M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MED.INS.&RSH&ORS. Vs. LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS
Section 4 - Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon
Section 6 - Declaration that land is required for a public purpose
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Civil), 1431 of 2008, Judgment Date: Mar 29, 2017
ITEM NO.105 COURT NO.12 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 1431/2008
M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MED.INS.&RSH&ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS. Respondent(s)
(with appln. (s) for impleadment and substitution and c/delay in filing
reply affidavit)
Date : 29/03/2017 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER
For Appellant(s) Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ramesh Singh, Adv.
Mr. A.T. Patra, Adv.
Ms. Bina Gupta,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Ms. Rachana Srivastava,Adv.
Mr. Nitya Madhusoodhnan, Adv.
Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv.
Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, Adv.
M/s Saharya & Co.,Adv.
Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma,Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.
| (NEELAM GULATI) | (TAPAN KR. CHAKRABORTY) |
|COURT MASTER |COURT MASTER |
(Signed Reportable order is placed on the file)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1431 OF 2008
M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE
& RESEARCH CENTRE Appellant(s)
VERSUS
LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
The appeal has been preferred by the M/s. Meena Devi Jindal
Medical Institute and Research Centre questioning the judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on March 03, 2005 in W.P.
(C) No. 1479 of 1982 repelling the challenge to the land acquisition
proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in
short 'the Act') as per the Notification issued on 19.3.1981. Enquiry under
Section 5A of the Act was held. The objections preferred by the appellant
were duly considered and rejected. Thereafter declaration under Section 6
of the Act was issued on 21st September, 1981. Appellant/Petitioner filed
writ petition before the High Court of Delhi questioning the land
acquisition proceedings in the year 1982.
The facts unfold that one Smt. Kanso Devi (since deceased) was
owner of the property. She had entered into an agreement dated 21.04.1979
with Rank Television Pvt. Ltd. for construction of group housing society.
Appellant No.1 herein claims to be registered society under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and it was formed with the object to establish and
maintain hospitals for philanthropic purpose and it entered into a lease
agreement with owner Kanso Devi on 3.1.1981. The lease agreement has been
concurred by Rank Television Pvt. Ltd., as confirming party. It was tri-
partite agreement. Later on 17.2.1981 the appellant No.1 herein entered
into an agreement to sell with respect to said property with Kanso Devi.
It was confirmed by M/s Rank Television Pvt. Ltd. Power of Attorney has
been obtained by the appellant No.1 from Kanso Devi and the appellant had
been placed in possession of the property.
Kanso Devi purportedly executed a will in favour of the appellant
No.1 on 4.4.1982. She ultimately died on 27.11.1989 during the pendency of
the writ petition. It is submitted that property had been mutated in the
name of the appellant No.1- charitable institution . The acquisition had
been questioned in the High Court on the ground that in the Notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act, purpose was shown to be planned
development of Delhi. Only 10,000 Sq. Yard land comprised in Khasra No.
394 (plot no.20), Alipur Road, Delhi was proposed to be acquired. It was
not specified in the Notification for what specific purpose of planned
development of Delhi, Notification had been issued. Thus the objection
raised by the Appellant No.1 herein, in the course of enquiry, held under
Section 5A of the Act, had been illegally rejected. The acquisition for
the purpose of School was not mentioned in the Notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act as such the Notification was vague and no useful
purpose would be served by acquisition of a small plot of land.
It was not disputed that in the zonal plan prepared for
development of Delhi, the area in question had been shown as reserved for
the institutional purposes.
The writ application was resisted on behalf of the respondents
on the ground that acquisition had been made in accordance with law for the
planned development of Delhi. Ultimately it was for the purpose of the
school the acquisition had been made and it would be open after acquisition
to change the purpose related to the planned development of Delhi as such
there was no illegality in the acquisition of the land and no malafide has
been attributed.
