MAHESHWAR PERI & ORS Vs. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Crl.), 549 of 2016, Judgment Date: Jun 30, 2016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 549 OF 2016
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5032 of 2015)
MAHESHWAR PERI & OTHERS … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT
ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR
GENERAL … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.:
Leave granted.
What is the period of limitation for suo motu initiation of contempt
proceedings, is the short question for consideration in this case.
The Outlook Magazine, in its 10.11.2008 edition, published an article
authored by the third appellant, which mainly dealt with the infamous
Provident Fund Scam. The names of the Judges, who are allegedly involved in
the case, were published.
On 18.11.2008, one Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr. Veer Singh, Advocates
practicing in the High Court of Allahabad, filed Miscellaneous Application
No. 21 of 2008 with the following prayer:
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may
graciously be pleased to proceed for initiating Criminal Contempt
proceedings on its own motion against aforesaid opposite parties and they
be punished accordingly under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and
or to pass any other order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and
proper.”
According to them, the article “has caused great insult to the Higher
Judiciary. The remarks are derogatory and have lowered the authority of the
Higher Judiciary.” Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/High Court
of Allahabad submits that the petition was placed before a Single Judge of
the High Court, and thereafter, before the Chief Justice. It appears, for
about four years, nothing happened in the matter until it was listed before
the Division Bench of the High Court leading to the impugned order dated
28.04.2015. It was held in the impugned order that:
“… The publication dated 10.11.2008 at page 56, 57, 58, 59 as mentioned
above has caused great insult to the higher Judiciary. The remarks are
derogatory and lower the authority of the higher Judiciary. Hence, it is a
fit case to take ‘suo motu’ action by this Court. Accordingly, we take ‘suo
motu’ action. Hence the name of the petitioner is not to be shown in the
cause list.”
xxx xxx xxx xxx
“Let a notice be issued to contemnor opposite party no. 2,3,4, namely, Mr.
Maheshwer Peri, Mr. Bishwadeep Moitra, Sushri Chandrani Benerji through
Chief Judicial Magistrate Ghaziabad to show cause why the charges be not
framed against them for committing contempt of this Court and to punish
them in accordance with law. They shall also appear in person on the next
date.”
Aggrieved, appellants are before this Court.
As we propose to deal with the legal contention on limitation, it is not
necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the article actually
constitutes contempt.
The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants is
that the High Court, having initiated action only after four years of the
alleged contempt, the whole proceedings are barred by Section 20 of The
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) which
has prescribed the period of limitation of one year for initiating any
proceedings of contempt, be it suo motu or otherwise. Section 20 of the
Act reads as follows:
“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No court shall initiate any
proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is
alleged to have been committed. "
Learned Counsel appearing for the High Court, however, contends that being
an action initiated by the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution
of India and since the genesis of the initiation of the contempt is the
application dated 18.11.2008 filed by Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr.
Veer Singh, Advocates, and since the High Court had considered the
application within one year and had taken action by issuing notice, though
after six years, it is within time.
Our attention is invited to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others[1] and particular to paragraphs-39 and
40. Paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as follows:
“39. In the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the
High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate
court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the
Central Government in the case of a Union Territory. This reference or
motion can conceivably commence on an application being filed by a person
whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so
satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil
contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the notice
of the court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc.
which could amount to the commission of the offence. The attention of the
court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a person filing
an application in that behalf. In other words, unless a court was to take a
suo motu action, the proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the
attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. When the
judicial procedure requires an application being filed either before the
court or consent being sought by a person from the Advocate-General or a
Law Officer, it must logically follow that proceedings for contempt are
initiated when the applications are made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking
cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the
proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of refusal
or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following
or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt,
filing of an application drawing the attention of the court is necessary
for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”
We are afraid, the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the
appellants cannot be appreciated. Be it an action initiated for contempt
under Article 129 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme Court or
under Article 215 of the Constitution of India by the High Court, it is now
settled law that the prosecution procedure should be in consonance with the
Act, as held by this Court in Pallav Sheth case (supra).
And thus, the dispute boils down to the question of limitation only.
Under the Act, the action for contempt is taken by only two courts, either
the Supreme Court or the High Court. The procedure is prescribed under
Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows:
“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.—(1) In the case of a
criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the
Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a
motion made by—
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing to (sic of) the Advocate-
General, or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such
Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in
writing of such Law Officer.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High
Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or
on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union
territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the
contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty.
Explanation.—In this section, the expression “Advocate-General” means—
(a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-
General;
(b) in relation to the High Court, the Advocate-General of the State or any
of the States for which the High Court has been established;
(c) in relation to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner, such Law Officer
as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf.”
Criminal Contempt of court subordinate to High Court can be initiated
either suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General. The suo motu
action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the subordinate court.
In view of the process involved in making the Reference by the subordinate
court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has been held that the Reference is
the starting point of the process of initiation of the action for contempt.
That is why in paragraph-39, which we have extracted above, it has been
clearly held that … “unless a court was to take suo motu action, the
proceeding under The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence
with the filing of an application drawing the attention of the court to the
contempt having been committed. “The application is the motion provided
under Section 15 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any
person other than Advocate General, can be made only with the consent in
writing of the Advocate General. In other words, any other application made
by a person without the consent of the Advocate General, is not an
application in the eyes of law.”
This aspect has been succinctly discussed and subtly distinguished in
paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case (supra). To quote paragraph-44:
“44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that
initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the
court’s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily
be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court
itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases
initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion,
therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that
action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the
court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
Coming to the factual matrix of the present case, the High Court is clear
in its mind that the action under Section 15 of the Act is initiated suo
motu by the High Court. To make it abundantly clear in the impugned order,
it is said that the name of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause
list. Apparently, it can only be suo motu because the application filed by
the advocates, and which is referred to in the impugned order, is without
the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The only application other
than by the Advocate General, contemplated under Section 15 of the Act, is
the motion made by any person with the consent in writing of the Advocate
General. Being a jurisdiction which, when exercised, is fraught with
serious consequences, the Parliament has thought it justifiably fit to
provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned article, having been
published on 10.11.2008 and the High Court having initiated the suo motu
action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the limitation of one year
prescribed under the Act.
In that view of the matter, it has become unnecessary for us to deal with
the submissions on merits as to whether the contents of the article would
constitute criminal contempt or not.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
...................................J.
(KURIAN JOSEPH)
........………………………………J.
(ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
New Delhi;
June 30, 2016.
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[1] (2001) 7 SCC 549
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REPORTABLE
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