Makhan Lal and others Vs R.K. Narad, Additional Secretary and another.
Chhatisgarh High Court (Single Judge)
ACQA->ACQUITTAL APPEAL [ APPEAL U/S 378 ], 71 of 2015 of 2015, Judgment Date: Feb 18, 2015
1 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SINGLE BENCH: HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY K. AGRAWAL ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contempt Case (C) No. 71 of 2015 PETITIONERS : Makhan Lal and others. VERSUS RESPONDENTS Contemnors : R.K. Narad, Additional Secretary and another. CONTEMPT PETITION UNDER SECTION 12 OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT READ WITH ARTICLE 215 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Present: Shri P.P.Sahu, counsel for the petitioner. None for the respondents. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- O R D E R (Passed on 18.02.2015) (1) Invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(for short, ‘Act of 1971’) read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India this contempt petition has been filed by the petitioner herein alleging non-compliance of award of the Labour Court as confirmed by the Industrial Court and modified by this Court. (2) In the petition filed by the petitioners under the provisions of Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation Act,1960 (for short, ‘the Act 2 of 1960’), the Labour Court vide its award dated 23.09.1997 held that the petitioners are permanent Gangmen and entitled for pay and allowances of permanent Gangmen admissible as per Government rules. (3) Against that order, the State Government preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the award of the Labour Court. (4) Feeling aggrieved against that order of Industrial Court, the writ petition No. 2960/2004 was preferred by the State Government which was allowed by this Court setting aside the part of award of Labour Court/Industrial Court granting backwages to the petitioners. The State Government preferred special leave petition before the Supreme Court of India, challenging the other part of order of Labour Court holding that the petitioners are permanent Gangmen. The said S.L.P.(civil) No.18221/2013 was dismissed on 07.05.2014. (5) This contempt petition has been filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondents/contemnors have wilfully disobeyed the award of Labour Court as affirmed by the Industrial Court and by the High Court and as such they be held guilty for non-compliance of the award of the Labour 3 Court and be punished in accordance with the provisions of Act of 1971. (6) Shri P.P. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the contempt petitioner would submit that the ‘Labour Court’ is an court sub-ordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act of 1971, therefore the non-compliance of the award of the Labour Court, the respondents/contemnors be held guilty and be punished under the provisions of the Act of 1971. (7) I have heard Shri P.P. Sahu, learned counsel for the petitioner on the question of admission of the contempt petition. (8) At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 10 of Act of 1971, which deals with powers of High Court to punish for the contempt of sub-ordinate court. “10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 4 (9) The question for consideration would be whether “Labour Court” is a “Court” subordinate to High Court within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act of 1971. (10) The word “Court” is not defined in Act of 1971. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act defines the “Court” as under:- "Court" includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorized to take evidence.” (11) The Labour Courts are constituted by State Government under Section 8(1) of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation Act, 1960 (for short, ‘Act of 1960’). The powers of the Labour Court has been provided under Sections 61& 64(1) of the Act of 1960. Sections 61 & 64(1) of the Act provides as under:- “61. Powers of Labour Court.- (1) In addition to powers conferred under other provisions of this Act, a Labour Court shall have power to- (A) decide- (a) disputes regarding which application has been made to it under sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Act; (b) Industrial disputes- (i) Referred to it under Section 51 or 52; (ii) In respect of which it is appointed as the Arbitrator by a submission; (c) Whether a strike, lock-out, stoppage, closure or any change is illegal under this Act; 5 (B) require any employer- (a) to withdraw any change or lock-out which is held by it to be illegal; or (b) To carry out any change provided such change is a matter in issue in any proceeding before it under this Act; (C) require any employee to withdraw a strike which is held by it to be illegal; (D) [try offences punishable under this Act and the Acts specified in Schedule II-A] and where the payment of compensation on conviction for an offence is provided for, determine the compensation and order its payment. (2) For the purposes of deciding a dispute under paragraphs (A) and (B) of sub-section (1) it shall be lawful for the Labour Court to determine questions of fact relevant to the dispute. [(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, every offence punishable under this Act and the Acts specified in Schedule II-A shall be tried by the Labour Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.]” ***** “64. Power of Labour Court and Industrial Court in respect of Criminal Cases.- (1) In respect of offences punishable under this Act or any of the Acts specified in Schedule II-A, a Labour Court shall have all the powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974) of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and in the trial of every such offence shall follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XXI of the said Code for summary trial and the rest of such provisions of the Code shall, so far as may be, apply to the trial.” 6 Section 73 of the Act, vests powers of the Civil Court with the Labour Court. It provides as under:- “ 73 . Powers of authority to summon witnesses, etc.