Tags Murder

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 423 of 2015, Judgment Date: Jul 25, 2016

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.423 OF 2015


DEVRAJ                                              ... APPELLANT

                           VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                              ... RESPONDNET


                               J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

            This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order  dated
7th January, 2013 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal  Appeal  No.
780 of 2008. The First Additional Sessions Judge in  Sessions  Trial  No.396
of 2006 had convicted the appellant-Devraj  and   Dinda  @  Deenanath  under
Section 302 and 201 IPC and awarded imprisonment for life and  to  pay  fine
of Rs.1,000/- each for the charge levelled under Section 302 IPC and RI  for
three years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each for the charge under  Section
201 IPC. Four other accused were acquitted by the First Additional  Sessions
Judge. The High Court in Criminal Appeal No.780 of 2008  although  acquitted
the  accused   Dinda  @  Deenanath,  it  confirmed  the  conviction  of  the
appellant under  Section  302  IPC.   The  High  Court  has  set  aside  the
conviction and sentence of Devraj under Section 201 IPC.

2.          Aggrieved by the judgment and order  of the High  Court,  Devraj
has come up in this appeal.

3.          The prosecution case in brief is:
            There existed a land dispute between the deceased Devi Prasad  @
Prachar and Devraj, Dinda @ Deenanath. Devraj and   Dinda  @  Deenanath  are
real brothers whereas deceased Devi Prasad  was  their  cousin  brother.  On
26th June, 2006, after 8 p.m. when deceased  Devi  Prasad  was  going  along
with one Ratan Singh Guruji in a  motorcycle  he  was  intercepted  by  five
persons near pakkar tree. The deceased was beaten  by  geda   and  lathi  by
Devraj, Dinda  and  others  and  after  killing  him  his  body  along  with
motorcycle was thrown below Rakhet Pulia. The body  was  seen  on  next  day
morning by a  boy  of  village  who  informed  the  wife  of  the  deceased.
Thereafter, First Information Report was lodged by Anita Bai at  10.15  a.m.
on 27th June,  2006.  Police  official  came  on  the  spot  prepared  death
panchnama and site plan. The statements from various persons were  recorded.
The charges were framed against six accused under Section 147, 148,149,  302
and 201 IPC. The accused Sheonath, Thema  @  Vishwanath,  Devraj,   Dinda  @
Deenanath, Khoru and Dayalal were sent for trial.
4.          The prosecution examined 20 witnesses  and  placed  reliance  on
various exhibits. Learned Additional  Sessions  Judge  after  examining  the
statements of witnesses held charges under Section 302 and  201  IPC  proved
against accused Devraj and  Dinda  @  Deenanath,  other  four  accused  were
acquitted by the Trial Court.
5.          The Trial Court placed heavy reliance  on  witnesses  PW.8-Ratan
Singh, PW.13-Shivlochan and  PW.16-Ajar  Das  who  were  found  to  be  eye-
witnesses. The statements of witnesses were found corroboration  from  other
evidence.  Although  witnesses  PW.13-Shivlochan  and  PW.16-Ajar  Das  were
declared hostile witnesses and they were cross-examined but the Trial  Court
relied on their statements having found to be truthful and worth reliance.
6.          Both Devraj and Dinda @ Deenanath filed  an  appeal  before  the
High Court. The High Court vide its judgment and order  dated  7th  January,
2013 acquitted   Dinda  @  Deenanath  from  all  the  charges.  However,  it
confirmed the conviction of  the  appellant-Devraj  under  Section  302  IPC
while setting aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC.
7.          Devraj is before us in this appeal. Only Devraj  being  in  this
appeal, we need to confine  our  discussion  with  regard  to  the  evidence
against Devraj only and as to whether the courts below  on  valid  materials
and evidence were justified in convicting Devraj.
8.           We  have  heard  Shri  Akshat  Shrivastava,   learned   counsel
appearing  for  the  appellant  and  Shri  C.D.  Singh,  learned  Additional
Advocate General for the State.

