Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1257 of 2017, Judgment Date: Jan 31, 2017

                                                                REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No.  1257 of 2017
                   (Arising out of SLP(C)No.38558 of 2012)

Mrs. Ivy C.da.Conceicao                                      ...Appellant

                                   VERSUS

State of Goa & Ors.                                        ...Respondents

                               J u d g m e n t

Adarsh kumar goel, J.

1.    Leave granted. This appeal has been  preferred  against  judgment  and
order dated 14th August, 2012 passed by the High Court of Bombay at  Goa  in
    Writ Petition NO.542 of 2008.

2.    The question for consideration is whether the process  of  appointment
of a principal in minority institution is open to  judicial  review  and  on
what grounds.
3.    The case of the appellant is that she is a Grade-I  teacher,  teaching
Economics in Rosary Higher Secondary School, Navelim, Salcete, Goa,  run  by
respondent No.3-Diocesan Society.  She had passed  her  B.A.  (in  Economics
and Commerce) and M.A.          (in Economics) from  Bombay  University  and
also completed her B.Ed.  She has been teaching for the  last  21  years  in
the school run by  respondent     No.3-Diocesan  Society.   Respondent  No.3
receives aid for running the school  under  the  provisions  of  Goa  School
Education Act, 1984 (for short, “the Act”) and Goa  School  Education  Rules
1986 (for short, “the Rules”).  In the seniority list of teachers,  prepared
by  respondent  No.3-Society,  the  appellant  is  at  serial  No.16   while
respondent Nos.4 to 6 are at serial Nos.43, 35 and 28 respectively.  She  is
eligible and qualified for the post of  principal  and  the  most  competent
person among those available for  the  said  post.   She  was  appointed  as
Incharge-Principal, in the absence of regular  principal,  from  7th  March,
2005 and again from  5th  May,  2005.                  She  has  no  adverse
remark in her Confidential Reports.   On  1st  April,  2005  a  vacancy  was
created for the post of  principal  on  retirement  of  one      Sh.  Edward
Coutinho, the  then  Principal  of          St.  Andrew's  Higher  Secondary
School, Vasco.  Respondent No.3 sought information about  the  appellant  on
28th July, 2008 and again a vacancy was created on 1st August, 2008 for  the
post of Principal on retirement of Smt. Nirmala Mesquita, Principal  of  Fr.
Basilio Andrade Memorial Higher Secondary  School,  Majorda,  Salcete,  Goa,
and also on 4th August,  2008  on  account  of  appointment  of  Sh.  Mervin
D'Souza to the post of  Chairman  of  Goa  Board  of  Secondary  and  Higher
Secondary Education.  Vacancies  were  filled  up  by  promoting  respondent
nos.4 and 5 in violation of  Rules  74  and  86  of  the  Rules.   The  said
respondents were junior to the  appellant  and  were  not  in  the  zone  of
consideration.  Respondent No.6 who  was,  vide  order  dated  16th  August,
2003, appointed to the post of Principal in  Fr.  Basilio  Andrade  Memorial
Higher Secondary  School,  Majorda,  has  already  been  challenged  by  the
appellant by way of Writ  Petition  NO.236  of  2004  and  which  was  still
pending when the said respondent was again appointed  as  Principal  of  St.
Theresa's   Higher  Secondary  School,  Candolim,  on  15th  June,  2007  on
availability of a vacancy and the claim of the appellant  for  consideration
against the post of Principal has been overlooked.

4.    Respondent No.3-Society contested the petition by submitting that  the
school run by it was a “minority institution”.  Claim of the appellant,  for
the post of Principal, was duly considered and  in  exercise  of  its  right
under Article 30  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  it  selected  the  most
suitable candidate.  There was, thus, no violation of Rules  74  and  86  of
the Rules.  Respondent No.3 sought leave  to  produce  the  Minutes  of  the
D.P.C. to support its  conduct.   Private  respondents  also  contested  the
petition.

