Chhatisgarh High Court (Single Judge)

ACQA->ACQUITTAL APPEAL [ APPEAL U/S 378 ], 71 of 2015 of 2015, Judgment Date: Feb 18, 2015

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
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SINGLE BENCH: HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
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Contempt Case (C) No. 71 of 2015
PETITIONERS : Makhan Lal and others.
VERSUS
RESPONDENTS
Contemnors
: R.K. Narad, Additional Secretary
and another.
CONTEMPT PETITION UNDER SECTION 12 OF THE CONTEMPT OF
COURTS ACT READ WITH ARTICLE 215 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA
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Present:
Shri P.P.Sahu, counsel for the petitioner.
None for the respondents.
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O R D E R
(Passed on 18.02.2015)
(1) Invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Section
12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(for short, ‘Act of
1971’) read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India this
contempt petition has been filed by the petitioner herein
alleging non-compliance of award of the Labour Court as
confirmed by the Industrial Court and modified by this Court.
(2) In the petition filed by the petitioners under the provisions of
Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation Act,1960 (for short, ‘the Act
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of 1960’), the Labour Court vide its award dated 23.09.1997
held that the petitioners are permanent Gangmen and
entitled for pay and allowances of permanent Gangmen
admissible as per Government rules.
(3) Against that order, the State Government preferred an
appeal before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the award of the Labour
Court.
(4) Feeling aggrieved against that order of Industrial Court, the
writ petition No. 2960/2004 was preferred by the State
Government which was allowed by this Court setting aside
the part of award of Labour Court/Industrial Court granting
backwages to the petitioners. The State Government
preferred special leave petition before the Supreme Court of
India, challenging the other part of order of Labour Court
holding that the petitioners are permanent Gangmen. The
said S.L.P.(civil) No.18221/2013 was dismissed on
07.05.2014.
(5) This contempt petition has been filed by the petitioners
alleging that the respondents/contemnors have wilfully
disobeyed the award of Labour Court as affirmed by the
Industrial Court and by the High Court and as such they be
held guilty for non-compliance of the award of the Labour
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Court and be punished in accordance with the provisions of
Act of 1971.
(6) Shri P.P. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the contempt
petitioner would submit that the ‘Labour Court’ is an court
sub-ordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section
10 of the Act of 1971, therefore the non-compliance of the
award of the Labour Court, the respondents/contemnors be
held guilty and be punished under the provisions of the Act of
1971.
(7) I have heard Shri P.P. Sahu, learned counsel for the
petitioner on the question of admission of the contempt
petition.
(8) At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 10 of
Act of 1971, which deals with powers of High Court to punish
for the contempt of sub-ordinate court.
“10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of
subordinate Courts- Every High Court shall have
and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and
authority, in accordance with the same procedure
and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts
subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect
of contempts of itself:
Provided that no High Court shall take
cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it
where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
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(9) The question for consideration would be whether “Labour
Court” is a “Court” subordinate to High Court within the
meaning of Section 10 of the Act of 1971.
(10) The word “Court” is not defined in Act of 1971. Section 3 of
the Indian Evidence Act defines the “Court” as under:-
"Court" includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all
persons, except arbitrators, legally authorized to
take evidence.”
(11) The Labour Courts are constituted by State Government
under Section 8(1) of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation
Act, 1960 (for short, ‘Act of 1960’). The powers of the
Labour Court has been provided under Sections 61& 64(1)
of the Act of 1960. Sections 61 & 64(1) of the Act provides as
under:-
“61. Powers of Labour Court.- (1) In addition to
powers conferred under other provisions of this Act,
a Labour Court shall have power to-
(A) decide-
(a) disputes regarding which application has
been made to it under sub-section (3) of
Section 31 of the Act;
(b) Industrial disputes-
(i) Referred to it under Section 51 or 52;
(ii) In respect of which it is appointed as
the Arbitrator by a submission;
(c) Whether a strike, lock-out, stoppage,
closure or any change is illegal under this
Act;
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(B) require any employer-
(a) to withdraw any change or lock-out which
is held by it to be illegal; or
(b) To carry out any change provided such
change is a matter in issue in any
proceeding before it under this Act;
(C) require any employee to withdraw a strike
which is held by it to be illegal;
(D) [try offences punishable under this Act and
the Acts specified in Schedule II-A] and
where the payment of compensation on
conviction for an offence is provided for,
determine the compensation and order its
payment.
(2) For the purposes of deciding a dispute under
paragraphs (A) and (B) of sub-section (1) it shall be
lawful for the Labour Court to determine questions
of fact relevant to the dispute.
[(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974)
or any other law for the time being in force, every
offence punishable under this Act and the Acts
specified in Schedule II-A shall be tried by the
Labour Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction
it was committed.]”
*****
“64. Power of Labour Court and Industrial Court
in respect of Criminal Cases.- (1) In respect of
offences punishable under this Act or any of the
Acts specified in Schedule II-A, a Labour Court shall
have all the powers under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974) of a Judicial
Magistrate of the First Class and in the trial of every
such offence shall follow the procedure laid down in
Chapter XXI of the said Code for summary trial and
the rest of such provisions of the Code shall, so far
as may be, apply to the trial.”
