Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 9043 of 2003, Judgment Date: Mar 25, 2015

                                                                'REPORTABLE'
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9043 OF 2003


AGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX OFFICER & ANR.              ... Appellants


                                   VERSUS

GOODRICKE GROUP LTD. & ANR.                        ... Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

R. F. Nariman, J.

            An interesting question is raised in this  appeal  which  arises
out of two judgments of this Court, namely, 'Buxa Dooars  Tea  Company  Ltd.
and others v. State of West Bengal  and  others'  [(1989)  3  SCC  211]  and
'Goodricke Group Ltd.  and  others  v.  State  of  W.B.  and  others'  [1995
Supp.(1) SCC 707].

            In the present appeal, we are concerned  with  The  West  Bengal
Rural Employment and Production  Act,  1976  and  The  West  Bengal  Primary
Education Act, 1973.  The High Court has found, based on a  reading  of  the
interim orders passed in both  Buxa  Dooars  Tea  Company  Ltd.'s  case  and
Goodricke Group Ltd.'s case, that for the period prior to the Amendment  Act
of 1989, the respondent herein is entitled to a refund of the cess  paid  by
it together with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and  has  further  found
that insofar as interest is payable after the Amendment  Act  is  concerned,
such interest would only be  payable  after  assessment  orders  are  passed
(which on facts here,  we  are  informed,  were  passed  on  27.07.1993  and
thereafter).

            By an interim order dated 16.06.1983  in  the  Buxa  Dooars  Tea
Company Ltd.'s case, this court held as hereunder: -

            "Rule NISI.  There will be no order on stay application  but  if
the petitioner succeeds in the writ petition, the State of West Bengal  will
refund the amount of cess collected with interest thereon @  12%  per  annum
from the date of collection."

            By the judgment delivered in  Buxa  Dooars  Tea  Company  Ltd.'s
case in 1989, this Court held that the  charging  sections  under  both  the
aforesaid Acts were invalid both on the ground of legislative competence  as
well as violation of  Article  301  inasmuch  as  the  impugned  legislative
measures were outside Entry 49 in List II of the  Seventh  Schedule  of  the
Constitution, which speaks of "taxes of lands and  buildings";  and  it  was
further held that the levy being on movement of goods, Article  301  of  the
Constitution would be  attracted  and  these  levies  are  not  saved  under
Article 304(b) as no Presidential assent has been taken on either  of  these
legislative measures.

            The West Bengal legislature was swift to act after the  judgment
of this court.  By the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment)  Act  of
1989 amending the provisions  of  both  the  aforesaid  Acts,  the  charging
sections were substituted with retrospective effect, and  the  levy  of  the
rural employment cess  and  education  cess  (which  was  levied  under  the
earlier principal Acts on the basis of despatch  of  manufactured  tea)  was
now levied on the basis of production of tea leaves.  A  challenge  to  this
Amendment Act was made before this  Court  which  challenge  failed  in  the
second judgment referred to hereinabove (in Goodricke Group Ltd.'s case).

            The 1989 Amendment Act was upheld in the following terms:

"Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioners questioned the validity  of
the retrospective effect given to the impugned enactment.  We  fail  to  see
any substance in this submission.  If the Act  is  good,  it  is  good  both
prospectively and retrospectively.  Retrospective effect is  given  for  the
period covered by the anterior provisions which were  struck  down  in  Buxa
Dooars.  Once we hold  that  the  defect  pointed  out  in  Buxa  Dooars  is
rectified and remedied in the impugned enactment, it can certainly be  given
retrospective effect to cover the period covered by  the  earlier  enactment
which is not only a well-known but a frequently adopted measure by  all  the
legislatures.
             For  the  above  reasons,  the  writ  petitions  fail  and  are
accordingly dismissed.  The interim orders  made  in  these  writ  petitions
shall also come to an end.  The petitioners shall pay the cesses  stayed  by
the orders of this Court along with interest @  12%  p.a.   There  shall  no
order as to costs."

            It is a little important to note that before the final  judgment
in Goodricke  Group  Ltd.'s  case  ,  an  interim  order  was  passed  dated
25.01.1990 in the following terms:
            "Issue notice.  In the meantime the assessment may  be  made  as
usual but there will be no enforcement of demand under  the  Act  or  Rules.
Status quo to be maintained as far as refund of Cess is concerned."