5.    Relying upon the judgment of this  Court  in  Secy.  Malankara  Syrian
Catholic College v. T. Jose and Others[1].  The High Court upheld  the  plea
of the respondents in the following terms :

“36.  … the minority  educational  institution  is  entitled  to  appoint  a
qualified person of its  choice  as  Principal,  subject  to  the  appointee
having educational qualifications prescribed by  the  State  Government  and
such a right cannot be taken away by Rules and Regulations.  In the case  of
Manohar Naik (supra), though the Division  Bench  allowed  the  appeal,  the
Apex Court upheld the right of minority educational institution  in  Goa  to
appoint a qualified teacher having requisite qualification, serving  in  the
State of Maharashtra, in a school run by  minority  educational  institution
as the headmaster of the school in Goa. Obviously, therefore, he  could  not
have been considered by the DPC in terms of Rule 74(2) of the Rules  nor  he
could be one of the eligible teachers in the school run by  respondent  no.3
Society and as such, Rule 86 was not complied with.  Even  in  such  factual
background, the Apex Court has upheld  the  right  of  minority  educational
institution to  appoint  a  teacher  having  requisite  qualification  as  a
headmaster of its school.  In the present case, it is not the  case  of  the
petitioner that the respondents no.4 to 7 do not have minimum  qualification
for being appointed as Principals of the school.  This being  the  position,
in our considered opinion, the ratio of the judgments of the Apex  Court  in
the above mentioned cases, is squarely applicable in the present case.   The
necessary sequitur is that the challenge of the petitioner that DPC was  not
properly constituted or that some of the appointees do not come  within  the
zone of consideration, are  irrelevant  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  the
issues involved in the  present  petition.   Therefore,  in  our  considered
view, no  fault  can  be  found  with  the  action  of  respondent  no.3  in
appointing respondents no.4 to 7 as the Principals of the different  schools
run by it.”
                                                            (Emphasis added)

6.    The contention raised on behalf of the appellant  is  that  while  the
minority institution may be entitled to appoint a qualified  person  of  its
choice as 'principal', it is not open to it to act arbitrarily  or  unfairly
in considering the eligible candidates.  Right of autonomy under Article  30
does not exclude the power of judicial review nor  it  excluded  enforcement
of fundamental rights of the eligible candidates under Articles 14,  16  and
21 of the Constitution of India.  It  was  submitted  that  statutory  rules
require constitution of a committee for selection and the selection  has  to
be reasonable and fair but the  High  Court  erroneously  assumed  that  its
jurisdiction was limited to  see  that  the  appointed  candidate  possessed
requisite qualification.  The  High  Court  ought  to  have  considered  the
contention of the petitioner that not  only  he  was  senior,  he  was  more
suitable for the post but was not considered by the respondents.

7.    Rules 74 and 86 which have been relied upon are as follows:
“74. Recruitment and promotion.
(2) Recruitment/promotion of employees in  each  recognised  private  school
aided or unaided shall be  made  on  the  recommendation  of  the  selection
committee/ promotion committee.
(3) The selection committee/promotion committee shall consist of:

(a) in the case of recruitment/promotion  of  the  head  of  the  school/Hr.
Secondary school/primary Teachers Training Institute.

(i) the chairman of the managing committee;
(ii)the Dy. Education Officer of the area or an  educationist  nominated  by
the Director of Education;
(iii) an educationist nominated by the managing committee and

(b) in the case of an appointment/promotion of a  teacher  (other  than  the
headmaster of the school) : -

(i) the chairman of the managing committee  or  a  member  of  the  managing
committee nominated by the chairman;
(ii) the head of the institution;
(iii) the Dy. Education Officer of the area  or  his  representative  to  be
nominated by him; and
(iv) in the case of appointment of a teacher in the Hr. Secondary school  or
a primary Teachers' Training Institute, a specialist may be co-opted by  the
committee and in such  a  case  he/she  shall  carry  the  same  rights  and
privileges on par with other members.

(c) in the case of an appointment/promotion of a non-teaching staff

(i)the chairman of the managing  committee  or  a  member  of  the  managing
committee to be nominated by the chairman;
(ii) head of the institution;
(iii)the Dy. Education Officer of the area or his nominee;

Explanation: In case of minority schools the nominee of  the  Department  or
an Educationist appointed by the Director of Education in sub-rule

(3) shall function as an observer and can  participate  in  the  discussion,
but he/she shall not have the  right  to  vote  or  make  selection  of  the
candidates, however he/she shall send a separate report to the  Director  of
Education about his/her observations.

(4) The chairman of the managing committee, or, where he is not a member  of
the "selection/promotion" committee, the member of  the  managing  committee
who   is   nominated   by   the   chairman   to   be   a   member   of   the
"selection/promotion" committee, shall be the chairman  of  the"  selection/
/promotion" committee.

(5) Selection Committee/Promotion  Committee  shall  "follow  the  procedure
applicable to the corresponding posts in the Government Schools".

