Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 7914 of 2015, Judgment Date: Sep 23, 2015

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7914 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.4384 OF 2013)



JAI MAHAL HOTELS PVT. LTD.                                     … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

RAJKUMAR DEVRAJ & ORS.                                       … RESPONDENTS

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7915 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.4903 OF 2013)

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7919 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.13752 OF 2013)

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7916 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.13756 OF 2013)

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7917 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.14309 OF 2013)

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7918 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.14322 OF 2013)







                    J U D G M E N T


ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.



1.    Leave granted.  The question raised in these appeals  relates  to  the
scope of power under Section 111 of  the  Companies  Act,  1956,  to  direct
rectification in the share register of a company.  The question  has  to  be
examined in the context of correctness of the view  taken  in  the  impugned
order passed by the High Court directing rectification at  the  instance  of
Respondent  No.1-Rajkumar  Devraj  and  Respondent  No.2-Rajkumari   Lalitya
Kumari (the “DR Group”), who are the son and daughter respectively  of  late
Maharaja Jagat Singh (“LMJS”) .

2.    LMJS held shares in M/s. Jai Mahal Hotels Pvt.  Ltd.,  M/s.  Ram  Bagh
Palace Hotels Pvt. Ltd., M/s Sawai Madhopur Lodge Pvt. Ltd. and M/s.  S.M.S.
Investment Corporation Pvt. Ltd.  He died on  05th  February,  1997  leaving
behind a Will dated 23rd June, 1996 in favour of  his  mother  Gayatri  Devi
(“GD”).  Succession certificate dated 19th February, 2009 was issued by  the
District Judge, Jaipur jointly in favour of GD and DR  Group.   GD  executed
transfer deed dated 27th April, 2009  in  favour  of  DR  Group.   She  also
executed Will dated 10th May, 2009 in favour of DR Group.  She died on  29th
September, 2009.  Vide letter  dated  15th  July,  2009,  DR  Group  claimed
transmission and transfer  of  shares  in  their  favour  on  the  basis  of
succession certificate dated 19th February, 2009 issued by the District  and
Sessions Judge,  Jaipur  (Civil),  transfer  deed  dated  27th  April,  2009
executed by their grand mother Gayitri Devi (“GD”) along  with  revalidation
of the letter issued by the Registrar of Companies.

3.    The application having not been accepted by the Company, the DR  Group
filed appeals before the Company Law  Board  (“CLB”),  New  Delhi.   Urvashi
Devi, grand daughter of husband of GD from another wife (“UD  Group”)  filed
application for impleadment stating that the succession  certificate  was  a
nullity.  She accepted validity of Will dated 23rd June,  1996  executed  in
favour of GD by LMJS but contested the succession certificate.  It  was  her
further case that DR Group had no right of succession in view of Will  dated
23rd June, 1996 and they were also not heirs of GD as LMJS  was  adopted  in
another family.  Further stand  was  that  since  at  the  instance  of  GD,
proceedings were stayed, succession certificate could not  be  granted  even
at her instance.  Stay granted by the High Court was in a  petition  seeking
consolidation of a probate case and succession certificate.  Section 370  of
Succession Act was also invoked.  It was also submitted that the  settlement
which was the basis of succession certificate was  not  genuine.   Her  Will
dated 10th May, 2009 was also contested.  Urvashi Devi, Prithvi Raj and  Jai
Singh also sought transfer of shares in their favour claiming  as  heirs  of
GD.  It was submitted that GD could not enter into any  settlement  contrary
to the Will dated 23rd June, 1996.  Further contention  was  that  she  died
intestate on 29th September, 2009 and that DG has been disinherited by  LMJS
in his Will dated 23rd June, 1996.
4.    Suit No.32 of 2010 was also filed by the UD Group before the  District
Judge, Jaipur, raising the dispute of succession to the estate of GD.     In
the said suit, CMA No.20 of 2010 was filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1  and  2
CPC, for temporary injunction. The application  was  dismissed  by  detailed
order dated 28th July, 2011.   In  the  said  application,  all  the  issues
raised by the UD Group were examined  prima  facie,  including  validity  of
succession  certificate  dated  19th  February,   2009.     The   Court   on
considering the rival submissions held :
“In such condition seeing the said entire facts and  circumstances  and  the
documents submitted no prima facie case is made out by  the  applicants  for
stopping the implementation of the order dated  19.02.2009  passed  in  S.A.
No.134 of 1998 by the Learned District Judge, Jaipur till  the  disposal  of
the suit.”

