JAYA BISWAL & ORS. Vs. BRANCH MANAGER, IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR.

Tags Compensation

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 869 of 2016, Judgment Date: Feb 04, 2016

| REPORTABLE |

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.869 OF 2016
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 1903 of 2015)

JAYA BISWAL & ORS. ………APPELLANTS

Vs.

BRANCH MANAGER, IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR. ………RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.
The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated
13.08.2014 passed in F.A.O. No. 472 of 2013 by the High Court of Orissa at
Cuttack, wherein the learned single Judge reduced the amount of
compensation awarded to the appellants by the learned Commissioner for
Employees’ Compensation from Rs.10,75,253/- to Rs.6,00,000/- and also
waived the award of 50% penalty with interest.

The brief facts of the case required to appreciate the rival legal
contentions advanced on behalf of the parties are stated here under:
The elder son of appellant Nos. 1 and 2 worked as a truck driver with one
Bikram Keshari Patnaik (respondent no. 2 herein). On 19.07.2011, he met
with an accident while on his way to deliver wheat bags in the truck from
Berhampur, Orissa to Paralakhemundi, Andhra Pradesh. He sustained severe
injuries on the back of his head and died on the spot. The cleaner of the
truck, who was present at the time of the accident, gave information
regarding the accident to the Mandasa Police Station, Srikakulam, whose
personnel reached the spot and conducted the inquest, prepared the
panchnama and sent the body of the deceased for post mortem. The cleaner
also informed the father of the deceased (Appellant No.1 herein), who made
arrangements for taking the dead body of his son back to the native village
for cremation. On 03.11.2011, the appellants, being the father, mother and
younger brother of the deceased, filed claim petition W.C. Case No. 61 of
2011 before the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation,
Berhampur, Ganjam District. The claim of the appellants was that the
deceased was aged around 26 years at the time of death and had died while
he was in and during the course of employment of respondent no. 2 herein.
They claimed that he was getting monthly wages at Rs.4,000/- per month,
daily bhatta (allowance) at Rs.200/- which comes to Rs.6,000/- per month,
along with additional trip benefit amounting to Rs.3,000/-, the total
amounting to Rs.13,000/- per month. On this basis, they claimed a lump sum
of Rs.18,00,000/- as pecuniary damages towards loss of past and future
wages and loss of earning. They claimed additional amount of Rs.20,000/-
towards funeral expenses, Rs.30,000/- towards mental agony, physical shock
and pain, and Rs.50,000/- towards expectation of life and Rs.1,00,000/-
towards loss of estate, inconvenience and hardships caused to the family
members of the deceased on account of the death of deceased.

In response, the owner of the truck, respondent no.2 herein filed a Written
Statement and denied his liability. He claimed that he was not liable to
compensate the deceased as he had died on the spot due to his own
negligence, as he had tried to enter the vehicle while it was in motion.
Respondent no. 2 also contended that in any case he is not liable to pay
the amount as claimed by the appellants. He submitted in the Written
Statement that he has been paying only Rs. 100/- per day as wages, and Rs.
50/- per day as bhatta. Further, he had already given financial assistance
to the father of the deceased for the cremation. The learned Employees
Compensation - cum- Assistant Labour Commissioner considered the above
aspect of the matter at length and arrived at the conclusion that the
deceased was working in the employment of Respondent no.2 at the time of
his death and that he had lost his life in an accident caused during and in
the course of his employment with Respondent no.2. The learned Commissioner
relied upon the testimony of the witnesses to construct the following chain
of events leading up to the accident:
“The deceased was working as a driver in truck No. OR 15J-1047 owned by the
O.P.I……On 19-07-2011 at about 4.30 A.M., the deceased received personal
back head injury near Sandhigam village by vehicular accident arising out
of and in course of his employment as a driver of the truck No. OR 15J-1047
which was loaded with wheat bags. He along with the cleaner Sarada Prasana
Patnaik loaded the said wheat bags on 18-07-2011 at about 11.30 P.M. at
godown. On the way, they stopped and kept the vehicle and took the rest and
slept there on 18-07-2011. Another truck bearing No. OR 07B-8791 which was
also followed with the offending vehicle had also halted and stopped there
along with them. They all had taken rest and slept there and got up early
morning at about 4.30 A.M. on 19.07.2011 and started to proceed to
Paralakhemundi for unloading the goods. While to proceed, the deceased had
started the vehicle but the vehicle did not start. Hence, the deceased and
the cleaner got down from the vehicle and checked the battery box and
removed the wooden log piece kept for obstructing the right wheel of the
said truck. After removal of the wooden log piece, the vehicle moved to run
down. The deceased saw that the vehicle was moving ahead, he immediately
climbed into the vehicle through the iron stepping of the truck, but
unfortunately, he fell down from the truck and sustained severe and
grievous bleeding injuries on the back side of the head and died at the
spot. The vehicle proceeded few distance on the public road and capsized in
the field. Thereafter, he and the cleaner of the vehicle saw the condition
of the deceased and had consulted with the village Revenue Officer of
Sandigam village and told the fact. They immediately reported the matter to
the police, Mandasa Police Station and informed the same to the O.P.I as
well as to the father of the deceased.”

