LILAWATI AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND
Supreme Court of India (Full Bench (FB)- Three Judge)
Appeal (Civil), 1363 of 2007, Judgment Date: Apr 01, 2016
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1363 OF 2007
Lilawati Agarwal (D) By Lrs. Appellant(s)
and Others
Versus
State of Jharkhand Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Lilawati Agarwal (Dead) By Lrs.
and Others vs. State of Jharkhand[1], after referring to the paragraphs 31
and 34 of the pronouncement in Union of India and Another vs. Raghubir
Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc.[2], expressed doubt with regard to the
correctness of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan (II) vs. State of Kerala
and Others[3] and eventually expressed thus:-
“In Raghubir Singh case two terminus points were fixed i.e. award by the
Collector or decision of the Reference Court must have been taken between 3-
4-1982 and 24-9-1984. It has been clearly stated in the last line of para
34 that every case “must” have been decided between the aforesaid terminus.
In Paripoornan II case at para 4 it was observed that restrictive
interpretation should not be given. With great respect we are unable to
subscribe to the view. As a matter of fact a three-Judge Bench was trying
to give an interpretation different from what was specifically given by the
Constitution Bench.
Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench to
consider correctness of the view expressed in para 4 in Paripoornan II case
holding that a restricted interpretation should not be given, on the face
of what has been stated in para 34 of Raghubir Singh case. Records may be
placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for necessary details.”
On the basis of the aforesaid order, the matter has been placed
before us.
2. As we perceive, it is necessary to express an opinion whether the
correctness of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan (II) deserves to be
considered by a Constitution Bench as the pronouncement in the said case is
binding on us.
3. To appreciate the controversy, we think it appropriate to reproduce
paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 from Raghubir Singh (supra):-
“30. We now come to the merits of the reference. The reference is limited
to the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act of 1984. Before the enactment of the Amendment Act, solatium was
provided under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly, "the
parent Act") at 15% on the market value of the Land computed in accordance
with Section 23(1) of the Act, the solatium being provided in consideration
of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition Amendment
Bill, 1982 was introduced in the House of the People on 30 April, 1982 and
upon enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 commenced operation
with effect from 24 September, 1984. Section 15 of the Amendment Act
amended Section 23(2) of the parent Act and substituted the words '30 per
centum' in place of the words '15 per centum'. Parliament intended that the
benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available albeit to a
limited degree, even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before
that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by enacting Section 30(2)
in the Amendment Act, Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act provides:
"(2) the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 23......of the principal
Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15........of this Act .......
shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation
to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the
High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the
provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date
of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the
House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act.”
31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the
award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the
Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award made by the
Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original
Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it
by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt
that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in
respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and 24
September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended
by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April
1982 and .24 September 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award
made before 30 April, 1982.
xxxxx xxxxx
34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v.
Mohinder Singh[4], but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which
persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult
to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges
who decided Bhag Singh[5], but the judgment in Bhag Singh, (supra) as we
have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material
provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance
with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal
is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of
reference under-Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a
general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory
provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously
relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the
original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in
invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out
that the word 'or' has been used in Section 30(2), as a disjunctive between
the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order
passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says,
properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24
September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High
Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector
or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the
benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or
the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of
the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the
Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word 'or' is
used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time
when the benefit under-Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the
proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court
made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be
applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the
proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the
Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will
be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court
must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.”
[Emphasis supplied]
4. In Raghubir Singh (supra), the question of law referred to the
Constitution Bench was:-
“Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the claimants are entitled to solatium at
30 per cent of the market value irrespective of the dates on which the
acquisition proceedings were initiated or the dates on which the award had
been passed?”
5. In the said case, the award with regard to compensation was passed by
the Collector in March, 1963 and the reference under Section 18 of the Act
was disposed of by the Additional District Judge on June 10, 1968. The
reference court had enhanced the compensation granted by the Collector
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, ‘the Act’). The
claimant had preferred an appeal to the High Court claiming further
compensation. During the pendency of the appeal, the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982 was introduced in the Parliament on April 30, 1982
and became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 when it
received the assent of the President on September 24, 1984. The High Court
disposed of the appeal by its judgment and order dated December 6, 1984.