5.    The CLB dismissed the appeals filed by the DR Group vide  order  dated
16th March, 2011.  The Board framed following questions for consideration  :


“(i)  Whether order dated 19.02.2009  in  Succession  Case  No.134/98  is  a
nullity?

(ii)  Whether a Will exists?

(iii) Whether the alleged Will dated 23.06.1996 is required to be proved  or
disprove?

(iv)   Whether  the  probate  proceedings  in  Case  No.32/2006   could   be
dismissed/disposed of on the basis  of  a  settlement  between  the  private
parties?

(v)   Whether probate proceedings exist as on date?

(vi)  Whether construction of the Will is required?

(vii) Whether bar of Section 370 of the Indian Succession  Act  operates  in
the facts and circumstances of this case?

(viii)      Whether Sections 373, 381,  383  and  other  provisions  of  the
Indian Succession Act are applicable in the facts and circumstances of  this
case?

(ix)  Whether Late Maharaj Jagat Singh was adopted?

(x)   Who really are the legal representatives for the shares  held  in  the
sole name of the deceased?”

6.    To decide the above questions, following issues were framed :

(i)   Whether these petitions involve disputed and complicated questions  of
law and facts regarding entitlement to the  estate  of  late  Maharaj  Jagat
Singh?

(ii)  If these petitions involve complicated questions  of  law  and  facts,
whether these are maintainable before the CLB?  To be precise,  whether  the
CLB has jurisdiction in this matter or  it  is  ousted  on  account  of  the
competent court i.e. Civil Court having jurisdiction in this matter.

(iii) In case, the CLB exercising its  discretion  proceeds  to  decide  the
entitlement to shareholding attracting the provisions of sub-section (7)  of
Section 111, is the CLB competent to decide whether  the  alleged  Will   is
proved or disproved?  And as well as other questins enumerated  in  para  51
above.

(iv)  Further, can be CLB ignore that in view of the stay order of the  High
Court the order dated 19.02.2009 in  Case  No.134/98  on  which  issuing  of
Succession Certificate is based and Succession Certificate is the basis  for
the petitioners in C.P. Nos.13 to 16 to claim transmission of shares,  is  a
nullity, is it ab initio void in law, is it without jurisdiction,  is  it  a
merely nullity, it is not necessary for anybody who objects to  that  order,
to apply to set it aside, he can only rely on its invalidity when it is  set
up against him, although he has not taken steps to set it aside, such  order
cannot give rise to any right whatever not even to a  right  to  appeal,  it
can give rise to no rights and  impose  no  obligations,  the  same  can  be
ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eye of law and  it  is  not
necessary to set it aside?

(v)   Whether the order dated 19.02.2009 is unenforceable due to the bar  of
Section 370 of the Indian  Succession  Act,  1925  for  granting  Succession
Certificate in the presence of the Will?

(vi)  Can in view of Section 381  of  the  Succession  Act,  the  Succession
Certificate granted jointly in  the  name  of  the  Rajmata  and  two  grand
children be operative after the demise of the Rajmata?

(vii) Can the probate proceedings in case  No.327/06  be  dismissed  on  the
basis of a settlement between private parties?

(viii)      Can probate proceedings decide entitlement?

(ix)  Whether the CLB shall proceed to decide whether in  the  face  of  the
alleged Will disinheriting Devraj & Lalitya, Late Rajmata  can  directly  or
indirectly still make them entitle to  the  estate  of  Late  Maharaj  Jagat
Singh?

(x)   Whether in the presence of the alleged  Will  disinheriting  Devraj  &
Lalitya, the estate of Late  Maharaj  Jagat  Singh  devolve  upon  Rajkumari
Urvashi, Maharaj Prithviraj Singh, Maharaj Jai Singh  and  Maharaja  Bhawani
Singh whose case is based on adoption of Late Maharaj Jagat Singh?

(xi)  Whether the CLB can decide these questions in a  summary  jurisdiction
is the main issue to be considered in this matter?

