Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1665 of 2015, Judgment Date: Sep 15, 2016

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1665 of 2015

MANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED

                                                           .... Appellant(s)
                                   Versus

M/S. AMR POWER PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

                                                             ….Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

      Mangalore Electricity Supply  Company  Ltd.  (MESCOM),  the  Appellant
herein, is a distribution licensee.  M/s. AMR  Power  Private  Limited,  the
First Respondent herein, is a renewable power generator which has  developed
and is operating a 24.75 MW run of the river mini  hydel  power  project  in
the  State  of  Karnataka.   The  Karnataka  State  Electricity   Regulatory
Commission is the Second Respondent in the present Appeal.
2.    The Appellant and the First Respondent entered into a  Power  Purchase
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘PPA’) on 02.08.2006  for  the  supply
of 24 MW of electricity.  It was mentioned in the PPA  that  the  Government
of Karnataka accorded its sanction to the proposal of the  First  Respondent
for installation of a mini hydel electric power generating station of 24  MW
capacity across River Netravathi, Dakshina Kannada  District  and  that  the
Appellant was permitted to enter into a PPA with the  First  Respondent  for
purchase of electricity.  Article 5 of the PPA provides for  payment  of  Rs
2.80 per kilowatt-hour for the first 10  years  for  the  delivered  energy.
From the 11th year onwards, the PPA provides that the  Appellant  shall  pay
to the company a rate determined by the Commission for the energy  delivered
at the metering point.   Article  6  of  the  PPA  deals  with  billing  and
payment, Article 9 covers the term, termination and default of the PPA.   As
per Article 9.1.1, the PPA shall continue to be in force for a period of  20
years from the commercial operation date and may be renewed for a period  of
10 years on such terms and  conditions  as  may  be  mutually  agreed  upon.
Article 6 and Article 9 which fall for consideration in this  case  will  be
dealt with in detail in  the  subsequent  paragraphs.   On  04.08.2008,  the
First Respondent increased the capacity from 24 MW to 24.75 MW.
3.    The First Respondent started generating power and commenced supply  of
electricity to the Appellant on 12.09.2009. The First Respondent  approached
the Karnataka  Electricity  Regulatory  Commission,  the  Second  Respondent
herein, by filing O.P. No. 28  of  2009  for  a  declaration  that  the  PPA
executed on 02.08.2006 was null and void.  A further  relief  for  grant  of
open access was also sought by the First Respondent.  An interim  order  was
passed by the Second  Respondent  Commission  on  27.08.2009  directing  the
Appellant to synchronize the plant and pay for the power at the rate of  Rs.
2.80 per unit pending final adjudication.  The Second Respondent  Commission
dismissed O.P. No. 28 of 2009 on 23.12.2010.  Pursuant to  the  observations
made in the said order dated 23.12.2010, the First Respondent requested  the
Appellant to revise the tariff which was not considered  by  the  Appellant.
The First Respondent also filed a review of the order passed in O.P. No.  28
of 2009 which was dismissed on 22.12.2011.
4.    The First Respondent by a letter dated  26.05.2011  served  a  Default
Notice as provided in Article 9.3.2 of the PPA and requested  the  Appellant
to remedy the default.  The First Respondent referred to default in  payment
of power bills, default in payment of  interest  for  the  delay  caused  in
payment of the power bills and  default  in  opening  a  Letter  of  Credit.
Details of the default were annexed to the  said  letter  dated  26.05.2011.
The Appellant responded to the Default Notice  by  sending  a  letter  dated
04.07.2011 in which it was stated that an attempt was being  made  to  clear
all dues towards power purchase to all the  generators  without  any  delay.
The Appellant also stated that  the  payment  of  bills  for  the  month  of
January, February  and  March  2011  were  delayed  because  of  the  inter-
connection approval not being produced by  the  First  Respondent.   It  was
also stated that an endeavour would be  made  in  the  future  to  make  the
payments without delay and that the Letters of Credit would be opened.   The
First Respondent, not being  satisfied  with  the  reply  dated  04.07.2011,
issued a Notice of Termination of the PPA on 22.07.2011.
5.    The First Respondent approached the Second Respondent by  filing  O.P.
No. 48 of 2011 seeking a declaration that the  PPA  dated  02.08.2006  stood
terminated and was not subsisting.  A further  declaration  for  intra-state
open access was sought.  The Second Respondent Commission by an order  dated
23.02.2012 passed an interim order for payment of tariff at the rate of  Rs.
