MAYA DEVI & ANR. Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

Tags Dowry Death

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 1263 of 2011, Judgment Date: Dec 07, 2015

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1263 OF 2011

Maya Devi & Anr. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Haryana .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

R.K. Agrawal, J.
1) This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated
14.01.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
Criminal Appeal No. 488-DB of 1999 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the appeal.
2) Brief facts:
(a) As per the prosecution story, the marriage of Kavita @ Kusum (since
deceased) was solemnized with Karamvir, son of Mahavir, resident of House
No. 36, Type II, M.D. University Campus, Rohtak according to Hindu rites
and ceremonies on 17.07.1994. After 20-25 days of the solemnization of the
marriage, Karamvir (appellant No. 2 herein), his mother Maya Devi
(appellant No. 1 herein), brothers Dharamveer and Paramveer and Sister
Sonika@Pinki started harassing, maltreating and beating Kavita (since
deceased) on account of dowry. Despite all efforts, the attitude and
relations of her in-laws towards her went from bad to worse.
(b) On 26.09.1996, the police got a telephonic message from a stranger at
3:30 a.m. that the dead body of a woman was lying in House No. 36, Type II,
M.D. University Campus, Rohtak. On coming to know about the incident,
Kanwar Singh (the complainant) - father of Kavita reached the spot and
identified the body to be that of his daughter.
(c) A complaint was lodged by Kanwar Singh (PW-3) at the P.S. Civil
Lines, Rohtak regarding the incident on 27.09.1996 alleging torture and
harassment meted out to the deceased on account of demand of dowry who had
committed suicide by consuming some poisonous substance. On the basis of
the said complaint, FIR No. 466 of 1966 was registered under Sections 498A,
304B, 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’). After
investigation, charges under Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of
the IPC were framed against the accused persons.
(d) The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and numbered as
11/10.04.1997 and Maya Devi-mother-in-law of the deceased (appellant No. 1
herein), Karamvir-husband of the deceased (appellant No. 2 herein) and
Dharamveer and Paramveer-brothers of Karamvir were arrayed as accused.
(e) The Court of Sessions Judge, Rohtak, by order dated 22/27.09.1999,
while acquitting Dharamveer and Paramveer -brothers of Karamvir, convicted
the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 herein for the commission of offence under
Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC and sentenced them to suffer rigorous
imprisonment (RI) for life under Section 304B of the IPC. Both the accused
were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for 2 (two)
years, along with a fine of Rs. 500/- each, for the offence under Section
498A of the IPC.
(f) Being aggrieved, the appellant herein filed Criminal Appeal No. 488-
DB of 1999 before the High Court. Kanwar Singh-the complainant also filed
Criminal Revision No. 208 of 2000 before the High Court for setting aside
the judgment and order dated 22/27.09.1999 to the extent of acquittal of
Dharamveer and Paramveer.
(g) The Division Bench of the High Court, by order dated 14.01.2010,
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein while modifying the
sentence of life imprisonment to that of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years
for the offence under Section 304B while maintaining the sentence in
respect of other offence. The Division Bench also dismissed the revision
filed by the complainant.
(h) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have preferred this
appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
3) Heard Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the appellants
and Mr. Narender Hooda, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State.
Rival Submissions:
4) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted before this Court
that Kavita (since deceased) was suffering from mental depression and
psychosis and no case has been made out for bringing the same within the
definition of dowry as contained in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Learned senior counsel further contended that she was suffering from mental
depression even before her marriage. Her brother and uncle used to
administer anti-depression medicines to her secretly. In support of the
same, learned senior counsel relied upon the deposition of Dr. V.P. Mehla,
MD, Consultant Psychiatric Centre, Civil Hospital, Rohtak who deposed as
under:-
“Kavita wife of Karambir remained under my treatment and because I have
seen her in the OPD on 26.08.1996 vide OPD No. 1034/96. Ex. DC is her OPD
slip. As per my record, patient was suffering from moderate depressing
episode. The patient suffered from sadness of mood, absent mindless, loss
of interest in the usual activities, decreased sleep and appetite for the
last two month, when I first saw her. On mental status examination by me,
she was found to have said, irritable facets. She was having depressed mood
and expressed pessimistic ideas and complained against her in-laws
and husband. She also expressed occasional suicidal ideas. Her Judgment and
insight was read to be fair by me. On the basis of above findings, I judged
her to be suffering from moderate depressive episode and I had prescribed
her capsule flute 20 mg. / OD and I have counseled her and her husband who
had accompanied her, regarding the needful treatment and importance of
psychosocial support in this disease. History of the patient is contained
in Ex. DB.
XXX’C. Question : How much time did you take examining patient Kavita in
this case ?
Ans :- I can give no time in this case but routine I used to take new
patient 20 to 30 minutes.
I have not mentioned any marks of identification or signatures of the
patient Kavita in Ex. DD. Whatever was stated by husband of the patient was
recorded in Ex. DD. (Volunteered that Chief Complaints recorded in Ex. DD
were told by patient’s husband and patient herself). I cannot specifically
state as to what was told by the patient and what was by her husband, Ex.
DD contains the mixture of observation of the complaints of patient and her
husband. It is correct that patient only came to me on 26.08.1996. There is
no pagination in the patient register but serial no. has been maintained.
There is one entry only on 26.08.1996 and that is at the fag end of the
page. Besides Kavita, who was examined on 26.8.96 as a new patient, I also
examined old patients on the said date and their registration no is
mentioned as 226/94 and 983/96 by the side of entry no. 1034. Patient had
this illness as first episode. As per my record there was no family or past
history of psychiatric illness. Moderate depressing episode is a diagnostic
category as defined in ICD/10 as a depressive illness with symptoms of
depression with moderate intensity. In an expert hand, this disease is 100%
curable. I did not feel the need of any test of the patient. In a
predisposed individual any kind of stress can lead to the precipitation of
a depressive disease and illness. It is incorrect to suggest that I have
deposed falsely.”