7.    It was held that the Board could not decide the  complexity  of  facts
and law which had arisen and such questions  could  be  decided  before  the
Civil Court and not before the CLB.  In this view of the matter, the  matter
was not gone into on merits.   The  concluding  part  of  the  order  is  as
follows :
“67.   Having carefully considered the facts of the  present  case  and  the
nature of the allegations  made  by  the  parties  as  mentioned  above  and
applying the ratio of the decisions mentioned above, I am of the  view  that
such disputed and complicated questions of law and facts cannot  be  decided
by the CLB in the summary jurisdiction under Section 111 of the  Act.   Such
questions which are involved in the present case can be decided  before  the
Civil Court on the basis of the oral and  documentary  evidence  adduced  by
the parties in support of their respective cases.  The CLB is not the  forum
to adjudicate on these complicated questions of law and  facts.   The  issue
“whether the application is not maintainable on  account  of  its  involving
complicated questions of title” it is not  necessary  to  decide  the  other
issues raised in the case.  ………”

8.    DR Group moved the High Court  of  Delhi  under  Section  10F  of  the
Companies Act.  UD Group also filed appeals  before  the  High  Court.   The
High Court allowed the appeals of DR Group and dismissed  the  appeal  filed
by the UD Group. The operative part of the order passed by  the  High  Court
is as follows :
“38.   Having considered carefully, the facts of the present  case  and  the
nature of the allegations made by the respondents,  it  is  clear  that  the
alleged  disputes  raised  by  the  respondent  group  in  so  far  as   the
rectification issue is concerned are all illusory.  Admittedly these  shares
were in the name of Jagat Singh  who  had  bequeathed  them  to  his  mother
Maharani Gayatri Devi and she in terms of a settlement  arrived  at  between
her grandchildren followed  by  her  Will  had  bequeathed  the  said  share
holding thereafter in  favour  of  her  grandchildren  i.e.  the  petitioner
group. The respondents who were the cousins of  Jagat  Singh  are  not  even
claiming as legal heirs of Jagat Singh but only in  their  capacity  of  his
legal representatives; these allegations do not in  any  manner  affect  the
title of the shareholding of Jagat Singh. There is  no  involvement  of  any
fraud or forgery. Petition under Section 111 of the Companies Act  was  well
maintainable.

39. The CLB returning a finding opposite has committed an  illegality  which
is liable to be set aside. It is accordingly  set  aside.  The  order  dated
16.3.2011 is set aside; the member register of the  companies  be  rectified
in the name of the petitioner group and the petitioners  i.e.  Dev  Raj  and
Lalitya Kumari be substituted in lieu of Jagat Singh.

40.  As  noted  Supra,  the  appeals  filed  by  the  respondent  group  are
infructuous; they have supported the order of the CLB, their prayer  in  the
appeal that the shares register be rectified in their favour as  necessarily
to be dismissed as even as per their own statement, they  do  not  have  any
document  to  support  their  submission  that  they  are  entitled  to  the
rectification of the member register qua these  shares  of  Jagat  Singh  in
their favour.”

9.    Thus, the High Court held that the succession certificate  dated  19th
February, 2009 issued by the competent court had to be taken  as  conclusive
evidence under Section 381 of the Indian Succession Act.  The plea that  the
succession certificate dated 19th February, 2009 was in  violation  of  stay
order dated 20th August, 2008 was  rejected.   It  was  observed  that  stay
order was passed at the instance of GD herself whose  statement  itself  was
the basis of the order dated 19th February, 2009.  Writ Petition No.7524  of
2008 wherein order dated  20th  August,  2008  was  passed  itself  was  got
disposed of as infructuous on 18th January, 2011  in  view  of  order  dated
19th February, 2009.  UD  Group  was  in  no  manner  connected  with  those
proceedings.  As regards Suit filed by  UD  Group  challenging  order  dated
19th February, 2009, interim  application  for  stay  of  order  dated  19th
February, 2009 was dismissed on 28th July, 2011.  The Court had  refused  to
grant any interim injunction in favour of UD  Group  and  other  plaintiffs.
As regards disinheritance of DR Group in Will dated 23rd June, 1996, it  was
observed that the reason for disinheriting  as  mentioned  therein  was  not
against the DR Group but only against the estranged wife  of  the  testator.
The GD who was the legatee herself bequeathed her rights in  favour  of  the
DR Group by duly signing the transfer deeds and communicating  the  same  to
the Board of Directors.  She also executed Will dated 10th May, 2009.   Mere
fact that the same had been challenged was no bar to the  claim  of  the  DR
Group.

10.   We have heard S/Shri H.P. Rawal, Sanjiv Sen,  learned  senior  counsel
for the Companies, Shri Vikas Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  UD
Group and Shri C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel for the  DR  Group  and
perused the records.