            Learned counsel for the appellant Shri Anip Sachthey has  argued
before us that the impugned judgment should be set aside on the ground  that
the interim order dated 16.06.1983 in the Buxa  Dooars  Tea  Company  Ltd.'s
case did not survive as it was substituted by the final order  in  the  Buxa
Dooars Tea Company Ltd.'s case, which is to be found  in  Para  16  thereof,
which  stated  that  the  two  West  Bengal  Acts  were  declared  void  and
consequential refund ordered.  There was no separate order as to payment  of
interest in the final judgment and therefore the interim order which  merges
with the final judgment had no independent existence.   He  has  also  urged
that since the two West Bengal Acts were amended in 1989 with  retrospective
effect from 1981 and 1984 respectively, the basis of the  judgment  in  Buxa
Dooars Tea Company Ltd.'s case was removed and as  a  result,  it  is  clear
that no refund at all is payable.

            Mr. C. U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of
the respondent, on the other hand, supported the  judgment  on  both  counts
and submitted that the levy under the original Act no  longer  remained  the
same, so that the levy under the 1989 amendment was a separate and new  levy
of rural employment cess and education cess, and this  being  the  position,
the interim order as well as the final judgment in Buxa Dooars  Tea  Company
Ltd.'s case still remain intact.  He  further  submitted  that  the  interim
order was self operative inasmuch as interest became payable at the rate  of
12 per cent the moment the  writ  petitions  were  finally  decided  in  the
petitioner's favour.  He also supported the second portion of  the  impugned
judgment saying that the final order in Goodricke Group Ltd.'s  case  is  to
be read with the interim order thereof and if so read, the  result  is  that
interest is only payable under the new Act with  effect  from  the  date  of
assessment and not before.

            We have heard learned counsel for the parties.  In our  opinion,
Mr. C. U. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents,  is
right in saying that the interim order dated 16.06.1983 is  self  operative.
In any case, the final order in Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd.'s case did  not
say anything to the contrary, and when both the  judgment  and  the  interim
order are read together, it is clear that the refund will have  to  be  made
together with 12 per cent interest.

            But the matter does not end here.  The  Amendment  Act  contains
two very important provisions, namely, Section 4B of the West  Bengal  Rural
Employment and Production Act and Section 78C of  the  West  Bengal  Primary
Education Act.  Both the sections are set out hereinbelow: -

"4B.  (1) Where any sum has been paid by, or collected from, any owner of  a
tea estate during the period commencing on the 1st day of  April,  1981  and
ending on the day immediately preceding the date of  coming  into  force  of
the West  Bengal  Taxation  Laws  (Second  Amendment)  Act,  1989  as  rural
employment cess in respect of any period prior to the coming into  force  of
the said Act, such portion  of  the  said  sum  as  may  become  payable  in
accordance with the provisions of this Act after the coming  into  force  of
the said Act shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree  or  order  of  any
court, be deemed to have been validly levied, paid or collected  under  this
Act, and where after assessment or fresh assessment any portion of such  sum
is found to have been levied, paid or  collected  in  excess  of  the  rural
employment cess payable for the said period shall be refunded to such  owner
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  the  rules   made
thereunder.
            (2)  Where any assessment is purported to  have  been  made,  or
any order is purported to have been passed on appeal,  revision  or  review,
by any authority, or any appeal or application for revision  or  review  has
been made before such authority under  this  Act,  or  any  order  has  been
passed by a court or where any sum has  been  paid  or  collected  as  rural
employment cess, before the coming into force of the  West  Bengal  Taxation
Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989, in respect of any  period  prior  to  the
coming into force of the said Act, assessment  or  fresh  assessment  shall,
notwithstanding such order on appeal, revision or review,  or  the  pendency
of such appeal or application for revision or review, or  any  order  passed
by a court, be made in accordance with the provisions  of  this  Act  within
four years from the date of coming into force of the said Act.
            (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any  default
by an owner of a tea estate to make payment of the rural employment cess  or
to apply  for  registration  or  to  file  return  in  accordance  with  the
provisions of this Act after the  coming  into  force  of  the  West  Bengal
Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 in respect of  any  period  prior
to the coming into force of the said  Act  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  a
contravention of such provisions if such owner makes payment of  such  rural
employment cess within one month or files return within six months,  as  the
case may be, from the date of coming into force of the said Act.
(4)   The amount of the rural employment cess payable by any owner of a  tea
estate under sub-section (2A) of section 4 of this Act  in  respect  of  any
period prior to the coming into force  of  the  West  Bengal  Taxation  Laws
(Second Amendment) Act, 1989, shall, notwithstanding anything  contained  in
this Act, be reduced by such amount of  rural  employment  cess  payable  in
respect of such tea estate on such quantity of  green  tea  leaves  produced
therein during the said period as may be equivalent to the quantity  of  any
tea despatched for which such owner has purported to have enjoyed  or  would
have enjoyed exemption from payment of  the  rural  employment  cess  during
such period, and it is hereby declared that for determining  the  amount  of
the rural employment cess to be reduced, each  kilogram  of  tea  despatched
during such period shall be equivalent to  four  and  a  half  kilograms  of
green tea leaves produced in such tea estate."