5) In view of the above, learned senior counsel relied upon a decision
of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4
SCC 116 wherein it was held as under:-
“40. Thus, from the recitals in the letters we can safely hold that there
was a clear possibility and a tendency on her part to commit suicide due to
desperation and frustration. She seems to be tired of her married life, but
she still hoped against hope that things might improve. At any rate, the
fact that she may have committed suicide cannot be safely excluded or
eliminated. It may be that her husband may have murdered her but when two
views are reasonably possible the benefit must go to the accused. In order
to buttress our opinion, we would like to cite some passages of an eminent
psychiatrist, Robert J. Kastenbaum where in his book Death, Society and
Human Experience he analyses the causes, the circumstances, the moods and
emotions which may drive a person to commit suicide. The learned author has
written that a person who is psychotic in nature and suffers from
depression and frustration is more prone to commit suicide than any other
person. In support of our view, we extract certain passages from his book:
“The fact is that some people who commit suicide can be classified as
psychotic or severely disturbed.
If we are concerned with the probability of suicide in very large
populations, then mental and emotional disorder is a relevant variable to
consider.
And it is only through a gross distortion of the actual circumstances that
one could claim all suicides are enacted in a spell of madness.
Seen in these terms, suicide is simply one of the ways in which a
relatively weak member of society loses out in the jungle-like struggle.

The individual does not destroy himself in hope of thereby achieving a
noble post-mortem reputation or a place among the eternally blessed.
Instead he wishes to subtract himself from a life whose quality seems a
worse evil than death,
The newly awakened spirit of hope and progress soon became shadowed by a
sense of disappointment and resignation that, it sometimes seemed, only
death could swallow,
Revenge fantasies and their association with suicide are well known to
people who give ear to those in emotional distress.
People who attempt suicide for reasons other than revenge may also act on
the assumption that, in a sense, they will survive the death to benefit by
its effect.
* * *
The victim of suicide may also be the victim of self-expectations that have
not been fulfilled. The sense of disappointment and frustration may have
much in common with that experienced by the person who seeks revenge
through suicide.... However, for some people a critical moment arrives when
the discrepancy is experienced as too glaring and painful to be tolerated.
If something has to go it may be the person himself, not the perhaps
excessively high standards by which the judgment has been made.... Warren
Breed and his colleagues found that a sense of failure is prominent among
many people who take their own lives.