The High Court by the impugned order has dismissed the writ
application on various grounds; firstly that acquisition is permissible for
planned development of the city. Apart from that, it has been found that
in that zonal development plan of Delhi the area in question had been shown
for the institutional purposes thus, it was open to acquire the area in
accordance therewith for the purpose of planned development of Delhi. The
petitioner No.1, at the relevant point of time, was having only agreement
to sell in its favour. The enquiry was properly held under Section 5A of
the Act. Thus the writ petition has been ultimately dismissed holding that
running of educational institution by the Government for the benefit of
public at large can hardly be equated to running of the charitable
hospital. Thus acquisition cannot be said to be suffering with any
illegality. Thus the same has been upheld. Aggrieved thereby the appeal
has been preferred.
It was submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that there was no public purpose behind the
acquisition. The mention that it was for planned development of Delhi was
absolutely vague, mention of public purpose, if any. The enquiry under
Section 5A of the Act was not properly conducted. The objection raised by
the appellant had been illegally rejected. Reliance has been placed on the
decisions with respect to the vagueness on Munshi Singh & Ors. vs. Union
of India [(1973)2 SCC 337] and with respect to the entitlement of tenants
to question the acquisition, reliance has been placed on the decision of
this court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Krishan Lal Arneja & Ors. [(2004)8
SCC 453] in which reliance was placed upon the decision in Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development Investment Co.
(P.) Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC 501] in which it has been held that it cannot be
said that in no case of the land acquisition under the provisions of the
Act tenant cannot challenge the proceedings.
On the other hand learned counsel on behalf of the respondents
has submitted that land as has been acquired in accordance with zonal plan
for “planned development of Delhi” for institutional purposes land could be
acquired by specifying that it is being acquired for planned development of
Delhi. Learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor of
Delhi & Ors. [(1975) 4 SCC 285]. She has also referred to the decision of
this Court in Bhagat Singh vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1999) (2) SCC 384] to
submit that once the land has been acquired for planned development its
purpose can be changed at any point of time for appropriately for planned
development of the city.
Section 3(f) of the Act defines public purpose for which
acquisition can be made under the Act. The definition of public purpose is
inclusive of Section 3f(iii) contains the provisions regarding acquisition
for planned development of land from public fund in pursuance of any scheme
or policy would be for public purpose. Section 3(f) of the Act is
extracted hereunder:
“3(f) The expression “public purpose” includes -
(i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development
or improvement of existing village-sites;
(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning;
(iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public
funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent
disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale
with the object of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the
State;
(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless
or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to
persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme
undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or
controlled by the State;
(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing,
health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any
authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or,
with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local
authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in
force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law
relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any
State;
(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored
by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by
a local authority;
(viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public
office,
but does not include acquisition of land for companies.”
The scheme contained in the zonal plan for Delhi city
indicated the planned development of Delhi and the area was reserved for
institutional purposes. The word “Institution” includes educational
institute as defined in Oxford Dictionary is to the following effect:
“a large organization founded for a particular purpose, such as a
college, bank, etc.- an organization providing residential care for people
with special needs. – an official organization with an important role in a
country. 2. an established law or custom. -a well established and familiar
person or thing; he became a national institution. 3. the action of
instituting.”
It is apparent that there can be acquisition for planned
development as per zonal plan prepared under Delhi Development Act, 1957
(in short 'the Act') for institutional area, it was not necessary to
mention particular purpose, once planned development of Delhi has been
specified that to be read with the zonal plan applicable in the area in
question. Thus, it Could not be said that the Notification suffered with
any legal vice. The constitution Bench of this court in the case of
Aflatoon (supra) has considered the question where the Notification was
issued under section 4 of the act with respect to planned development of
Delhi though no doubt it was with respect to larger area, but area would
not make a difference, ultimately this court has upheld similar
Notification under Section 4, while discussing the matter, this Court held
as under:
“23.The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the
Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came
into force. It is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi
except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after
that Act came into force but there was no inhibition in acquiring land for
planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was
ready. [see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi).
