Supreme Court of India (Full Bench (FB)- Three Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 10941-10942 of 2013, Judgment Date: Dec 04, 2015

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10941-10942 OF 2013



NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                                  .....APPELLANT



                                VERSUS

HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD
STORAGE PVT. LTD.                                              …..RESPONDENT


                                    WITH

             C A NOS.10943-10944 OF 2013, C.A. NO.1774 OF 2014,

         SLP (C) NO.2833 OF 2014 & SLP (C) Nos.11257-11258 OF 2014.



                               J U D G M E N T



ANIL R. DAVE, J.



1.    While  considering  Civil  Appeal  No.D  35086  of  2013,  this  Court
expressed its doubt in relation to the period of limitation for  filing  the
written statement or giving version of the opponent as  per  the  provisions
of Section 13(2)(a)  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’).  The question was, whether  the  said  issue  was
governed by the law laid down by this Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant &  Ors.  v.
Shrinath Chaturvedi, [(2002) 6  SCC  635]   or  Kailash  v.  Nanhku  &  Ors.
[(2005) 4 SCC 480].  The following order was passed by  this  Court  in  the
aforestated Civil Appeal on 29th November, 2013:

“1.   Heard Mr. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General,  in  support  of  these
appeals.  Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned senior counsel,  appears  for  the
respondent(s).

2.    Learned Attorney General points out that  the  judgment  in  Dr.  J.J.
Merchand & Ors. vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi, reported in [2002(6) SCC 635],  has
been considered and a different view has been taken in Kailash vs. Nanhku  &
Ors., reported in [2005(4) SCC  480],  on  the  issue  of  limitation.   The
matters, therefore, require consideration.

3.    Delay condoned.

4.    The appeals are admitted.

5.    Since this point of law  requires  to  be  resolved,  we  request  the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice to place  these  appeals  before  a  larger  Bench
…………………”



2.    In the aforestated  circumstances,  these  matters  have  been  placed
before this three-Judge Bench so as to ascertain whether the law  laid  down
in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) still holds the  field  or  whether
the law has been changed in view of the later  judgment  delivered  by  this
Court in the case of Kailash (supra).

3.    The whole issue centers round the period  within  which  the  opponent
has to give his version to the District Forum in pursuance of  a  complaint,
which is admitted under Section 12 of the Act.  Upon receipt of a  complaint
by the District Forum, if the complaint is admitted under Section 12 of  the
Act, a copy of the complaint is to be served upon the opposite party and  as
per provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the opposite party has to give  his
version of the case within a period of 30 days from the date of  receipt  of
the copy of  the  complaint.   There  is  a  further  provision  in  Section
13(2)(a) that the District Forum may extend the  period,  not  exceeding  15
days, to the opposite party for giving his version.   The  relevant  Section
of the Act reads as under:

“13.  Procedure on admission of complaint – (1) …………………….

(2)   The District Forum shall,  if  the  complaint  admitted  by  it  under
section 12 relates to goods in respect of which the procedure  specified  in
sub-section (1) cannot be followed, or  if  the  complaint  relates  to  any
services, -

(a)   refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him  to
give his version of the  case  within  a  period  of  thirty  days  or  such
extended period not  exceeding  fifteen  days  as  may  be  granted  by  the
District Forum;

(b)   ………………………………………………………….”



Thus, upon plain reading of the aforestated Section, one can find  that  the
opposite party is given 30 days’ time for giving his version  and  the  said
period for filing or giving the version can  be  extended  by  the  District
Forum, but the extension should not exceed 15 days.  Thus, an upper  cap  of
45 days has been imposed by the Act  for  filing  version  of  the  opposite
party.

4.    The question arose in the case of Dr. J.J.  Merchant  (supra)  whether
the Forum can grant time beyond 45 days to the  opposite  party  for  filing
its version.  After considering the aforestated section in the light of  the
object with which the Act has been enacted,  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  this
Court came to the conclusion that in no case period beyond 45  days  can  be
granted to the opposite party for filing its version of the case.

5.    Without discussing  the  aforestated  three-Judge  Bench  Judgment  in
detail, we now turn to another judgment which has been referred  to  by  the
referring Bench.  The other judgment which has been referred to  is  Kailash
(supra), which pertains to Election Law.  The issue  involved  in  the  said
case was whether time limit of 90 days, as  prescribed  by  the  proviso  to
Rule 1 of Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, is mandatory or directory  in
nature.   The said issue had arisen in an election matter where the  written
statement was not  filed  by  the  concerned  candidate  within  the  period
prescribed under the relevant Election Law and the issue was whether in  the
Election trial, delay caused in filing  the  written  statement  could  have
been condoned.