(6) The selection made by  the  selection  committee/  /promotion  committee
shall be ordinarily accepted by the managing committee of the school.  Where
any selection made by the selection  committee/promotion  committee  is  not
acceptable to the Managing committee of the school, the  managing  committee
shall record its reasons for such non acceptance and  refer  the  matter  to
the Director of Education for his decision and  the  Director  of  Education
shall decide the same.

(7) Where a  candidate  for  "recruitment/promotion"  to  any  post  in  the
recognised school is related to  any  member  of  the  selection  committee,
promotion committee the member to whom he is related shall  not  participate
in the selection and a new  member  shall  be  nominated  "by  the  Managing
Committee of the school or by the Director of Education as the case  may  be
as provided in sub-rule (3)".

(8) No managing committee shall entertain  any  application  for  employment
from a person who is  already  serving  as  a  teacher  or  otherwise  in  a
recognised school, whether aided or not, unless, the application  from  such
person is duly forwarded  by  the  manager  of  the  school  in  which  such
applicant is serving:

"Provided that every such application shall be forwarded  by  the  applicant
through the Head of the School to the Manager who shall forward the same  to
the prospective employer within seven days of its receipt  by  the  Head  of
the  School,  under  intimation  to  the  applicant  well  within  the  time
stipulated by the later towards the receipt of  such  application.  In  case
the Manager fails to forward the application, the applicant may send a  copy
of his/her application to the prospective employer and appear  directly  for
the interview."
Provided further that no such employee shall be relieved of  his  duties  on
registration except after the expiry of a period of:

(i) three months, in the case of a  permanent  employee  from  the  date  on
which notice of resignation to leave the school is given;
(ii) one month, in the case of an employee who is not  permanent,  from  the
date of which notice of resignation to leave the school is given;

Provided also where the employee  desires  to  relieve  himself  before  the
expiry of the notice period he shall be relieved  forthwith  after  recovery
of three months salary including allowances from the permanent employee  and
one month salary with allowances from  the  non-permanent  employee  as  the
case may be and the amount so recovered shall be credited to the  Government
treasury within one month of the acceptance of the resignation.

86. Filling of vacancies.- (1) Notwithstanding anything  contained  in  rule
78,every vacancy in an aided school shall be filled up by promotion  failing
which by direct recruitment, in accordance with such rules as may be  framed
by  the  Director  of  Education  in  this  behalf  and  notified/circulated
separately.

"Provided that the claim of any employee  already  working  under  the  said
Management  in  the  Under  graduate  category  possessing   the   requisite
qualifications for the direct  recruit  shall  be  given  due  consideration
while filling up the post with direct recruitment."

(2) The vacancy of Principal,  Higher  Secondary  School/  Primary  Training
Institutes, Headmasters of Secondary Schools and  Middle  Schools,  and  the
Asstt. Headmasters of Secondary Schools shall  be  filled  up  by  promotion
subject to the eligibility conditions prescribed in rule 78.  While  filling
up of these posts, the managements shall first explore  the  possibility  of
selecting the senior most teacher from the next  below  'category  indicated
in column 5 of Table  under  rule  78.  While  making  such  selection  the.
management shall also give very careful consideration and shall  select  the
best  qualified  and  most  competent  person  among  those  available   for
selection/ appointment to the post. Seniority shall be  the  first  criteria
subject to fitness and merit. If the claim of a senior eligible  teacher  is
by-passed, the reason for the same in writing will have to  be  recorded  in
the minutes by the promotion committee. The claim of  the  senior  qualified
teacher shall not be by-passed arbitrarily without tangible reasons.

Explanation:- Common managements running the secondary schools  as  well  as
Higher Secondary schools, shall consider the claims of  the  Headmasters  of
Secondary schools in the order of inter se seniority for  the  promotion  to
the post of Principal of Higher Secondary  Schools  subject  to  eligibility
conditions prescribed in rule 78.

(3) The management shall make appointment of Heads only on probation  for  a
year in the first instance  and  communicate  full  particulars  with  their
biodata to the Director of Education for  his  approval.  No  Head  of  -the
school shall be confirmed without the prior  approval  of  the  Director  of
Education.

(4) Every vacancy which is to be filled up by direct  recruitment  shall  be
notified to the Employment Exchange or in the local newspapers as  the  case
may be as per the rules applicable to Government  Offices  while  recruiting
the corresponding posts in Government schools.  However  the  harness  cases
shall be regulated as per the rules applicable  to  Government  offices  and
the Director of Education shall be the controlling authority.”

