Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 8155 of 2014, Judgment Date: Mar 19, 2015

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8155 OF 2014


Dhropadabai and Others                                       Appellant(s)

                                    Versus

M/s. Technocraft Toolings                                   Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

            The present appeal, by special leave, is  directed  against  the
judgment and order dated 16th July,  2012,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of
Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in First Appeal No.462 of 2011, whereby the  High
Court has allowed  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  award  passed  by  the
Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,  (for  short,  'the
1923 Act').

            The facts  which  are  requisite  to  be  stated  are  that  the
appellants, the legal heirs of Ambadas  Lahane,  filed  an  application  for
grant  of  compensation  under  the  1923  Act  before  the  labour   Court,
Maharashtra at Aurangabad, forming the subject matter of  Application  No.51
of 2006.  It was asserted  in  the  application  that  the  appellant  No.1,
Dhropadabai, is the wife and the other respondents were  minor  children  of
the deceased-employee, who had suffered a  chest  pain  at  the  work  place
about 8.30 a.m. on 2nd April, 2005.     He  was  immediately  taken  to  the
Medical College Hospital, Ghati, Aurangabad, where  he  was  declared  dead.
After the death took place, the appellant No.1  approached  the  authorities
of the respondent-employer for grant of compensation.  As the same  was  not
granted, she along with her children,  was  compelled  to  move  the  labour
Court.

            Before the labour Court, the employer,  the  respondent  herein,
took two fold stand, namely, (i) that  the  legal  heirs  of  the  deceased-
employee were not entitled to get any compensation under  the  1923  Act  as
the deceased-employee was an  insured  person  under  the  Employees'  State
Insurance Act, 1948 (for short, 'the 1948 Act'), and (ii) the  accident  did
not occur during course of his employment as the death  took  place  due  to
coronary disorder, which has nothing to do with the work place.  The  labour
Court  framed  two  principal  issues,  namely,  whether  the  accident  had
occurred during course of employment of the deceased-employee,  and  whether
the legal heirs were entitled for grant of compensation  amounting  to  Rs.3
lacs along with 50% penalty and interest at the rate of  18%  per  annum  on
the total amount of compensation from the date of accident till  realization
of compensation amount as per law.

            The labour Court considering the material brought on record  and
the decision of this Court in Jyothi Ademma vs. Plant  Engineer,  Nellore  &
Another[1], came to hold that the deceased-employee had died  in  course  of
employment  while  remaining   on   duty   with   the   respondent-employer.
Thereafter, it referred  to  the  applicability  of  the  1923  Act  in  the
backdrop of Section 53 of the 1948 Act and came to hold that  there  was  no
justification to deny the compensation under the  1923  Act  solely  because
the employee was an insured person under the 1948 Act.  Being of this  view,
the labour Court directed that a  sum  of  Rs.4,07,700/-  shall  be  awarded
towards the payment of compensation on the death of deceased Ambadas  Lahane
to his legal heirs.  It also stipulated that if the employer failed  to  pay
such compensation within a stipulated period, that is, one  month,  it  will
be open to the legal heirs of the deceased-employee to file  an  application
under Section 4(a) of the 1923 Act.

            Being grieved by the aforesaid award,  the  employer  moved  the
High Court and reiterated both the contentions.  The  High  Court  analyzing
the evidence on record and the stand put forth by the employer affirmed  the
view expressed by the labour Court that the deceased was an  employee  under
the respondent-firm and he has  breathed  his  last  during  the  course  of
employment.  As far as the applicability of the 1923 Act is  concerned,  the
learned Single Judge opined on the basis of the decision  rendered  by  this
Court in A. Trehan vs. Associated Electrical Agencies  and  Another[2]  that
the legal heirs would not be entitled to get  compensation  under  the  1923
Act as he was an insured person.

            We have heard Mr. Sandeep Singh Tiwari, learned counsel for  the
appellants and Mr. Shashibhushan  P.  Adgaonkar,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent.

            The status of the employee and the factum of his breathing  last
during the course of employment, cannot be called in question as  it  hinges
on the facts and we find that the approach of the labour Court, as  well  as
of the High Court on this score is absolutely infallible.    Therefore,  the
only question that remains for consideration is whether the  High  Court  is
justified in denying the benefit under the 1923 Act.  In  this  context,  we
may refer to Section 53 of the 1948 Act, which reads as under:

"53.  Bar against receiving or recovery of  compensation  or  damages  under
any other law.-  An insured person or his dependents shall not  be  entitled
to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the  insured  person  or
from any other person, any  compensation  or  damages  under  the  Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), or any other law for the time  being  in
force or otherwise, in respect of an  employment  injury  sustained  by  the
insured person as an employment injury sustained by the  insured  person  as
an employee under this Act."

