shall also differ, leading to a situation of uncertainty  and  conflict
between the two Acts.  In such a scenario, we respectfully  agree  with  the
Delhi view and disapprove that of the Punjab & Haryana High Court.
Coming to the case laws, on behalf of Megnostar, Delhi view was assailed  by
placing reliance upon Rajasthan State Financial Corporation.  In  this  case
decided by three Judges, this Court  examined  the  grievance  of  Rajasthan
State Financial Corporation in the context of conflict between the  SFC  Act
and the Companies Act.  After taking note of various  earlier  judgments  of
this Court in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (2000)  4  SCC  406;
International Coach Builders Ltd. v. Karnataka State  Financial  Corporation
(2003) 10 SCC 482; Industrial Credit and  Investment  Corporation  of  India
Ltd. v. Srinivas Agencies  (1996)  4  SCC  165;  and  A.P.  State  Financial
Corporation v. Official Liquidator (2000) 7 SCC 291, it was held in para  16
that a financial corporation has the right to proceed under  Section  29  of
the SFC Act against a debtor, if it is a company, only so long as  there  is
no order of winding up.  When the debtor is a company  in  winding  up,  the
provisions of Sections 529 and 529A of the Companies Act  would  affect  the
rights of financial corporations because of a “pari passu” charge in  favour
of the workmen.  In respect  of  such  dues  of  the  workmen  the  Official
Liquidator has to be accepted as their representative.
In the context of RDB Act, reliance was  placed  upon  another  judgment  of
this Court by three Judges in the case of Bank of Maharashtra  v.  Pandurang
Keshav Gorwardkar (2013) 7 SCC 754 wherein this Court held  that  the  Debts
Recovery Tribunal is not empowered to adjudicate/ determine dues of  workmen
of debtor-company.  Once the company is in winding up workmen’s dues can  be
determined only by the liquidator under supervision of Company Court and  by
no  other  authority.   In  para  53,  while  considering  Rajasthan   State
Financial Corporation decided by three Judges’ Bench  it  was  noticed  that
once a  winding  up  proceeding  has  commenced,  the  distribution  of  the
proceeds of the sale  of  the  assets  at  the  instance  of  the  banks  or
financial institutions coming under the RDB Act or SFC Act can only be  with
the association of the Official Liquidator and under the supervision of  the
Company Court.  The reason for such a view was recognized to lie in  Section
529A of the Companies Act  which  governs  the  distribution  of  assets  as
provided therein.  But it was also noted that since there was a conflict  as
to who would be competent to sell the assets, it  was  held  that  for  this
purpose the DRT would be competent because the  RDB  Act  of  1993  being  a
later and special law shall prevail  over  the  Companies  Act  which  is  a
general law.
Reliance was also placed upon this Court’s judgment in  Employees  Provident
Fund Commissioner v. Official Liquidator (2011) 10 SCC 727.  This  case  had
arisen in the context of dues payable by an employer  under  Section  11  of
the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and  the
question was whether in granting priority, such dues  would  be  subject  to
Section 529A of the Companies Act. The answer was in the affirmative,  i.e.,
the Companies Act would, in this matter  hold  its  field  as  there  is  no
situation of conflict.
On behalf of respondent Bank, Kotak Mahindra as well as  Respondent  No.  2,
auction purchaser, the judgment in the case  of  Rajasthan  State  Financial
Corporation (supra) was distinguished by placing reliance upon  factual  and
legal situation prevailing in that case as  noted  in  Paragraph  2  of  the
judgment.  It was pointed out that Section 32 (10) of the SFC  Act  contains
ample clarification  that  if  liquidation  proceedings  have  commenced  in
respect of the borrower before an application is made under sub-section  (1)
of Section 31, the financial corporation will not get  any  preference  over
the other creditors unless it is conferred on it by any other law.  In  that
case  no  proceeding  had  been  initiated  under  the  SFC  Act   and   all
developments had taken  place  in  the  liquidation  proceeding.   Rajasthan
State Financial Corporation was therefore unable to take  any  advantage  of
provisions under SFC Act.   At the end of paragraph 2,  this  Court  rightly
held that “a mere right to take advantage of any enactment without  any  act
done towards availing of that right cannot be deemed a right accrued.”