11.    Contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  mainly  is  that
jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Companies Act  is  summary  in  nature
and complicated questions of title cannot be adjudicated upon  in  the  said
jurisdiction.  Reliance has also been placed on Ammonia Supplies Corpn.  (P)
Ltd. vs. Modern Plastic Containers (P) Ltd.[1], Standard Chartered Bank  vs.
Andhra Bank Financial  Services  Ltd.[2],  Luxmi  Tea  Company  Limited  vs.
Pradip Kumar Sarkar[3] and Bajaj Auto Ltd. vs.  N.K.  Firodia[4].    Further
submission is that succession certificate was void  on  account  of  interim
order passed by the High Court dated 20th August, 2008.  Reliance  has  been
placed  on  Mulraj  vs.  Murti  Raghonathji  Maharaj[5],  Manohar  Lal   vs.
Ugrasen[6], Ajudh Raj vs. Moti[7] and Chiranjila Shrilal Goenka  vs.  Jasjit
Singh[8].

12.   It was also submitted that DR Group could not inherit  the  rights  of
LMJS in view of the language of the Will dated 23rd June, 1996 and  also  on
the ground that the Will executed by GD was under challenge.  In absence  of
the said Will, DR Group could  not  acquire  any  rights  as  UD  Group  was
entitled to inherit the estate of GD.

13.   Per contra, Shri Sundaram supported the view taken by the High  Court.
  His  submission  is  that  there  is  no  real  dispute.   The  succession
certificate in favour of DR Group has to be acted upon  especially  when  in
the suit filed by the UD Group, interim order has been declined and  it  has
been found that there was no prima facie  case  in  challenge  to  the  said
certificate.  Pendency of suit without there  being  any  interim  order  in
favour of the UD Group in respect of succession to the estate of the GD  was
of no consequence. The scope of power under Section 111(7) of the  Companies
Act included  jurisdiction  to  decide  a  question  of  title.  Apart  from
succession certificate and the Will,  GD  had  executed  transfer  deed  and
communicated the same to the  Board  of  Directors.   In  the  face  of  her
statement in proceedings for succession  certificate  followed  by  transfer
deed, no dispute whatsoever, remained as to the rights of DR Group  to  have
the shares  transferred  in  their  favour.   The  Board  of  Directors  was
dominated by the UD Group who abused its position to  deprive  DR  Group  of
their rights.  The CLB failed to appreciate the scope  of  its  jurisdiction
as well as the scope of controversy between the  parties.   The  High  Court
rightly allowed their appeal.  Apart  from  relying  upon  the  judgment  in
Ammonia (supra), reliance was also  placed  on  judgment  of  Calcutta  High
Court by Ruma Pal, J. (as she then was) in Nupur  Mitra  vs.  Basubani  Pvt.
Ltd.[9].

14.   We have given due consideration to the rival  submissions.   The  main
question for consideration is whether there is any real dispute between  the
parties about the entitlement of DR Group to have the shares transferred  in
their favour and whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the High  Court  is
beyond the scope of Section 111 of the Companies Act.

15.   We are of the opinion that  there  is  no  real  dispute  between  the
parties as held by the High Court.  DR Group has  furnished  the  succession
certificate as well as the transfer deed executed by  GD  in  their  favour.
The same had to be acted  upon.    Moreover,  the  civil  court  in  interim
application moved by the UD Group held that the UD Group had no prima  facie
case.  The said order was required to be acted upon subject to  any  further
order that may be passed in any pending  proceedings  between  the  parties.
There is no conflicting order of any court or authority.  There is thus,  no
complicated question of title.  Moreover, there is no  bar  to  adjudication
for purposes of transfer of shares unless the court  finds  otherwise.   The
stay order obtained by  GD  herself  could  not  debar  her  from  making  a
statement  to  settle  the  matter.    The  judgments  relied  upon  by  the
appellants have no application to such a fact situation.

16.   In Ammonia (supra), the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court  to
deal with an issue of rectification in the Register  of  Members  maintained
by the Company was considered.  Following Public Passenger Service Ltd.  vs.
M.A. Khadar[10], it  was  held  that  jurisdiction  under  Section  155  was
summary in nature.  If for reasons of complexity or  otherwise,  the  matter
could be more conveniently decided in a suit, the  Court  may  relegate  the
parties to such remedy.  Subject to the  said  limitation,  jurisdiction  to
deal with such matter  is  exclusively  with  the  Company  Court.   It  was
observed :

“31. ……..It cannot be doubted that in spite of exclusiveness to  decide  all
matters pertaining to the rectification it has to act within the  said  four
corners and adjudication of such matters cannot be doubted to be summary  in
nature. So, whenever a question is raised the court  has  to  adjudicate  on
the facts and circumstances of each case. If it truly is rectification,  all
matters raised in that connection should  be  decided  by  the  court  under
Section 155 and if it finds adjudication of any  matter  not  falling  under
it, it may direct a party to get his right adjudicated  by  a  civil  court.
Unless jurisdiction is expressly or implicitly barred under a  statute,  for
violation  or  redress  of  any  such  right  the  civil  court  would  have
jurisdiction. ……..”