41. The above observations are fully applicable to the case of Manju. She
solemnly believed that her holy union with her husband would bring health
and happiness to her but unfortunately it seems to have ended in a
melancholy marriage which in view of the circumstances detailed above, left
her so lonely and created so much of emotional disorder resulting from
frustration and pessimism that she was forced to end her life. There can be
no doubt that Manju was not only a sensitive and sentimental woman but was
extremely impressionate (sic) and the letters show that a constant conflict
between her mind and body was going on and unfortunately the circumstances
which came into existence hastened her end. People with such a psychotic
philosophy or bent of mind always dream of an ideal and if the said ideal
fails, the failure drives them to end their life, for they feel that no
charm is left in their life.
42. Mary K. Hinchliffe, Douglas Hooper and F. John Roberts in their book
The Melancholy Marriage observe that—
“Studies of attempted suicide cases have also revealed the high incidence
of marital problems which lie behind the act. In our own study of 100
consecutive cases (Roberts and Hooper 1969), we found that most of them
could be understood if the patients’ interactions with others in their
environment were considered.” (p. 5)
43. Such persons possess a peculiar psychology which instils extreme love
and devotion but when they are faced with disappointment or find their
environment so unhealthy or unhappy, they seem to lose all the charms of
life. The authors while describing these sentiments observe thus:
“‘Hopelessness’, ‘despair’, ‘lousy’ and ‘miserable’ draw attention to the
relationship of the depressed person ‘to his environment. The articulate
depressed person will often also struggle to put into words the fact that
not only does there appear to be no way forward and thus no point to life —
but that the world actually looks different.” (p. 7)
44. Coleridge in Ode to Dejection in his usual ironical manner has very
beautifully explained the sentiments of such persons thus:
“I see them all so excellently fair —
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are;”
45. At another place the authors (Hinchliffe, Hooper, and John) come to the
final conclusion that ruptured personal relationships play a major part in
the clinical picture and in this connection observed thus:
“Initially we applied these ideas to study of cases of attempted suicide
(Roberts and Hooper 1969) and although we did not assume that they were all
necessarily depressed, we looked for distal and proximal causes for their
behaviour and found that ruptured personal relationships played a major
part in the clinical picture.”
The observations of the authors aptly and directly apply to the nature,
mood and the circumstances of the unfortunate life of Manju which came to
an end within four months of her marriage.”

6) Learned senior counsel further submitted that Kavita had committed
suicide on account of the fact that she was mentally depressed and no case
is made out under Section 304B of the IPC as the requirement of law is that
the harassment and cruelty should be “soon before her death” and no
evidence has come on record for this purpose. In order to bring home
conviction under Section 304B of the IPC, it will not be sufficient to only
lead evidence showing that cruelty or harassment had been meted out to the
victim, but that such treatment was in connection with the demand for
dowry. The phrase, “soon before her death”, no doubt, is an elastic
expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or
within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her
death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative intent in
providing such a radius of time by employing the words “soon before her
death” is to emphasis the idea that her death should, in all probabilities,
has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. There should be a
perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or
cruelty inflicted on her.
7) In support of the above contention, learned senior counsel for the
appellants referred to a decision of this Court in Durga Prasad and Another
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 9 SCC 73 wherein it was held as under:-
7. It was pointed out that the only evidence on which reliance had been
placed both by the trial court, as well as the High Court, for convicting
the appellants, was the evidence of Vimla Bai, PW 1, the mother of the
deceased and Radheshyam, PW 3, the brother of the deceased. In fact, the
prosecution story was that since no dowry had been received from the family
of the victim, she had been beaten and treated with cruelty. There is no
other evidence regarding the physical and mental torture which the deceased
was alleged to have been subjected to.
8. Mr Gupta urged that the marriage of Appellant 1 with the deceased was
performed as part of a community marriage being celebrated on account of
the poverty of couples who could not otherwise meet the expenses of
marriage and that even the few utensils which were given at the time of
such community marriage were given by the persons who had organised such
marriages.
9. Mr Gupta submitted that the evidence in this case was wholly
insufficient to even suggest that the victim had been subjected to cruelty
or harassment which was sufficient to compel her to commit suicide. In
support of his submissions, Mr Gupta firstly referred to the decision of
this Court in Biswajit Halder v. State of W.B. wherein, in facts which were
very similar, it was held that there was practically no evidence to show
that there was any cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, the
demands for dowry. There was also no finding in that regard. It was further
observed that this deficiency in evidence proved fatal for the prosecution
case and even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment was not
sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. It had to be shown in addition
that such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, demand of
dowry. Mr Gupta urged that since the appellants had not been convicted
under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the charge under
Section 304-B would also fail since the same was linked with the question
of cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, the demand for dowry.

