Dashrath Gupta (HUF) & others Vs State of Chhattisgarh and others
Chhatisgarh High Court (Single Judge)
ACQA->ACQUITTAL APPEAL [ APPEAL U/S 378 ], .1761 of 2013 of 2015, Judgment Date: Jan 30, 2015
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Single Bench : Hon’ble Shri Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Writ Petition (C) No.1761 of 2013 Petitioners Dashrath Gupta (HUF) & others Versus Respondents State of Chhattisgarh and others --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Present :- Shri N.K. Vyas, Advocate for the petitioners. Shri Arun Sao, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the State. Shri Sumesh Bajaj, Advocate for the respondent No.3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ORAL ORDER (Passed on this 30th day of January, 2015) Heard learned counsel for the parties. 1. Petitioners have challenged the award dated 26-6-2012 in so far as it relates to inclusion of their land bearing khasra No.66/20 village Dunda and the order for compensation. The petitioners have also prayed for exempting the petitioners' land from acquisition and for a consequential direction to the respondent No.3-Raipur Development Authority (for short 'RDA') to allot them the reconstituted plots No.A-82 & A-83 in Sector 6 of Kamal Vihar Scheme-4 for which allotment has already been made to them by the RDA. 2. In course of hearing, it transpired that in the requisition sent by the RDA to the Land Acquisition Officer for acquisition of certain lands, the petitioners' land was wrongly included despite the fact that the petitioners had consented for the scheme and agreed to receive the allotment of reconstituted plots. Since RDA has never intended to acquire such lands and it agreed to allot reconstituted plots to such holders of land who have consented for the scheme, the acquisition of subject land should have been dropped, however, because of lack of communication amongst different authorities, the award pertaining to the petitioners' land came to be passed. In the meanwhile, RDA has issued a letter of allotment of reconstituted plots in favour of the petitioners. 3. Shri Bajaj, learned counsel for the RDA, would submit that the RDA is willing to hand over the reconstituted plots to the petitioners in accordance with the scheme, however, since the award has already been passed, there is difficulty in implementing the said allotment in favour of the petitioners because the RDA has already deposited the amount of compensation with the Land Acquisition Officer. 4. Shri Sao, learned Dy. Advocate General appearing for the State, also expresses the difficulty faced by the Land Acquisition Officer because once the award is passed, the Land Acquisition Officer becomes functus officio and he cannot return the amount to the beneficiary of the land acquisition proceeding. Shri Sao would submit that only option left with the Land Acquisition Officer is to make payment of compensation to the petitioners. 5. In the opinion of this Court, the situation emerging in the matter warrants exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction to resolve the dispute and facilitate the parties who have otherwise agreed to implement the scheme floated by the RDA. 6. The nature of power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India conferred on the High Court has been explained by the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. Incometax Officer, Special Circle, D. Ward, Kanpur and another1 as under : “4......This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression 'nature', for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over 1AIR 1966 SC 81 the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself......” (Emphasis supplied) 7. Yet again in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and others v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others2, the Supreme Court held thus : “73. While the remedy under Article 226 is extraordinary and is of Anglo-Saxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of English processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the lancet operates where injustice suppurates. While traditional restraints like availability of alternative remedy hold back the court, and judicial power should not ordinarily rush in where the other two branches fear to tread, judicial daring is not daunted where glaring injustice demands even affirmative action. The wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the court’s province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process. There is a native hue about Article 226, without being anglophilic or anglophobic in attitude. Viewed from this jurisprudential perspective, we have to be cautious both in not overstepping as if Article 226 were as large as an appeal and not failing to intervene where a grave error has crept in. Moreover, we sit here in appeal over the High Court’s judgment. And an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine.” (Emphasis supplied) 2(1980) 2 SCC 593 8. In a recent judgment rendered in Eastern Coalfields Limited and others v. Bajrangi Rabidas3, the Supreme Court held thus : “19......It is well settled in law that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power of the High Court is required to be exercised “to reach injustice wherever it is found”. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, it has been observed that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not to be exercised whenever there is an error of law. The powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion, it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily and one of the limitations imposed by the courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in such class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. That apart, the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can always take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances and pass appropriate directions to balance the justice. The jurisdiction being extraordinary it is required to be exercised keeping in mind the principles of equity.....” 9. The common thread flowing from the above referred judgments of the Supreme Court with regard to the nature of power and jurisdiction under Article 226 is to the effect that the High Court's power is equitable and discretionary. The High Court is required to exercise the jurisdiction to reach injustice wherever it is found. There are no limits to the power, the same should not be exercised unless substantial injustice has ensued or is 3(2014) 13 SCC 681 likely to ensue and further that the Court can always take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances and pass appropriate directions to balance the justice. It also follows that the wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the court's province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process and that the High Court should not fail to intervene when a grave error has crept in and injustice or arbitrariness has ushered. 10. In the case in hand, for the mistake of one or the other authority, a wholly peculiar and anomalous situation has crept in wherein the beneficiary i.e. RDA having floated a housing scheme seeking consent of the land owners whose land is covered within the scheme area and the petitioners have accorded such consent yet by mistake the Land Acquisition Officer proceeded to acquire the petitioners' land because a mistake was committed by the RDA at the beginning. Resultantly, the award having been passed now the petitioners are unnecessarily required to receive the amount, pay some tax like income tax (TDS) etc., on the same and then redeposit the amount with the RDA for obtaining reconstituted plots. 11. In a situation like this, the Court's endeavor should be to drive the parties to settle the dispute rather than to aggravate the same and put the parties in a state of suspended animation with regard to the subject matter. When the petitioners submit that they will face difficulty as they may be required to make payment of income tax if they receive the amount of compensation and then deposit the same with the RDA, which would otherwise may not be commensurate with the terms of the scheme floated by the RDA to which the petitioners have agreed, it is desirable in the interest of justice to dispose of this writ petition in the following manner. The land acquisition award in respect of the petitioners' land is quashed. The Land Acquisition Officer shall return the amount of compensation qua the petitioners' land to the RDA. On receipt of the amount of compensation, the RDA shall finalize the allotment of reconstituted plots in favour of the petitioners. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. J u d g e Gowri