8.    The above rules are admittedly applicable.  Learned  counsel  for  the
State and the private respondents have relied upon Article 30  and  judgment
of this Court in T. Jose (supra) to submit that a minority  institution  had
the autonomy in selecting a principal and that seniority  is  not  the  only
criteria and, therefore, it was not  open  to  go  into  the  claim  of  the
petitioner on merits.

9.    We have given our anxious  consideration  to  the  rival  submissions.
There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in the case  of  T.  Jose
(supra), that right to choose a principal is a part of a right  of  minority
institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution and the  said  right  is
not affected merely because aid is extended  by  the  State  to  a  minority
institution.   In T. Jose (supra), this Court held  that  Section  57(3)  of
the Kerala University Act, 1974 which required appointment  of  senior  most
lecturer as Principal did not apply to  a  minority  institution.   However,
the decision of this Court cannot be read as laying down a principle that  a
minority institution could act arbitrarily or unfairly in dealing  with  the
selection out of the eligible candidates.  The minority institution may  not
be compelled to go by seniority alone but it must follow  a  criteria  which
is rational.

10.   In Full Bench judgment of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  Belsi  M.  v.
Corporate Management of Latin Catholic Schools, Diocese of  Neyyattinkara[2]
the question considered was: whether the judgment delivered  by  this  Court
in T. Jose (supra) dispensed with  the  requirement  of  fair  procedure  in
selecting headmaster of a school.  The Full Bench  held  that  the  autonomy
under  Article  30  was  not  in  conflict  with  the  requirement  of  fair
procedure, in the matter of selection of  a  headmaster/principal.   It  was
held :

“....So, We find it difficult to accept the view canvassed  by  the  learned
counsel for the management that the direction to follow a fair procedure  in
the matter  of  selection  of  teachers  for  appointment  to  the  post  of
Headmaster, will have the effect of diluting the right of the minorities  to
administer  their  institutions,  guaranteed  by  Article   30(1)   of   the
Constitution of India.  The Manager  is  a  statutory  authority  under  the
Kerala Education Act.  He is  conferred  with  certain  powers,  rights  and
duties.  Every power conferred on a statutory authority has to be  exercised
fairly and reasonably.  It is an implied limitation on the  power  of  every
statutory functionary.  The Manager  has  the  power  to  take  disciplinary
action against an erring teacher,  but  he  cannot  take  action  against  a
teacher  for  being  red-haired.   Likewise  the  Manager  of   a   minority
educational institution cannot say that he will  select  the  Headmaster  by
holding a test of 100 metres race and person who  comes  out  first  in  the
said race  will  be  appointed  as  Headmaster.   If  such  a  procedure  is
followed, the same will be condemned as ultra  vires,  being  arbitrary  and
irrational.   The  power  to  administer  does  not  include  the  power  to
maladminster.  The power to make selection does not take  in  its  fold  the
power to follow an unfair  procedure  in  making  the  selection.   In  this
context, we refer to the decision of  the  House  of  Lords  in  Roberts  v.
Hopwood – 1925 AC 578.  It was a  case  where  the  Poplar  Borough  Council
substantially increased the wages of its employees, on the ground  that  the
Council was  authorised  to  grant  wages  it  thought  fit.   The  auditors
objected.  The matter finally reached the House of  Lords,  The  House  held
that the power to grant such  wages  the  Borough  Council  thinks  fit,  is
subject to the implied limitation that it can  pay  only  reasonable  wages,
even though the word “reasonable” is not present in  the  enabling  statute.
What is stated by  the  House  of  Lords  is  a  well-settled  principle  of
Administrative Law.  This decision has been referred  to  with  approval  by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India 1996  (2)
SCC 405.  So, the Full Court in Kurian Lizy (supra) only reminded  the  duty
of a statutory functionary that while he overlooks the  rights  of  seniors,
he may follow a fair procedure.  We have no doubt in our mind that the  said
direction can  definitely  stand  with  the  decision  in  Malankara  Syrian
Catholic College (supra).  The said decision  does  not  impliedly  overrule
the decision in Kurian Lizy (supra).  So, the observation  of  the  Division
Bench in Lijin (supra) that Kurian Lizy (supra) cannot stand with  Malankara
Syrian Catholic College (supra) is not tenable.”