14. Ms Makhija then contended that as had been laid down by this Court in
Anand Kumar v. State of M.P., in order to counter the presumption available
under Section 113-B, which is relatable to Section 304-B, a heavy burden
has been shifted on to the accused to prove his innocence. Having regard to
the language of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which indicates that
when a question arises as to whether a person has committed the dowry death
of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by such other person or in connection
with any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had
caused such dowry death. Ms Makhija urged that the aforesaid wording of
Section 113-B of Evidence Act and the use of the expression “shall” would
clearly indicate that the court shall presume such death as dowry death
provided the conditions in Section 113-B were satisfied and it would then
be for the accused to prove otherwise.
15. Ms Makhija, thereupon, urged that the order of conviction passed by the
trial court holding the appellants guilty under Sections 498-A and 304-B
IPC, confirmed by the High Court, did not warrant any interference by this
Court.
16. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the
respective parties, we are inclined to allow the benefit of doubt to the
appellants having particular regard to the fact that except for certain
bald statements made by PWs 1 and 3 alleging that the victim had been
subjected to cruelty and harassment prior to her death, there is no other
evidence to prove that the victim committed suicide on account of cruelty
and harassment to which she was subjected just prior to her death, which,
in fact, are the ingredients of the evidence to be led in respect of
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872, in order to bring home the guilt
against an accused under Section 304-B IPC.
17. As has been mentioned hereinbefore, in order to hold an accused guilty
of an offence under Section 304-B IPC, it has to be shown that apart from
the fact that the woman died on account of burn or bodily injury, otherwise
than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of her marriage, it has
also to be shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry. Only then would such death be called
“dowry death” and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused
the death of the woman concerned.
18. In this case, one other aspect has to be kept in mind, namely, that no
charges were framed against the appellants under the provisions of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the evidence led in order to prove the same
for the purposes of Section 304-B IPC was related to a demand for a fan
only.
19. The decision cited by Mr R.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, in
Biswajit Halder case was rendered in almost similar circumstances. In order
to bring home a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, it will not be
sufficient to only lead evidence showing that cruelty or harassment had
been meted out to the victim, but that such treatment was in connection
with the demand for dowry. In our view, the prosecution in this case has
failed to fully satisfy the requirements of both Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 304-B of the Penal Code.

8) Learned senior counsel further relied upon Satvir Singh and Others
vs. State of Punjab and Another (2001) 8 SCC 633 which is as under:-

“21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the
marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is “at any time”
after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period.
But the crucial words are “in connection with the marriage of the said
parties”. This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or
valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in
connection with the marriage of the parties. There can be many other
instances for payment of money or giving property as between the spouses.
For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or
other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are
not enveloped within the ambit of “dowry”. Hence the dowry mentioned in
Section 304-B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed
to be given in connection with the marriage.
22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman
with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked.
But it should have happened “soon before her death”. The said phrase, no
doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either
immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks
before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that
expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by
employing the words “soon before her death” is to emphasise the idea that
her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such
cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus
between her death and the dowry-related harassment or cruelty inflicted on
her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or
cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position to gauge
that in all probabilities the harassment or cruelty would not have been the
immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the
facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that
particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept “soon
before her death”.”