"78C. "Validation and exemption. (1) Where any sum  has  been  paid  by,  or
collected from, any owner of a tea estate during the  period  commencing  on
the 14th day of April, 1984 and ending on the day immediately preceding  the
date of  coming  into  force  of  the  West  Bengal  Taxation  Laws  (Second
Amendment) Act, 1989 as education cess in respect of  any  period  prior  to
the coming into force of the said Act, such portion of the said sum  as  may
become payable in accordance with the  provisions  of  this  Act  after  the
coming into force of the said Act shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  validly
levied, paid or collected under this Act, and  where  after  assessment  any
portion of such sum is found to have  been  levied,  paid  or  collected  in
excess of the amount payable as education cess for the said period shall  be
refunded to such owner in accordance with the provisions  of  this  Act  and
the rules made thereunder.
(2)   Where any assessment is purported to have been made, or any  order  is
purported to have  been  passed  on  appeal,  revision  or  review,  by  any
authority, or any appeal or application for  revision  or  review  has  been
made before such authority under this Act, or any order has been  passed  by
a court, or where any sum has been paid  or  collected  as  education  cess,
before the coming into force  of  the  West  Bengal  Taxation  Laws  (Second
Amendment) Act, 1989, in respect of any period  prior  to  the  coming  into
force  of  the   said   Act,   assessment   or   fresh   assessment   shall,
notwithstanding such order on appeal, revision or review or the pendency  of
such appeal or application for revision or review or  any  order  passed  by
any court, be made in accordance with the  provisions  of  this  Act  within
four years from the date of coming into force of the said Act.
(3)   Notwithstanding anything contained in this  Act,  any  default  by  an
owner of a tea estate to make payment of the education cess or to apply  for
registration or to file return in accordance with  the  provisions  of  this
Act after the coming into force of the West  Bengal  Taxation  Laws  (Second
Amendment) Act, 1989 in respect of any  period  prior  to  the  coming  into
force of the said Act shall not be deemed to  be  a  contravention  of  such
provisions if such owner makes payment of such education cess  within  three
months or applies for registration within one month or files  return  within
six months, as the case may be, from the date of coming into  force  of  the
said Act.
(4)   The amount of the education cess payable by any owner of a tea  estate
under sub-section (2A) of Section 78 of this Act in respect  of  any  period
prior to the coming into force of the  West  Bengal  Taxation  Laws  (Second
Amendment) Act, 1989, shall notwithstanding anything contained in this  Act,
be reduced by such amount of education cess payable in respect of  such  tea
estate on such quantity of green tea  leaves  produced  therein  during  the
said period as may be equivalent to the quantity of any tea  despatched  for
which such owner has  purported  to  have  enjoyed  or  would  have  enjoyed
exemption from payment of the education cess during such period, and  it  is
hereby declared that for determining the amount of the education cess to  be
reduced, each kilogram  of  tea  despatched  during  such  period  shall  be
equivalent to four and a half kilograms of  green  tea  leaves  produced  in
such tea estate.
       (5)    The  provisions   of   this   section   shall   have   effect,
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order  of  any  court,  tribunal  or
other authority to the contrary."

