COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE Vs. M/S.UNITED SPIRITS LTD.& ANR.
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Civil), 5003 of 2006, Judgment Date: Jan 05, 2017
In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are constrained to remit the
matter to the tribunal for reconsideration of the aforesaid aspects on the
basis of observations made hereinabove and the law in the field. However,
we may proceed to state that we have not expressed anything on the merits
of the case including the imposition of penalty and interest. We expect
the tribunal shall advert to each and every facet in detail so that this
Court can appropriately appreciate the controversy.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5003 OF 2006
Commissioner Central Excise, Bangalore ... Appellant(s)
Versus
M/s. United Spirits Ltd. & Anr. ... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
The respondent is a manufacturer of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL)
and is a registered owner of several known brands of IMFL. The respondent,
as the facts have been unfolded, also “manufactures” food flavours at its
unit at Shayura Orchards, Kumbalagodu, Bangalore and the present appeal
pertains only to food flavours.
2. The respondent has got its own distillery units at various places. In
addition, it has entered into agreements with various manufacturers of
liquor who had their bottling plants and also appropriate licences to
manufacture liquor. With these liquor manufacturers the respondent had
entered into Usership Agreement whereby they were permitted to use the
trademark of the respondent on IMFL manufactured by them on the terms and
conditions mentioned in the agreement. The respondent had also entered into
another agreement with the liquor manufacturers called the manufacturing
agreement which provides for manufacture and sale by liquor manufacturers
of IMFL under the respondent’s brand names or its purchase by the
respondent on the terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. It is
stipulated in the agreement that sale and purchase of IMFL under the
agreement shall be on principal to principal basis. These liquor
manufacturers were to purchase raw materials such as rectified spirit,
extra neutral alcohol and blending and packing materials in accordance with
the standards and specifications set forth in the agreement and from the
approved suppliers. It was also provided in the manufacturing agreement
that modalities of price payable by the respondent to the liquor
manufacturers for sale of IMFL and the price was to be the aggregate of
cost of rectified spirit, extra neutral alcohol, blending and packing
materials, storage, insurance premium and all manufacturing costs and
expenses as mentioned in the agreement. In addition, the liquor
manufacturers were entitled to the margin of profit called service charges
in the agreement. The total price so paid to the liquor manufacturers was
the sole consideration for the sales and such price is known as Ex-
Distillery Price (EDP), which includes all costs, charges and expenses
incurred by the liquor manufacturers for manufacture of IMFL as well as
their margin described as service charges. The IMFL manufactured by liquor
manufacturers was affixed with the brand names owned by the respondent. It
provided the manufacturing logo, quality control, product research, etc.
The respondent provided technical know-how/expertise to liquor
manufacturers for manufacture of IMFL.
3. The liquor manufacturers sell IMFL manufactured by them either to the
respondent or to the customers identified by the respondent or to the
government-owned corporations. The sales personnel of the respondent
contact the customers, book orders, collect outstanding amounts from the
market, collect statutory forms like C-Forms, Excise
Verification Certificates, Permits, etc. and forward the same to the liquor
manufacturers. The respondent would promote its brands through marketing
teams and operation of various promotional schemes and advertisements and
all expenses with regard to the same are incurred by the respondent. The
liquor manufacturers were entitled to receive EDP which include the actual
cost of IMFL manufactured by them plus the profit margin. The prices were
negotiated by the respondent even when the goods were sold by the liquor
manufacturers to such buyers and they would bill by such buyers at the
rates negotiated and determined by the respondent.
4. The respondent, however, asserts that such rates/prices negotiated
with outside buyers were either more or less than the EDP with certain
consequences, namely, (a) if the selling price to outside customers is more
than EDP, the difference was paid by the liquor manufacturers to the
respondent by calling it under different nomenclature like royalty or
service charge; (b) if the selling price to outside customers was less than
EDP, the difference/shortfall is borne by the respondent and paid to the
liquor manufacturers; and (c) if the price realized from outside buyers is
more than EDP, the difference accrued to the respondent.
5. As has been stated earlier, the respondent “manufactures” food
flavours at its food flavour manufacturing unit at Bangalore. On the said
aspect, the respondent asserts that the food flavours were “prepared” by
mixing of various essences (odoriferous substances) purchased by the
respondent from different suppliers.
6. Food flavours it is accepted play a role in the flavour profile of
the liquor. Food flavours are not used in all brands of IMFL. There are
certain brands of IMFL in which no food flavours are used and wherever they
are used in IMFL, the percentage is very low ranging from 0.0001% to 00019%
per litre. However, it is not the case of the respondent, that food
flavours do not matter in the IMFL business.
7. Food flavours were supplied by the respondent to their IMFL
manufacturing units and also sold to liquor manufacturers who were
manufacturing IMFL under manufacturing/usership agreements. Food flavours
were also sold to third party manufacturers of IMFL. The liquor
manufacturers under the manufacturing agreement would use food flavours in
such proportions as identified by the respondent and the blending
proportion was maintained as a trade secret of the respondent.
8. The respondent stands registered under the Central Excise Act, 1944
(for short, “the Act”) for manufacture of food flavours falling under Sub-
Heading No. 3302.10 of the Central Excise Tariff since 1994 and holds the
Central Excise Registration Certificate No. 8/94. Food flavours
manufactured by the respondent have been always cleared on payment of
central excise duty. As a procedure, the respondent used to file price
lists/declarations from time to time declaring the assessable value of food
flavours in accordance with law. The assessable value included the entire
cost of raw material, labour cost, overheads and profit margin and were
cleared from the factory on payment of central excise duty. The price of
food flavours supplied to the respondent owned IMFL manufacturing units,
liquor manufacturers and to other independent IMFL manufacturers, it is
asserted by the respondent, did not vary and remain identical.