9) Learned senior counsel for the appellants further contended that so
far as Maya Devi-appellant No. 1 herein is concerned, she was not staying
at Rohtak at the relevant time and she was a teacher in Municipal School at
Delhi which is apparent from the statement of Smt. Rajbala (DW-3), Head
Mistress, Nagar Nigam Prathmik Balika Vidyalaya, Ladpur, Delhi as also from
the investigation and the case of the prosecution. Even, Karamvir-husband
of the deceased was not present in the house when Kavita committed the act
of suicide. He finally contended that there is nothing on record to show
that any demand for dowry was made and she meted out cruelty or harassment
soon before her death. Learned senior counsel further contended that even
for the purpose of Section 498A the evidence is lacking.
10) On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that there is no dispute that Kavita died on 26.09.1996 in her
matrimonial home otherwise than under normal circumstances due to
poisoning. Admittedly, there were persistent demands put up by the accused
right from the solemnization of the marriage which continued till the date
of the death of the deceased. He further contended that the accused had
been maltreating, harassing and subjecting her to cruelty for the
fulfillment of their demands for additional dowry. It was next contended
that in the present case, besides Kavita, the accused had also humiliated
Pankaj (PW-4) – brother of the deceased. When PW-4 visited the house of
the accused with some ceremonial articles on the day of ‘sakrant’, the
accused expressed displeasure upon the articles brought by him. He further
contended that the claim that the deceased was suffering from moderate
depressing episode and was having suicidal tendencies prior to her death
which had come true on 26.09.1996 is hardly of any consequence. A series
of transactions of maltreatment and cruelty which commenced just 20-25 days
after the solemnization of the marriage of the deceased with appellant No.
2 herein and culminated on the date of the death of the deceased would go a
long way to show that she was harassed, maltreated and was subjected to
cruelty soon before her death for and in connection with the demands for
dowry. It was further submitted that the deceased was so much depressed as
a result of cruelty/harassment meted out to her at the hands of the
appellants that she developed the suicidal tendencies. He further
submitted that the accused had created such a vicious and charged
atmosphere in the matrimonial home that Kavita (since deceased) started
picking up the ideas of committing suicide.
11) Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State vehemently contended
that all the accused except appellant No. 1 were living in a house and the
claim of the appellants that there is no point of involvement of Maya Devi
in the whole incident is wholly irrelevant as she too was a frequent
visitor to Rohtak as admitted by her in the statement made under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) and there
is sufficient evidence on record to show that as and when the demands were
put up by the accused to the complainant party, Maya Devi always
accompanied her son.
12) Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State finally contended
that the trial Court rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants under
Section 304B and 498A of the IPC and the High Court upheld the same with
some modification in the sentence. The appellants deserve a deterrent
punishment in the present case.
Discussion:
13) Before considering the prosecution case as well as the defence pleaded,
it is desirable to extract the relevant provisions of Section 304B which
relates to dowry death:
“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed
to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the
same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of
1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.”

The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force with
effect from 19.11.1986. There is no dispute about the applicability of the
above provision since the marriage and the death occurred in the year 1994
and 1996 respectively.
14) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section
304B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:
(i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or
otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand
for dowry.

When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable
evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his
relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the abovementioned
ingredients are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall
presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is
disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such
evidence for disproving such conclusive presumption as the burden is
unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an
answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by
adducing evidence on the defence side.

15) Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to
dowry death which reads as under:
“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a
person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the
same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

As stated earlier, the prosecution under Section 304B IPC cannot escape
from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the
demand for dowry and such was caused “soon before her death”. In view of
the Explanation to the said section, the word “dowry” has to be understood
as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which reads as
under:
“2. Definition of ‘dowry’.—In this Act, ‘dowry’ means any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or
indirectly—
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to
either party to the marriage or to any other person,
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage
of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of
persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.”

16) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main
ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that
“soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for, or
in connection with the demand for dowry”. The expression “soon before her
death” used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is
present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no proximity for the
alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we
shall advert to while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution.
Though the language used is “soon before her death”, no definite period has
been enacted and the expression “soon before her death” has not been
defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the
period which can come within the term “soon before her death” is to be
determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the
interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and
the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a
proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand
and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in
time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of
the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.
17) The aforesaid provisions were considered by this Court in Bansi Lal
vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 wherein it was held that while
considering the case under Section 304B cruelty has to be proved during the
close proximity of the time of death and it should be continuous and such
continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life
of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide. This
Court further held that where the cruelty has been proved during the close
proximity of the time of death then the provisions of Section 113B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 providing for presumption that the accused is
responsible for dowry death, have to be pressed in service. In paras 19
and 20 of the judgment, this Court has further held as follows:-

“19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used
the word “shall” thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the
court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had
subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of
dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act
where a discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been
provided that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married woman.
Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the
presumption and in case of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC,
the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only
requirements are that death of a woman has been caused by means other than
any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred within 7
years of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with
any demand of dowry.
20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been
established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a
presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also be
pertinent to mention herein that the expression “soon before her death” has
not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the
Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of
the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the
demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the death.”