9.          Learned counsel for the  appellant  in  support  of  the  appeal
contended that the courts below have relied on  three  eye-witnesses  namely
PW.8-Ratan Singh, PW.13-Shivlochan and PW.16-  Ajar  Das.   PW.13-Shivlochan
and PW.16-Ajar Das having been declared hostile  witnesses,  their  evidence
could not have been relied and PW.8-Ratan Singh, another eye-witness  having
not stated that Devraj  had  assaulted  the  deceased  hence  there  was  no
evidence worth name to convict the accused-Devraj. It is  further  contended
that even the eye-witnesses, PW.13 and PW.16 had only stated that they  have
heard the voice of  Devraj,  the  prosecution  ought  to  have  proved  that
witnesses had recognised the voice of Devraj and Devi Prasad. The  witnesses
have only stated that Devraj had assaulted Devi Prasad @ Prachar  by  Danda.
It has not been proved that injury by Danda, if any, was sufficient to  kill
Devi Prasad. The Doctor in his evidence has stated that injuries which  were
sustained by Devi Prasad  could  be  possible  by  an  accident.  Thus,  the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was  Devraj  who
killed  Devi  Prasad  @  Prachar.  There  was  contradiction   between   the
statements of eye-witnesses, which has not been adverted  to by  the  courts
below.
10.    Learned  Additional  Advocate  General  appearing   for   the   State
supporting  the  judgment  of  courts  below  contended  that  incriminating
evidence on the record are sufficient to  convict  the  accused-Devraj.  All
the eye-witnesses have proved the presence of accused-Devraj.  The  evidence
of PW.13 and PW.16 was wholly  reliable  and  even  if  they  were  declared
hostile witnesses their examination-in-chief and the cross-examination  does
not in any manner weaken  the  evidentiary  value  of  their  evidence  that
Devraj assaulted Devi Prasad  on  the  late  evening  of  26th  June,  2006.
Several witnesses  have  testified  that  there  was  land  dispute  between
deceased-Devi Prasad and Devraj  and  there  being  animosity  between  Devi
Prasad and Devraj there was a motive to kill the deceased. The  judgment  of
the Trial Court is based on  correct  appreciation  of  evidence.  The  High
Court also having examined the statements of witnesses and  having  come  to
the conclusion that there was  sufficient  material  on  record  to  convict
Devraj there is no ground for interference by  this  Court  in  exercise  of
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution  of  India.  It  is  well
settled that this Court shall not  reappraise  the  evidence  and  interfere
with concurrent findings of facts recorded by the  courts  below  which  are
sufficient for upholding the conviction of the accused.
11.    We  have  considered  the  arguments  made  by  the  learned  counsel
appearing for the parties and perused the records. The original  records  of
the Trial Court produced before us including  the  statements  of  witnesses
have also been perused by us.
12.   In the present case the deceased-Devi  Prasad  was  going  along  with
Ratan Guruji from his house on a motorcycle on Panchayat Road   at  about  8
p.m. Deceased left  his house on a motorcycle with  Ratan  Singh  Guruji  as
pillion rider for dropping Ratan Singh at village Chendra. On the  Panchayat
Road near pakkar tree, the deceased was intercepted and was  asked  to  stop
the motorcycle by five persons. The quarrel took place between the  deceased
and his interceptors. The witnesses have  specially  mentioned  that  Devraj
and  Dinda @ Deenanath were present on the spot  and  Devraj  hit  and  gave
lathi blows on deceased. The witnesses who saw the deceased being  assaulted
are Ratan Guruji, Shivlochan and Ajar Das. It  is  useful  to  re-capitulate
the statements of the above eye-witnesses. Ratan Singh-PW.8 has stated  that
he had gone to Devi Prasad's house and after  8  p.m.  he  along  with  Devi
Prasad left his house on a motorcycle and as soon as they  reached  at  some
distance from his house five persons were standing  near  the  pakkar  tree.
Those persons got  the  vehicle  stopped.  Dinda  came  towards  him  (Ratan
Guruji), he was having a torch and switched on the torch. In the  meanwhile,
a person ran from back side with a stick and spoke “kill him, what  are  you
looking' and he gave stick blow to Devi Prasad.  On  receiving  injury  Devi