Since we have held earlier in favour of views of Delhi  High  Court,  it  is
not necessary to burden this judgment with the case laws which support  that
view and have been noted by the High Court.   We are in agreement  with  the
submissions advanced on behalf of respondent Kotak Mahindra Bank as well  as
respondent No.2 that there is no lacuna or ambiguity in the SARFAESI Act  to
warrant reading something more  into  it.   For  the  purpose  it  has  been
enacted, it is a complete code and the earlier  judgments  rendered  in  the
context of SFC Act or RDB Act vis-à-vis the Companies Act,  cannot  be  held
applicable on all force to the SARFAESI Act. There  is  nothing  lacking  in
the Act so as to borrow anything from the Companies Act till the  stage  the
secured assets are sold by the secured  creditors  in  accordance  with  the
provisions in the SARFAESI Act and the Rules.  At the post sale  stage,  the
rights of the persons or parties having any stake in the sale  proceeds  are
also taken care of by sub-section (9) of Section 13 and  its  five  provisos
(not numbered).  It is significant that as per sub-section  (9)  a  sort  of
consensus is required amongst the secured creditors, if they are  more  than
one, for the  exercise  of  rights  available  under  sub-section  (4).   If
borrower is  a  company  in  liquidation,  the  sale  proceeds  have  to  be
distributed in accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Section  529A  of  the
Companies Act even where the company is being wound  up  after  coming  into
force of the SARFAESI Act, if the secured creditor of such company  opts  to
stand out of the winding up proceedings, it is entitled to retain  the  sale
proceeds of its secured assets after depositing the workmen’s dues with  the
liquidator in accordance with the provisions of Section 529A of the  Company
Act.  The third proviso is also meant to work out the provisions of  Section
529A  of  the  Companies  Act,  in  case  the  workmen’s  dues   cannot   be
ascertained, by relying upon communication of estimate of such dues  by  the
liquidator to the secured creditor, who has to deposit the  amount  of  such
estimated dues with the liquidator and then it can retain the sale  proceeds
of the secured assets.  The other two  provisos  also  are  in  aid  of  the
liquidator to discharge his duties and  obligations  arising  under  Section
529A  of  the  Companies  Act.   Thus,  it  is  evident  that  the  required
provisions of the Companies Act have been incorporated in the  SARFAESI  Act
for harmonizing this Act with the  Companies  Act  in  respect  of  dues  of
workmen and their protection under Section 529A of the  Companies  Act.   In
view of  such  exercise  already  done  by  the  legislature,  there  is  no
plausible reason as to take recourse to any provisions of the Companies  Act
and permit interference in the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act either  by
the Company Judge  or  the  liquidator.   As  noted  earlier,  the  Official
Liquidator as a representative of the borrower company under winding up  has
to be associated, not for supplying any omission in  the  SARFAESI  Act  but
because of express provisions therein as well as in the Rules.    Hence  the
exercise of harmonizing that this Court had to undertake in the  context  of
SFC Act or the RDB Act is no longer warranted in  respect  of  SARFAESI  Act
vis-à-vis the Companies Act.
The aforesaid view commends itself to us also because of clear intention  of
the Parliament expressed in Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act  that  a  secured
creditor has  the  right  to  enforce  its  security  interest  without  the
intervention of the court or tribunal.  At the same  time,  this  Act  takes
care that in case of grievance,  the  borrower,  which  in  the  case  of  a
company under liquidation would mean the liquidator, will have the right  of
seeking redressal under Sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act.
On account of the above discussions, the  Division  Bench  judgment  of  the
Punjab and Haryana High Court under challenge by Pegasus fails to  meet  our
approval and is therefore, set aside only for the purpose of clarifying  the
law.  Since the  sale  already  made  has  not  been  assailed  by  Pegasus,
therefore that issue  will  abide  by  the  views  that  we  shall  indicate
hereinafter in respect of SLP(C) Nos.  117-118  of  2011  preferred  by  Mr.
Vinod Rajaliwala.
We grant leave in SLP(C) No.7074 of 2010 preferred by  HSIIDC  but  only  to
dismiss this  case  as  we  have  found  the  grievance  of  Pegasus  to  be
justified; it  was  entitled  not  only  to  stay  outside  the  winding  up
proceeding in view of provisions of SARFAESI Act  which  is  a  special  and
later Act but was also entitled to exercise its rights without  any  fetters
that were erroneously placed upon it by the company Judge and were  approved
also by the Division  Bench.   Hence,  the  grievance  of  the  HSIIDC  that
Pegasus should not have been  permitted  to  stay  outside  the  winding  up
proceeding  is  found  meritless.   Consequently  its  appeal  has   to   be
dismissed.
As we have approved the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi  High  Court
in the case of Megnostar, the appeals  preferred  against  the  judgment  in
Civil Appeal Nos. 9293-94 of 2014 are hereby dismissed.   In  the  facts  of
the case there shall be no order as to costs.