In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an
area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the
local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the
land for planned development under the Acts. Section 12 is concerned only
with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of
property; acquisition generally precedes development. For planned
development in an area other than a development area, it is only necessary
to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in
section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property under the
Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. We
do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the power to
acquire the land under Section 15 was delegated by the Central Government
to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. We have already held the appellants and
the writ petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of the
notification under section 4 on the ground of laches and acquiescence. The
plea that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to initiate the
proceeding for acquisition by issuing the notification under section 4 of
the Act as section 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives that power only to
the Central Government relates primarily to the validity of the
notification. Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was not
authorized by the central Government to issue the notification under
Section 4 of the land acquisition Act, since the appellants and the writ
petitioners are precluded by their laches and acquiescence from questioning
the notification, the contention must, in any event, be negatived and we do
so.”
The reliance has been placed by learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant on Munshi Singh's case (supra) which reads as
follows:
“8. As already noticed, in the notifications under section 4 all that was
stated was that the land was required for "planned development of
the area". There was no indication whatsoever whether the development
was to be of residential and building cites or of commercial and
industrial plots nor was it possible for any one interested in the land
sought to be acquired to find out what kind of planned development was
under contemplation i.e. whether the land would be acquired and the
development made by the government or whether the owners of properties
would be required to develop a particular area in a specified
way. If the master plan which came to be sanctioned on September 4,
1962 had been available for inspection by the persons interested in
filing objections or even if the knowledge of its existence on the part
of the appellants had been satisfactorily proved the position may have been
different. In that situation the appellants could not claim that they were
unable to file objections owing to the lack of any indication in the
notification under section 4 of the nature of development for which the
area was being requisitioned. On behalf of the state it has been
pointed out that the appellants had themselves filed a copy of the master
plan which was sanctioned on September 4, 1962 and that it was a
matter of common knowledge that the master plan was under preparation.
The details relating to the master plan and the plan itself had been
published in the local newspapers and the appellants could have
easily discovered what the proposed scheme was with regard to the
development of the area in which they were interested. In view of the
peculiar circumstances of these cases we gave an opportunity to the
state to apply for amendment of its return since nothing had been
said about these matters therein and to produce additional evidence in
support of its allegations. Such a petition was filed and
certain documents were sought to be placed on the record. after a
careful consideration of the petition for amendment and the evidence
sought to be adduced we dismissed the prayer for amendment as well as for
production of additional evidence as we were not satisfied that the
documents sought to be produced were either relevant or were
required to enable this court to pronounce judgment.”
It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion made in Munshi
Singh's case (supra) that there was no master plan/zonal plan in vogue in
the area. Thus when there was no plan for the area, in that context, this
court has observed that mention in the Notification issued under Section 4
of the act that it was acquisition for the purpose of planned development
of the area was vague as such purpose should have been mentioned. In the
Munshi Singh's case (supra) the facts were totally different and the
decision in Munshi Singh's case (supra) had been taken consideration in
the latter decision of Constitution Bench in Aflatoon's case (supra) and
the similar submission raised with respect to the vagueness of the
Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was not accepted.
This court in Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. vs. State of U.P. &
Ors. [(2010) 10 SCC 282] has also considered the concept of public purpose
under Section 3(f) of the Act and it has been discussed that a purpose
complementary to public purpose is also a public purpose. When the land
had been acquired for construction of Yamuna Expressway which itself was of
public importance the acquisition of the land for Yamuna Expressway for
development of the same for commercial, amusement, industrial,
institutional and residential purposes was held to be complementary to the
creation of expressway hence amounted to acquisition for public purpose.
The planned development of Delhi is by itself a public purpose. The
submission raised by the appellant is thus liable to be rejected.
In view of the decision on merits, we need not go into the
question as to whether the petition was maintainable at the instance of the
petitioners on the strength of the lease deed. The fact remains that owner
has not chosen at any point of time to question it.
The acquisition is for public purpose. In our opinion, there
was no vagueness in the Notification. It could not be said that particular
property has been plucked out as there is no allegation of any malafide
attributed in the matter of acquisition. it was as per zonal plan which is
binding upon all concerned and could not be departed to having been issued
under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957.
Thus we find no force in the appeal. The same is liable to be and
is hereby dismissed. No costs.
................J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
...............J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 29, 2017