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Section 73 of the Act, vests powers of the Civil Court
with the Labour Court. It provides as under:-
“ 73 . Powers of authority to summon witnesses,
etc.- (1) For the purpose of holding an enquiry or
proceeding under this Act, the Registrar, a Labour
Court, the Industrial Court, a Board and a Court of
Enquiry shall have the same powers as are vested
in Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (V of 1908), in respect of ─
(a) proof of facts by affidavits;
(b) summoning and enforcing the attendance
of any person and examining him on oath;
(c) compelling the production of documents;
(d) issuing commissions for the examination
of witnesses; and
(e) such other matters as may be prescribed.
(2) For the purpose of obtaining the
information necessary for compelling and
maintaining the record under Chapter XV, the officer
authorized under Section 95 shall have the power
specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1).”
Reading the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the
Labour Court though having trappings of Civil Court
under the Code of Civil Procedure and all exercising
powers vested in Judicial Magistrate under the Code of
Criminal Procedure on the other hand, sub-section (1) of
Section 73 of Act of 1960, powers of Labour Court are
restricted in the sense that, it will have same powers like
Civil Court in respect of enforcing the attendance of any
person and examining him on oath compelling production
of documents and thus Labour Court exercise limited
powers and by virtue of Section 76 of Act, every
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proceeding before the Labour Court shall be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Sections 192, 193 and
228 of Indian Penal Code.
(12) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of
Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain1, has held that the word
“Court” is not defined in the Contempt of Courts Act and the
expression “Courts subordinate to the High Courts” in
Section 3(1) would prima facie mean the courts of law
subordinate to the High Courts in hierarchy of Courts
established for the purpose of administration of justice
throughout the Union. The definition of “Court” in Section 3
of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive but framed only for the
purpose of that Act and is not to be extended where such an
extension is not warranted.
(13) In the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The
Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd2, has held as
under:-
“The subordination for the purpose of Section 3 of
the Contempt of Courts Act means judicial
subordination and not subordination under the
hierarchy of Courts under the Civil Procedure Code
or the Criminal Procedure Code.”
1 1956 Cri.L.J. 156
2 1967 Cri.L.J.1380
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(14) The Supreme Court, in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v.
Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.3, has held that the
Industrial Tribunal, though discharges judicial functions, is
not a “Court”. It was observed therein that the industrial
Tribunal set up under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 has all the necessary attributes of a Court of
Justice. The fact that the Government has to make a
declaration under Section 15(2) of the Act after the final
decision of the Tribunal is not in any way inconsistent with
the view that the Tribunal acts judicially. The functions and
duties of the Industrial Tribunal are very much like those of a
body discharging judicial functions although it is not a “Court”
in the technical sense of the word.
(15) In case of Board of Revenue v. Vinay Chandra Misra4,
their Lordships of the Supreme Court has considered the
phrase “court subordinate to it” as employed in Section 10 of
Act and held as under:-
“15……………The phrase “courts subordinate to it”
used in Section 10 is wide enough to include all
courts which are judicially subordinate to the High
Court, even though administrative control over them
under Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in
the High Court. Under Article 227 of the
Constitution the High Court has the Power of
3 AIR 1950 SC 188
4 AIR 1981 SC 723
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superintendence over all courts and tribunal
throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue Board,
therefore, in the instant case, is a court “subordinate
to the High Court” within the contemplation of
Section 10 of the Act.”
(16) In a decision reported in Alahar Co-operative Credit
Service Society v. Sham Lal5, their Lordships of the
Supreme Court has held that Labour Court is not a Court
subordinate to the High Court in the sense of Act of 1971.
Paragraph 4 of report states as under:-
“4. The Labour Court is not a court subordinate to
the High Court in the sense the Contempt of Courts
Act makes provision requiring the High Court to deal
with contempt of its subordinate courts; therefore,
the High Court should have looked into that aspect
before entertaining the contempt proceedings for
non-compliance with the direction of the Labour
Court. Contempt proceedings are again not
intended to be a substitute of the execution process
and, therefore, care should have been taken before
entertaining the contempt petition to examine the
maintainability of such action.”
(17) Thus on the basis of aforesaid analysis and following the
principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in the above-stated cases i.e. Brajnandan Sinha
(supra), Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha (supra), Bharat Bank
Ltd. (supra), Board of Revenue (supra) and Alahar Cooperative
(supra) it is held that “Labour Court” is a not a
court subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 10
5 (1995) 2 Guj.L.H. 550
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of Act of 1971 and therefore, the contempt petition as framed
and filed for enforcement of the award of the Labour Court is
not maintainable in law.
(18) At this stage, it is appropriate to point out that the award
passed by the Labour Court under Act of 1960, can be
executed under Section 78-A (1) of the Act of 1960 read with
Rule 48-A(1) & (2) of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation
Rules, 1961, Section 78-A(1) of Act of 1960 read with Rule
48 of Rules, 1961 provides that, the Labour Court on an
application made in prescribed form by the person in whose
favour award is passed; the court shall follow the procedure
laid down in Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
execute the award so passed. As such the petitioner is
liberty to take appropriate steps for execution of the award in
accordance with Section 78-A (1) of the Act of 1960 read
with Rule 48-A (1) & (2) of Rules of 1961 by filing suitable
application before the Labour Court.
(19) As a fall out and consequence of aforesaid discussion the
contempt petition deserves to and accordingly dismissed
with the aforesaid observation at the admission stage without
issuance of the rule to the other side. No order as to cost(s).
Judge
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HEAD NOTE
Labour Court is not a Court subordinate to High Court for the
purpose of Section 10 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 dh /kkjk 10 ds iz;kstu ds fy, Je
U;k;ky;] mPp U;k;ky; dk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ugha gSA
Laxmi Pandey
Private Secretary,
to Hon’ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.