Further, Respondent no.2 had also admitted before the learned Commissioner
that the death of the deceased had occurred due to an accident arising out
of and during the course of the employment for which a compromise was
sought to be reached by Respondent no.2 with the appellants, to the amount
of Rs.3,50,000/-. Accordingly, the learned Commissioner came to the
conclusion that the deceased was an ‘employee’ within the meaning of the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the “E.C.
Act”) and had died in an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment under Respondent no.2. The learned Commissioner, relying on the
date of birth of the deceased as 01.07.1984, as mentioned in the driver’s
license and Transfer Certificate, came to the conclusion that the age of
the deceased was 27 years at the time of the accident. On the question of
the monthly wages being earned by the deceased at the time of his death,
the learned Commissioner concluded that the contentions advanced by
Respondent no.2 that he was being paid wages of Rs. 100/- per day and
bhatta of Rs. 50/- per day cannot be believed. The vehicle in which the
accident had occurred possessed a National Route Permit, and the deceased
often drove the vehicle to destinations outside the state. He was also a
highly skilled workman. In the light of the said fact stated by the
appellants, the wages of Rs.4,000/- per month and bhatta of Rs.200/- per
day and trip charges of Rs.3,000/- per month (i.e.Rs.13,000/- per month)
seemed genuine. Accordingly, the learned Commissioner calculated the
compensation as under:
Rs.8,000/- (wage limited to) x 50% x 213.57 (27 years of age factor)
= Rs.8,54,280/-
The learned Commissioner further awarded an interest @ 12% per annum to the
appellants from the date of accident, as well as Rs.20,000/- as the cost of
proceedings, the total amount of compensation thus coming to Rs. 10, 75,
253/-.

Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Company filed an appeal under Section
30 of the E.C. Act before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. The learned
single Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the award passed by the
learned Commissioner. The learned single Judge of the High Court held as
under:
“Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties
and keeping in view the findings of the Commissioner as given in the
impugned award with regard to the quantum of compensation amount awarded
and the basis on which the same has been arrived at, I feel, the interest
of justice would be best served, if the awarded compensation amount of
Rs.10,75,253/- is modified and reduced to Rs.6,00,000/- However the award
of 50% penalty with interest @12% per annum is not proper and justified and
the same is accordingly waived. Accordingly, the claimants are entitled to
modified compensation amount of Rs.6,00,000/- on which no penalty or
interest is payable. The impugned award is modified to the said extent
only.”

The present appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the
correctness of impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.

Mr. Alakh Alok Srivastava, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants contends that the High Court committed a grave error in
entertaining an appeal under Section 30(1) of the E.C. Act, which reads as
under:
“30. Appeals (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following
orders of a Commissioner namely:-
(a) an order as awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of
redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in
full or in part for a lump sum;”

*************************************

The proviso to the Section reads as under:
“Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial
question of law is involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other
than an order such is referred to in clause (b) unless the amount in
dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees…”
(emphasis laid by this Court)

The learned counsel contends that the High Court could not have entertained
the appeal under Section 30(1) of the E.C. Act in the light of the fact
that no substantial question of law was involved in the
appeal. The learned counsel places reliance on a decision of this Court in
the case of T.S. Shylaja v. Oriental Insurance Co. & Anr.[1], wherein this
Court held that the High Court committed an error in entertaining an appeal
against the decision of the Compensation Commissioner without answering or
framing any substantial question of law. In that case, this Court held as
under:
“10. The only reason which the High Court has given to upset the above
finding of the Commissioner is that the Commissioner could not blindly
accept the oral evidence without analysing the documentary evidence on
record. We fail to appreciate as to what was the documentary evidence which
the High Court had failed to appreciate and what was the contradiction, if
any, between such documents and the version given by the witnesses examined
before the Commissioner. The High Court could not have, without adverting
to the documents vaguely referred to by it have upset the finding of fact
which the Commissioner was entitled to record. Suffice it to say that apart
from appreciation of evidence adduced before the Commissioner the High
Court has neither referred to nor determined any question of law much less
a substantial question of law existence whereof was a condition precedent
for the maintainability of any appeal under Section 30. Inasmuch as the
High court remained oblivious of the basic requirement of law for the
maintainability of an appeal before it and inasmuch as it treated the
appeal to be one on facts it committed an error which needs to be
corrected.”