18) This Court, in Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh vs State of Maharashtra (2012)
11 SCC 397 held as under:-
“9. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section
304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:
(i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or
otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;
(iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand
for dowry.
When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable
evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his
relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the abovementioned
ingredients are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall
presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is
disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such
evidence for disproving such compulsory presumption as the burden is
unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an
answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by
adducing evidence on the defence side.

11. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients
of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her
death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for, or in connection
with the demand for dowry”. The expression “soon before her death” used in
Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the
idea of proximity test. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of
dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to the
same while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the
language used is “soon before her death”, no definite period has been
enacted and the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in
both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can
come within the term “soon before her death” is to be determined by the
courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However,
the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be
much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question.
In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death
concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has
become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman
concerned, it would be of no consequence. These principles have been
reiterated in Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. and Yashoda v. State of M.P.”

19) In the case of Ramesh Vithal Patil vs. State of Karnataka (2014) 11
SCC 516 this Court held as follows:-

“20. Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed suicide within a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage. Section 113-A of the Evidence
Act is, therefore, clearly attracted to this case. Presumption contemplated
therein must spring in action. This provision was introduced by the
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 to resolve the difficulty of
proof where married women are forced to commit suicide but incriminating
evidence is difficult to get as it is usually available within the four
walls of the matrimonial home…..”