While it raised the rate of compensation it also raised the rate of
interest payable on the compensation and taking into account the amendment
Act, awarded solatium at 30%. The judgment and order of the High Court was
under assail before this Court and a two-Judge Bench keeping in view the
decisions in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer[6],
and Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh[7] thought it apt to refer
the matter to a larger Bench which ultimately resulted in the verdict in
Raghubir Singh (supra).
6. To understand the dictum in Raghubir Singh (supra), it is necessary
to understand what was stated in Bhag Singh (supra) and what has been
overruled in Raghubir Singh (supra). In Bhag Singh (supra) a three-Judge
Bench was dealing with the question of law relating to interpretation of
Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. In the said case, the award was passed
by the land acquisition collector on October 9, 1975 and the reference
court had passed the award on July 31, 1979. The award passed by the
reference court was assailed in appeal before the High Court. The three-
Judge Bench considered the decisions in State of Punjab v. Mohinder
Singh[8] and K. Kamalajammanniavaru (supra) and agreed with the view
expressed in Mohinder Singhis case and recorded therein disagreement with
the view taken in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (supra). Be it stated, the three-
Judge Bench in Bhag Singh (supra) while agreeing with the earlier three-
Judge Bench decision has opined thus:-
“We may first consider what would be the position if Section 30 sub-section
(2) were not enacted and the amendments in Section 23 subsection (2) and
Section 28 were effective only from the date on which they were made,
namely, September 24, 1984 when the Amending Act received the assent of the
President and was brought into force. If at the date of the commencement of
the Amending Act, any proceedings for determination of compensation were
pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or before the
court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the amended Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 would admittedly be applicable to such
proceedings. This much indeed was conceded by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents and even in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra)
it was accepted to be the correct position. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking on
behalf of the Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra) observed (SCC p.
584): “The new Section 23(2), of course, necessarily applies to awards made
by the Collector or court after the commencement” of the Amending Act. …”
7. Regard being had to the both the aspects, it is imperative to
understand the issue that was referred to the Constitution Bench. As is
noticeable, the larger Bench observed that the reference was limited to
the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. The Constitution
Bench noted the intention of the Parliament, referred to Section 30(2) of
the Amendment Act and in that context opined that:-
“32. The question is: What is the meaning of the words “or to any order
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such
award?” Are they limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals
against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents,
appeals disposed of between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 even though arising out
of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We are of
opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be
preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified
the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by
describing it as an appeal against “any such award”. The submission on
behalf of the respondents is that the words “any such award” mean the award
made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and
that in this context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order in
appeal is an appellate order made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 — in
which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been
made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the words “any such award” cannot bear
the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such
words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High
Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the
existing hierarchical structure of fora contemplated in the parent Act
those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the
award of the Collector or of the Court. The words “any such award” are
intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those
words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer
to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.
In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of
the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the
Court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 or to appeals against such
awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the
decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9-
1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the
Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-
1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached [pic]by
this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer1,
and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v.
Union Territory of Chandigarh2. The expanded meaning given to Section 30(2)
in the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the
language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges in
that case missed the significance of the word “such” in the collocation
“any such award” in Section 30(2). Due significance must be attached to
that word, and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to
the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced
solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of
the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984”.
8. The aforesaid larger Bench decision, as we find, was only concerned
with the grant of solatium in respect of the award passed between two
dates, namely, April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. The issue before the
Constitution Bench was not relatable to any award as such passed after the
amended date.
9. In K.S. Paripoornan (II) (supra), the three-Judge Bench appreciated
the law laid down in Raghubir Singh’s case and referred to Section 30(2) of
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) which was a
transitory provision and reproduced paragraph 31 of the Constitution Bench
judgment and then proceeded to state thus:-
“This Court thereby clearly held that even in the pending reference made
before 30-4-1982, if the civil court makes an award between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984, Section 30(2) gets attracted and thereby the enhanced solatium
was available to the claimants. Since Section 30(2) deals with both the
amendments to Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Principal Act by Section
15(b) and Section 18, respectively, of the Amendment Act by parity of the
reasoning the same ratio applies to the awards made by the civil court
between those dates. The conflict of decisions as to whether Section 23(2)
as amended by Section 15(b) of the Amendment Act through Section 30(2) of
the transitory provisions would be applicable to the pending appeals in the
High Court and the Supreme Court was resolved in Raghubir Singh case 1 by
the Constitution Bench holding that the award of the Collector or the court
made between 13-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 would alone get attracted to Section
30(2) of the transitory provision. The restricted interpretation should not
be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would not apply to the award of
the civil court pending at the time when the Act came into force or
thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award of the civil court was made
after the Act had come into force, namely, 28-2-1985.”