9. The royalty paid to the respondent by the liquor manufacturers, as
asserted, is the difference between their selling prices of IMFL to outside
buyers and the EDP of such IMFL. As pleaded, the payment of royalty has no
nexus or connection with the food flavours. There are several brands of
IMFL where no food flavour was supplied by the respondent to liquor
manufacturers. However, royalty on the difference between the selling
price of IMFL and EDP was still paid. The respondent claims that there
were several instances where food flavours were sold and used in IMFL but
no royalty was received. In those cases the selling price of IMFL was
lower than the EDP and rather than receiving royalty, the respondent had
borne the shortfall and reimbursed the same to liquor manufacturers. On
this ground, the respondent intends to put forth the stand that royalty was
solely relatable to the higher selling prices of IMFL over and above EDP
and has nothing to do with food flavour. The food flavours were not used
in IMFL products like Signature Whisky, Centenary Whisky, Single Malt
Whisky, etc. which were manufactured without using food flavours. In
respect of the same, the liquor manufacturers manufacturing the said brand
were paying royalty to the respondent, that being the difference between
their selling price of the said brands and their EDP.
10. We have narrated the aforesaid factual scenario as substantially put
forth by the respondent. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that
revenue issued a show cause notice on 11.04.2000 on the ground that the
respondent-assessee received additional consideration from its franchisees
in the form of royalty for supplying food flavours which were essential
ingredients of the IMFL manufactured by the franchisees. The proviso to
Section 11A of the Act was invoked by the adjudicating authority and it was
propose to re-determine the assessable value of food flavours by including
the royalty received by the assessee. The differential duty demanded for
the period April, 1997 to March, 2009 was 35,45,865,860/-. Penalties were
proposed on the unit and on the Senior Manager (Taxation) and interest was
also levied. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand vide his
order dated 29.08.2002. The respondent approached the Customs, Excise and
Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, “tribunal”) which in its order
dated 08.07.2003 remanded the matter to the learned Commissioner as certain
invoices of sales were produced before the tribunal which were not
considered by the concerned Commissioner. While remitting the matter, the
tribunal observed that as the matter was being remitted, the issue of
limitation and such other issues were kept open for the adjudicator to re-
determine and pass an appropriate order granting the opportunity to the
parties for effective hearing. The issue of penalty was also kept open.
11. After the remit, the adjudicating authority passed an order on
27.02.2004. It placed reliance on the decision in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh[1], and held that the royalty from
the various units under the manufacturing agreement deserve to be included
in the assessable value of the food flavour supplied to them and
accordingly confirmed the demand under proviso to Section 11A of the Act.
Equal amount of penalty was imposed under Section 11 AC and interest under
Section 11AB was also levied. A penalty of Rs.
3,00,000/- was imposed on the Senior Manager (Taxation) under Rule 26 of
the Central Excise Rules, 2002.
12. Before the tribunal, it was contended by the assessee that it
purchased duty paid essences from various suppliers and simply mixed them
by a process of manual mixing in the proportion developed by the respondent
and which was kept as a top secret and the mere process of manual mixing of
the essence did not amount to manufacture; that though the said issue was
raised before the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner on 18.02.2000 and a
prayer was made to consider their plea that the food flavour produced by
them was not excisable and, pass an appropriate order, the concerned
authority did not respond to the same and thereafter, the assessee informed
the department that till a final decision was taken, the duty would be paid
under protest. It is further contended that food flavours were odoriferous
compounds and the quantum of food flavours used in IMFL wherever used were
very negligible ranging from 0.0001% to 0.0019% per litre of various IMFL
products and such use had no relevance in the marketability of IMFL product
nor its final market price. Referring to the letters dated 18.02.2000 and
dated 04.09.2001 wherein the assessee had taken a stand that mixing of duty
paid flavours would not amount to manufacture. It reiterated the stand
that it was not a manufacture on the basis of the decision rendered in
Union of India & Ors v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Limited and
Others[2]. Reference was also made to the order passed by the
Commissioner, Central Excise, Hyderabad who vide his letter dated
22.09.2003 had held that the mixing of duty paid food flavours could not
result in emergence of a new product and the resultant essence which comes
into existence in the premises of M/s. Shaw Wallace Co. (SWC) does not
answer the test of marketability and as the facts are identical in the case
of the assessee, the same should have been followed by the jurisdictional
Commissioner. To bolster the said stand, reliance was placed on Delhi
Cloth and Generals Mills Co. Limited (supra), South Bihar Sugar Mills
Limited & Anr. Etc. v. UOI & Anr, Etc[3], and Tata Chemicals Limited v.
R.M. Desai, Inspector, Central Excise, Mithapur & Others, Moti Laminates
Private Limited v. CCE (SC)[4], Kilpest India Limited v. CCE (Tri.)[5], XI
Telecom Limited v. Supdt. Of Central Excise, Hyderabad(AP-DB)[6], and CCE
v. Jagatjit Industries (SC)[7].
13. It was further argued that in certain cases, the flavours which were
not bought are not even mixed but were supplied directly to the bottlers,
only the labels were changed in order to maintain secrecy and such an
activity could not be regarded as ‘manufacture’ inasmuch as under Chapter
Heading 3302.10 re-labelling does not amount to manufacture. It was
argued that mixing of flavours does not bring into existence a new product
and even after mixing flavours, the resultant products still remains to be
a flavour only. Attention of the tribunal was invited to Board’s Circular
No. 247/81/96-CX dated 03.10.1996 clarifying that mixing duty paid paints
to obtain paint in different shade would not amount to manufacture.
Further submission before the tribunal was that flavours were either mixed
or supplied in the form in which they were purchased to the bottlers and
cannot be marketed to anyone else and no other manufacturer would buy these
flavours, for they were meant only for use in the product manufactured for
the assessee.