20) With these principles in mind, let us analyse the evidence led in by
the prosecution. The marriage of Kavita@Kusum (since deceased) was
solemnized with Karamvir on 17.07.1994. Kavita died on 26.09.1996 after
consuming some poisonous substance at her matrimonial home. The father of
the deceased lodged a complaint against the accused persons that he had
given dowry on the eve of marriage beyond his means but after 20-25 days of
marriage, Karamvir-appellant No. 2 herein, Maya Devi-appellant No.1 herein
and brothers Dharamveer and Paramveer and sister Sonika, started harassing
his daughter for more money. When Kavita visited her father’s house, she
narrated the entire tale of woes to her parents and brother. When the
complainant enquired about the matter, the appellants informed the
complainant that the appellant No. 2 is in need of money and they also have
to perform the marriage of Sonika. A sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid to
appellant No. 2 so that the daughter of the complainant is not harassed.
It was further stated that the complainant received a letter of his
daughter regarding continuous demand for dowry and sufferings meted out to
her. The complainant paid a further sum of Rs. 25,000/- for the purchase
of refrigerator and gold chain to the appellant No. 2. Kavita was sent
with her husband on the assurance that the accused family would not harass
her in future. Even on the day of ‘sakrant’, when the brother of the
deceased visited her matrimonial home, the accused threatened them that the
household articles of Kavita will be thrown out. A further demand of Rs.
30,000/- was made to meet the kitchen expenses by the appellants. Since
that demand was not fulfilled, the deceased was left with her father at
Delhi. Subsequently, the complainant requested to compromise the matter
and tendered his apology in writing. In June 1996, the deceased was
brought to home by the accused persons. After some days, when the
complainant visited her matrimonial home at Rohtak, he was informed that
situation has not changed and whenever she brings money, the peace returns
for 10-20 days otherwise she is beaten mercilessly by the accused persons.
On 26.09.1996, the complainant got the information about the death of his
daughter. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and the
accused were found guilty under Section 304B and 498A of the IPC. There is
ample evidence that the deceased was harassed, maltreated and was subjected
to cruelty, for and in connection with the demands for dowry by the
accused. Admittedly, appellant No. 2 was present in his office on
26.09.1996 located at M.D. University Campus at Rohtak but he did not
attend to his wife at the relevant time. The assertion made by learned
senior counsel for the appellants that the deceased was suffering from
moderate depressing episode and was having suicidal tendencies prior to her
death is of no consequence. Dr. V.P. Mehla (DW-2) was apprised by the
deceased about the harassment and the maltreatment by her in-laws a month
prior to her death when she was taken to the aforesaid doctor for the
alleged treatment. According to DW-2, the deceased was so much depressed
as a result of the act of cruelty meted out to her at the hands of the
appellants that she developed suicidal tendencies. The testimony of DW-2
shows that the accused had created such a charged environment in her
matrimonial home that she developed suicidal tendencies. Except appellant
No. 1 herein, all were living in the house at Rohtak. Appellant No. 1
herein was a frequent visitor to that house and she herself admitted this
fact in her statement under Section 313 of the Code. Thus, it is very much
clear that accused persons maltreated, harassed and subjected the deceased
to cruelty, after the solemnization of her marriage with the appellant No.
2 herein, during her life time and soon before her death, for and in
connection with the demands for dowry, who died at her matrimonial home
within seven years of her marriage otherwise than in normal circumstances.
21) Section 304B IPC does not categorise death as homicidal or suicidal or
accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in a given case, be
homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily
injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
Finally, any death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances”
can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if
all the other ingredients of Section 304B IPC are fulfilled, any death
(homicidal or suicidal or accidental) whether caused by burns or by bodily
injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per
the legislative mandate, be called a “dowry death” and the woman’s husband
or his relative “shall be deemed to have caused her death”. The section
clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also
identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused
the dowry death.
22) The key words under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 are “shall
presume” leaving no option with a court but to presume an accused brought
before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. However, the
redeeming factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable.
Section 113B of the Act enables an accused to prove his innocence and
places a reverse onus of proof on him or her. In the case on hand, accused
persons failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died a
natural death. When Kavita allegedly committed suicide, her husband-
appellant No.2, though he was not present in the house, was present in his
office at M.D. University, Rohtak at the relevant time but he did not make
any sincere effort to take her to the hospital which was very near to the
place of the incident. Similarly, appellant No. 2 got the deceased
examined by DW-2 in order to create an impression that she was struggling
with chronic depression but the truth floated upon the surface when the
deceased reveals that the accused persons were maltreating her and she had
started picking up the ideas of suicide. Lastly, appellant No. 2 falsely
informed the court that having learnt about the death of his wife Kavita,
he left for Delhi to inform her family members. In fact, the accused never
went to Delhi and the complainant received a telephonic message from an
unknown person regarding the death of his daughter. So far as Maya Devi-
appellant No. 1 herein is concerned, there is no denying the fact that she
was working as a teacher in a government school and she was not present at
the relevant time at the place of incident but it is very much clear from
the evidence on record that both the accused persons had a dominating role
in the entire episode and she had always accompanied her son-appellant No.
2 herein to the house of the complainant (PW-3) for the dowry demands. The
presumption under Section 113B of the Act is mandatory may be contrasted
with Section 113A of the Act which was introduced contemporaneously.
Section 113A of the Act, dealing with abetment of suicide, uses the
expression “may presume”. This being the position, a two-stage process is
required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable under Section
304-B IPC: it is necessary to first ascertain whether the ingredients of
the Section have been made out against the accused; if the ingredients are
made out, then the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman
but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having caused a dowry
death. From the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that in the
present case Kavita died an unnatural death by committing suicide as she
was subjected to cruelty/harassment by her husband and in-laws in
connection with the demand for dowry which started from the time of her
marriage and continued till she committed suicide. Thus, the provisions of
Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC will be fully attracted.
Conclusion:
23) In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that
Kavita@Kusum suffered death at her matrimonial home, otherwise than under
normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and the case
squarely falls within the ambit of dowry death. In the present case, from
the evidence of the Doctor (DW-2), PW-3 and PW-4, we find that the
harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce her to convince her
parents to meet the demands for dowry.
24) All the above factors clearly established the legal requirements for
an offence falling under Sections 304B and 498A IPC with the aid of Section
113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 against the appellants and the conviction
and sentence imposed, therefore, do not call for interference. Hence, the
appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

...…………….………………………J.
(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)

.…....…………………………………J.
(R.K. AGRAWAL)

NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 7, 2015.
ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.12 SECTION IIB
(for Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 1263/2011

MAYA DEVI & ANR. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA Respondent(s)

Date : 07/12/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, AOR

Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Agrawal pronounced the reportable judgment
of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikramajit Sen and His
Lordship.
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(R.NATARAJAN) (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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