With respect to the case of Vinod Rajaliwala, it has been indicated  earlier
that approximately 36 acres of land of Haryana Concast Limited  was  put  to
auction and sale by Pegasus in association with official liquidator and  was
ultimately sold for Rs.32 crores in favour of  M/s.  Venus  Realcon  Private
Limited. Vinod  Rajaliwala  challenged  the  orders  of  the  company  Judge
confirming the sale by preferring  a  company  appeal  and  also  through  a
public interest litigation (a writ petition).  Both were  dismissed  by  the
Division Bench of  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  by  orders  passed  on
23.9.2010.  These orders in company appeal No. 10/2010  and  PIL  being  CWP
No.8422 of 2010 are under  challenge  at  the  instance  of  Mr.  Rajaliwala
through special leave petition (C) Nos. 117-118 of 2011.
Since the larger issue arising out of the conflicting  judgments  of  Punjab
and Haryana High Court and Delhi High Court has already  been  addressed  by
us, the case of Mr. Rajaliwala requires adjudication, mostly on facts as  to
whether the sale  confirmed  by  the  Company  Judge  and  approved  by  the
Division Bench in favour of M/s. Venus Realcon  requires  any  interference.
It is not at all necessary to go into the facts which preceded the  sale  in
favour of M/s  Venus  Realcon  for  Rs.32  crores  which  till  date  stands
confirmed.    It is against confirmation of sale  that  Mr.  Rajaliwala  has
preferred appeal as well as a PIL  on  the  ground  that  the  consideration
money does not reflect the correct value of the secured  assets,  i.e.,  the
land sold to M/s. Venus Realcon.  In order to substantiate this  claim,  Mr.
Rajaliwala was granted an opportunity by the Division Bench to  find  out  a
higher  bid.   One  M/s.  ACHASTES  Promoters  Private  Limited  through  an
application in Company Appeal No. 10/2010 claimed to offer a  bid  of  Rs.33
crores but later withdrew the  same.   Thereafter,  another  buyer  made  an
offer of Rs.37 crores but tendered  a  meagre  amount  of  Rs.1  crore  only
before the Division Bench.  On these  facts  the  Division  Bench  dismissed
company appeal on 23.9.2010.  As a consequence, the PIL was  also  dismissed
on the same date.   In this Court, the petitioner claimed that the  property
was worth hundred of crores  but  ultimately  petitioner  persuaded  another
entity M/s. Himalayan Infra Projects Private Limited to offer a higher  bid.
 This company was allowed to intervene and be impleaded,  and  it  deposited
10 crores in January, 2011 and Rs. 40 crores in April, 2011.  That money  is
lying in deposit in this Court.
The argument on behalf of Mr. Rajaliwala and the intervener Himalayan  Infra
Projects Private Limited is that this Court should  take  a  practical  view
and allow the offer of Rs.50 crores in comparison to Rs.32 crores  deposited
by the auction purchaser.  In reply, on behalf of Venus Realcon-  respondent
No. 3, it was pointed out that Mr. Rajaliwala is himself a  property  dealer
and  a  PIL  at  his  instance,  in  this  matter,  does  not  deserve   any
consideration for lack of good faith, in view of Judgment  in  the  case  of
Arun Kumar Agrawal vs. Union of India,  2014 (2) SCC 609.   It  was  pointed
out from materials on  record  that  the  valuation  of  property  has  been
changing from 2002 when it was estimated to be Rs.10.13 crores.  In  January
2010 its market value was around Rs.24-25 crores  and  the   distress  value
was Rs.18-20 crores approximately as per two  different  valuation  reports.
The valuation of Rs.75 crores approximately in 2008 was unrealistic,  solely
on the basis of oral communication from the Collector said to be based  upon
valuation for commercial plot  and  not  for  an  industrial  plot.   It  is
pointed out  that  one  bid  in  2005  by  M/s.  Radha  Raman  Builders  and
Developers Private Limited for Rs.29 crores approximately for a larger  plot
than the actual land, could not materialize.  The first offer by M/s.  Venus
Realcon on 9.4.2010 was Rs.26 crores which  on  negotiation  was  raised  to
Rs.26.50 crores.  Subsequently on allegations made  by  Mr.  Rajaliwala  the
Company Judge on 13.5.2010 held an open bid in  Court,  wherein  M/s.  Venus
Realcon raised its bid to Rs.32 crores.  The Court then  ordered  for  fresh
advertisement pursuant to which no bidder, including Mr. Rajaliwala  offered
more than Rs.32 crores.   Hence the Company  Court  confirmed  the  sale  in
favour of M/s. Venus Realcon for Rs.32 crores but it  was  made  subject  to
Special Leave Petitions filed by Pegasus and HSIIDC.
On considering the submissions of parties, we find that the  sale  confirmed
in favour of M/s. Venus Realcon  for  Rs.32  crores  does  not  require  any
interference particularly at the instance  of  Petitioner-Vinod  Rajaliwala.