14. Commenting on the nexus between the royalty and the price of food
flavours, it was canvassed before the tribunal that the royalty and service
charges were received by the assessee for use of the trade mark and for
marketing services provided by it to the contract bottling units and even
though flavours were supplied to independent manufacturers, neither royalty
nor service charges were received from them and hence, the royalty bill had
no nexus with the price of the food flavour. That apart, it was argued
that the assessee sold food flavours to Contract Bottling Units who
employed them to manufacture IMFL products or to different other brand
owners to whom they were paying royalty and service charges. However, the
other brand owners paid only the price of flavours to the assessee and this
would be indicative of the fact that the royalty had no nexus with the
price of the flavours. Additionally, it was propounded that material was
purchased before the concerned Commissioner showing that assessee had sold
some kind of flavour to certain distilleries with whom there was no
bottling agreement nor there was any receipt of royalty or service charges
because the contract unit had not applied the brand of the assessee nor
secured services of the assessee for marketing and in such a case, the
Commissioner could not have asserted that the agreement was for sale of
flavour and receipt of royalty and service charges. Reliance on the Pepsi
Foods Ltd. (supra) was seriously criticised before the tribunal as the
ratio laid down was not applicable to the case at hand. Before the
tribunal the learned counsel for the assessee had drawn attention that the
manufacturing agreement and usership agreement to highlight certain
aspects, to draw distinction and the adjudicating authority could not have
proceeded to allocate the entire receipts to the value of food flavours
alone without any basis. Criticising the invocation of the jurisdiction
under Section 11A of the Act, it was contended that there was no
suppression on the part of the appellants as the factum of payment of
royalty was known to the department and it was clear from the note of the
Range Officer to the Deputy Commissioner which clearly laid down that the
amount paid towards royalty was only for use of the brand name for sale of
flavour and prior to the issue of show cause notice, there was an audit
inspection on 28.03.2001 and the assessee was asked to clarify various
points raised which had been clarified vide letter dated 28.04.2001 and all
these aspects had not been taken into consideration while invoking the
jurisdiction. It was also put forth that as royalty had no nexus with the
price of food flavours, the assessee was not expected to declare it and,
therefore, it could not be treated as suppression. That apart, at the time
of audit objection even the Range Superintendent was of the view that there
was no nexus between the royalty received by the appellant and the price of
food flavours sold by the assessee and, therefore, in the obtaining
circumstances, the notices were clearly barred by time.
15. The stand and stance put forth by the assessee was controverted by
the revenue contending, inter alia, that the department had raised the
question of excisability of the product in question, when it found the
modification of stay order Nos. 838 and 839/2004 dated 10.08.2004 by the
High Court. It was also urged that there was an earlier proceeding in 1995
relating to food flavour and the case was adjudicated by the then
Commissioner, consequent upon which the assessee had started paying duty
and hence, excisablity of the product in question was never an issue at all
as the conduct of the assessee would reflect. Reference was made to Entry
3302 in the Tariff and 3302.10 to highlight that the tariff itself
recognizes mixtures of odoriferous substances as excisable product and,
hence, it could not be said that no manufacture was involved in the mixing
of the essences to produce such food flavours. It was urged that goods to
fit into the term ‘manufacture’ must be capable of being bought and sold in
the market and to be known as such. In that regard, placing reliance on
Bhor Industries Ltd v. CCE, Bombay[8], Union Carbide v. CCE[9], Moti
Laminates Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v. CCE, Ahmedabad[10], Union Of India & Others v.
Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd. and another[11] and CCE, Chandigarh-II v.
Jagatjit Industries Ltd.[12], it was canvassed that in the case at hand the
food flavours manufactured by the assessee were marketable as evidenced
from the assesse’s admissions that it has been selling food flavours to
other independent bottlers who were not manufacturing the IMFL brands of
McDowell but their own brands which establish marketability of the product.
It was further argued that the inputs were essences and once they were
mixed or prepared, they lost their original identity. It was also urged
that though the input and finished goods were under the same tariff
heading, still there was manufacture and the finished goods were having
distinct, separate and identifiable function, with reference to the
product, i.e., IMFL. The further stand was that mixing amounts to
manufacture as has been laid down in Gopal Zarda Udyog v. CCE, New
Delhi[13], O.K. Play (India) Limited v. CCE, New Delhi II[14], Nestle India
Limited v. CCE, Chandigarh II[15], T.N. State Transport Corporation
Limited v. CCE, Madurai[16], Kothari Products Limited v. Government of
Andhra Pradesh[17], CCE, Guntur v. Crane Betel Nut Powder Works[18], and
Henna Export Corporation v. CCE[19]. The revenue further contended that as
per Section 4 of the Act, the assessable value depends on the nature of
transaction and each price in a transaction was an assessable value and it
cannot be compared if the type of transaction was different. The assessee
received royalty charges from buyers who were contract bottling units and
separate assessable value was computable for these types of customers and
in such cases, the royalty charged by the assessee from the buyers has to
be treated as additional consideration.