Prasad ran towards back side crying “save save”. Ratan Singh further  stated
that Shivlochan came on the spot and told him to come with him as there  was
 risk there. PW.8-Ratan Singh further stated that there was a  land  dispute
between Devi Prasad and Dev Raj.
13.   Shivlochan-PW.13 is a witness whose house is situated near  the  place
where Devi Prasad was stopped. The Exhibit  No.P.7  which  is  a  site  plan
prepared at the spot  clearly  indicates  the  house  of  Shivlochan  is  at
indication mark No.5. Shivlochan in his statement has stated  that  he  knew
both the accused-Devraj and deceased-Devi Prasad. Shivlochan belongs to  the
same  village  Sayar  Rai  of  which  accused  and  deceased  belonged.   In
examination-in-chief, Shivlochan stated that he was returning to  his  house
from his sister's house when he saw the  deceased-Devi  Prasad  near  pakkar
tree. Devraj came from the front and some dialogues  entered  between  them.
Thereafter, Devraj assaulted Devi Prasad by wood or stone. Thereafter,  Devi
Prasad started running. The witness was  cross-examined  on  behalf  of  the
accused and in his cross-examination he stated that he heard  the  voice  of
Devraj who was saying “Maro Sale Ko” and it was  Devraj  who  hit  the  Devi
Prasad @ Prachar and Prachar shouted “Bachao Bachao” which he heard.
14.    Another  eye-witness  PW.16-Ajar  Das  has  been  examined   by   the
prosecution. The house of Ajar Das is also near to the scene  of  occurrence
which is shown in Exhibit No.P-7 as indication mark 8. Ajar Das stated  that
he knew the deceased and  the  accused.  Deceased  Devi  Prasad  was  cousin
brother of Devraj and  Dinda @ Deenanath.  The  quarrel  had  earlier  taken
place between Devi Prasad and Devraj.  He was returning to  his  house  from
village Gangapur and when he was going through    Panchayat  Road  adjoining
pakkar tree near Jam tree accused Devi Prasad had given  three  lathi  blows
to Devi Prasad. Accused Devraj told  Shivlochan  that  he  should  run  away
otherwise he will also be assaulted on which he ran away.   The  prosecution
took permission of  the  Court  for  asking  question  after  declaring  the
witness as hostile. On which the witness again stated that he has  forbidden
Devraj from beating Devi Prasad. He further stated that  he  had  also  seen
that while beating Devi Prasad, Devraj was saying that he has been  tortured
throughout life. Devraj and Dinda had beaten the deceased in the  night  and
the dead body of Devi Parasad was  found  below  the  Rakhet  Pulia  in  the
morning. He further stated that due to land dispute between Devi Prasad  and
Devraj and Dinda, they  entered into “marpeet”. In the cross-examination  he
stated that he has seen accused-Devraj giving three  lathi  blows.  However,
he does not know to whom the blows were given since it was  dark.  There  is
overwhelming evidence on the  record  to  prove  the  land  dispute  between
Devraj, Dinda with Devi Prasad-deceased.
15.   Anita Bai-PW.7 wife of the  deceased,  Ratan  Singh-PW.8,  Shivlochan-
PW.13, Shivram-PW.18,Ram Kewal-PW.3 and Narayan Prasad-PW.10 all had  stated
that there was a land dispute between  the  parties.  Witness  PW.10-Narayan
Prasad had also stated that with regard to  the  land  dispute  the  leg  of
Devraj was broken and there was animosity between Devi Prasad  and  accused-
Devraj and Dinda.  The arguments which  have  been  raised  by  the  learned
counsel for the appellant that PW.13  and  PW.16  having  been  declared  as
hostile witnesses their evidence ought  not  to  have  been  relied  by  the
courts below more so when Ratan Singh another eye-witness does not say  that
deceased Devi Prasad was  assaulted  by  Devraj.  At  this  juncture  it  is
relevant to examine the question as  to  what  extent  evidence  of  hostile
witnesses can be relied by the Court while recording conviction.
16.   In a three-Judge bench judgment of this  Court  in  Bhagwan  Singh  v.
State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 389,  the witness Jagat  Singh  was  declared
hostile. The  appellant  was  convicted  under  Section  165A  IPC.  It  was
contended that the whole case is destroyed since the  witness  was  declared
as hostile. In the aforesaid decision  the  Court  held  that  there  is  no
legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated  by  other
reliable evidence. Following was stated in paragraph 8:

“8. We have carefully perused the evidence of Jagat Singh, who was  examined
in the trial  after  more  than  a  year  of  detection  of  the  case.  The
prosecution could have even avoided  requesting  for  permission  to  cross-
examine the witness under Section 154 of the  Evidence  Act.  But  the  fact
that the court gave permission to the prosecutor to  cross-examine  his  own
witness, thus  characterising  him  as,  what  is  described  as  a  hostile
witness, does not completely  efface  his  evidence.  The  evidence  remains
admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction  upon
his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. We  are  satisfied
in this case that  the  evidence  of  Jagat  Singh,  but  for  whose  prompt
assistance the case  would  not  have  seen  the  light  of  day  and  whose
statement  had  immediately  been  recorded  by   the   D.S.P.,   is   amply
corroborated by other evidence mentioned above to inspire confidence in  his
testimony. Apart from that the fact of recovery of the  gold  coins  in  the
pocket of the appellant gave a seal of finality to the truth of  the  charge
against the appellant. If Jagat Singh had accepted the bribe he  would  have
been guilty under Section 161 IPC. There is, therefore,  clear  abetment  by
the appellant of the offence under Section 161 IPC and  the  ingredients  of
Section 165-A IPC are established against him.”

17.   Another judgment which needs to be noted is Khujji v. State  of  M.P.,
(1991) 3 SCC 627. This Court in the above case held that  merely  because  a
witness was declared hostile, his  entire  evidence  cannot  be  treated  as
effaced from the record,his testimony, to the extent found reliable, can  be
acted upon. In paragraph 6 following was observed:
      “6......The evidence of PW 3 Kishan Lal and PW 4  Ramesh  came  to  be
rejected by the trial court  because  they  were  declared  hostile  to  the
prosecution by the learned Public Prosecutor as  they  refused  to  identify
the appellant and his companions in  the  dock  as  the  assailants  of  the
deceased. But counsel for the State  is  right  when  he  submits  that  the
evidence of a witness, declared hostile, is  not  wholly  effaced  from  the
record and that part of the evidence which is otherwise  acceptable  can  be
acted upon. It seems to be well settled by the decisions  of  this  Court  —
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana,(1976) 1 SCC 389, Rabindra  Kumar  Dey  v.
State  of  Orissa,(1976)  4  SCC  233   and   Syad   Akbar   v.   State   of
Karnataka,(1980) 1 SCC 30, — that the  evidence  of  a  prosecution  witness
cannot be rejected in toto merely because the  prosecution  chose  to  treat
him as hostile and  cross-examined  him.  The  evidence  of  such  witnesses
cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the  record  altogether  but  the
same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to  be  dependable
on a careful scrutiny thereof.....”

18.   The above propositions have again been reiterated  by  this  Court  in
Vinod Kumar vs. State of Punjab,   (2015) 3 SCC 220, where in  paragraph  31
following has been stated:
“31.  The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is whether  testimony
of a hostile evidence that has come on record should be relied upon or  not.
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that as PW-
7 has totally resiled in  his  cross-examination,  his  evidence  is  to  be
discarded in toto. On a perusal of the testimony of the said witness, it  is
evincible that in examination-in-chief, he  has  supported  the  prosecution
story in entirety and in the cross-examination he  has  taken  the  path  of
prevarication. In Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana, (1976) 1  SCC  389,  it
has been laid down that even if a witness is  characterized  has  a  hostile
witness, his evidence is not completely effaced. The said  evidence  remains
admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction  upon
his testimony, if corroborated  by  other  reliable  evidence.  In  Khuji  @
Surendra Tiwari V. State of Madhya  Pradesh,(1991)  3  SCC  627,  the  Court
after referring to the authorities in Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra  Kumar
Dey V. State of  Orissa,(1976)  4  SCC  233  and  Syad  Akbar  V.  State  of
Karnataka,(1980) 1 SCC 30, opined  that  the  evidence  of  such  a  witness
cannot be effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same  can  be
accepted to the extent it is found to be dependable on  a  careful  scrutiny
thereof.”