11.   It can hardly be disputed that power of judicial review under  Article
226 is available to  go  into  the  question  whether  action  of  an  aided
educational institutional (even a minority institution) is  transparent  and
fair.  Despite the autonomy  under  Article  30,  exercise  of  power  by  a
minority institution  discharging  public  functions  is  open  to  judicial
review.[3]  In T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors.  v. State of  Karnataka  &  Ors.
[4] this Court held:

“  135. We agree with the contention of the learned  Solicitor-General  that
the Constitution in Part III does not contain or give  any  absolute  right.
All rights conferred in Part III of  the  Constitution  are  subject  to  at
least other provisions of the said Part. It is difficult to comprehend  that
the framers of the Constitution would have given such an absolute  right  to
the  religious  or  linguistic  minorities,  which  would  enable  them   to
establish and administer educational institutions in a manner so  as  to  be
in conflict with the other Parts of the Constitution. We find  it  difficult
to accept that  in  the  establishment  and  administration  of  educational
institutions by the religious and  linguistic  minorities,  no  law  of  the
land, even the Constitution, is to apply to them.

136. Decisions of this Court have held that the  right  to  administer  does
not include the right to maladminister. It  has  also  been  held  that  the
right to administer is not absolute,  but  must  be  subject  to  reasonable
regulations  for  the  benefit  of  the  institutions  as  the  vehicle   of
education, consistent with national  interest.  General  laws  of  the  land
applicable to all persons have been held to be applicable  to  the  minority
institutions also — for example,  laws  relating  to  taxation,  sanitation,
social welfare, economic regulation, public order and morality.

137. It follows from the aforesaid decisions that even though the  words  of
Article 30(1) are unqualified, this Court has held  that  at  least  certain
other laws of the land pertaining  to  health,  morality  and  standards  of
education apply. The right under Article  30(1)  has,  therefore,  not  been
held to be absolute or above other provisions of the law, and  we  reiterate
the same. By the same  analogy,  there  is  no  reason  why  regulations  or
conditions concerning, generally,  the  welfare  of  students  and  teachers
should not be  made  applicable  in  order  to  provide  a  proper  academic
atmosphere, as such provisions do not in any way interfere  with  the  right
of administration or management under Article 30(1).

138. As we look at it, Article 30(1) is a sort of guarantee or assurance  to
the linguistic  and  religious  minority  institutions  of  their  right  to
establish  and  administer  educational  institutions   of   their   choice.
Secularism  and  equality  being  two  of  the   basic   features   of   the
Constitution,  Article  30(1)  ensures  protection  to  the  linguistic  and
religious minorities, thereby preserving  the  secularism  of  the  country.
Furthermore, the principles  of  equality  must  necessarily  apply  to  the
enjoyment of such rights. No  law  can  be  framed  that  will  discriminate
against such minorities with regard to the establishment and  administration
of educational institutions vis-à-vis other  educational  institutions.  Any
law or rule or regulation that would put the  educational  institutions  run
by the minorities at a disadvantage when compared to  the  institutions  run
by the others will have to be struck down. At  the  same  time,  there  also
cannot be any reverse  discrimination.  It  was  observed  in  St.  Xavier’s
College case3 at SCR p. 192 that : (SCC p. 743, para 9)

“The whole object of conferring the right on minorities under Article 30  is
to ensure  that  there  will  be  equality  between  the  majority  and  the
minority. If the minorities do not have such special  protection  they  will
be denied equality.”

In other words, the essence of Article 30(1) is to  ensure  equal  treatment
between the majority and the minority institutions. No one type or  category
of institution should be disfavoured  or,  for  that  matter,  receive  more
favourable treatment than another. Laws of the  land,  including  rules  and
regulations, must apply equally to the majority institutions as well  as  to
the minority institutions. The minority institutions must be allowed  to  do
what the non-minority institutions are permitted to do.

139.  Like  any  other  private  unaided   institutions,   similar   unaided
educational institutions administered by linguistic or religious  minorities
are  assured  maximum  autonomy  in  relation  thereto;   e.g.   method   of
recruitment of teachers, charging of fees and admission  of  students.  They
will have to comply with the conditions  of  recognition,  which  cannot  be
such as to whittle down the right under Article 30.