10. On a perusal of the principle stated in Raghubir Singh case and what
has been clarified in K.S. Paripoornan (II) case, we do not find that the
three-Judge Bench decision runs counter to the authority in the
Constitution Bench. It also does not give a different interpretation to
Section 30(2) that what has been stated by the Constitution Bench. In fact,
K.S. Paripoornan (II) clearly postulates about the awards that have been
passed by the court after the Act has come into force which is in
consonance with the ratio laid down in Raghubir Singh’s case. The three-
Judge Bench has only observed that the restricted interpretation placed by
the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh (supra) should not convey that
Section 23(2) would not apply to the awards of the civil court pending at
the time when the Act came into force or thereafter. Thus, the controversy
with which the three-Judge Bench was dealing with was absolutely different
and the view expressed by it is absolutely in accord with the principles
laid down in Raghubir Singh’s case. Additionally, it is also in
consonance with the provisions contained in Section 23(2) of the Act.
Therefore, we do not see any reason to disagree with the view expressed in
K.S. Paripoornan (II) as we are of the convinced opinion that it has
appositely understood the rule exposited in Raghubir Singh’s case.
11. Having so stated, ordinarily we would have directed the matter to be
placed before a two-Judge Bench, but it is not necessary to do so. We have
been apprised at the Bar that the award in this case had been passed by the
reference court on 30th September, 1985. Therefore, there cannot be any
trace of doubt that principle stated in K.S. Paripoornan (II) would
squarely be applicable.
12. The High Court by the impugned judgment has opined that the principle
stated in the K.S. Paripoornan (II) (supra) would not be applicable. The
said view is perceptibly erroneous. We are of the considered opinion that
the appellant shall be entitled to the benefits as per the law laid down in
K.S. Paripoornan (II). It is not disputed at the Bar that the appellants
are not entitled to the benefits under Section 23(1A) in view of the
decision in K.S. Paripoornan (I) vs. State of Kerala[9].
13. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of another
aspect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sunder vs. Union of
India[10] has opined that:-
“24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the position further
clear. The proviso says that "if such compensation" is not paid within one
year from the date of taking possession of the land, interest shall stand
escalated to 15% per annum from the date of expiry of the said period of
one year "on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been
paid or deposited before the date of such expiry". It is inconceivable that
the solatium amount would attract only the escalated rate of interest from
the expiry of one year and that there would be no interest on solatium
during the preceding period. What the legislature intended was to make the
aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the hands of the
person as and when the award is passed, at any rate as soon as he is
deprived of the possession of his land. Any delay in making payment of the
said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum until he
receives the payment. Splitting up the compensation into different
components for the purpose of payment of interest under Section 34 was not
in the contemplation of the legislature when that section was framed or
enacted.
xxx xxx xxx
27. In our view the aforesaid statement of law is in accord with the
sound principle of interpretation. Hence the person entitled to the
compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the aggregate
amount including solatium. The reference is answered accordingly.”
14. We have referred to the aforesaid authority by abundant caution so
that the respondent while computing the amount shall take the same into
consideration. Needless to say, in case the respondent do not comply with
the judgment, execution can be levied and at that juncture this aspect can
also be taken note of as it forms a part of the decree.
15. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and it is directed that the
appellants shall be entitled to the benefits as stated herein-above. The
judgment and the decree passed by the High Court stands modified. The
respondents are directed to deposit the amount before the executing court
within six weeks hence. If any amount has already been deposited, that
shall be taken into consideration while computing the amount. In the
fact and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
..............................J.
(Dipak Misra)
…..........................J.
(V. Gopala Gowda)
…..........................J.
(Kurian Joseph)
New Delhi
April 01, 2016.
-----------------------
[1] (2008 15 SCC 464
[2] (1989) 2 SCC 754
[3] (1995) 1 SCC 367
[4] (1986) 1 SCC 365
[5] (1985) 3 SCC 737
[6] (1985) 1 SCC 582
[7] (1985) 3 SCC 737
[8] Civil Appeal No. 3267 of 1979 decided on May 1, 1985
[9] (1994) 5 SCC 593
[10] (2001) 7 SCC 211