19.   The evidence of a witness  who   has  been  declared  hostile  can  be
relied if there are some other material on the basis of which said  evidence
can be corroborated. More  so,  that  part  of  evidence  of  a  witness  as
contained in examination-in-chief, which remains unshaken even after  cross-
examination, is fully reliable even though the  witness  has  been  declared
hostile.
20.   It is relevant to note  that  the  trial  began  against  six  accused
persons.  Shivlochan-PW.13 in his  examination-in-chief  took  the  name  of
Devraj alone who was stated to have assaulted      Devi  Prasad.  Shivlochan
did not mention in his examination-in-chief  about  the  presence  of  other
accused which may be a  reason  for  the  prosecution  to  get  the  witness
declared as hostile. It is, however, relevant  to  note  that  even  in  the
cross-examination the witness repeated that he  heard  Devraj  saying  “Maro
Sale Ko” who had assaulted Devi Prasad  and  Devi  Prasad  @  Prachar  cried
“Bachao Bachao”. The factum of assault by Devraj was  throughout  maintained
by the witness. Thus, even though witness was declared  as  hostile  witness
his evidence so far as the role of Devraj is unshaken.  Similarly,  evidence
of Ajar Das-PW.16, where in his examination-in-chief he stated that  accused
Devraj gave three lathi blows to Devi Prasad which  was  seen  by  him.  The
witness further stated that Devraj threatened him to run away  otherwise  he
shall also be assaulted. Even after the  witness  was  declared  hostile  he
maintained his stand that he forbidden Devraj from assaulting  Devi  Prasad.
He further stated that he saw Devraj and Dinda  assaulting  Devi  Prasad  in
the night and on the next day the dead body was found  below  Rakhet  Pulia.
The witness further stated that due to land dispute  Devraj  and  Dinda  had
assaulted Devi Prasad. In cross-examination he voluntarily  stated  that  he
had seen the accused giving three lathi blows. Further, he  stated  that  he
did not see that whom he has beaten because it was dark.  The  statement  in
cross-examination in no manner dilute the value  of  the  evidence.  It  was
Devi Prasad who  received  injury   whose  dead  body  was  found  next  day
morning. The statement that  it  was  Devraj  who  gave  three  lathi  blows
obviously referred to lathi blow to Devi Prasad-deceased. Thus, we  conclude
that in spite of witnesses PW.13 and PW.16 having been declared  as  hostile
witnesses their evidence that Devraj assaulted Devi Prasad is  unshaken  and
has rightly been relied by the courts below in recording conviction.
21.   As noted above Ratan Guruji was pillion  rider  along  with  deceased-
Devi Prasad and after they proceeded from the house of Devi  Prasad  on  the
motorcycle after some distance near pakkar tree they were  stopped  by  five
persons. The vehicle was got stopped by those persons they asked as  to  who
is sitting behind, upon this Devi Prasad said that Ratan Guruji  of  Chandra
was sitting. Then Dinda came towards them having a  torch  with  him.  Ratan
Guruji stated that one person came from behind with geda and shouted  “maro,
kya dekh rahe ho” and he assaulted Devi Prasad with  geda.  Devi  Prasad  on
being assaulted ran towards back side and  shouted  “bachao  bachao”.  Thus,
statement of Ratan Guruji of assault on  Devi  Prasad  when  read  with  the
evidence of PW.13 and PW.16 clearly indicates that it  was  Devraj  who  had
assaulted Devi Prasad which caused death of the deceased.

22.   Learned counsel for the appellant has further  contended  that  injury
given by danda cannot be said to be sufficient for death  of  a  person  and
there is no evidence to indicate  that  the  injury  caused  by  Devraj  was
sufficient for death. He further submitted that Dr. K.P.  Vishwakarma-PW.20,
in his statement stated that injuries which were  found  in  the  person  of
Devi Prasad-deceased could have been received in an accident. We  have  gone
through the statement of  Dr.  K.P.  Vishwakarma-PW.20  and  the  postmortem
report. The Doctor-PW.20 in his statement after referring  to  the  injuries
received by the deceased has clearly stated that only some of  the  injuries
could have been caused by accident.