The learned counsel further places reliance on the decision of this Court
in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan & Anr.[2], wherein it
was held that an appeal under Section 30 of the E.C. Act would be
maintainable subject to the limitations placed under Section 30 itself.

The learned counsel further contends that the High Court patently erred in
waiving off the 50% penalty alongwith the 12% interest payable by
Respondent No.1 in case of default without assigning the cogent reason. The
learned counsel places reliance on a Four Judge Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata[3], wherein
this Court held that the amount of compensation is payable from the date of
accident and not from the date of award. The same was reiterated by a
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company
Ltd.v. Siby George & Ors.[4], wherein after referring to several decisions
of the Court, it was held that:
“In the light of the decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K.,
it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due
only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which
the claim application is made.”

The learned counsel further contends that the High Court committed an error
in reducing the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Commissioner
without assigning any cogent reasons. Further, there was no discussion in
the impugned judgment as to whether there was any connection between the
death of the deceased and the use of the offending vehicle. The learned
counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of
Harijan Mangri Siddakka & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.[5],
wherein it was held as under:
“We find that there is practically no discussion on the factual scenario as
to whether there was any connection between the death and the use of the
vehicle. It would depend upon the factual scenario in each case and there
cannot be any strait jacket formula to be applied.”

The learned counsel further contends that the deceased had died as a result
of an injury sustained in an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Mackinnon
Mackenzie & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohd. Issak[6], wherein it was held as
under:
“To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and
in the course of employment. The words "in the course of the employment"
mean "in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and
which is incidental to it." The words "arising out of employment" are
understood to mean that during the course of the employment, injury has
resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, when,
unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe
the workman would not otherwise have suffered.
In other words, there must be a causal relationship between the accident
and the employment. The expression "arising out of employment" is again not
confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to
employment as such-- to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its
incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought
within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises
"out of employment." To put it differently, if the accident had occurred or
account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for
compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself
to an added peril by his own imprudent act.”

The learned counsel contends that the judgment of the High Court thus being
wholly and patently erroneous is liable to be set aside and the order of
award of compensation passed by the learned Commissioner be restored.
On the other hand, Mr. K.K. Bhat, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent Insurance Company contends that the High Court has been
compassionate and reasonable in allowing even the amount of compensation it
did award, considering the fact situation of the case on hand. In fact, the
appellants are not entitled to any compensation whatsoever when the
deceased himself was solely negligent and responsible for the accident
which resulted in his death. The learned counsel places reliance on the
three judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Khenyei v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd.[7], wherein it was held as under:
“In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself
contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries
sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence……”

The learned counsel further contends that the Insurance Company is not
liable to pay the penalty in any case. He places reliance on the decision
of this Court in the case of Ved Prakash v. Premi Devi & Ors.[8], wherein
this Court held as under:
“In other words the insurance company will be liable to meet the claim for
compensation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the
Workmen's Commissioner under the Compensation Act on the conjoint operation
of Section 3 and Section 4-A Sub-section (3)(a) of the Compensation Act. So
far as additional amount of compensation by way of penalty imposed on the
insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner under Section 4A(3)(b) is
concerned, however, the insurance company would not remain liable to
reimburse the said claim and it would be the liability of the insured
employer alone.”

We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties.
We are unable to agree with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent Insurance Company.

The E.C. Act is a welfare legislation enacted to secure compensation to the
poor workmen who suffer from injuries at their place of work. This becomes
clear from a perusal of the preamble of the Act which reads as under:
“An Act to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their
workmen of compensation for injury by accident.”

This further becomes clear from a perusal of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, which reads as under:
“……The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing
use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, alongwith the
comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that
they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from
accidents.
An additional advantage of legislation of this type is that by increasing
the importance for the employer of adequate safety devices, it reduces the
number of accidents to workmen in a manner that cannot be achieved by
official inspection. Further, the encouragement given to employers to
provide adequate medical treatment for their workmen should mitigate the
effects to such accidents as do occur. The benefits so conferred on the
workman added to the increased sense of security which he will enjoy,
should render industrial life more attractive and thus increase the
available supply of labour. At the same time, a corresponding increase in
the efficiency of the average workman may be expected.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)