2.80 per unit, pending disposal of O.P. No. 48 of 2011.  On 22.03.2012,  the
First Respondent moved an application for  withdrawal  of  O.P.  No.  48  of
2011.  The Second Respondent Commission dismissed O.P. No.  48  of  2011  as
withdrawn.   The  First  Respondent  approached  the   Central   Electricity
Regulatory Commission (CERC) by  filing  petition  No.  141/MP/2012  seeking
permission for inter-state  open  access  to  supply  electricity  to  third
parties.  On 23.08.2012, the Appellant filed O.P. No. 37 of 2012 before  the
Second Respondent Commission seeking  quashing  of  the  termination  notice
dated 22.07.2011 and for a declaration that the  PPA  dated  02.08.2006  was
valid and subsisting.  A further direction was  also  sought  to  the  First
Respondent to act in accordance with the PPA dated 02.08.2006 and to  supply
power in terms thereof.  The CERC dismissed Petition No. 141 of  2012  filed
by the First Respondent for grant of inter-state open access in view of  the
pendency of O.P. No. 37 of 2012 before the State  Commission  in  which  the
validity of the  PPA  was  challenged.   The  Second  Respondent  Commission
directed status quo to be maintained on 23.08.2012 in O.P. No. 37  of  2012.
The said  interim  order  dated  23.08.2012  was  challenged  by  the  First
Respondent before the  Appellate  Tribunal  for  Electricity  (APTEL).   The
APTEL continued the interim arrangement but  clarified  that  the  order  of
status quo passed by the Second Respondent Commission would  not  mean  that
the operation of the termination of the PPA was stayed.  By an  order  dated
14.08.2013 the Second Respondent Commission dismissed O.P. No.  37  of  2012
upholding the Termination Notice dated 22.07.2011  and  declaring  that  the
Appellant was not entitled for a direction to the First  Respondent  to  act
in accordance with the PPA dated 02.08.2006.  Appeal No. 275 of  2013  filed
by  the  Appellant  before  the  APTEL  was  dismissed  on  17.10.2014,  the
correctness of which is assailed in the present Civil Appeal.
6.    The Second Respondent Commission framed two issues for  consideration.
 They are as follows:
“(1)  Whether the termination of the PPA dated 02-08-2006 by the  Respondent
is illegal and invalid, as contended by the petitioner?
(2)   Whether the petitioner has made out a case  for  a  direction  by  the
Commission to the Respondent to act in accordance with the PPA dated  02-08-
2006 and supply power in terms of the PPA, as prayed for?”
7.    The Commission held that the Appellant in its  reply  to  the  Default
Notice did not deny the delay in  payment.   The  Commission  further  found
that the Appellant made an  attempt  to  justify  the  delay  and  virtually
admitted the delay.  The Commission  also  held  that  in  response  to  the
Default Notice dated 26.05.2011 the Appellant should have  cleared  all  the
pending bills including interest within the time specified in  the  PPA  for
curing the defects.  Issue No.1 was held in favour of the  First  Respondent
and the Termination Notice dated 22.07.2011 was upheld.   As a  consequence,
Issue No.  2  pertaining  to  a  direction  to  the  Respondent  to  act  in
accordance with the PPA was refused.
8.    The APTEL after considering the submissions made by the  parties  held
that the Appellant failed to make out a  case  of  either  res  judicata  or
issue estoppel as the scope of the proceedings in  the  petitions  filed  by
the First Respondent was different.  After a detailed consideration  of  the
Default Notice dated 26.05.2011, the reply to the  notice  dated  04.07.2011
and the Termination Notice dated 22.07.2011 in the light of  the  provisions
contained in the PPA, the APTEL confirmed the order of the Tribunal.
9.    Mr. V. Giri,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the  Appellant
submitted that the First Respondent had repeatedly made valiant  efforts  to
wriggle out of the obligations under the PPA.  He submitted that  the  First
Respondent initially filed a petition for a declaration  that  the  PPA  was
void. Having failed in  that  attempt,  the  First  Respondent  resorted  to
issuance of the Termination Notice for delay in payments.
10.   Mr. Giri  urged  that  the  First  Respondent  should  not  have  been
permitted to take a defence justifying the Termination  Notice  and  seeking
open access in O.P. No. 37 of 2012, particularly after O.P. No. 48  of  2011
was withdrawn from  the  State  Commission  without  seeking  permission  to
initiate fresh proceedings.  He submitted that the withdrawal  of  O.P.  No.
48 of 2011 by the First Respondent before the State Commission would act  as
a bar under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  and  the
Respondent should not be permitted to raise the grounds in O.P.  No.  48  of
2011 before any other forum. He placed reliance upon the  judgment  of  this
Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State  Transport  Appellate  Tribunal,
MP Gwalior and Ors. reported in (1987) SCC 5, wherein it  was  held  that  a