xxx
Q. 5. (c) Whether the statutory provisions  which  regulate  the  facets  of
administration  like  control  over  educational  agencies,   control   over
governing     bodies,     conditions      of      affiliation      including
recognition/withdrawal  thereof,  and  appointment  of   staff,   employees,
teachers and principals including their service  conditions  and  regulation
of  fees,  etc.  would  interfere  with  the  right  of  administration   of
minorities?
A.  So  far  as  the  statutory  provisions   regulating   the   facets   of
administration are concerned, in case of  an  unaided  minority  educational
institution, the regulatory measure of control should  be  minimal  and  the
conditions of recognition as well as the  conditions  of  affiliation  to  a
university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter  of  day-to-
day management, like the appointment of staff,  teaching  and  non-teaching,
and administrative  control  over  them,  the  management  should  have  the
freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However,  a
rational procedure for the  selection  of  teaching  staff  and  for  taking
disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself. ”

12.   In the same judgment, Khare, J. (as     His Lordship then was) held:
 “  232. Another question that arises in this connection is as  to  on  what
grounds the staff and teachers, if aggrieved, can  challenge  the  arbitrary
decisions of the management. One of the  learned  Senior  Counsel  suggested
that such decisions be tested on the  grounds  available  under  the  labour
laws. However, seeing the nature of the minority  institutions  the  grounds
available under labour laws are too wide and  it  would  be  appropriate  if
adverse decisions of the management are tested on grounds of breach  of  the
principles of natural justice and fair play or any regulation made  in  that
respect. ”
                                                            (Emphasis added)

      13.   In M. Nagaraj &  Ors.  v.  Union  of  India  &  Ors.[5]  it  was
observed:

“  31. At the outset, it may be noted that equality, rule of  law,  judicial
review and separation of powers are  distinct  concepts.  They  have  to  be
treated separately, though they are intimately connected. There  can  be  no
rule of law if there is no equality before the law;  and  rule  of  law  and
equality before the law would be empty words if their violation  was  not  a
matter of judicial scrutiny or judicial review and judicial relief  and  all
these features would lose their  significance  if  judicial,  executive  and
legislative functions were united in only one authority, whose dictates  had
the force of law. The rule of law and equality before the law  are  designed
to secure among other things, justice both social and economic.
106. …… According to the Constitutional Law of India, by H.M.  Seervai,  4th
Edn., p. 546, equality is not violated by mere conferment  of  discretionary
power. It is  violated  by  arbitrary  exercise  by  those  on  whom  it  is
conferred. This is the theory of “guided power”. This  theory  is  based  on
the assumption that in the event of arbitrary exercise by those on whom  the
power is conferred, would be corrected by the courts.
118. The constitutional principle of equality is inherent  in  the  rule  of
law. However, its reach is limited because its primary concern is  not  with
the content of the law but with its enforcement and  application.  The  rule
of law is satisfied when laws are applied  or  enforced  equally,  that  is,
even-handedly, free of bias and without irrational distinction. The  concept
of equality allows differential treatment but it prevents distinctions  that
are not properly justified. Justification needs each case to be  decided  on
case-to-case basis.  ”

14.    The  above  decisions  clearly  show  that  autonomy  of  a  minority
institution does not dispense with the requirement to act fairly  and  in  a
transparent manner and the High Court in exercise of its power  of  judicial
review is entitled to examine fairness of selection process.   Grievance  of
a citizen that he was treated unfairly cannot be ignored on the ground  that
a minority institution has autonomy or right of choice.  Exercise  of  right
of choice has to be fair, non-discriminatory and rational.

15.    We,  thus,  hold  that  while  under  the  constitutional  scheme,  a
“minority institution” is free to select and appoint  a  principal,  without
being bound by the principle of seniority  alone,  whether  the  appointment
has been made fairly and reasonably and whether there is violation of  right
of an individual eligible candidate  by  the  minority  institution  by  not
adopting fair procedure, is liable to be tested  in  exercise  of  power  of
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.   Since  this  aspect
of the matter has not been gone into  by  the  High  Court,  we  allow  this
appeal and set aside the impugned order.  The matter  stands  remitted  back
to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.  We  make  it
clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits  of  the  controversy
between the parties.  No costs.

The parties are directed  to  appear  before  the  High  Court  for  further
proceedings on Wednesday, the 15th February, 2017.
                                                ..........................J.
                                  (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

                                                ..........................J.
                                  (UDAY UMESH LALIT)

New Delhi,
January 31, 2017.


-----------------------
[1]   (2007) 1 SCC 386
[2]   2010 (2) KHC 220
[3]    (2005) 4 SCC 649 para 31-32.
[4]    (2002) 8 SCC 481
[5]    (2006) 8 SCC 212.

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