16. After noting down the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties, the tribunal adverted to the issue of nexus between the royalty
and the price of food flavours. The tribunal clearly stated that in the
year 1995, the department had proceeded against the assessee for non-
payment of central excise duty on the food flavours produced by them and
the Commissioner confirmed the demands raised and at that time, the
excisability of food flavours was not questioned by the assessee. After
the adjudication order dated 30.01.1995, the assessee was clearing the
goods on payment of duty. During 2001, the departmental audit raised
certain objections with reference to the receipt of certain amounts towards
royalty, service charges, etc. from the contract bottling units engaged in
the manufacture of IMFL and according to the audit, the royalty charges
should be added to the value of the food flavour sold to the contract
bottling units. At that juncture, the assessee gave justification for non-
inclusion of royalty charges. The tribunal, as the impugned order would
reflect, has adverted in detail to the justification given by the assessee
before the adjudicating authority which was basically founded on the
conditions set out in the agreement that royalty was payable by the
manufacture for use of the brand name and that the royalty had no relevance
with the goods or various inputs that go into the manufacture of these
goods. It was also set forth that the brands of the company had their own
value and the royalty receivable from the manufacturer was primarily on
account of company’s brands of finished goods, namely, IMFL viz. No. 1
Brandy, No. 1 Whisky, Diplomat Whisky, Premium Whisky, Dry Gin, etc. It
was also contended that the audit party had erroneously mis-
interpreted the concept of royalty as one which was capable of being
subdivided into and allocable to various manufacturing inputs, for it is
neither feasible nor a correct procedure to apportion the royalty which was
accruing to the company on the company’s brand image. It was also
contended that such an understanding would defeat the purpose of the
agreement. Though such a stand was explained by the assessee, yet the
department was of the view that the royalty should be added to the
assessable value and consequently first show cause notice dated 11.04.2002
was issued. The tribunal thereafter chronologically analysed the facts and
order of remit and the de novo order and perused the relevant agreements of
the appellants with the CBUs. On scrutiny of the agreements, the tribunal
found that there were two agreements, one is called the Manufacturing
Agreement and the other is Usership Agreement. As per the terms and
conditions of the agreement, the products were to be manufactured by the
second party would include the products whose trade mark was owned by the
assessee-appellant before the tribunal and any other associate company of
it. The second party to the agreement was required to purchase blending
and packing materials from such suppliers specified by the assessee and
above condition was for the purpose of ensuring quality specification. The
agreement defined the blending material. The tribunal referred to the
definition of “Blending Material” and opined that the said definition
includes food flavours. It referred to para 18 of the agreement which
stipulates that during the currency of the agreement, the second party (as
pointed out by the tribunal) Gemini Distilleries (Tripura) Pvt. Ltd. (GDPL)
shall not use trade mark to or adopt any trade mark similar to any of the
trade marks on or in connection with any product. On that basis, the
tribunal opined that on careful reading of the agreement reveals that the
assessee has good control over the manufacture of IMFL by GDPL and it
ensures the quality of the product, which bears the trade mark of the
assessee. Referring to the usership agreement, the tribunal observed that
the proprietor was the assessee and the user was GDPL and according to the
said agreement, at the request of the user, the proprietor had agreed to
permit the user to use the trade marks in respect of the goods on the terms
and conditions mentioned in the agreement. The tribunal referred to para
12 of the agreement which postulates that in consideration of this licence,
the user shall pay to the proprietor such sum per case manufactured of the
goods as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties from time to time and
the consideration shall be paid by the user by the following month. It
further observed that though the word royalty has not been used in the
agreement, it was clear that the sum mentioned in para 12 of the agreement
refers to royalty and the royalty was for the use of trade mark and there
was no indication whatsoever to infer that the royalty was paid for supply
of food flavour. It took note of the fact that food flavour was one of the
blending materials and not the sole blending materials sold by the assessee
to the CBU and hence, prima facie, there does not appear to be any close
nexus between royalty and the food flavour.
17. Be it noted, the assessee before the tribunal highlighted that there
were three types of transactions, namely, receipt of royalty and also
supply of food flavours; royalty was received though there was no supply of
food flavours; and royalty was not received even though there was supply of
food flavours. Accepting the said submission, the tribunal held thus:-
“The appellants took us through the various documents and showed us that
there is practically no difference in price in respect of sales to
independent buyers and the prices at which food flavours are sold to CBUs.
This fact clinches the issue. It is very clear that there is no nexus
between the royalty and the food flavours. The adjudicating authority has
relied on the Apex Court’s decision in the Pepsi case. In our view, the
ratio of the above decision should not have been blindly applied as done by
the adjudicating authority. In the Pepsi case, both the concentrate and
the final product are excisable which is not the case in the present
appeals. The final product here is IMFL for which royalty is paid. IMFL
is not subjected to Central Excise duty. In the Pepsi case, the concentrate
is the most essential ingredient of Pepsi Cola whereas in the present case,
it is not so. There are certain brands of IMFL which do not require any
food flavour. In the Pepsi case, the concentrates are sold only for the
franchisees. In the instant case, the appellants have sold food flavours
to independent manufactures of IMFL who will not be using the brand name of
the appellants. Such independent manufacturers would not pay any royalty.
In the Pepsi case, an express prohibition restricting the bottlers to
purchase the concentrate from any other source was there. No such express
prohibition is there in the present agreement. It was further pointed out
by the appellants that there are instances wherein the appellants have paid
an amount to bottlers when the sale price of IMFL is much below the ex-
distillery price. It is further seen that apart from food flavour, the
appellants supplied other blending materials to these CBUs. In these
circumstances, the entire royalty paid cannot be attributed to the food
flavour whose cost is only 0.45% according to the appellants. Further we
find that even in 2001, at the time of audit inspection, the appellants
have taken a firm stand not only regarding the includibility of royalty but
also the question of very excisability of the food flavour itself. In these
circumstances, there is no justification for alleging suppression of facts
to invoke the larger period. Hence the Show Cause Notice dated 11.04.2002
and 08.03.2004 are clearly time barred. For the above mentioned reasons,
the royalty has no nexus with the price of the food flavour and hence, not
includible in the assessable value. Moreover, the first two Show Cause
notices are time barred as there is no suppression of facts.”