fresh Writ  Petition  was  not  maintainable  after  withdrawal  of  a  Writ
Petition without permission to file a fresh Petition in respect of the  same
subject matter.  He also  submitted  that  there  is  no  admission  of  any
default in his letter dated 04.07.2011.  In any  event,  according  to  him,
the delay was not inordinate and  there  was  no  further  delay  in  making
payments  after  May  2011.   He  also  stated  that  the  First  Respondent
continued  to  supply  power  even  after  the  Termination   Notice   dated
22.07.2011 which amounts to condoning the default, if there was any, in  the
payment of earlier bills.  He also stated that the inter-connection  renewal
was obtained by the First Respondent on 23.03.2011 and the First  Respondent
cannot complain of any delay in payments made prior to that date.
11.   Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing  for  the
First Respondent submitted that it is clear from the reply  to  the  default
notice that the Appellant admitted the delay in payments.   He  stated  that
the Appellant did not deal with the Letter of Credit  at  all  in  the  said
reply to the default notice.  He also submitted that the  defects  were  not
cured within a period of 30 days, as the payment for the months of Jan  2011
and Feb 2011 which were due on 18.02.2011 and 18.03.2011 were made  only  on
25.05.2011.  No interest for the delayed payment was paid  as  provided  for
in the agreement.  A Letter of Credit was not opened even after the  default
notice.  Mr. Patil stated that the inter-connection  approval  was  only  an
excuse for non-payment and  that  it  was  not  a  condition  precedent  for
payment of tariff invoices.  He relied  upon  an  earlier  judgment  of  the
APTEL in Appeal No. 152 of 2012.   Countering the argument of the  Appellant
on Order 23, Rule 1, Mr. Patil stated that withdrawal of a petition  without
liberty to file a fresh petition would not bar  the  First  Respondent  from
taking a defence in another round of litigation.  He relied upon a  judgment
of this Court in Kandapazha Nadar & Ors. v. Chitraganiammal & Ors.  reported
in (2007) 7 SCC 65.
12.   In reply, Mr. Giri submitted that no  time  limit  is  prescribed  for
payment of bills in Article 9.2.2. Letters of Credit would not  fall  within
the purview of the words  “payments  default”  in  Clause  9.2.2.   He  also
submitted that the right to terminate the contract ought not  to  have  been
exercised by the First Respondent for non-opening  of  a  Letter  of  Credit
which was not a fundamental default  of  the  conditions  of  the  PPA.   He
further stated that the Appellant is a public utility and any order  against
the Appellant would have a huge impact on public revenue.
13.   The point for determination in the  present  appeal  pertains  to  the
validity of the Termination Notice dated 22.07.2011 and the  entitlement  of
the Appellant to seek a declaration that the PPA is  valid  and  binding  on
Respondent No.1.  It would be necessary to examine the relevant Articles  in
the PPA for a proper adjudication of the lis in this case.  Article  6.3  of
the PPA provides for payment of penal interest at the  rate  of  SBI  Medium
Term Lending Rate per annum in case of delay in payment  by  the  Appellant.
Clauses 9.2 and 9.3 are also relevant and they are as follows:
“9.2 Events of Default
9.2.1 Company’s Default
[. . .]
9.2.2 MESCOM Default: The occurrence of any of the  following  at  any  time
during the Term of this Agreement shall constitute an Event  of  Default  by
Corporation:
1.    Failure or refusal by  MESCOM  to  perform  its  financial  and  other
material obligations under this Agreement.
2.    In the event of any payment default by the  MESCOM  for  a  continuous
period of three months, the Company shall be permitted to  sell  electricity
to third parties by entering into a wheeling & banking  agreement  with  the
MESCOM for which it shall pay transmission and other charges to  the  MESCOM
at  the  rates  applicable  from  time  to  time  and  as  approved  by  the
Commission.
9.3         Termination.
9.3.1 Termination for Company’s Default.
[. . .]
9.3.2 Termination for MESCOM’s Default: Upon the occurrence of an  event  of
default as set out in sub-clause 9.2.2 above, Company may deliver a  Default
Notice to the MESCOM in writing which shall  specify  in  reasonable  detail
the Event of Default giving rise to the default  notice,  and  calling  upon
the MESCOM to remedy the same.
At the expiry of 30 (thirty) days from the delivery of this  default  notice
and unless the Parties have  agreed  otherwise,  or  the  Event  of  Default
giving rise to the Default Notice has been remedied, Company may  deliver  a
Termination Notice to MESCOM.   Company  may  terminate  this  agreement  by
delivering such a Termination Notice to MESCOM and intimate the same to  the
Commission.   Upon delivery of the Termination Notice this  Agreement  shall
stand terminated and Company shall stand discharged of its obligations.”

