MAQSOOD & ORS. Vs. STATE OF U.P.
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (CrPC)
Section 320 - Compounding of offences
Section 360 - Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition
Section 302 - Punishment for murder
Section 325 - Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt
Section 304 - Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Crl.), 207 of 2011, Judgment Date: Oct 09, 2015
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 207 OF 2011
Maqsood & Ors. ... Appellant (s)
Versus
State of U.P. ... Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.208 OF 2011
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
Criminal Appeal No.207 of 2011
Out of the 8 appellants who have filed this appeal challenging their
conviction, inter alia, under Section 325 IPC as made by the High Court by
the impugned judgment and order dated 21.05.2010, the appellant Nos.2 and 6
(Shakeel and Haneef) have died during the pendency of the present appeal.
We will, therefore, be concerned with the case of the remaining appellants
before us.
The learned trial court had convicted the appellants under different
provisions of the Indian Penal Code including Section 308 thereof and
sentenced the accused appellants to undergo RI for a period of 4 years
under the aforesaid section of the Code. In appeal, the High Court while
maintaining the conviction and sentence awarded for the lesser offences
altered the conviction under Section 308/149 IPC to Section 325/149 IPC.
The sentence of four years RI was also reduced to a period of one year. It
is against the aforesaid order of the High Court that the appellants have
filed the present appeal.
We have heard Shri Siddhartha Dave learned counsel for the appellants and
Shri Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel for the respondent.
Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the acts
committed by the accused appellants were in the exercise of their right of
self defence inasmuch as the complainant party which had comprised of as
many as 8 persons had come to assert their right over the Gher (open area
of land), ownership and possession of which was disputed between the
parties. On the said basis it is contended that no offence can be
attributed to the accused on account of the overt acts committed by them,
the same being in exercise of their right of self defence. Alternatively,
it is argued that if this Court is to hold that the accused appellants are
guilty of commission of the offences in question the said offences may be
compounded and the accused may be directed to pay compensation to the
injured. Additionally, it is urged that the provisions of Section 360 of
the Cr. P.C. may be invoked and while maintaining the conviction the
accused may be released on probation of good conduct.
The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants have been resisted by
the learned counsel appearing for the State who contends that the benefit
of right of private defence would not be available to the accused inasmuch
as both parties had come to the disputed Gher and there was a mutual
altercation leading to a free fight between the two groups. The above is a
finding of fact recorded by the learned trial court and affirmed by the
High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the offence
under Section 325 IPC being grave and the sentence imposed (one year RI) by
the High Court being sufficiently lenient, in the facts of the present
case, the provisions of neither Section 320 or Section 360 Cr. P.C. ought
to be invoked.
We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. We
have also looked into the evidence and materials on record. The trial court
and the High Court have concurrently held that the injuries sustained by
P.W.2 Musharraf and P.W.1 Ameer Ahmed have been caused by the accused in
the course of a mutual fight. The said finding of fact is supported by the
evidence and materials on record. This Court, therefore, will have no
occasion to arrive at any contrary finding. What would follow from the
above is that the accused persons must be held liable for the acts
committed and the consequential injuries suffered by P.W.2. Musharraf and
P.W.1 Ameer Ahmed.
We have considered the medical evidence on record which shows that P.W.2
Musharraf, had suffered a fracture injury which would bring the same within
the expression “grievous hurt” as appearing in Section 320 of the IPC.
Punishment for the said offence would therefore be covered by Section 325
IPC which contemplates a period of imprisonment upto 7 years alongwith
fine. Having regard to the above, the punishment of imprisonment of one
year imposed by the High Court, in our view, is lenient enough and,
therefore, will not justify our interference. The injured Musharraf (P.W.2)
and Ameer Ahmed (P.W.1) who are represented in the connected appeal
(Criminal Appeal No.208 of 2011) are not willing to compound the offence in
question. It is also our considered view that the present case is devoid of
any special circumstance which would justify invocation of the provisions
of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code or the release of accused
appellants on probation by invoking the provisions of Section 360 Cr. P.C.
For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. Consequently
the same is dismissed and the order of the High Court is affirmed.
Criminal Appeal No.208 of 2011 –
9. This appeal is filed by the State against the alteration of the
conviction of the accused respondents under Section 302/149 IPC to Section
304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC as well as the reduction of the
sentence of life imprisonment to the period of custody undergone by the
accused which is about 2 ½ years. There are certain other offences under
the Code for which the accused respondents have been found guilty and have
been accordingly convicted and sentenced. However, the same would not be
very significant and it is the conviction under Section 304 Part II and the
sentence imposed which may be treated as the principal offence.
10. Shri Ratnakar Dash, learned Counsel for the appellant, has argued
that the State would truncate the scope of the present appeal and not
question the correctness of the alteration of the conviction from Section
302 IPC read with Section 149 to Section 304 Part II/149 of the IPC. It
is urged that the only question, therefore, would be the correctness of the
sentence imposed on the accused respondents (period already undergone)
following the alteration of their conviction to Section 304 Part II of the
IPC. Shri Dash has submitted that the accused respondent had undergone
custody for a period of about 2 ½ years and as the maximum sentence
imposable under Section 304 Part II is 10 years the sentence awarded in the
present case is grossly inadequate.
11. For the purpose of deciding the above contention advanced on behalf
of the State it is not necessary for us to enter into a detailed discussion
on the nature of the sentencing power and the principles governing its
exercise as also the parameters for interference in the case of
inappropriate sentencing. All that would be required to be noticed is that,
though not specifically mentioned in the order of the High Court, the
incident had occurred in the year 1997 and that death had occurred in the
course of a mutual fight. The party of the complainant had also been tried
for injuries caused to some of the present accused and have been found
guilty and convicted under Section 325 IPC which conviction and the
sentence imposed (One year RI) has been challenged in the connected appeal
(Criminal Appeal No.207 of 2011). Taking into account all the said facts
and the long efflux of time that has occurred, we are of the view that no
interference with the sentence imposed by the High Court would be
justified. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and affirm the order of
the High Court.
..……..……......................J.
(RANJAN GOGOI)
….……..…….....................J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 9, 2015.