18. After so stating, the tribunal addressed the issue pertaining to
excisability of food flavours. It took note of the fact that there was
purchased duty paid odoriferous compounds called essences and these
essences were mixed manually to obtain food flavour. In what proportion
and which essences were to be mixed has been kept a trade secret and
different brands of IMFL require food flavour of different profiles. In
order to ensure the quality consistency in the various brands of IMFL, the
production of food flavour was centralized at Bangalore which does not use
power. The tribunal referred to Board’s circular dated 22.11.1999 wherein
it has been clarified that agarbati manufacturing process involving simple
mixing of a few aromatic chemicals with the base oil in a container in
liquid form, which was mixed directly with the dough or applied on agarbati
in the required proportion used for rolling of agarbati is not excisable
product and, therefore, no duty was leviable on such compounds during the
course of manufacture of agarbati. It was urged before the tribunal that
the fact situation in the case of assessee was similar, as has been
clarified in the Board’s circular in respect of agarbati. It is further
urged that there was a simple mixing of essences of different flavour
profile and the food flavours produced by the assessee are exclusively used
for making their brands of IMFL in their own units and contract units and
it cannot be sold in the market as such. The tribunal posed a question
whether the process of mixing of essences results in a distinct commodity,
which was different from the original inputs. In that context, it held
thus:-
“We find that both the essences and the resultant product food flavour fall
under the same Tariff Heading. Since different proportion of the
ingredients give different flavours to the resultant product, we cannot say
that a ingredients give different flavours to the resultant product, we
cannot say that a completely distinct product emerges. The comparison with
agarbathi mention in Board’s Circular is justified. Board’s Circular dated
03.11.1996 deals with the process of tinting of duty paid base white Paint
with duty paid strainer to obtain paint of different shades. It has been
clarified that the above process does not amount to manufacture on the
ground that the process of tinting does not bring about any new commodity
with different commercial identity as the resultant emulsion/enamel point
and hence, it may not be appropriate to consider this process as amounting
to manufacture. While clarifying the above position, the Board has applied
the ratio of the classic judgment of the Apex Court in the DCM case wherein
it has been held that “Manufacture implies change, but every change is not
manufacture and yet every change in an article is a result of treatment,
labour and manipulation, but something more is necessary and there must be
transformation; a new and different article must emerge having distinctive
name, character and use.”
In another Circular dated 13.07.1992, the Board has clarified that
conversion of plain plastic granules into coloured plastic granules would
not amount to manufacture.
In all these cases, the commercial identify of the ingredients and the
finished product remained the same. In the present case also, the process
of mixing two or more essences in certain proportions does not bring into
existence any new product. The essence remained essences only and because
of the different proportion, a distinct flavour is imparted to the
resultant product. That cannot make the process as manufacture.”
19. To arrive at the said conclusion, it placed reliance on CCE Chennai
v. Fountain Consumer Appliances Limited[20], Tega India Limited v. CCE,
Calcutta II[21], State of Maharashtra v. Mahalaxmi Stores[22], and CCE
Chennai v. Titanium Equipment & Anode Manufacturing Co. Ltd.[23]
20. We have heard Mr. Yashank Adhyaru, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Ms. Indu Malhotra and Mr. S.K. Bagaria, learned
senior counsel for the respondents. It is submitted by the learned counsel
for the appellant that the final product ‘food flavour’ is classified under
Chapter Heading 3302.10 and hence is excisable and dutiable. According to
him, the assessee itself had admitted that it was selling the food flavours
to independent bottling units and that establishes the marketability of the
product. The assessee had claimed that its product is custom made and the
formula is a trade secret and further it had availed CENVAT credit of
inputs for payment of duty on final product. As the facts had been
established, contend Mr. Adhyaru, the finished goods are sold on different
code numbers assigned by the assessee, hence a new identity is established.
Learned senior counsel would urge to construe a particular good has been
manufactured, the goods must be capable of being bought and sold in the
market, as has been held by this Court in Bhor Industries Ltd. (supra),
Jagatjit Industries Ltd. (supra) and Servo Med Industries Pvt. Ltd. v.
CCE[24]. Learned senior counsel would contend that mixing which is
prefixed by simple fixing by the assessee is not acceptable because the
process of mixing can amount to manufacature as has been held in Gopal
Zarda Udyog (supra) and O.K. Play (India) Limited (supra). As far as the
royalty is concerned, it is urged by him that the assessee had received
royalty charges from buyers who are contract bottling units and separate
assessable value is computable for this type of customers.
21. In the instant case, as the revenue would put forth, the
royalty/service charge received by the assessee under the various agreement
with other manufacturers of IMFL forms additional consideration and is
includible in the assessable value under Section 4 of the Act read with
Valuation Rules as has been held in Pepsi Foods Ltd.
(supra).