14.   Article 9.2.2 contemplates  that  the  failure  of  the  Appellant  in
performing its financial and other material obligations under the PPA  would
constitute an event  of  default  on  its  part.    The  said  Article  also
provides for the First Respondent being permitted  to  sell  electricity  to
third parties in the event  of  payment  default  by  the  appellant  for  a
continuous period of three months.   The  procedure  prescribed  in  Article
9.3.2 for  termination  for  the  Appellant’s  default  is  that  the  First
Respondent should deliver a Default Notice giving details in  the  event  of
default and asking the Appellant to remedy the same.  If the Appellant  does
not remedy the defaults within the prescribed  period  of  30  days  or  any
extended period as mutually agreed upon, the First Respondent  may  issue  a
Termination Notice.
15.   The Default Notice dated 26.05.2011 refers to default in  payments  of
bills, non-payment of interest for the delayed payments and  non-opening  of
a Letter of Credit as provided for in Article 6.5 of the Agreement.  In  the
reply dated 04.07.2011, the Appellant did not expressly  deal  with  any  of
the defaults mentioned in  the  Default  Notice.   On  the  other  hand  the
Appellant stated that it relied heavily on Government  subsidy  for  payment
to be made, an attempt  would  be  made  in  the  future  to  make  payments
promptly, LCs would be opened and that payment  for  January,  February  and
March 2011 were delayed because the approval for inter-connection was  given
only on 23.06.2011. The invoice for December 2010 which was due to  be  paid
on 19.01.2011 was actually paid on 24.02.2011.  The payment to be  made  for
the months  of  January  2011  and  February  2011  due  on  18.02.2011  and
18.03.2011 was actually done on 25.05.2011.   Admittedly,  interest  on  the
delayed payments as provided for in Article 6 was not paid and a  Letter  of
Credit was not opened.  In view  of  the  default  mentioned  by  the  First
Respondent in the notice not being remedied within a period of 30  days,  we
are of the opinion that the Second Respondent Commission and the APTEL  were
correct in upholding the termination  notice  dated22.07.2011.   We  do  not
agree with the submissions of Mr. Giri that non-opening of Letter of  Credit
would not be a default covered by Article 9.2.2. As  per  Article  9.2.1,  a
failure or refusal by the Appellant  to  perform  its  financial  and  other
material obligations under a PPA constitutes an event of default.  Both  the
parties to the PPA are bound by the terms  thereof  and  they  are  free  to
resort to action in accordance with the provisions contained therein.