There was no illegality or irregularity established against the  conduct  of
auction and once it is found that the offer  of  Rs.32  crores  was  a  fair
offer in a  competitive  bid   conducted  fairly  and  the  offer  has  been
accepted and the sale confirmed, it would not be proper for  this  court  to
undermine   the value of  such  auction  sale  conducted  not  only  by  the
secured creditor but also by the Official Liquidator who  was  permitted  to
be associated with the whole process of finding out of valuation as well  as
the conduct of sale.   M/s. Venus Realcon has rightly placed  reliance  upon
the judgments of this court in the case of Valji Khimji & Co.  vs.  Official
Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Ltd.  2008(9)  SCC  299  and
Vedica Procon Private Limited  vs.  Balleshwar  Greens  P.  Ltd.,    2015(8)
SCALE 713.  In Valji Khimji,  the   law was enunciated in  Paragraph  28  in
the following words:
      “If it is held that every confirmed sale can be set aside  the  result
would be that no auction-sale will ever be complete because always  somebody
can come after the auction or its confirmation  offering  a  higher  amount.
It could have been a different matter if the auction had been  held  without
adequate publicity in well-known newspapers  having  wide  circulation,  but
where the auction-sale was done after wide  publicity,  then  setting  aside
the sale after its confirmation will create huge problems.  When an auction-
sale is advertised in well-known newspapers  having  wide  circulation,  all
eligible persons can come and bid for the same, and they are  themselves  to
be blamed if they do not come forward to bid at the  time  of  the  auction.
They  cannot  ordinarily  later  on  be  allowed  after  the   bidding   (or
confirmation) is over to offer a higher price.   Of  course,  the  situation
may be different if an auction-sale is finalized, say for  Rs.1  crore,  and
subsequently somebody turns up offering Rs.10 crores.  In this situation  it
is possible  to  infer  that  there  was  some  fraud  because  if  somebody
subsequently offers Rs.10 crores, then an inference can  be  drawn  that  an
attempt  had  been  made  to  acquire  that  property/asset  at  a   grossly
inadequate  price.   This  situation  itself  may  indicate  fraud  or  some
collusion.  However, if the price offered after the auction  is  over  which
is only a little over the auction price, that cannot by itself suggest  that
any fraud has been done.”

In Vedica Procon’s case (supra) the aforesaid view  was  noticed  and  after
considering many judgments in Paragraph 39,  the  Court  approved  the  view
taken in Navalkha and Sons vs. Sri Ramanya Das &  Ors.,  1969  (3)  SCC  537
that there is a discretion in the Company Court either to accept  or  reject
the highest bid before an order of confirmation of sale is  made.   However,
once the Company  Court  is  satisfied  that  the  price  is  adequate,  the
subsequent higher offer cannot be a ground for refusing  confirmation.   The
price of immoveable property keeps on  varying  depending  upon  the  market
conditions and availability of  a  buyer.   Such  fluctuations  may  attract
fresh higher offers but normally such offers cannot be made  the  basis  for
reopening the confirmed sale which was  otherwise  valid.   In  the  present
case, we are satisfied that the sale made in favour of  M/s.  Venus  Realcon
does not require any interference.  There is no good  reason  why  the  full
price paid by Venus Realcon should be ordered to be refunded  with  interest
etc. and possession which was delivered to Venus  Realcon  at  the  time  of
sale  should  be  disturbed  after  passage  of  so  much  time.   In   such
circumstances, while granting leave in SLP(C)  Nos.117-118,  the  consequent
Civil Appeals are hereby dismissed but without any order as to  costs.   The
money deposited  in  this  case  by  the  intervener  M/s.  Himalayan  Infra
Projects Private Limited should be  refunded  to  it  forthwith  along  with
interest accrued thereupon.
The views expressed and the orders passed  hereinabove  may  once  again  be
recapitulated as follows :-  (1) Civil Appeal No. 3646 of  2011  is  allowed
only for declaration of  law  without  interfering  with  the  sale  of  the
secured assets which has not been challenged by Pegasus. (2)   Civil  Appeal
No.---------/2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 7074  of  2010)  is  dismissed.
(3) Civil Appeal Nos. ------------/2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.  117-118
of 2011) are dismissed.   The  amount  of  Rs.50  crores  deposited  by  the
intervener M/s. Himalayan Infra Projects Private Limited shall  be  refunded
to it forthwith alongwith interest accrued thereupon. (4) Civil Appeal  Nos.
9293-94 of 2014 are dismissed. The judgment and  order  of  the  Delhi  High
Court is affirmed by holding that powers under the Companies Act  cannot  be
wielded by the Company Judge to interfere  with  proceedings  by  a  secured
creditor to realize its secured interests as per provisions of the  SARFAESI
Act.
There shall be no order as to costs.


                                                         ………………………………..…….J.
                                                           [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]



                                                         ………………………………….…..J.
                                                        [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.
December 29, 2015.




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