22. Mr. Bagaria and Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel appearing
for the assessee in their turn would contend that the food flavours were
odoriferous compounds and are prepared by way of simple mixing of various
essences (odoriferous substances) purchased from different suppliers and
thus the food flavours that were obtained from simple mixing of duty paid
essences/flavours done manually cannot be regarded as manufacture, for by
such mixing no new commodity having existing name, character or use
emerges. That apart, in around 26% of the cases even such mixing was not
done and the flavours purchased from the market were cleared as such merely
after relabeling and when flavours fall under the Heading No. 3302.10, no
extended meaning is to be given to the expression ‘manufacture’. Reliance
has been placed on circular no. 247/81/96-Cx. dated 03.10.1996 issued by
CBEC, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, which had clarified that
the process of tinting of base emulsion/enamel paint with strainers to
obtain paint of different shades does not amount to ‘manufacture’ within
the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act. It was their further submission
that tribunal has rightly made the comparison between the process of
tinting of base emulsion/enamel paint with strainers with the process of
mixing two or more essences in certain preparation to arrive at the
conclusion that no process of manufacture was involved in the case of the
assessee. It was urged that it is well settled that mere mention of the
goods in one of the Entries in the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff
would not render them exigible to excise duty unless the twin tests of
manufacture and marketability were satisfied. It has also been repeatedly
held that manufacture implies a change but every change was not manufacture
and in order to attract the concept of manufacture, there must be
transformation of the raw materials into a new and different article having
a distinctive name, character and use. In that regard reliance has been
placed on Union of India v. Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd & others.[25],
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CCE, Jaipur[26], Delhi Cloth & General Mills (supra)
and Satnam Overseas Ltd. v. CCE, New Delhi[27]. It has been emphatically
put forth that a simple process of mixing do not amount to manufacture as
there is no transformation of the inputs into any new or differential
commodity and for the said proposition, reliance has been placed on CCE,
Bangalore-II v. Osnar Chemicals Private Ltd.[28], CCE, Meerut v. Goyal
Gases (P) Ltd.[29] and Crane Betel Nut Powder Works v. Commr. of Customs &
Central Excise, Tirupathi[30]. Further stand of the respondent is that in
respect of the Sub-Heading 3302.10 which covers food flavours, no
artificial or extended meaning has been given to the expression
‘manufacture’ by the legislature by exercising the power under Section
2(f)(iii) and hence, it cannot be regarded as manufacture. Heavy reliance
is placed on the decisions in Shyam Oil Cake Ltd. v. CCE-I, New Delhi,
Jaipur[31] and CCE v. S.R. Tissues (P) Ltd.[32] As far as the stand of the
revenue that the assessee at one point of time had accepted the process of
mixing and manufacture and paid the duty under the specified heading, it
would debar the assessee to raise the plea again is sans substance as the
Commissioner himself had admitted that food flavours were prepared by
simple manual mixing of odoriferous substances but by the assessee. That
apart, the assessee was entitled to raise such an issue in respect of the
subsequent period and is not stopped to do so in view of the decision in
Municipal Corporation of City of Thane v. Vidyut Metallics Ltd.[33] As far
as the conclusion arrived at by the tribunal that two show cause notices
dated 11.04.2002 and 30.04.2004 are barred by limitation, no fault can be
found with it inasmuch as the said show cause notices were issued after
expiry of one year from the period covered thereunder and hence, plea
barred by limitation as provided under Section 11A(1) of the Act. As
regards the limitation, learned senior counsel for the respondent have
drawn inspiration from Cosmic Dye Chemical v. CCE, Bombay[34], Padmini
Products v. CCE, Bangalore[35], Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. CCE,
Bombay[36] and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, Raipur[37]. As far as penalty
imposed under Section 11AC is concerned, it is urged that there has been no
fraud or collision or wilful mis-statement or
suppression of facts or contravention of provisions of the Act or the Rules
with the intention to evade payment of duty and, therefore, the authorities
could not have mechanically imposed the penalty and the tribunal is
absolutely justified in setting aside the same.
23. From the factual narration and the submissions advanced at the Bar,
we find three issues, namely, (i) whether there was
‘manufacture’, (ii) whether there was nexus in royalty received and the
price paid for the food flavour sold, and (iii) whether two show cause
notices have been correctly determined to be barred by limitation by the
tribunal. First we shall advert to the issue of ‘manufacture’. The
submission of the respondent is that they are mixing essences and in some
cases merely selling food flavours purchased from third parties without any
processing and in any case mixing of essences under no circumstances can
amount to manufacture. The said submission is founded on the principle
that by such process of mixing change takes place and no separate and
marketable commodity comes into existence. Various judgments have been
cited at the Bar to explain the term ‘manufacture’. It is well settled in
law that ‘manufacture’ implies change, but every change is not manufacture,
such change is normally a result of treatment, labour and manipulation. In
this regard, we think it appropriate to to reproduce a passage from Union
of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.[38] wherein the
Constitution Bench quoted with approval from an American judgment in
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. United States[39], which is to the
following effect:-
“‘Manufacture’ implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and
yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and
manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be
transformation; a new and different article must emerge having a
distinctive name, character or use.”
24. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes),
Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers[40], a three-Judge Bench while interpreting
Section 5-A(1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 opined that:-
“There are several criteria for determining whether a commodity is consumed
in the manufacture of another. The generally prevalent test is whether the
article produced is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as
distinct in identity from the commodity involved in its manufacture.
Commonly manufacture is the end result of one more processes through which
the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing
may vary from one case to another, and indeed there may be several stages
of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage.
With each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change.
But it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity
to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the
original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article
that a manufacture can be said to take place. Where there is no essential
difference in identity between the original commodity and the processed
article it is not possible to say that one commodity has been consumed in
the manufacture of another. Although it has undergone a degree of
processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity.”
25. After so stating, the Court posed the question: does the processing
of original commodity brings into existence a commercially different and
distinct article? In that context, the three-Judge Bench analysed the
ratio in previous decisions and stated thus:-
“Some of the cases where it was held by this Court that a different
commercial article held come into existence include Anwarkhan Mahboob Co.
v. State of Bombay[41] (where raw tobacco was manufactured into bidi
patti), A. Hajee Abdul Shakoor and Co. v. State of Madras[42] (raw hides
and skins constituted a different commodity from dressed hides and skins
with different physical properties), State of Madras v. Swastik Tobacco
Factory[43] (raw tobacco manufactured into chewing tobacco) and Ganesh
Trading Co., Karnal v. State of Haryana[44], (paddy dehusked into rice). On
the other side, cases where this Court has held that although the original
commodity has undergone a degree of processing it has not lost its original
identity include Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kurnool v. CTO[45], (where
hydrogenated groundnut oil was regarded as groundnut oil) and C.S.T., U.P.,
Lucknow v. Harbilas Rai and Sons[46] (where bristles plucked from pigs,
boiled, washed with soap and other chemicals and sorted out in bundles
according to their size and colour were regarded as remaining the same
commercial commodity, pigs bristles).”