16.   This Court in Sarguja Transport Service (supra) held  that  withdrawal
of a Writ Petition without seeking permission to file a fresh Writ  Petition
would bar filing of a fresh Writ Petition. But there is no bar for taking  a
defence in a fresh  round  of  litigation  in  respect  of  the  same  point
involved in a suit  which  was  withdrawn  without  seeking  liberty.   (See
Kandapazha Nadar, (supra)).  The First Respondent initially sought for  open
access for sale of electricity to third parties intra-state by  filing  O.P.
No. 48  of  2011.   After  withdrawing  O.P.  No.  48  of  2011,  the  First
Respondent filed a Petition before the CERC  for  inter-state  open  access.
It is no doubt true that in O.P. No. 48 of 2011, the First  Respondent  also
sought for a relief of a declaration that the PPA  is  not  binding  on  it.
Strictly speaking, there was no need for such a declaration being sought  by
the First Respondent as the PPA was  terminated  by  issuance  of  a  notice
dated 22.07.2011.  In any event, we are at present concerned with  O.P.No.37
of 2012 in which the First Respondent  raised  a  defence  that  Termination
Notice was valid and that it was entitled to open access, which  is  legally
permissible.

17.   The APTEL  found  that  the  grant  of  inter-connection  approval  on
26.03.2011 could not be a justification for delayed payment  of  bills.   It
was held that there was delay in payment of bills for January  and  February
2011 even after the inter-connection approval was given  on  23.03.2011,  as
admittedly the payments were made only  on  26.05.2011.   The  APTEL  relied
upon an earlier order passed by it in Appeal No.152 of 2012[1] to hold  that
an inter-connection approval was not a condition precedent  for  payment  of
tariff invoices.   We approve the above findings recorded by the APTEL.

18.   It is an admitted fact that the First Respondent continued  to  supply
power to the Appellant on payment of Rs.2.80 per unit even after the  notice
of termination dated 22.07.2011.  There was a refusal of open access to  the
First Respondent in the pending proceedings.   There  was  also  an  interim
order for maintenance of status quo in  O.P.No.37  of  2012  by  the  Second
Respondent Commission.  In view  of  the  fact  that  the  power  was  being
generated by the First Respondent and had to be supplied,  the  continuation
of the supply made by the First  Respondent  after  the  Termination  Notice
dated 22.07.2011 cannot be taken to  be  a  condonation  of  the  events  of
default by the Appellant.

19.   In view of the foregoing, we do not find any error in the judgment  of
the APTEL confirming the Order of the  Second  Respondent  Commission.   The
Civil Appeal is dismissed.  No order as to costs.

                                            .…............................J.
                                                       [ANIL R. DAVE]


                                          ................................J.
                                                   [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

New Delhi,
September 15, 2016.



-----------------------
[1]    M/s.  Soham Manipatlu Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Karnataka Power
Transmission Corp. & Ors. (decided on 12.02.2014)