K.K.SINGHAL & ORS. Vs. STEEL STRIPS LTD : Supreme Court-Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 417, 418 and 420 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code
Supreme Court of India
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2546 OF 2014 Judgment Date: Dec 09, 2014
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2546 OF 2014
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6033 of 2008]
K.K. Singhal & Ors. ...Appellants
:Versus:
Steel Strips Ltd.
...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against an order passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Misc. No. 35963-M of 2001, whereby
the High Court dismissed the application filed by the appellants under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint
filed under Sections 417, 418 and 420 read with Section 120-B of the Indian
Penal Code and the summoning order dated 14.6.2001 passed by the Judicial
Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh .
The basis of the filing of the application relates to issuance of 33
cheques by the appellants during the course of its business aggregating to
Rs.2,40,64,022.19 paise in consideration of the payment against steel
billets and rolled products supplied to them by the complainant/respondent.
On presentation, all the cheques were dishonoured on different dates
culminating in lodging of 26 complaints against the appellants for the
commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Upon notice, the appellants filed an application under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court for
quashing the said complaints.
The appellants on 22.7.1998 requested the complainant that he had material
worth Rs. 1 crore for disposal in the shape of forging of steel flanges
which he would dispose of and would make the payment of the amount to the
complainant and requested the complainant to find out a customer. At the
request of the complainant, M/s. Uma Shanker Khandelwal and Company
Limited, New Delhi agreed to purchase the material from the appellants.
The appellants agreed to pay the entire consideration to the respondent and
in turn directed the said company to pay the consideration directly to the
complainant against all the deliveries. The appellants further promised to
clear the balance outstanding by arranging funds from its source. Relying
upon such allurement and inducement of the appellants, the respondent
agreed to withdraw all the complaints except one. It appears as per
promise, the appellants supplied flanges to said M/s. Uma Shanker
Khandelwal and Company for an amount of Rs.31,22,524/- only and directed
that the amount be paid directly to the respondent.
The appellants thereafter induced the respondent to withdraw the 25
complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, on
the plea that the appellants would pay the entire consideration to the
respondent. The appellants also withdrew the said application filed under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. from the High Court. However, after withdrawal
of all the complaints by the respondent, the appellants neither took any
step to pay the amount nor kept his commitment.
In these circumstances, after recording the preliminary evidence, the trial
court by an order dated 12.6.2001 issued summons against the appellants as
accused for commission of offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal
Code. The appellants filed an application for quashing of the said summons
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing in support of this
appeal first contended that the Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh had no
territorial jurisdiction since the agreement between the parties was
entered into on 24.7.1998 at Faridabad. He further contended that the
appellants having its place of business at Faridabad, it is the Court at
Faridabad, which would have jurisdiction. His basic structure of the
submission was that the dispute is nothing but a civil dispute and thereby
jurisdiction lies at Faridabad. Secondly, he contended that since the
dispute is of civil nature, the offence of cheating cannot be attracted in
the facts of this case. According to him, there is no intention to
deceive, therefore, the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating
was not present in this case. Thirdly, he submitted that it is based on
breach of contract between the parties on the ground that the agreement was
not performed. Therefore, it attracts the breach of contract and nothing
else. Lastly, he contended that the appellant No.3 is an old man of 85
years, being the father of appellant No.1 and further he had no involvement
in the functioning of the company, which would be evident from his non-
appearance at the time of agreement entered into between the parties on
24.7.1998.
On the contrary, Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for
the complainant/respondent drew our attention to the facts of the case and
pointed out that right from the beginning, the appellants had the intention
to induce the respondent to enter into a compromise despite the fact that
they approached the Board of Directors, who passed the resolution on
3.7.1998, and came to the conclusion that net worth of the company has been
eroded and has become a sick industrial company within the meaning of
Section 3(1)(O) of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
and passed a resolution only to by-pass their liability. Furthermore, the
company unit was declared as sick on the one hand; on the other hand, they
entered into a compromise dated 24.7.1993 and assured the
complainant/respondent that they had the stock worth Rs. 1 crore. He
contended that the said fact would attract Section 415 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 which would show that the intention of the appellants is to
cheat the respondent. He further pointed out that a complaint under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the company
proceedings cannot be stayed since Section 22 or Section 22A of the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act has nothing to do with the
criminal prosecution. He further pointed out that it was not the case of
the appellants that the cheques, which were bounced, were payable at
Faridabad only. Further, all the complaints were filed by the complainant
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act at Chandigarh, for the
reason that the head office of the company is at Chandigarh and the
compromise was also arrived at Chandigarh. On the basis of the compromise,
the complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were
withdrawn from the Court at Chandigarh. Therefore, according to him, the
question of jurisdiction as raised by the appellants, is of no consequence
and the same will be decided by the trial court during the trial. He
further pointed out that the motive and conduct of the appellants was mala
fide and hence he narrated that the appellants tried to deceive the
complainants in a planned way, to get rid of the criminal liability and
decided to move to BIFR under Sick Industrial Companies Act thereby
avoiding civil liability. Each and every steps of the appellants is
nothing but calculated and with an intent to deceive the
respondent/complainant. Hence, he submitted that the High Court correctly
dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after weighing the
material placed before us, we cannot accept the contention of Dr. Dhawan
that the Court at Chandigarh had no jurisdiction. It appears that on the
question of territorial jurisdiction, the submissions made on behalf of the
respondent/complainant have substance. In our opinion, the agreement was
entered into at Chandigarh to withdraw the criminal proceedings, the
complainant having its head office at Chandigarh and further nowhere the
appellants have made out a case that all the cheques were payable at
Faridabad. Therefore, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the
question of jurisdiction is of no consequence, which would be decided by
the trial court. The second point, which was urged by Dr. Dhawan that the
dispute is of civil nature, cannot be allowed to stand at this stage after
taking into account the conduct of the appellants.
We do not find any reason to accept the contention of Dr.
Dhawan on the ground that the intention of the appellants is absolutely
clear from their actions, which they followed to allure the complainant to
withdraw the 25 complaints filed by them under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. We do not wish to express our views further,
but we are not in a position to accept such contention of Dr. Dhawan and
further the question of non-performance of the contract tentamounts to
breach of contract as sought to be stated by Dr. Dhawan, also cannot be
accepted in the teeth of the facts placed before us at this stage.
Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the orders passed
by the High Court. We find no merits in the appeal. The appeal is
dismissed. The Trial Court shall decide the matter in question without
being influenced, in any manner whatsoever, by the observations made by us.
.........................................J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
.........................................J.
(Pinaki Chandra
Ghose)
New Delhi;
December 09, 2014.