26. Adverting to the fact situation which pertained to pineapple fruit
and canned pineapple slices, the Court held:-
“In the present case, there is no essential difference between pineapple
fruit and the canned pineapple slices. The dealer and the consumer regard
both as pineapple. The only difference is that the sliced pineapple is a
presentation of fruit in a more convenient from and by reason of being
canned it is capable of storage without spoiling. The additional sweetness
in the canned pineapple arises from the sugar added as a preservative. On a
total impression, it seems to us, the pineapple slices must be held to
possess the same identity as the original pineapple fruit.”
27. In Collector of Customs, Bombay v. S.H. Kelker & Co. Ltd.[47], the
assessee had imported an organic chemical “abbalide” which the assessee had
classified under Chapter 29 and not as an odoriferous substances under
Heading 33.02 of the tariff. Reversing the judgment of the tribunal, it
was held by the Court as under:-
“10. Heading 33.02 of the Tariff refers to
“mixtures of odoriferous substances and mixtures (including alcoholic
solutions) with a basis of one or more of these substances, of a kind used
as raw materials in industry”.
It envisages (i) mixtures of odoriferous substances, and (ii) mixtures
(including alcoholic substances) with a basis of one or more of odoriferous
substances and the mixtures are of a kind used as raw materials in
industry. In the present case, it has been found that the chemical, in its
original form, consists of various isomers and is an odoriferous substance.
It has been dissolved in diethyl phthalate, a non-odoriferous substance.
The odoriferous substance is the basis of the mixture. It is not disputed
that the mixture is used as a raw material, viz., perfume in industry. It
can, therefore be said that the compound is a mixture with a basis of an
odoriferous substance and since it is for use as a raw material in
industry, it would be classifiable under Heading 33.02.
11. In our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in construing clause 1(e) of
Chapter 29 and in holding that the said product was classifiable under
Chapter 29. Clause 1(e) of the Notes in Chapter 29 postulates that if a
product mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) or (c) of clause 1 is dissolved
in a solvent and the solution constitutes a normal and necessary method of
putting up these products adopted solely for the reasons of safety or for
transport then the product would fall within Chapter 29 only if the solvent
does not render the product particularly suitable for specific use rather
than for general use. As per the certificate dated 19-9-1986 issued by the
manufacturer the compound imported by the respondents cannot be used in the
condition it is manufactured and for making it suitable for use and for
retaining its suitability for use it has to be dissolved in a solvent. The
need of a solvent is not only for the purpose of storage and transport of
the chemical, but also for retaining the suitability of the product after
it is manufactured. Its dissolution in the solvent is necessary in order to
make the product suitable for use. Since the product is used only for
perfumery and not for any other purpose, it has to be held that the product
is intended for specific use only. In view of clause 1(e) of the Notes in
Chapter 29, it may be held that the product imported by the respondents
cannot be regarded as falling under Chapter 29 of the Tariff and would fall
under Heading 33.02 in Chapter 33 of the Tariff. We are, therefore, unable
to uphold the impugned judgments of the Tribunal.”
28. We have referred to the decisions to highlight the concept of
essential change in the character of the product. In this regard, useful
reference may be made to the authority in Income Tax Officer, Udaipur v.
Arihant Tiles and Marbles Pvt. Ltd.[48], the Court after referring to CIT
v. M/s N.C. Budharaja and Company[49], opined thus:-
“25. Applying the above tests laid down by this Court in Budharaja case to
the facts of the present cases, we are of the view that blocks converted
into polished slabs and tiles after undergoing the process indicated above
certainly results in emergence of a new and distinct commodity. The
original block does not remain the marble block, it becomes a slab or tile.
In the circumstances, not only is there manufacture but also an activity
which is something beyond manufacture and which brings a new product into
existence and therefore, on the facts of these cases, we are of the view
that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the activity
undertaken by the respondent assessees did constitute manufacture or
production in terms of Section 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
26. Before concluding, we would like to make one observation. If the
contention of the Department is to be accepted, namely, that the activity
undertaken by the respondents herein is not manufacture, then, it would
have serious revenue consequences. As stated above, each of the respondents
is paying excise duty, some of the respondents are job-workers and the
activity undertaken by them has been recognised by various government
authorities as manufacture. To say that the activity will not amount to
manufacture or production under Section 80-IA will have disastrous
consequences, particularly in view of the fact that the assessees in all
the cases would plead that they were not liable to pay excise duty, sales
tax, etc. because the activity did not constitute manufacture.”
29. At this juncture, it is obligatory to state that revenue has heavily
relied upon on Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra). In the said case the Court had
found that the consideration payable as royalty was an inevitable
consequence of the sale of the concentrate and in such circumstances the
price paid for the concentrate was not the sole consideration paid by the
purchaser. The terms of agreement had obligated the bottler to purchase
the concentrate from the assessee alone, use the assessees’ trade mark on
the bottled beverage and also pay royalty for assessees’ trade mark at the
specified percentage of the maximum retail price of each bottle. In the
given circumstances and evidence available, it was held that the price
actually paid for sale of concentrate was not to be the determinative
factor as the price paid for the sale of concentrate, i.e., invoice would
not be determinative, as the royalty payment was inseparably linked with
the sale consideration paid for the concentrate. The indelible nexus and
connect was established to club the two considerations.