23.   Dr. K.P. Vishwakarma in his statement has stated  that  the  cause  of
death is head injury  caused  to  the  deceased.  Thus,  there  is  Doctor's
evidence that all the injuries  which  were  found  on  the  person  of  the
deceased could not have been caused due to  the  accident  that  is  falling
below Rakhet Pulia.
24.   There being clear evidence of stopping of the motorcycle  near  pakkar
tree and ensuing quarrel and assault on Devraj the  theory  of  accident  as
sought to be suggested by the learned counsel for the  appellant  is  wholly
unreliable. The details in the Panchnama of the dead body  and  position  of
the dead body as stated by Anup Shai Rajwade, Inspector of Police-PW.11,  in
his statement completely bely the theory of accident. In the examination-in-
chief he stated about the injuries, further stated that in between both  the
legs, between the thigh one white bottle of one litre having half bottle  of
liquor was kept and at a distance of 4 ft. the motorcycle was there  key  of
which was put  on a  stone.  He  further  stated  that  motorcycle  was  not
damaged since only back light was damaged which  indicates  that  motorcycle
was brought and thrown in the water. The manner in which liquor  bottle  was
kept between the thigh of  dead  body   and  glass  of  back  light  of  the
motorcycle alone being damaged does not  support  the  theory  of  accident.
Thus, there are more than one reasons for rejecting the theory  of  accident
and there was  evidence  to  prove  that  the  deceased  was  assaulted  and
murdered and thereafter body and the motorcycle was brought  and  put  below
the Pulia. Both Trial Court and the High Court have referred to  and  relied
on sufficient evidence for  convicting  the  accused.  We,  ourselves  after
going through the evidence relied on by the courts below for convicting  the
accused, are of the opinion that the  prosecution  has  successfully  proved
beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused who had caused  homicidal  death
of the deceased.
25.    We  are  also  conscious  that  the  jurisdiction  which  this  Court
exercises under Article 136 has its own  self-imposed  restrictions.  It  is
sufficient to refer  to  this  Court's  decision  reported  in  Ganga  Kumar
Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2005) 6  SCC  211,  where  this  Court  after
referring  to  various  decisions  has  laid  down  certain  principles  for
exercising the power of this Court under Article 136. It is useful to  refer
to paragraph 10 of the judgment, which is :
“10. From the aforesaid series of decisions of this Court  on  the  exercise
of power of  the  Supreme  Court  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution
following principles emerge:

(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are  very
wide but in  criminal  appeals  this  Court  does  not  interfere  with  the
concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.

(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of  fact  given
by the High Court, if the High  Court  has  acted  perversely  or  otherwise
improperly.

(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under  Article  136  only
in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law  of  general
public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the test  of
reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe  to  act  upon
it.

(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any  error
of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural  justice,
errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or  where  the  conclusions
of the High  Court  are  manifestly  perverse  and  unsupportable  from  the
evidence on record.”

26.   To the similar effect, another judgment  of  this  Court  reported  in
Alamelu v. State, (2011) 2 SCC 385, where this Court held that  even  though
the powers of this Court under Article 136 are very wide,  but  in  criminal
appeals,   this    Court    would   not   interfere   with   the  concurrent
findings of facts, save in very exceptional cases. Following was  laid  down
in paragraph 19:

“19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for  the
parties. Before we embark upon an examination of the evidence, we may  point
out that even though the powers of this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution are very wide, but in criminal appeals, this  Court  would  not
interfere with the concurrent findings of facts, save  in  very  exceptional
cases. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, this  Court  does
not normally appreciate the evidence by itself and go into the  question  of
credibility of witnesses. The assessment of the evidence by the  High  Court
is accepted as final except where  the  conclusions  recorded  by  the  High
Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable by the evidence  on  record.
Keeping in view the aforesaid principles,  we  have  examined  the  findings
recorded by the courts below.”

27.   On the  principles  as  laid  down  by  this  Court  for  exercise  of
jurisdiction under Article 136, we are satisfied that the findings  recorded
by  the  courts  below  from  the  evidence  on  record  fully  justify  the
conviction of accused.  The  findings  recorded  by  the  courts  below  can
neither  be  said  to  be  perverse  nor contain any such  illegality  which
may render the findings not reliable.
28.   We thus do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is
dismissed.

                                                    ......................J.
                                                        ( S.A. BOBDE )

                                                    ......................J.
                                                     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
JULY 25, 2016.