            The aforesaid provision came to be interpreted  by  a  two-Judge
Bench in A. Trehan's case, wherein the  Court  after  reproducing  the  said
provision and taking note of the definition of  workman  as  provided  under
Section 2(1)(n) of the 1923 Act, came to hold as follows:

"A comparison of the relevant provisions of the  two  Acts  makes  it  clear
that both the Acts  provide  for  compensation  to  a  workman/employee  for
personal injury caused to him by accident arising out of and in  the  course
of his employment. The ESI is a later Act and has a wider  coverage.  It  is
more comprehensive. It also provides  for  more  compensation  than  what  a
workman would get under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The  benefits  which
an employee can get  under  the  ESI  Act  are  more  substantial  than  the
benefits which he can get under the Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  The  only
disadvantage, if at all it can be called a disadvantage,  is  that  he  will
get compensation under the ESI Act by way of periodical payments and not  in
a lump sum as under the Workmen's Compensation Act. If  the  Legislature  in
its wisdom thought it better to provide for periodical payments rather  than
lump sum compensation its wisdom cannot be doubted. Even if  it  is  assured
that the workmen had a better right under the Workman's Compensation Act  in
this behalf it was open to the Legislature  to  take  away  or  modify  that
right. While enacting the ESI Act the intention  of  the  Legislature  could
not  have  been  to  create  another  remedy  and  a  forum   for   claiming
compensation for an injury received by the employee by accident arising  out
of and in the course of his employment."

            Be it noted, the Court distinguished the  decision  rendered  in
Regional Director, ESI Corporation vs. Francis De  Costa[3],  and  overruled
the Full Bench decision of the  High  Court  of  Kerala  in  P.  Asokan  vs.
Western Indian Plywoods Ltd., Cannanore[4].

            In Bharagath Engineering vs. R. Ranganayaki  and  Another[5],  a
two-Judge Bench has ruled thus:

"The deceased employee was clearly an 'insured person', as  defined  in  the
Act. As the deceased employee has suffered an employment injury  as  defined
under Section 2(8) of the Act and  there  is  no  dispute  that  he  was  in
employment of  the  employer,  by  operation  of  Section  53  of  the  Act,
proceedings under the Compensation Act were excluded statutorily.  The  High
Court was not justified in holding otherwise. We find that  the  Corporation
has filed an affidavit indicating that the benefits under the Act  shall  be
extended to the persons entitled  under  the  Act.  The  benefits  shall  be
worked out by  the  Corporation  and  shall  be  extended  to  the  eligible
persons."

            In National  Insurance  Company  Ltd.  vs.  Hamida  Khatoon  and
Others[6], reference  has  been  made  to  A.  Trehan's  case,  as  well  as
Bharagath Engineering's (supra) and as it appears to  us,  the  later  Bench
has concurred with the view expressed in the earlier case.

            The aforesaid authorities make it eminently clear that  once  an
employee is an "insured  person"  under  Section  2(14)  of  the  1948  Act,
neither he nor his dependents would be entitled to get any  compensation  or
damages from the employer under the 1923 Act.  We are obliged to hold so  as
the plain language used in the Act clearly conveys  so.   Therefore,  we  do
not find any flaw in  the  view  expressed  by  the  High  Court.   At  this
juncture, we  may  state  that  while  this  Court  granted  leave  on  22nd
February, 2014, had directed the respondent to  deposit  Rs.4  lacs  in  the
Registry of this court within four weeks and  permitted  the  appellants  to
withdraw the said sum on furnishing a personal bond.  We have been  apprised
that the amount has been  deposited  by  the  employer  and  also  has  been
withdrawn  by  the  legal  heirs  of  the  deceased  employee.   Though  the
respondent is getting the benefits under the 1948 Act, yet we do not  intend
that the amount that has already been withdrawn by the legal  heirs  of  the
deceased-employee, should be recovered by the employer by way  of  deducting
the periodical sum that is paid  to  the  family  members  of  the  deceased
employee.  We have passed this order as we are compelled to  feel  that  the
cause of justice should be best  sub-served  as  the  appellants  have  been
fighting the litigation since a decade.
             Consequently,  the  appeal,  being  devoid  of  merit,   stands
dismissed.  However, there shall be no order as to costs.

                                             ....................J.
                                             [Dipak Misra]


                                             ....................J.
                                             [Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi
March 19, 2015.


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[1]   (2006) 5 SCC 513
[2]   (1996) 4 SCC 255
[3]   (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 100
[4]    AIR 1987 Kerala 103
[5]   (2003) 2 SCC 138
[6]   (2009) 13 SCC 361