6.    After considering the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of  the Code  of
Civil Procedure, 1908 and several other judgments  pertaining  to  grant  of
time or additional time for  filing  written  statement  or  reply,  in  the
interest of justice, this Court came to the conclusion that  the  provisions
of Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. are not mandatory but directory  in  nature  and
therefore, in the interest of justice, further time for filing reply can  be
granted, if the circumstances are such that require grant  of  further  time
for filing the reply.

7.    The judgment delivered in the case of  Kailash  (supra)  is  later  in
point of time and while considering the said  judgment,  judgment  delivered
in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) had also been  considered  by  this
Court.

8.    In the aforestated circumstances, we have now to consider  whether  in
a case under the provisions of the Act, where a  complaint  has  been  filed
and the opposite party has not filed its version to the case within 30  days
or within extended period of 45 days, which at  the  most  could  have  been
granted by the District Forum, the version given by the opposite  party  can
be accepted.

9.    The learned counsel appearing for the complainant submitted  that  the
view expressed by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dr.  J.J.  Merchant
(supra) is absolutely just and proper and is  on  the  subject,  with  which
facts of the present case are concerned.  The said case also deals with  the
provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act,  whereas case of Kailash  (supra)
pertains to an Election trial and under a different Act.

10.   According to the learned counsel appearing  for  the  complainant,  in
the instant case, in fact, there is no conflict between  the  two  judgments
referred to hereinabove as the  judgment  delivered  in  Dr.  J.J.  Merchant
(supra) was prior in time and was on the subject of  the  Act.   Looking  at
the contents of the said judgment, it is clear that the said  judgment  also
pertains to the provisions with regard to grant of time for  filing  version
of the opposite party before the District Forum.  Once a judgment  has  been
delivered by a three-Judge Bench  on  the  same  subject  and  on  the  same
section, according to the learned counsel, there was no need to  re-consider
the same.

11.   On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for  the  other  side
contended that as per the view expressed in the  case  of  Kailash  (supra),
the District Forum can grant time beyond 15  days  to  the  other  side  for
giving its version  or  reply.   The  learned  counsel  submitted  that  the
marginal note to Section 13 of the Act reads  “procedure  on  completion  of
complaint’.  Thus, the provisions incorporated in Section 13 of the Act  are
merely procedural and are directory in nature, as observed by this Court  in
the case of Kailash (supra).

12.   The learned counsel also referred to a judgment delivered in the  case
of Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank [(2002) 6 SCC 33]. This Court  was
faced with the same issue in the aforestated  case.   After  discussing  the
provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act, this Court came  to  the  conclusion
that procedural rules should not be considered as mandatory in  nature.   In
the said case, ultimately, this Court came to the conclusion that  provision
contained  in  Section  13(2)(a)  of  the  Act  is  procedural  in   nature.
According to the said judgment, the object behind enactment of  the  Act  is
speedy disposal of cases pending before the District  Forum  and  therefore,
it has been provided that reply should be  filed  within  30  days  and  the
extension of time may not exceed 15 days.   It  has  been  further  observed
that no penal consequences have been provided in the case  of  extension  of
time beyond 15 days  and  therefore,  the  said  provision  with  regard  to
extension of time beyond a particular limit is directory in nature and  that
would not mean that extension of time cannot exceed 15 days.   Relying  upon
the said judgment  and  the  judgment  delivered  in  the  case  of  Kailash
(supra), the learned counsel submitted that as  Dr.  J.J.  Merchant  (supra)
has not been followed in a later case though it was considered in  the  case
of Kailash (supra), the correct legal position would be to  treat  the  said
provision with regard to maximum period for filing the  reply  is  directory
and not mandatory.

13.   The learned counsel further submitted that some of the  provisions  of
Civil Procedure Code do apply to the District Forum and in the light of  the
said fact, in his submission, the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the  Act
are merely directory and not mandatory in nature.

14.   The learned counsel  also  submitted  that  if  further  time  is  not
granted, irreparable damage would be caused to the other side and in a  case
where the other side/respondent is staying at a distant place, it might  not
be possible for the respondent/other side to file its  version  even  within
45 days and therefore, in the interest of justice,  the  view  expressed  in
the case of Kailash (supra) should be accepted.

15.   Upon hearing the concerned  counsel  and  upon  perusal  of  both  the
judgments referred to hereinabove, which pertain to extension  of  time  for
the purpose of filing written statement, we are  of  the  opinion  that  the
view expressed by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dr.  J.J.  Merchant
(supra) should prevail.