            It is clear from a reading of Section 4B and 78C that where  any
sum is paid by or collected from an owner of a tea estate  during  a  period
commencing from 01.04.1981 or 14.04.1984, as the case  may  be,  up  to  the
date of the Amendment Act as rural employment cess  or  as  education  cess,
such portion of the said sum as may become payable under the  provisions  of
the Amendment Act shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree  or  order  of
any court, be deemed to have been validly levied, paid  or  collected  under
the Amendment Act.

            In our view,  the  purport  of  these  two  sections  is  clear.
Whatever may have been the subject matter of Buxa Dooars Tea Company  Ltd.'s
case, that is the subject matter of the  two  Acts  as  originally  enacted,
will now, notwithstanding the interim order or the final  judgment  in  Buxa
Dooars Tea Company Ltd.'s case, be  deemed  to  have  been  validly  levied,
collected and paid as rural employment cess and  education  cess  under  the
Amendment Act.

            This being the case, it is clear that  Section  4B  and  Section
78C have changed the basis of the law as it existed  when  Buxa  Dooars  Tea
Company Ltd.'s case  was  decided  and  consequentially,  the  judgment  and
interim order passed in Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd.'s case  will  cease  to
have any effect.  Also, what would  have  been  payable  under  the  Act  as
unamended, is now payable only under the 1989 Amendment Act which  has  come
into force with retrospective effect.

            Mr. C. U. Singh, however, referred us to 'Madan Mohan Pathak  v.
Union of India and others' [1978 (3) SCR 334] and in particular  to  Justice
P. N. Bhagwati's judgment thereof, in which it  has  been  decided  by  this
Court that a Legislative Act cannot directly undo a writ  of  mandamus  that
is granted by an order of a superior court.  We are of the view  that  Madan
Mohan Pathak's case would not apply to the facts in  the  present  case  for
the simple reason that what has been undone by Section 4B  and  Section  78C
is not a mandamus issued by a superior court.  What is undone  is  the  very
basis  of  the  judgment  in  Buxa  Dooars  Tea  Company  Ltd.'s   case   by
retrospectively changing the levy of rural  employment  cess  and  education
cess. It must be understood that rural employment cess  and  education  cess
continue to be the same cess whether before  or  after  the  Amendment  Act.
What has been changed is the basis for the said  levy  so  as  to  undo  the
defects that  were  found  in  the  Buxa  Dooars  Tea  Company  Ltd.'s  case
judgment.  It is obvious that when the basis  of  Buxa  Dooars  Tea  Company
Ltd.'s case has gone, on a retrospective amendment of these  two  acts,  the
interim order and the judgment and order in Buxa Dooars Tea  Company  Ltd.'s
case can no longer survive.  For this reason, we are of the  view  that  the
impugned judgment needs to be  set  aside  on  this  score.        In  fact,
Madan Mohan Pathak has been explained in Indian Aluminium Company  v.  State
of Kerala, [(1996) 7 SCC 637] as follows:

"49. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India [(1978) 2 SCC  50  :  1978  SCC
(L&S) 103] , on the basis of a settlement, bonus became payable  by  LIC  to
its Class III and Class IV employees. In a  writ,  a  Single  Judge  of  the
Calcutta High Court issued mandamus directing payment of bonus  as  provided
in the settlement.  During  the  pendency  of  letters  patent  appeal,  LIC
(Modification of Settlements) Act, 1976 was enacted  denying  bonus  payable
to the employees. The appeal was withdrawn. The validity  of  1976  Act  was
challenged in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.  A  Bench  of
seven Judges had held that Parliament was not aware of the  mandamus  issued
by the court and it was declared that the 1976 Act  was  void  and  writ  of
mandamus was issued to obey the mandamus by implementing  or  enforcing  the
provisions of that Act and  directed  payment  of  bonus  in  terms  of  the
settlement. It was pointed out that there was no reference to  the  judgment
of the High Court in the Statement of  Objects  and  Reasons,  nor  any  non
obstante clause referring to the judgment of the Court was made  in  Section
3 of the Act. Attention of Parliament was not drawn to the  mandamus  issued
by the High Court. When the mandamus issued by the High Court became  final,
the 1976 Act was held invalid. Shri R.F. Nariman laid  special  emphasis  on
the observations of learned Chief Justice Beg who  in  a  separate  judgment
had pointed out that the basis of the mandamus issued  by  the  court  could
not be taken away by indirect fashion as observed at p. 743c to f. From  the
observations made by Bhagwati, J. per majority, it is clear that this  Court
did not intend to lay down  that  Parliament,  under  no  circumstance,  has
power to amend the law removing the vice pointed out by the court.  Equally,
the observation of Chief Justice Beg is to  be  understood  in  the  context
that as long as the effect of mandamus issued by the court  is  not  legally
and constitutionally made ineffective,  the  State  is  bound  to  obey  the
directions. Thus understood, it is unexceptionable. But  it  does  not  mean
that the learned Chief Justice intended to lay down the  law  that  mandamus
issued by court cannot at all be made ineffective by a  valid  law  made  by
the legislature, removing the defect pointed out by the court."