17.   Thus, there is a thin line in appreciating the scope  of  jurisdiction
of the Company Court/Company Law Board.  The jurisdiction  is  exclusive  if
the matter truly relates to rectification but  if  the  issue  is  alien  to
rectification, such matter may not be within the exclusive  jurisdiction  of
the Company Court/Company Law Board.

18.   In Standard Chartered  Bank  (supra),  scope  of  Section  111(7)  was
considered.  It was observed that jurisdiction being summary  in  nature,  a
seriously disputed question of title could be left  to  be  decided  by  the
civil court.  It was observed :

“29 ……The nature of proceedings under Section  111  are  slightly  different
from a title suit, although, sub-section (7) of Section  111  gives  to  the
Tribunal the jurisdiction to decide any question relating to  the  title  of
any person who is a party to the application, to have his  name  entered  in
or omitted from the register and also the  general  jurisdiction  to  decide
any question which it is necessary or  expedient  to  decide  in  connection
with such an application. It has been held in Ammonia  Supplies  Corpn.  (P)
Ltd. v. Modern Plastic Containers (P) Ltd. that the  jurisdiction  exercised
by  the  Company  Court  under  Section  155  of  the  Companies  Act,  1956
(corresponding to Section 111 of the present Act, before  its  amendment  by
Act 31 of 1988) was somewhat summary in  nature  and  that  if  a  seriously
disputed question of title arose, the  Company  Court  should  relegate  the
parties to a suit, which was the more appropriate remedy  for  investigation
and adjudication of such seriously disputed question of title.”



19.   In Luxmi Tea Company Limited and  Bajaj  Auto  Ltd.  (supra),  it  was
observed that a company did  not  have  any  discretion  in  rectifying  its
register except to require the procedure being followed.

20.   In the present case, as already observed, there  is  no  real  dispute
between the parties.  The DR Group followed the due procedure.  It  had  the
succession certificate in its favour apart from the transfer deed  from  GD,
who admittedly inherited rights from LMJS.  Will in favour of GD  is  beyond
any dispute.  Thus, the DR Group derived rights from  the  GD  by  documents
executed by her in her lifetime and conveyed to the Company.   Even  if  the
Will  of  GD  is  not  taken  into  account,  for  purposes  of   issue   of
rectification, the documents executed by GD clearly entitled  the  DR  Group
to have the rectification made.

21.   The decisions in  Mulraj,  Manohar  Lal,  Ajudh  Raj  and  Chiranjilal
Shrilal Goenka (supra)  are  of  no  relevance  to  a  situation  where  the
beneficiary of the interim order itself opts to proceed with the  matter  in
respect of which stay is granted by higher Court.  In the present  case,  GD
having settled the matter  and  having  herself  sought  rectification,  the
interim order granted at her instance could be no bar against the DR  Group.
 The decisions sought are thus, of no relevance to such a situation.

22.   We sum up our conclusions as follows :

(i)   LMJS executed will in favour of his  mother  –  GD  which  is  not  in
dispute;

(ii)  GD and DR jointly obtained succession certificate;

(iii) GD signed the transfer deeds and communicated the same  to  the  Board
of Directors; and

(iv)  The civil court vide order dated 28th July,  1991  declined  to  grant
temporary injunction finding no prima  facie  case  against  the  succession
certificate.

23.   In above circumstances, even in summary jurisdiction, the CLB  had  no
justification to reject the claim of the DR Group.  The High  Court  rightly
reversed the said order.

24.   In view of the above, we find no merit in  these  appeals.   The  same
are dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.5 lakhs in each of the appeals.


                                                    …………..……..…………………………….J.
                                                              [ANIL R. DAVE]


                                                    …………..….………………………………..J.
                                                         [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL]
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 23, 2015
-----------------------
[1]    1998 (7) SCC 105
[2]    2006 (6) SCC 94
[3]    1989 Supp. (2) SCC 656
[4]    1970 (2) SCC 550, 557
[5]    (1967) 3 SCR 84
[6]    2010 (11) SCC 557
[7]    1991 (3) SCC 136
[8]    1993 (2) SCC 507
[9]    1999 (2) Calcutta Law Times 264
[10]   AIR 1966 SC 489