16.   In the case of Dr.  J.J.  Merchant  (supra),  which  is  on  the  same
subject, this Court observed as under:

“13.  The National Commission  or  the  State  Commission  is  empowered  to
follow the said procedure.  From the aforesaid section it is  apparent  that
on receipt of the complaint, the opposite party  is  required  to  be  given
notice directing him to give his version of the case within a period  of  30
days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by  the
District  Forum  or  the  Commission.   For  having   speedy   trail,   this
legislative mandate of not giving  more  than  45  days  in  submitting  the
written statement or the version of the case is required to be  adhered  to.
If this is not adhered to, the  legislative  mandate  of  disposing  of  the
cases within three or five months would be defeated.

14.   For this purpose, even Parliament has amended Order 8 Rule  1  of  the
Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus:

“1.   Written statement. – The defendant shall, within thirty days from  the
date of service of summons on  him,  present  a  written  statement  of  his
defence:

Provided that where the  defendant  fails  to  file  the  written  statement
within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the  same
on such other day, as may be specified by  the  court,  for  reasons  to  be
recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from  the
date of service of summons.”

15.   Under this Rule also, there is  a  legislative  mandate  that  written
statement of defence is to be filed within 30 days.  However, if there is  a
failure to file such written  statement  within  the  stipulated  time,  the
court can at the most extend further period of 60 days and no  more.   Under
the Act, the legislative intent is not to give 90  days  of  time  but  only
maximum 45 days for filing the version of the  opposite  party.   Therefore,
the aforesaid mandate is required to be strictly adhered to.”



17.   We are, therefore, of the view that  the  judgment  delivered  in  the
case of Dr.  J.J.  Merchant  (supra)  holds  the  field  and  therefore,  we
reiterate the view that the District Forum can grant a further period of  15
days to the opposite party for filing his version or reply  and  not  beyond
that..

18.   There is one more reason to follow the law laid down in  the  case  of
Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra).  Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) was decided  in  2002,
whereas Kailash (supra)  was decided in 2005.  As per law laid down by  this
Court, while deciding the case of Kailash (supra), this Court ought to  have
respected the view expressed in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra)  as  the  judgment
delivered in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) was earlier in  point  of
time.   The  aforestated  legal  position  cannot  be  ignored  by  us   and
therefore, we are of the  opinion  that  the  view  expressed  in  Dr.  J.J.
Merchant (supra) should be followed.

19.   Our aforestated view has also been buttressed by  the  view  expressed
by this Court in the case of Central Board  of  Dawoodi  Bohra  Community  &
Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [(2005) 2 SCC 673], wherein  a  question
had arisen whether the law laid down by a Bench  of  a  larger  strength  is
binding  on  a  subsequent  Bench  of  lesser  or  equal  strength.    After
considering a number  of  judgments,  a  five-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court,
finally opined as under :
“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned  senior
counsel for the parties and  having  examined  the  law  laid  down  by  the
Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would  like  to  sum  up
the legal position in the following terms :-

(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by  a  Bench  of
larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench  of  lesser  or  co-equal
strength.


(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent  from  the  view  of
the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of  doubt  all  that  the
Bench of lesser quorum can do is  to  invite  the  attention  of  the  Chief
Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before  a  Bench
of  larger  quorum  than  the  Bench  whose  decision  has   come   up   for
consideration. It will be open only for  a  Bench  of  coequal  strength  to
express an opinion doubting  the  correctness  of  the  view  taken  by  the
earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may  be  placed  for
hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum  larger  than  the  one  which
pronounced the decision laying down the law  the  correctness  of  which  is
doubted.


(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid  rules
do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the  power  of
framing the roster and who can direct any particular  matter  to  be  placed
for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and


(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has  already
come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and  that  Bench  itself
feels that the view of the law taken by a  Bench  of  lesser  quorum,  which
view is in doubt,  needs  correction  or  reconsideration  then  by  way  of
exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it,  it  may  proceed
to hear the case and examine the correctness of  the  previous  decision  in
question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or  the  order  of
Chief Justice  constituting  the  Bench  and  such  listing.  Such  was  the
situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”


20.   In view of the aforestated clear legal position depicted  by  a  five-
Judge Bench, the subject is no more res integra.  Not only this  three-Judge
Bench, but even a Bench of coordinate strength  of  this  Court,  which  had
decided the case of  Kailash (supra), was bound  by  the  view  taken  by  a
three-Judge Bench in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra).
21.   In view of the aforestated legal position, we are  of  the  view  that
the law laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the  case  of  Dr.
J.J.  Merchant  (supra)  should  prevail.    The   Reference   is   answered
accordingly.



                                       ………................................J.
                                                              (ANIL R. DAVE)






                                       ………................................J.
                                                            (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)




                                      ……….................................J.
                                                      (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 04, 2015.

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