            This statement of law has been accepted in yet another  judgment
of this Court. (See:  State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil  Liberties,
Kerala State Unit & Ors., [(2009) 8 SCC 46 at paragraph 65].

            Bhagwati, J.'s judgment in Madan  Mohan  Pathak  also  makes  it
clear that Section 3 of the impugned Act in that case  sought  to  modify  a
settlement dated 24th January, 1974 arrived  at  between  the  LIC  and  its
employees. There was no reference to a Mandamus issued by the Calcutta  High
Court in the Statement of Objects and Reasons as a result of  which  Section
3 of the impugned Act did not contain a  non-obstante  clause  referring  to
any judgment of any court.  The right given  under  the  said  judgment  was
therefore not sought to  be  taken  away  by  the  impugned  Act.   Further,
inexplicably, the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the LIC was not pressed  as
otherwise Section 3 of the impugned Act would only have  to  be  applied  to
the facts in that case to upset the Single Judge judgment  that  had  issued
the Writ of Mandamus.  Bhagwati, J. also went on to state that the  judgment
given by the Calcutta  High  Court  was  not  a  mere  declaratory  judgment
holding an impost or tax to be invalid, so that  a  validation  statute  can
remove the defect pointed out  by  the  judgment  and  amend  the  law  with
retrospective effect to validate such impost  or  tax  -  See:  Madan  Mohan
Pathak v. Union of India, [(1978) 3 SCR 334 at 352 to 355].

            In the present case, the 1989 amendment Act expressly  seeks  to
remove the basis of Buxa dooars's judgment by retrospectively  changing  the
basis of the levy of the cesses mentioned above.  In the present case,  what
is done away with by the Amending Act of  1989  is  a  declaratory  judgment
holding the above cesses to be invalid.   On  all  these  grounds  also  the
judgment in Madan Mohan Pathak's case is distinguishable.

            However, insofar as interest is concerned, post Goodricke  Group
Ltd.'s case, we are of  the  view  that  Mr.  C.  U.  Singh  is  correct  in
supporting the impugned judgment.   Goodricke  Group  Ltd.'s  case  made  it
clear that the petitioners shall pay cesses  stayed  by  an  order  of  this
Court along with interest at 12 per cent per annum.  The expression  "cesses
stayed" has reference to  the  interim  order  dated  25.01.1990  which  had
stated that there would be no enforcement of demand under the Act  or  Rules
and in the meanwhile, assessment may be made.  We have  been  informed  that
assessments were made with effect from July, 1993 onwards and  consequential
demands have been  made  with  effect  from  1995  onwards.   It  is  clear,
therefore, that the impugned judgment is right in holding that  with  regard
to the payment of interest by the petitioner on the amount of  cess  payable
by virtue of the  Goodricke  Group  Ltd.'s  case,  interest  would  only  be
payable from the respective dates of assessment  for  the  various  relevant
periods till recovery.  On facts here, no  question  arises  as  to  whether
interest would become payable from the date of demand or from  the  date  of
the assessments  inasmuch  as  counsel  for  the  respondents  supports  the
impugned judgment on this score and is not aggrieved thereby.

            The respondents here have made payment of interest from time  to
time to the State.  These payments will be adjusted  against  any  sum  that
would become payable as a result of this judgment.

            The appeal is disposed of accordingly.


                                  ..........................., J.
                                  [ A.K. SIKRI ]


                                  ..........................., J.
                                  [ R. F. NARIMAN ]

New Delhi;
March 25, 2015.