Thus, the E.C. Act is a social welfare legislation meant to benefit the
workers and their dependents in case of death of workman due to accident
caused during and in the course of employment should be construed as such.
Section 3 of the E.C. Act provides for employer’s liability for
compensation and reads as:
“ 3 (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment his employer shall be liable to pay
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter”
(emphasis laid by this Court)

The liability of the employer, thus, arises, when the workman sustains
injuries in an accident which arises out of and in the course of his
employment. In the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation & Anr. v.
Francis De Costa & Anr.[9], a Three Judge Bench of this Court held as
under:
“In the case of Dover Navigation Company Limited v. Isabella Craig 1940
A.C. 190, it was observed by Lord Wright that-
Nothing could be simpler than the words "arising out of and in the course
of the employment." It is clear that there are two conditions to be
fulfilled. What arises "in the course of the employment is to be
distinguished from what arises "out of the employment." The former words
relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to
causality. Not every accident which occurs to a man during the time when he
is on his employment, that is directly or indirectly engaged on what he is
employed to do, gives a claim to compensation unless it also arises out of
the employment. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does not
define. The language is simple and unqualified.
Although the facts of this case are quite dissimilar, the principles laid
down in this case, are instructive and should be borne in mind. In order to
succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an
accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and
(3) the accident must have been suffered in course of employment.”

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has also rightly
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mackinnon
Mackenzie (supra). In the facts of the instant case, the deceased was on
his way to deliver goods during the course of employment when he met with
the accident. The act to get back onto the moving truck was just an attempt
to regain control of the truck, which given the situation, any reasonable
person would have tried to do so. The accident, thus, fairly and squarely
arose out of and in the course of his employment.

The next contention which needs to be dispelled is that the appellants are
not entitled to any compensation because the deceased died as a result of
his own negligence. We are unable to agree with the same. Section 3 of the
E.C. Act does not create any exception of the kind, which permits the
employer to avoid his liability if there was negligence on part of the
workman. The reliance placed on the decisions of this Court on Contributory
negligence like the Three Judge Bench decision in the case of Mastaan
(supra) is wholly misplaced as the same have been passed in relation to the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and have no bearing on the facts of the case on
hand. The E.C. Act does not envisage a situation where the compensation
payable to an injured or deceased workman can be reduced on account of
contributory negligence. It has been held by various High Courts that mere
negligence does not disentitle a workman to compensation. Lord Atkin in the
case of Harris v. Assosciated Portland Cement Manufacturers
Ltd.[10]observed as under:
"Once you have found the work which he is seeking to be within his
employment the question of negligence, great or small, is irrelevant and no
amount of negligence in doing an employment job can change the workman's
action into a non-employment job ... In my opinion if a workman is doing an
act which is within the scope of his employment in a way which is negligent
in any degree and is injured by a risk incurred only by that way of doing
it he is entitled to compensation."

The above reasoning has been subsequently adopted by several High Courts.
In the case of Janaki Ammal v. Divisional Engineer[11],the High Court of
Madras held as under:
“Men who are employed to work in factories and elsewhere are human beings,
not machines. They are subject to human imperfections. No man can be
expected to work without ever allowing his attention to wander, without
ever making a mistake, or slip, without at some period in his career being
momentarily careless. Imperfections of this and the like nature form the
ordinary hazards of employment and bring a case of this kind within the
meaning of the Act.”

While no negligence on part of the deceased has been made out from the
facts of the instant case as he was merely trying his best to stop the
truck from moving unmanned, even if there were negligence on his part, it
would not disentitle his dependents from claiming compensation under the
Act.

Thus, what becomes clear from the preceding discussion is that the deceased
died in an accident which arose in and during the course of employment. The
learned counsel for the appellants has rightly placed reliance on the
decision of this Court in the case of T.S. Shylaja (supra), wherein
referring to proviso of Section 30 of the E.C. Act, this Court held as
under:
“What is important is that in terms of the 1st proviso, no appeal is
maintainable against any order passed by the Commissioner unless a
substantial question of law is involved. This necessarily implies that the
High Court would in the ordinary course formulate such a question or at
least address the same in the judgment especially when the High Court takes
a view contrary to the view taken by the Commissioner.”

In the light of the well reasoned and elaborate order of award of
compensation, the High Court could not have reduced the compensation amount
by more than half by merely mentioning that it is in the ‘interest of
justice’. It was upon the High Court to explain how exactly depriving the
poor appellants, who have already lost their elder son, of the rightful
compensation would serve the ends of justice.