- (1) For the purpose of holding an enquiry or proceeding under this Act, the Registrar, a Labour Court, the Industrial Court, a Board and a Court of Enquiry shall have the same powers as are vested in Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), in respect of ─ (a) proof of facts by affidavits; (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (c) compelling the production of documents; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; and (e) such other matters as may be prescribed. (2) For the purpose of obtaining the information necessary for compelling and maintaining the record under Chapter XV, the officer authorized under Section 95 shall have the power specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1).” Reading the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the Labour Court though having trappings of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and all exercising powers vested in Judicial Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure on the other hand, sub-section (1) of Section 73 of Act of 1960, powers of Labour Court are restricted in the sense that, it will have same powers like Civil Court in respect of enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath compelling production of documents and thus Labour Court exercise limited powers and by virtue of Section 76 of Act, every 7 proceeding before the Labour Court shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 192, 193 and 228 of Indian Penal Code. (12) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain1, has held that the word “Court” is not defined in the Contempt of Courts Act and the expression “Courts subordinate to the High Courts” in Section 3(1) would prima facie mean the courts of law subordinate to the High Courts in hierarchy of Courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union. The definition of “Court” in Section 3 of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive but framed only for the purpose of that Act and is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted. (13) In the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd2, has held as under:- “The subordination for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act means judicial subordination and not subordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code.” 1 1956 Cri.L.J. 156 2 1967 Cri.L.J.1380 8 (14) The Supreme Court, in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.3, has held that the Industrial Tribunal, though discharges judicial functions, is not a “Court”. It was observed therein that the industrial Tribunal set up under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has all the necessary attributes of a Court of Justice. The fact that the Government has to make a declaration under Section 15(2) of the Act after the final decision of the Tribunal is not in any way inconsistent with the view that the Tribunal acts judicially. The functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions although it is not a “Court” in the technical sense of the word. (15) In case of Board of Revenue v. Vinay Chandra Misra4, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has considered the phrase “court subordinate to it” as employed in Section 10 of Act and held as under:- “15……………The phrase “courts subordinate to it” used in Section 10 is wide enough to include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even though administrative control over them under Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in the High Court. Under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court has the Power of 3 AIR 1950 SC 188 4 AIR 1981 SC 723 9 superintendence over all courts and tribunal throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant case, is a court “subordinate to the High Court” within the contemplation of Section 10 of the Act.” (16) In a decision reported in Alahar Co-operative Credit Service Society v. Sham Lal5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held that Labour Court is not a Court subordinate to the High Court in the sense of Act of 1971. Paragraph 4 of report states as under:- “4. The Labour Court is not a court subordinate to the High Court in the sense the Contempt of Courts Act makes provision requiring the High Court to deal with contempt of its subordinate courts; therefore, the High Court should have looked into that aspect before entertaining the contempt proceedings for non-compliance with the direction of the Labour Court. Contempt proceedings are again not intended to be a substitute of the execution process and, therefore, care should have been taken before entertaining the contempt petition to examine the maintainability of such action.” (17) Thus on the basis of aforesaid analysis and following the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-stated cases i.e. Brajnandan Sinha (supra), Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha (supra), Bharat Bank Ltd. (supra), Board of Revenue (supra) and Alahar Cooperative (supra) it is held that “Labour Court” is a not a court subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 10 5 (1995) 2 Guj.L.H. 550 10 of Act of 1971 and therefore, the contempt petition as framed and filed for enforcement of the award of the Labour Court is not maintainable in law. (18) At this stage, it is appropriate to point out that the award passed by the Labour Court under Act of 1960, can be executed under Section 78-A (1) of the Act of 1960 read with Rule 48-A(1) & (2) of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation Rules, 1961, Section 78-A(1) of Act of 1960 read with Rule 48 of Rules, 1961 provides that, the Labour Court on an application made in prescribed form by the person in whose favour award is passed; the court shall follow the procedure laid down in Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure to execute the award so passed. As such the petitioner is liberty to take appropriate steps for execution of the award in accordance with Section 78-A (1) of the Act of 1960 read with Rule 48-A (1) & (2) of Rules of 1961 by filing suitable application before the Labour Court. (19) As a fall out and consequence of aforesaid discussion the contempt petition deserves to and accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid observation at the admission stage without issuance of the rule to the other side. No order as to cost(s). Judge 11 HEAD NOTE Labour Court is not a Court subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 10 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 dh /kkjk 10 ds iz;kstu ds fy, Je U;k;ky;] mPp U;k;ky; dk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ugha gSA Laxmi Pandey Private Secretary, to Hon’ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.