MANOHARLAL Vs. STATE OF M.P
Section 376 - Punishment for rape
SCHEDULED CASTES AND THE SCHEDULED TRIBES (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Crl.), 1407 of 2013, Judgment Date: Nov 21, 2014
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1407 OF 2013
MANOHARLAL .... Appellant
Versus
STATE OF M.P. .... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 31.08.2012
passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench in Criminal
Appeal No. 442 of 1998 affirming the judgment and order of conviction
and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge, Ratlam in Sessions Trial
No.18 of 1997.
2. The instant matter arises out of FIR No.93 of 1997 lodged on
31.07.1997 at about 6:10 a.m. by PW-2 victim to the effect that in the
previous night the appellant herein had committed rape on her and
following was her version. The victim, an adivasi woman, though
married was staying with her parents at Devipada. On 30.07.1997 after
having visited her brother at Khetalpur, she had returned by bus and
alighted at Bajna bus stand at about 10:00 P.M. She was sitting near
a Ghumti when the appellant approached her and suggested to her to
spend the night at Dharamshala with his children. She then
accompanied him to Dharamshala but since there were no children he
took her to the house of another person. There a man suffering from
fever was sleeping and on the appellant suggesting that the victim be
allowed to sleep there, said man raised objection. Thereupon the
appellant went to get the keys of his house, during which time she
came back to Dharamshala situated at the bus stand. The appellant came
back and finding the victim to have fallen asleep, woke her up and
tried to take her to his house. The victim having refused to go, he
caught her hand and forcibly took her to his house. In the house the
appellant had forcible sexual intercourse with her, after which he
asked the victim to spend the night at his house. However she ran
away and returned to Dharamshala and slept there. The appellant came
back to Dharamshala and suggested that he could make arrangements for
her in the bus at which time a policeman also came. At Dharamshala
the victim told everything to one Riyaz who was like a brother to her.
3. Next day i.e., on 31.07.1997 she reached the police station and
lodged FIR exhibit P-2 as stated above, on the basis of which the
investigation was undertaken. The victim was sent for medical
examination and was examined by Dr. Sarojini Ben Patel (PW-1) who
found no injuries on the private or external parts of her body and the
doctor could not give any opinion about rape. The appellant having
been apprehended was also sent for medical examination and was found
to be capable of having sexual intercourse. After due investigation,
the appellant was charged for having committed offence under Section
376 IPC and under Section 3 (2) (5) of the SC/ST Atrocities Act, 1989.
4. In the trial the victim was examined as PW-2 who reiterated her
version as stated above. Riyaz who was examined as PW-3 however did
not support the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile.
Going by the medical evidence the trial court found that no definite
opinion could be given about commission of rape. However relying on
the testimony of the victim it convicted the appellant under section
376 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven
years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- in default whereof to suffer
further imprisonment for two months. The Trial Court however
acquitted the appellant of the offence under section 3 (2) (5) of the
SC and ST Atrocities Act, 1989.
5. In the appeal preferred by the appellant the High Court relied
on the testimony of the victim and confirming the order of conviction
and sentence it dismissed the appeal. The present appeal arises at
the instance of the appellant challenging his conviction and sentence.
While granting special leave to appeal the appellant was directed to
be released on bail vide order dated 09.09.2013. We have heard
Mr. Ram Ekbal Roy, learned Advocate for the appellant and
Ms. Ayesha Chaudhary, learned Advocate for the State.
6. Though as a matter of law the sole testimony of the prosecutrix
can sufficiently be relied upon to bring home the case against the
accused, in the instant case we find her version to be improbable and
difficult to accept on its face value. The law on the point is very
succinctly stated in Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported
in (2012) 7 SCC 178, to which one of us (Dipak Misra, J). was a party,
in following terms.
"20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the
statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence
and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based
only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no
corroboration would be required unless there are compelling
reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her
statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a
condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but
a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not
be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case.
21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of
the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her
testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of
probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a
high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view
of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. However, if the
court finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence,
direct or circumstantial which may lend assurance to her
testimony....."
Having found it difficult to accept her testimony on its
face value, we searched for support from other material but find
complete lack of corroboration on material particulars. First, the
medical examination of the victim did not result in any definite
opinion that she was subjected to rape. Secondly, Riyaz who was like
a brother to the victim and thus a close confidant, has not supported
the case of the prosecution and has completely denied having met her
when she allegedly narrated the incident to him. Thirdly the person
who was suffering from fever and to whose house she was first taken by
the appellant was not examined at all. Fourthly, the policeman who
the victim met during the night was also not examined. Fifthly,
neither the brother nor any of the parents of the victim were examined
to corroborate the version that she had come from the village of her
brother and alighted around 10:00 P.M. at Bajna bus stand. Lastly,
the sequence of events as narrated would show that she had allegedly
accompanied the appellant to various places. In the circumstances, we
find extreme difficulty in relying upon the version of the victim
alone to bring home the charge against the appellant. We are inclined
to give benefit of doubt to the appellant.
7. We, therefore, set aside the order of conviction and sentence
passed against the appellant. The present appeal is thus allowed and
the appellant is acquitted of the charge leveled against him. The
appellant who was released on bail, is discharged of his bail bonds.
.............................J.
(Dipak Misra)
.............................J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
November 21, 2014