30. The respondent, in its turn, has placed reliance on Shyam Oil Cake
Ltd. (supra) and contended that mere separate tariff entry is not
indicative whether the same amounts to manufacture, for tariff entry can be
merely for the purpose of identifying the product and the rate applicable
to it. In such case, it would not have the effect of rendering the
specified commodity to be excisable. Section 2(f) defines “manufacture”
and by deeming effect, a process can amount to manufacture. Albeit, for a
deeming provision to come into play, it must be specifically stated that a
particular process amounts to manufacture. The respondent has also placed
reliance on Circular no. 495/61/99-CX-3 dated 22nd November, 1998, but the
said circular relates to compound preparation during the course of
manufacture of agarbati. In the context of the said product, clarification
was issued. It is noticeable that the respondent had pleaded a different
factual matrix which has been accepted by the tribunal, albeit, without
referring to specific details. General observation and broad brush
approach need not reflect true consideration paid for all transactions. A
far greater and deeper scrutiny of facts is required before forming any
opinion, one way or the other. It would be wrong to be assumptuous without
full factual matrix being lucent and absolutely clear.
31. Recently, in The Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Bangalore v. Ayili Stone Industries Etc. Etc.[50] the Court was
dealing with the issue of grant of exemption on polished granite stone and
the view of the revenue that the polished and unpolished granite stones are
under separate Entries in the second schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax
Act, 1957. The question arose before this Court pertained to
interpretation of polished and granite stones and in that context the
concept of manufacture and after referring to various judgments, it held
that:-
“28. There is a distinction between polished granite stone or slabs and
tiles. If a polished granite stone is used in a building for any purpose,
it will come under Entry 17(i) of Part S of the second schedule, but if it
is a tile, which comes into existence by different process, a new and
distinct commodity emerges and it has a different commercial identity in
the market. The process involved is extremely relevant. That aspect has
not been gone into. The Assessing Officer while framing the assessment
order has referred to Entry 17(i) of Part S but without any elaboration on
Entry 8. Entry 8 carves out tiles as a different commodity. It uses the
words “other titles”. A granite tile would come within the said Entry if
involvement of certain activities is established. To elaborate, if a
polished granite which is a slab and used on the floor, it cannot be called
a tile for the purpose of coming within the ambit and sweep of Entry 8.
Some other process has to be undertaken. If tiles are manufactured or
produced after undertaking some other activities, the position would be
different. A finding has to be arrived at by carrying out due enquiry and
for that purpose appropriate exercise has to be undertaken. In the absence
of that, a final conclusion cannot be reached.”
32. In the case at hand, as we find from the order of the tribunal the
exact nature of the process undertaking and how mixing is undertaken and
the process involved is not discernible and has not been ascertained and
commented. It remains ambiguous and inconclusive. The respondent claims
that about 26% of the sales of odoriferous substances were brought from
third party and sold without any modification or process. These are all
questions of fact which must be first authenticated and the actual factual
position validated. The tribunal has answered the question in favour of
the respondent without the background check as to the actual process
involved and undertaken. Different flavours may have different processes.
33. The third issue relates to the issue of limitation. The tribunal has
held that certain show cause notices are barred by limitation. Mr.
Bagaria, learned senior counsel has submitted that the said conclusion is
absolutely flawless, if the dates are taken into consideration. For the
aforesaid purpose, he has commended us to the decision already referred to
hereinabove. As we notice, the tribunal on this score has also not
scrutinized the dates appropriately, but has returned a cryptic finding.
34. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are constrained to remit the
matter to the tribunal for reconsideration of the aforesaid aspects on the
basis of observations made hereinabove and the law in the field. However,
we may proceed to state that we have not expressed anything on the merits
of the case including the imposition of penalty and interest. We expect
the tribunal shall advert to each and every facet in detail so that this
Court can appropriately appreciate the controversy.
35. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the
tribunal for fresh determination. There shall be no order as to costs.
.............................J.
[Dipak Misra]
.............................J.
New Delhi; [N.V. Ramana]
January 05, 2017
-----------------------
[1] (2005) 9 SCC 28
[2] 1997 ELT (J199)SC
[3] 1978 ELT (J 336)
[4] 1995 (76) ELT 241
[5] 1999 (108) ELT 786
[6] 1999 (105) ELT 263
[7] 2002 (141) ELT 306
[8] (1989) 1 SCC 602
[9] 1986 (24) ELT 169 (SC)
[10] (1995) 3 SCC 23
[11] (2002) 7 SCC 435
[12] (2002) 3 SCC 614
[13] 2005 (188) ELT 251 (SC)
[14] 2005 (180) ELT 291 (SC)
[15] 2004 (169) ELT 315 (Tri-Del)
[16] 2004 (166) ELT 433 (SC)
[17] 1998 (98) ELT 315 (AP)
[18] 2005 (187) ELT 106 (Tri-Bang)
[19] 1993 (67) ELT 907 (Tribunal)
[20] 2004 (171) ELT 329 (Tri-Chennai)
[21] (2004) 2 SCC 727
[22] (2003) 1 SCC 70
[23] 2002 (142) ELT 162 (Tri-Chennai)
[24] 2015 (6) SCALE 137
[25] (2003) 11 SCC 129
[26] (2005) 2 SCC 662
[27] (2015) 13 SCC 166
[28] (2012) 2 SCC 282
[29] (2000) 9 SCC 571
[30] (2007) 4 SCC 155
[31] (2005) 1 SCC 264
[32] (2005) 6 SCC 310
[33] (2007) 8 SCC 688
[34] (1995) 6 SCC 117
[35] (1989) 4 SCC 275
[36] 1995 Supp (3) SCC 462
[37] (2013) 9 SCC 753
[38] AIR 1963 SC 791
[39] 207 US 556 (1908)
[40] 1980 Supp. SCC 174
[41] AIR 1961 SC 213
[42] AIR 1964 SC 1729
[43] AIR 1966 SC 1000
[44] (1974) 3 SCC 620
[45] AIR 1961 SC 412
[46] (1968) 21 STC 17 (SC)
[47] (2000) 10 SCC 478
[48] (2010) 2 SCC 699
[49] 1994 Supp (1) SCC 280
[50] Civil Appeal Nos. 1983-2039 of 2016 dated 18.10.2016