Since neither of the parties produced any document on record to prove the
exact amount of wages being earned by the deceased at the time of the
accident, to arrive at the amount of wages, the learned Commissioner took
into consideration the fact that the deceased was a highly skilled workman
and would often be required to undertake long journeys outside the state in
the line of duty, especially considering the fact that the vehicle in
question had a registered National Route Permit. The wages of the deceased
were accepted as Rs.4,000/- per month + daily bhatta of Rs.6,000/- per
month, which amounts to a total of Rs.10,000/-. The High Court did not give
any reason on which basis it interfered with the finding recorded by the
Commissioner on the aspect of monthly wages earned by the deceased. The
impugned judgment does not even mention what according to the High Court,
the wages of the deceased were at the time of the accident. Such an
unnecessary interference on part of the High Court was absolutely uncalled
for, especially in light of the fact that the appellant Nos.1 and 2 are old
and have lost their elder son and they have become destitutes. Further,
under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the onus is on the employer to
maintain the register and records of wages, Section 13A of which reads as
under:
“13-A. Maintenance of registers and records-
(1) Every employer shall maintain such registers and records giving such
particulars of persons employed by him, the work performed by them, the
wages paid to them, the deductions made from their wages, the receipts
given by them and such other particulars and in such form as may be
prescribed.
(2) Every register and record required to be maintained under this section
shall, for the purposes of this Act, be preserved for a period of three
years after the date of the last entry made therein.”

From a perusal of the aforementioned section it becomes clear that the onus
to maintain the wage roll was on the employer, i.e. Respondent No.2. Since
in the instant case, the employer has failed in his duty to maintain the
proper records of wages of the deceased, the appellants cannot be made to
suffer for it.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment and order of the High Court suffers
from gross infirmity as it has been passed not only in ignorance of the
decisions of this Court referred to supra, but also the provisions of the
E.C. Act and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside and accordingly
set aside.
The monthly wage of the deceased arrived at by the learned Commissioner was
Rs.10,000/-. The date of birth of the deceased according to the Driver’s
License produced on record is 01.07.1984. The date of death of the deceased
is 19.07.2011. Thus, according to Schedule IV of the E.C. Act, the
‘completed years of age on the last birthday of the employee immediately
preceding the date on which the compensation fell due’, is 27 years, the
factor for which is 213.57. Hence, the amount of compensation payable to
the appellants is calculated as under:
Rs.10,000/- x 50% x Rs.213.57 = Rs.10,67,850/-.
Funeral expenses to the tune of Rs.25,000/- are also awarded.
The total amount of compensation payable thus comes to Rs.10,92,850/-.

Further, an interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of
accident, that is 19.07.2011, is also payable to the appellants over the
above awarded amount. In light of the unnecessary litigation and the
hardship of the appellants in spending litigation to get the compensation
which was rightly due to them under the Act, we deem it fit to award the
appellants costs as Rs. 25,000/-.
Appeal is accordingly allowed. The respondent-Insurance Company is
directed to deposit the amount within six weeks from today with the
Employees Compensation Commissioner. On such deposit, he shall disperse the
same to the appellants.

…………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]

…………………………………………………………J.
[UDAY UMESH LALIT]
New Delhi,
February 4, 2016

ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.9 SECTION XV

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s).869/2016 @ SLP(C) No(s). 1903/2015

JAYA BISWAL & ORS. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

BRANCH MANAGER, IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY LTD. & ANR. Respondent(s)

Date : 04/02/2016 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT
today.

For Appellant(s)
Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathy,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
Mr. Ranjan Kumar Pandey,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the
Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit.
Leave granted.
The amount of compensation payable to the appellants is calculated as
under:
Rs.10,000/- x 50% x Rs.213.57 = Rs.10,67,850/-.
Funeral expenses to the tune of Rs.25,000/- are also awarded.
The total amount of compensation payable thus comes to Rs.10,92,850/-.
Further, an interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of
accident, that is 19.07.2011, is also payable to the appellants over the
above awarded amount. In light of the unnecessary litigation and the
hardship of the appellants in spending litigation to get the compensation
which was rightly due to them under the Act, we deem it fit to award the
appellants costs as Rs. 25,000/-.
The respondent-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the amount within
six weeks from today with the Employees Compensation Commissioner. On such
deposit, he shall disperse the same to the appellants.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment.

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1] [2] (2014) 2 SCC 587
[3] [4] (2006) 2 SCC 641
[5] [6] (1976) 1 SCC 289
[7] [8] (2012) 12 SCC 540
[9] [10] (2008) 16 SCC 115
[11] [12] (1969) 2 SCC 607
[13] [14] (2015) 9 SCC 273
[15] [16] (1997) 8 SCC 1
[17] [18] (1996) 6 SCC 1
[19] [20] 1939 AC 71
[21] [22] (1956) 2 LLJ 233

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